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The main focus of this thesis focuses on deconstructing and analysing the evolution of 
the different aspects of Dimitrije Ljotić’s ideological formation to show its relationship 
to his ZBOR movement and its development until his death in 1945. Ljotić’s ideological 
development and expression would show a marked syncretic and contradictory nature. 
This contradiction and incoherence stymies any definitive classification and 
categorisation of his politics. This creates difficulties in attempting to place ZBOR as a 
specific mono-ideological movement. This problem of categorisation will be reinforced 
through identifying and deconstructing the ideology of Ljotić and his ZBOR movement. 
It also will look at pre-existing ideological discourses that contributed to Ljotić’s ideas, 
including those of a wider European context of existing anti-democratic, anti-modernist, 
monarchist, and nationalist currents. The ideological and intellectual course of Ljotić, 
personified through the existence of ZBOR will be discussed in order to analyse the 
evolution of his ideology, and to understand the different influences contributing to his 
ideology as a basis for evaluating ZBOR as a movement. This analysis raises a number of 
questions. What contextual trends, if any, does the man, his philosophy, and movement 
represent, and how did they impact political life in interwar Yugoslavia? Where was 
ZBOR in relation to similar radical right, and fascist movements throughout interwar 
Europe, and to what extent are they parallel with each other? What was the nature of 
ZBOR’s ideology and what were its major influences?  
A more thorough approach to answer these questions, and indeed to ZBOR, is needed 
(a) because the subject has not been particularly well-explored among historians 
(especially in English language historiography) and (b) because of the rise of nationalist 
ideology and rhetoric in post-socialist Serbia. Through this thesis, the gap in literature 
regarding the evolution of Ljotić’s ideology, in relation to both the non-fascist radical 
right and the various definitions of fascism will be explored. This will show that Ljotić’s 
ideological and intellectual base, while possessing similarities to fascism, also showed 
differences, allowing for greater ambiguity in interpretation, as evidenced through 
among others, the terminology of ‘generic fascism’, as defined by Roger Griffin and 
Stanley Payne. The main contribution of this study to literature is the detailed 
deconstruction and analysis of the evolution of Ljotić’s ideology and its relevance or 
relationship to his ZBOR movement. ZBOR will be shown as syncretic, incoherent, and at 
times contradictory. This thesis provides in-depth discussion of both the political 
development of Ljotić as a personality, and the development of ZBOR as a movement in 
relation to Ljotić’s ideology and European trends. Thus, providing an analysis on the 
ideology of Ljotić and ZBOR with the use of the elements of both political biography and 
intellectual historical analysis, as represented by Ljotić and ZBOR. The study will show 
that Ljotić’s ideologies and ZBOR are inevitably interrelated with each other, and linked 
with a wider pre-fascist ideological and intellectual current. While focusing on Ljotić 
and ZBOR, this thesis places him and his movement in the wider context of interwar 
Yugoslavia and interwar Europe with discussions of a wider context of relevant 
theories. In contrast to other studies that included ZBOR and/or Ljotić, this thesis is 
different in the sense that the ideological evolution of Ljotić is discussed and analysed, 
with a focus on the interwar life of ZBOR, rather than relying on ZBOR’s collaborationist 
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Dimitrije Ljotić has been labelled ‘fascist’ and ‘saviour’, ‘hero’ and ‘villain’. His 
uncompromising anti-communism, outspoken nationalism, and collaboration with the Nazis 
has earned him, according to a large portion of Yugoslav historiography and contemporary 
Serbian historiography, a place in the ‘fascist’ camp.1 Amongst contemporaries in interwar 
Yugoslavia he was, as will be shown, decried as a fascist from opponents on both the left and 
the right. However, some of those who held the opinion of Ljotić as a fascist also admired 
what they perceived to be his honesty and patriotism.2 The legal codification of Ljotić as a 
fascist and collaborator according to the decrees of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia’s 5th 
Party Congress in early 1948, defined collaboration as any help rendered to the occupier. This 
definition was based on the newly constituted Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s 
official Marxist interpretation of history, and condemned Ljotić as a traitor.3 This view on 
treason and collaboration was countered in France, where a dichotomy arose between a 
collaborateur (collaborator), and collaborationniste (collaborationist), voluntary, ideological, 
and involuntary. A collaborator was one who, whether out of necessity, opportunity, or force, 
accommodated the Germans. A collaborationist was one who wholeheartedly believed in a 
Nazi victory, and worked towards that end.4 Based on the evaluation of his life and the 
evolution of his ideologies, there are some things certain about Ljotić: He was highly 
nationalistic and devotedly religious. 
 
Ljotić was seen as a fervent anti-Semite. He can be said to have promoted the removal of 
Jewish ‘influence’ from public and social life even before the outbreak of the Second World 
War. In his speeches, he mentioned that there was a ‘Great Director’ who was behind all the 
                                                        
1 With the exception of Mladen Stefanović’s Zbor Dimitrija Ljotića 1934-1945, published in 1984, which 
presupposes ZBOR’s National Socialist character by its anti-communism and supposed adherence to capitalism, 
neither Ljotić nor ZBOR have been the subject of a thorough monograph or study. Dragan Subotić’s Zatomljena 
misao. O političkim idejama Dimitrija Ljotića, published in 1994, attempts to place Ljotić’s thought in the 
context of 19th century conservative and nationalist thought, yet offers no analysis or source criticism. 
2 See especially the opinions of Anton Korošec, Dragoljub Jovanović, and Milan Jovanović-Stoimirović (also 
written as Stojimirović), in Milan Jovanović Stoimirović, Dnevnik 1936-1941 (Matica Srpska, 2000). 
3 See ‘V Kongres KPJ’, Branko Petranović and Momčilo Zečević, eds., Jugoslavija 1918-1988: tematska zbirka 
dokumenata, 2. izm. i dop. izd, Biblioteka Svedočanstva (Belgrade: Izdavačka radna organizacija “Rad,” 1988), 
936–945. The ‘collaborators’ were those who helped the ‘capitalists’ in their war of enslavement of Yugoslavia. 
According to Petranović and Zečević, the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia is notable for it 
was the first since the end of the Second World War, and sought the ‘construction of Socialism’, using the party 
as the mechanism of change and construction toward a new Yugoslavia.  
4 Jean-Pierre Azéma, Olivier Wievorka, Vichy 1940-1944 (Tempus Perrin, 2004), 84-86. 
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world’s problems.5 In public, he was very vocal about his hatred of Jews and the ideologies 
that supposedly originated from Jewish teachings, such as Freemasonry and Communism. In 
his writings, Ljotić would portray the Jews as being responsible for the advent of liberal 
democracy, Freemasonry, and Communism. He further stated his belief in a Jewish 
conspiracy, directed against Christians in Europe because of the Jewish betrayal of God’s 
will. According to Ljotić, this alleged Jewish conspiracy could be traced back to the French 
Revolution. From the French Revolution on, this conspiracy was involved in every significant 
historical event all over the world, with a focus the 1917 Russian Revolution. His virulent 
anti-Semitism has been, not surprisingly, a strong factor of correlation in linking Ljotić to the 
totalitarianism Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.  
 
Nevertheless, Ljotić’s anti-Semitism largely, at least up to 1941, was mostly devoid of a Nazi 
type racialist base, largely due to its incongruity with his sincere Christian belief. Most of 
Ljotić’s claims for his anti-Semitic beliefs, up to 1941, are based on more on religion than 
racial discrimination, which differentiates him from the Nazis.  Moreover, Ljotić would 
argue, even in 1940, against any physical measures against Jews, arguing only for action 
against the ‘work of the Jews’6. He would refer to the Jews as a collective personality, as a 
social group that had no land, and no language.7 Ljotić’s anti-Semitism, like much of the rest 
of his political ideals, will be shown to be contradictory, despite its virulence. Based on the 
later decisions and actions of Ljotić, it can be said that though he despised the Jews, he did 
not dehumanise them, thus, as will be shown with the example of the Jews in Smederevo in 
1941 under his direct purview, must be deserving of some extent of resources to sustain their 
existence, though not to the same extent as non-Jews. This may be seen as an illustration of 
how his anti-Semitic ways are more parallel to European right-wing anti-Semites and clerical 
anti-Semites rather than the traditions of the extreme racial Nazi anti-Semites.  
 
Ljotić also believed in divine intervention that had destined the Serbian people to play a 
significant role in the world: this was a prominent theme in his writings. Ljotić was a highly 
nationalistic (both Serb and Yugoslav, to be expanded on), and deeply religious man who 
dedicated himself to supporting and upholding the reigning Karadjordjević dynasty as a 
believer in monarchism, and authoritarianism, as the best protector of Yugoslavia’s integrity.  
                                                        
5 Dimitrije Ljotić, Drama Savremenog Čovečanstva (Belgrade: Makarija, 1940), 8-11. 
6 Ibid. 94 
7 Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: state-building and legitimation, 1918-2005 (Indiana University 
Press, 2006), 133. 
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Former followers however, praised Ljotić’s idiosyncratic, and contradictory characteristics. 
These followers were mostly writing from abroad, heralded Ljotić as a prophet and saviour. 
He was attributed with a willingness to sacrifice everything for the good of the nation.8 Not 
surprisingly given the polemics surrounding the man, and the ZBOR movement, the historical 
narrative in both former Yugoslav and contemporary Serbian historiography concerning 
ZBOR has afforded it a historical position of hindsight out of proportion to the influence 
Ljotić or ZBOR.  
 
This apparent paradox raises a number of issues. How important are Ljotić and ZBOR to the 
study and understanding of interwar Yugoslavia and to the study of the extreme right in 
interwar Europe? What contextual trends, if any, does the man, his philosophy, or movement 
represent, and how did they impact on political life in interwar Yugoslavia? Where was 
ZBOR in relation to similar so-called ‘fascist’, and actual fascist movements throughout 
interwar Europe, and to what extent are they parallel with each other? What was the nature of 
ZBOR’s ideology, and what were its major influences?  
 
Reviewing his life and political thought, Ljotić can be seen to have had a rigid and 
authoritarian worldview with strong traces of anti-Semitic, anti-democratic, and anti-
parliamentary beliefs. However, the main focus of this thesis is analysing the development of 
the different aspects of Ljotić’s political thought, to show his inclination toward a multi-
faceted and highly syncretistic ideology, with aspects of fascism, authoritarianism, and 
monarchism. Ljotić was not strictly speaking, categorically fascist, nor categorically an 
extreme monarchist, and extreme conservative nationalist. Because of the many facets in his 
ideologies, Ljotić seems to be self-contradicting and conflicted in his beliefs and ideas. In 
fact, as this thesis will argue, the pronounced contradictions, incoherencies, means that both 
man and movement defy strict categorisation, and ‘labelling’. In fact, they hinder any real 
attempt at fully deconstructing and analysing his ideology. He can be said to have been an 
ideological personification of a precursor to fascism, or perhaps a proto-fascist, but as will be 
shown, there were marked differences between core fascist ideals and his own, which would 
place him more in an amorphous ‘grey zone’, straddling fascism and an extreme, almost 
radical conservatism. Despite issues surrounding ideological categorisation, what will 
                                                        
8 On Ljotić’s supposed ‘selfless martyrdom’, see Boško Kostić, Za istoriju naših dana, (Lille, 1949); Hrvoje 
Magazinović, Kroz jedno mučno stoljeće, (Valjevo, 2009); Milutin Propadović, D.V. Ljotić i Komunistička 
Partija Jugoslavije 1935-1945. Prilozi na istinu o JNP ZBOR, (Iskra, 1990). 
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become clear are that Ljotić’s ideological extremes and rigidity would primarily be in 
reaction to world events, largely dictated by Nazi Germany, and the Second World War, 
which was then incorporated into Ljotić’s and ZBOR’s worldview. One, which would remain 
unchanging, and even more pronounced, even into the latter part of the war when it became 
clear that Germany could not prevail militarily. Moreover, His ideologically amorphous ‘grey 
zone’ is also reflected in ZBOR, especially in its early years. Because he was the founder and 
leading personality of ZBOR, during its existence, his personal beliefs have been 
unsurprisingly, influential in defining ZBOR. Hence, in a sense, Ljotić as an individual 
cannot be treated entirely different from ZBOR. This is despite the fact that there were 
inconsistencies, and contrasts, in ideas and beliefs between ZBOR leaders and its members.  
 
Exploring and analysing the evolution and bases of Ljotić’s ideology, the thesis will explore 
what distinctions are relevant or essential in exploring, and evaluating a movement such as 
ZBOR. Identifying the connection and distinction between Ljotić and the concepts of 
fascism, anti-democracy, and Christianity, will be helpful in deconstructing ZBOR as a 
movement based on its own unique purpose and identifying mark during its existence. 
Despite the prevalent historiographical trend in the Former Yugoslavia, and the slightly more 
contested opinion in contemporary Serbia, categorising Ljotić and ZBOR as fascist, 
establishing the limitations of a fascist/non-fascist dichotomy is relevant. It is relevant 
because it is an attempt to disassociate Ljotić’s thought from the narrow paradigm of fascism, 
while concurrently deconstructing and analysing his beliefs on their own merits. Through 
this, ZBOR may be seen as not just a mere by-product of fascism, but a movement in itself, 
with its own ideology and more importantly, its own worldview and end goal. 
 
Moreover, especially during the Nazi occupation of Yugoslavia from 1941-1944, Ljotić will 
be shown to be a representative of a highly idiosyncratic worldview that was to an extent a 
reinforcement of the thinking and motivations of the Serbian collaborationist administration. 
Therefore, exploring the life and the ideology of Ljotić can help gain a better comprehension 
of the motives and dilemmas that drove the collaborators. Third, a better understanding of 
ZBOR and Ljotić are necessary because of their position of adulation, legitimacy, and 
relevance among elements of the contemporary Serbian far right. 
 
Ljotić, like most ideologues, can be said to have developed his ideology from his experiences 
and relationships, generating emotional responses and opinions within him strong enough to 
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mould his character, beliefs, and behaviour. The exploration and analysis of Ljotić’s life can 
provide an understanding of his true rationale in establishing ZBOR, and what he hoped to 
achieve through it. Through a study of Ljotić’s life, it can be surmised that ZBOR can be seen 
not just as simply a fascistic movement or a movement that was formed from fascist 
intentions and ideas; the thesis will highlight the uniqueness of the movement and its founder 
in relation to the political life of interwar Yugoslavia and interwar Europe. Therefore this 
study will be as much a study of ideological, hence, intellectual history, as it is a political 
history of ZBOR, and political biography of Ljotić. To clarify, ‘ideology’, will be used as an 
encompassing word to describe those ideas held by individuals, or movements, whether 
rational or irrational, calling either for change, or for the maintenance of the status quo. As a 
result of this analysis, ZBOR and Ljotić may be seen in a different context from much of the 
existing historiography due to the amount of detail given into discussing the ideological and 
political trajectory of ZBOR. Through an exploration and analysis of differing historical sub-
strands and politics, this thesis will attempt to explain the existence of Ljotić and ZBOR in 
relation to their contemporaries and influences, and make justifications for the exploration of 
its evolution through its own several intertwining ‘strands’.   
 
Firstly, it will attempt to chronologically trace Ljotić’s life, the development of his thought, 
the ideology of ZBOR, and concurrently, of the distinct concept of Yugoslav nationalism as 
understood by Ljotić. It will also examine Yugoslav political life as represented and 
perceived by him from the interwar period until the end of the Second World War. This gives 
rise to questions of whether ZBOR was solely the ideological domain of Ljotić, and if a study 
of ZBOR is inevitably a political biography of Dimitrije Ljotić. While heavily indebted to 
Ljotić’s ideological evolution and its application, ZBOR would also show a marked degree of 
heterogeneity in regard to its ideological formation and definition. 
 
This strand, which will be discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, will be buttressed by the use 
of, among others, Ljotić’s publications, notably his Sabrana dela9 (Collected Works), his 
autobiography Iz moga života 10  (From my life), Dimitrije Ljotić u revoluciju i ratu 11 
                                                        
9 Dimitrije Ljotić, Sabrana dela (Belgrade: Nova Iskra, 2003); Dimitrije Ljotić, Sabrana dela (Belgrade: Nova 
Iskra, 2003). The 2003 version of Ljotić’s collected works published by Nova Iskra is more detailed, especially 
as it relates to the latter stages of the Second World War.  
10 Dimitrije Ljotić, Iz moga života (Munich: Logos, 1952). 
11 Dimitrije Ljotić, Dimitrije Ljotić u revoluciju i ratu (Munich: Iskra, 1961). 
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(Dimitrije Ljotić in Revolution and War), and various archival sources.12 Ljotić also wrote 
extensively in numerous ZBOR publications such as Bilten (Bulletin), Naša borba (Our 
Struggle), and Otadžbina (Fatherland), which provide excellent insight into his political 
evolution and thinking. Through a careful analysis of Ljotić’s life, his writings and the 
evolution of his ideological thought, with that of the ZBOR movement, this strand will show 
that Ljotić, during his youth and formative years, expressed an ideology likened to a pan-
Slavic conservative, monarchic, and anti-democratic political discourse, though later 
influenced by fascism, especially after the outbreak of the Second World War. On a wider, 
macro level, the focus of chapter 2, this discourse shares broad similarities with the discourse 
of ‘counter-enlightenment’, and ‘counter-revolution’, that has been identified with the Action 
Française (hereafter also referred to as the AF).13 This ‘proto--fascist’14 period of ZBOR will 
not be considered as strictly fascist or National Socialist, but rather will seek to place 
ZBOR’s genesis in a European context of pre-existing anti-democratic, monarchist, and 
nationalist currents, elements of which Fascism and National Socialism would later draw 
inspiration from.    
 
The second strand, comprising chapters 3 and 4 of this paper, will demonstrate the ‘proto-
fascist ideology of ZBOR, its actions, and political manifestation, during the interwar era. 
ZBOR’s ideological and political life within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia from 1935 to 1940 
has not been properly examined. This strand will analyse ZBOR’s politics within the context 
of Yugoslav political life, and which would climax with its actions during the Second World 
War. By rejecting the assumption of ZBOR as merely a poor imitator of the German National 
Socialist Party, the thesis therefore will fill a historical gap, which entails a detailed analysis 
and deconstruction of Ljotić’s interwar ideology and his political life, in relation to ZBOR. In 
this part, the thesis differs from the existing historiography in it explores and gives high 
                                                        
12 Archival sources from Arhiv Jugoslavije, specifically Fond 37 Milan Stojadinović, Fond 38 Central Press 
Bureau of the Presidency of the Ministerial Council of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Fond 102 Stanislav Krakov, 
and Fond 115 Dimitrije Ljotić; the Digitalna Narodna Biblioteka Srbije; Arhiv Srbije; see gradja Bezbednosno-
Informativne agencija; Istorijski Arhiv Smederevo; see Fond Izvanredni komesarijat za obnovu Smedereva; 
Istorijski Arhiv u Čačku; see Fond Kraljevska banska uprava Drinske Banovine, Arhivalije JNP ZBOR. 
13 Counter-revolutionary thought will be taken to mean an ideological and philosophical thought pattern that 
disagrees with and negates the achievements of the legacy of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. 
Principles of equality, rule of democracy, and human rights are therefore seen as ‘modern’, as opposed to 
‘traditional’, hierarchy, and social order. 
14 Though the author of this work contends that ZBOR occupied a grey zone between fascism and the radical 
non-fascist right, during the Second World War the movement would show a marked trend amongst its younger 
members and youth group the White Eagles, to permutate into a more clearly delineated National Socialist type 
organisation, which emphasised mass organisation, and a closer identification with Nazi goals. This will be the 
focus of Chapter 5. 
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priority to ZBOR’s interwar Yugoslav political life, both chronological and analytical. It will 
show that Ljotić and ZBOR had a distinct worldview, one based on the notion of a 
conservative and traditionalist agrarian Pan-Slavic utopia. While ZBOR would incorporate 
the rhetoric of spiritual and national renewal, it would however differ significantly from the 
more fascist like ‘palingenetic’ call for renewal. 15  Yet the movement would glorify the 
Nazi’s, and take great interest in and inspiration from its anti-communism and anti-Semitism. 
Ljotić’s influence was decisive in defining ZBOR in ideological matters, but his lack of 
interest, and indeed of capability, in organisational and administrative matters would further 
hamper ZBOR’s organisational development. He would revel in theory and ideas, yet as a 
leader, he would prove to be a poor tactician, unable of transmitting his thought, as opposed 
to his more clearly defined end goal. His was an idea of ends, without realising the means. He 
would be content to work within and under the personal dictatorship of the ruling 
Karadjordjević dynasty16. Wishing to re-mould the dictatorship from within, rather than lead 
a dynamic movement calling for a total national socio-economic and political reconstruction 
based on totalitarian models.  
 
The third strand, evident in chapter 5, consists of a micro and macro study of ZBOR under 
German occupation from 1941-1944, and analysis of the phenomenon of collaboration. This 
will show that ZBOR’s collaboration was not a case of simple identification with Fascist and 
National Socialist ideas, but rather with specific, if not nuanced non-fascist features of 
ZBOR’s pre-war ideology combined with opportunism and a mixture of fear and respect for 
German military might. ZBOR’s apocalyptic interpretation of Christianity, and rabid anti-
communism typified these features. This apocalyptic Christianity and extreme anti-
communism would act as a base and ‘legitimiser’ for ZBOR’s collaboration. As Yugoslavia 
was dismantled, ZBOR’s rationale changed from a Yugoslav context of national unity to that 
of protecting the Serbian people and what it saw as Serbian traditions from anarchy and 
                                                        
15 ‘Palingenetic’ emphasises the rebirth of the national spirit, culture, and society. Associated mostly with 
Fascism and National Socialism, it nevertheless spanned the entire political spectrum and was fundamental to 
many different forms of nationalism. In ZBOR’s case, while evident, it was alluded to more metaphorically, and 
in reference to allegory. For more see Stanley G. Payne, A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 5. 
16 The personal rule of King Alexander, proclaimed on 6 January, 1929, has also been referred to in Serbian and 
Croatian as the Šestojanuarska diktatura (6th of January Dictatorship). It was hoped that by taking direct control 
over Yugoslav political life, the monarchy would be able to end corruption, and political impasse, primarily 
between those who saw Yugoslavia as a centralised and unitary state, and those, (though not only, Croats) who 
wanted Yugoslavia as a federalised constitutional monarchy. For more see Dejan Djokić, Elusive Compromise: 
A History of Interwar Yugoslavia (London: Hurst & Company, 2007), 67-72; Branko Petranović, Istorija 
Jugoslavije, knjiga I Kraljevina Jugoslavija (Belgrade: Nolit, 1988), 190. 
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communism. Incidentally, Ljotić would not feel the need to ‘save’ the Serbs from Fascism 
and National Socialism. While accepting the new territorial delineations, ZBOR’s pre-war 
Pan Slavic worldview did not totally accommodate itself to the Nazi ‘New Order’,17 until the 
January 1943 German defeat at Stalingrad, and the subsequent Soviet advance into central 
and south eastern Europe, which would see Ljotić’s tone harden as the Axis began to be 
forced on the defensive. 
 
Furthermore, through a careful re-analysis of ZBOR’s actions and evolution under the Nazi 
occupation, ZBOR, as an organisation was in effect, consumed by the German occupation 
and Serbian collaborationist apparatus, even though it was legalised during this period. 
ZBOR, at Ljotić’s behest, would enter into collaboration with Germany, with an inflated 
belief in its own importance and bargaining position. This also, however, opened a fissure 
within ZBOR. Younger members, most notably from ZBOR’s youth wing the White Eagles 
(Beli Orlovi) more influenced and radicalised by National Socialism, and the instability, 
brutality, and violence of resistance and collaboration, would agitate for ZBOR to follow a 
more clearly defined National Socialist model. This model would also by typified by ZBOR’s 
general secretary from 1937-1941, and during the Second World War, Milorad Mojić. This 
would then result in a temporary soft break between Ljotić and younger ZBOR members, 
exacerbated by the September 1941 creation of the collaborationist Serbian Volunteer Corps, 
but more evident by 1945.18 In the final part of the thesis, there is analysis of ZBOR outside 
of Ljotić’s direct rule, in the case of the Čačak, where local members were primarily 
concerned with their local agenda and survival. A lack of organisational structure, 
membership, resistance, and centralisation of the ZBOR movement in Occupied Serbia 
proved to be a challenge that may have been detrimental to ZBOR as a unified and 
sustainable movement. 
 
                                                        
17 The Neuordnung Europas (New Order) was a theoretical Nazi political order and conception to be 
implemented in occupied Europe. While conceived as an integrated economic community, in essence it 
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Based on the combination of these strands, the author will illustrate how Ljotić, as well as 
ZBOR, are interconnected and combined into a historical context, especially within the socio-
economic and political life of interwar Yugoslav, that shows both as important examples of 
the wide and syncretic variety of anti-democratic and anti-modern currents active within 
interwar Europe and during the Second World War. It was incidentally, the Second World 
War, and the nature of Serbian collaboration allowed in the context of German occupation 
that would destroy the last vestiges of ZBOR, rather than the Partisans or the Soviet advance. 
ZBOR’s activity and energy would be largely reduced to the actions of the Serbian Volunteer 
Corps, who under German command were Nazi auxiliaries whose core ZBOR support could 
not sustain the causalities taken and reinforcements needed. On another level, this will show 
that during the Second World War, ZBOR was sustained primarily by its radicalised youth.  
 
ZBOR is historically relevant, as a product of the myriad of wider pan-European ideas, 
among them anti-democracy and anti-Semitism, applied in a local context. Regardless of its 
small size and mass unpopularity during its existence, ZBOR needs to be considered on its 
own terms. Though having displayed a marked degree of heterogeneity Ljotić and ZBOR 
were largely dismissed as a manifestation of a variance of fascism. Moreover, through this 
thesis, Ljotić’s political thought, and its relation to fascism will be explored further to show 
his ideological underpinnings which, though similar to fascism, also differed in respect to 
core fascist ideals, as will be shown through the literature review. Moreover, the gap in 
literature regarding Ljotić’s political thought, and its relation to fascism will be explored 
further to illustrate to readers that he had his own ideology, whose core ideas predated and 
differed in certain respects from fascism, making any real classification of categorisation 




ZBOR’s categorisation and classification as fascist has been at the forefront of any attempt to 
interpret and analyse its ideology, and place it in historical context. That said, with the 
exception of Mladen Stefanović’s work,19 ZBOR has not been subject of any monograph and 
critical analysis (e.g., analysis of its totality). This, however, has not precluded the debate 
surrounding ZBOR’s fascist characteristics or lack thereof. Unsurprisingly, ZBOR’s 
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presumed and presupposed fascist characteristics are used as buttresses to existing arguments 
regarding the myriad definitions of fascism. These distinctions are provided in an attempt to 
show how ZBOR is not simply an expression of Ljotić’s personal ideology. Moreover, any 
classification of ZBOR as a fascist movement has, to some extent, implications pertaining to 
the understanding of fascism. Additionally, the discussion of ZBOR in relation to a 
prominent social and political label, such as fascism, shows the role and perception of the 
movement in society during its existence. This then provides a clearer picture of how ZBOR 
may have had affected politics, however minimal, during the interwar period. Therefore, 
discussing ZBOR and fascism adds to the main focus of the study, which is to explore and 
analyse the evolution of ZBOR as a movement. A movement that Ljotić founded, but that 
wasn’t initially a direct extension of his ideology. 
 
Stefanović presupposes ZBOR’s fascism as a movement that ‘used fascist methods’, and 
accuses it of ‘imitating the Nazis’.20 Writing in 1984, in the former Socialist Yugoslavia, 
Stefanović’s argument would have been influenced by official ideological considerations that 
clearly defined fascism. What becomes clear is that any discussion or analysis surrounding 
ZBOR and other similarly deemed fascist, pro-fascist, or proto-fascist groups cannot take 
place outside an attempt at defining fascism. This then begs the question as the exact nature 
of fascism, and how it has been theorised and explained? And more importantly, does, a 
study of ZBOR inherently imply, or is helped by a discussion on fascism? 
 
Any real consensus on fascism therefore has been ‘limited’ in both scope and nature. This 
can, and indeed has, lead to causal questions and assumptions of fascism. Is fascism a social 
system? Or is it a distinctive political and social movement? What methods then, can be 
utilised to form a hypothetical categorisation and classification? Furthermore, when can 
supposedly fascist ideas be said to have originated and what were fascists preoccupied with? 
Using a reductionist argument can fascism be simply watered down to a single so-called 
‘generic phenomenon? That would seem inaccurate with the development of Italian Fascism 
and German National Socialism. Roger Griffin is of the opinion that the application of 
fascism as a term outside of Italy is to change the term to a ‘generic’ status.21 Also, using a 
more nominalist approach that insists solely on the distinctiveness and uniqueness of 
nationalist and fascist movements negates similarities that these movements shared. The 
                                                        
20 Ibid, 22, 27. 
21 Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (London; New York: Routledge, 1993), 1. 
 19 
problem is further compounded by Stanley Payne’s statement that fascism is vague because it 
‘carries no explicit political reference’.22 Ideological considerations surrounding variations of 
fascism’s interpretation may no longer be a relevant factor on a national level, but in the case 
of the Marxist approach to fascism, still holds currency within certain sectors. 
 
In terms of how ZBOR has been classified by the myriad of definitions surrounding fascism, 
it is perhaps beneficial to outline the genesis of such definitions chronologically, as well as 
thematically, to emphasise the evolution of ‘fascist studies’. 
 
Marxist ideology and fascism 
 
The Marxist definition of fascism was among the first, contemporary attempts to explain the 
rise of Fascism in Italy and to dissect its popularity. The Soviet Union, as the carrier of 
Marxist ideology, was created on 29 December, 1922 coming into existence in the aftermath 
of the 1917 Russian Revolution and subsequent Russian Civil War, which lasted until 1921. 
This coincided with the Fascist March on Rome from 22 to 29 October, 1922, which saw the 
rise of Benito Mussolini. That the Black-shirted paramilitary formations of the Fascist Party 
were initially formed in August 1920 with the explicit aim to break the 1920 general strike, 
while soon being turned into a tool of repression against anarcho-syndicalism and socialist 
movements, was not lost on the Soviets. 23  It was within this context, of both the 
establishment of the Fascist and Soviet regimes that the first Marxist interpretation of fascism 
originated. The Comintern (abbreviated form of Communist International) response 
emphasised that Fascism was ‘a weapon in the hands of the large landowners’. However, the 
Comintern seemed confident in Fascism’s inevitable demise stating that ‘Fascism, which has 
no programme and no ideas, no firm and uniform class basis, will very soon create a 
movement of public indignation against itself’.24 Even before this official response from the 
Comintern, in its self-appointed role as the harbinger of a global socialist revolution, Italian 
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Marxists, most notably Antonio Gramsci,25 grappled with defining Fascism and its inexorable 
rise.  
 
For Gramsci, writing in 1921, the rise of Fascism was a corollary and symptom of ‘the 
decomposition of Italian society’.26 Gramsci’s prescient and insightful analysis would show 
both an evolution of, and deviation from official Comintern decrees. According to Gramsci, 
Fascism could not be understood simply in class terms, for it was tied with the disintegration 
of Italian civil and political unity in Italy. Furthermore, as Gramsci stresses, ‘Fascism is a 
form of ‘international reaction’, and both a ‘criminal conspiracy’, as well as a ‘broad social 
movement’. It is, continues Gramsci, ‘essentially an urban phenomenon’, yet one that seeks 
contradictorily to ‘subordinate the towns to the countryside’.27 Gramsci’s approach is also 
indicative of the aforementioned terms pertaining to the ‘vulgar’, and ‘sophisticated’ Marxist 
approaches to interpreting fascism. According to Griffin, the ‘vulgar’ approach dictates that 
fascism was directly spawned by capitalism and is directly identified with the interests of 
capital. The ‘sophisticated’ variant, initially exemplified by Gramsci, sees fascism as an 
‘autonomous dynamic’, but one that has been ‘hijacked by capitalists’ for their own ends.28 
 
The evolution of the Marxist approach’s theoretical maturity has naturally allowed for a 
degree of evolution and sophistication, especially post-1945 with the realisation, horrors, and 
consequences of Nazism and Fascism. This is the view taken by Geoff Eley, a historian of 
modern Germany. Fascism, according to Eley, followed four salient features. The first was 
the immediate conjecture of violence, empire, and revolution in the immediate aftermath of 
the First World War. Secondly, fascism required a severe crisis of the state, in that it 
prospered when the state’s capacity was impaired. Eley cites the example of Germany circa 
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1930-1933, when political paralysis encompassed the ‘entire institutional machinery of 
politics’.29 Thirdly, Eley notes, it was vital to ‘reinstate the importance of fascist ideology’.30 
Eley sees the political left in Germany as being unable to counter the populist appeal of the 
right. The final element, he concludes, was the recourse to violence that fascists willingly 
adopt. Eley’s ‘salient features’ seem more contextual, than as a more thoroughly orthodox 
Marxist reductionist argument of a capitalistic state crisis, showing an evolution from 
Gramsci’s thought. This elucidates a symbiosis that could conceivably exist within a Marxist 
debate on fascism.  
 
Non-Marxist Approaches to Fascism and a ‘limited consensus’ 
 
The Marxist approach to fascism held sway throughout much of Yugoslav historiography, 
until largely discredited globally with the collapse of the Soviet system. This does not 
however, mean that there were no post-war attempts outside of Marxist ideological prisms to 
explain fascism. By the beginning of the Second World War, there was already a trend, 
outside of Marxist thought, to interpret the two regime types of Fascism and National 
Socialism as ‘Nazi-fascism’, implying a singular unity. 31  By the 1960s, a new wave of 
interest in the study of fascism developed with the publishing of German historian Ernst 
Nolte’s Der Faschismus in seiner Epoche (Fascism in its Epoch) in 1963.32 For Griffin, 
Nolte’s work was a breakthrough in that he began with the assumption that fascism was a 
‘generic concept’.33 Nolte did this through what he called the ‘phenomenological method’.34 
The phenomenological method was, according to Nolte, a method by which select 
movements were allowed to ‘speak for themselves’. What it did offer, however, was a real 
interpretative attempt at defining fascism beyond Marxism. Nolte did see certain limitations 
of his method though. Placing Fascism and National Socialism on equal footing and as 
comparative bases, Nolte states, does not deny importance to any other fascism, but allows 
for further understanding.35 This, however, can be interpreted, as Ian Kershaw does, as little 
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more than the regurgitation of fascist writings throughout Europe with no interpretation.36 
Nolte did not deny the ubiquity of fascism, stating that even to Mussolini, ‘fascism was a 
neologism’.37 Despite the bluntness of Mussolini’s definition, fascism remains disturbingly 
perplexing. Its central tenets have yet to be disclosed or fully explored. The notion of 
typology itself, while implying a degree of congruence or agreement, does not go far enough 
in explaining fascism outside of what fascists have written. Nevertheless, the base of this 
comparison, based on a ‘minimum’, was anti-Marxism as a common denominator to fascist 
movements. 
 
This minimum, a negative aspect of fascism, its negation of Marxism, formed the base of 
what has been called the ‘fascist minimum’. Nolte saw in Marxism a related ideology to 
fascism, and fascism’s attempt to destroy Marxism utilised nearly identical methods, though 
within a framework of ‘national assertion’.38 This signified in Nolte’s assertion that fascism 
was a ‘negative phenomenon’. This minimum is also part of Nolte’s typology, which he 
called taxonomy. Taxonomy consisted of four points of pre-fascism, early fascism, normal 
fascism, and radical fascism.39  
 
Nolte’s interpretation of fascism seems to rest on the assumption that fascism is 
‘metaphysical’, in that it is a ‘violent resistance to transcendence’. 40  Nolte saw this 
transcendence as both practical and theoretical, in that humanity was pressing forward with 
technological advances, acquiring powers previously attributed to the supernatural, as a form 
of the practical, combined with a theoretical ‘broadening of horizons’, the freedom from 
confines, allowing for a ‘full experience’. 41  In layman’s terms, Nolte evidently saw the 
world, especially Europe, as embracing new cultural modes that permeated society allowing 
for new avenues of thought and interpretation.  
 
 
Where Nolte’s study was also viewed as a breakthrough, though contested by Marxist 
scholars, was in fascism’s supposed historical origins. Nolte stressed that irrespective of 
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Hitler or Mussolini, fascism would have found political space in the aftermath of the First 
World War. It was the war itself, contends Nolte that would allow the political space for 
fascism to emerge.42 Nolte’s analysis and interpretation of fascism in the context of ideas 
rather than class opened a new course for research in fascist studies, that of ‘generic fascism’. 
Simultaneously, his neglect of, or rather negation, of the socio-economic factors affecting 
fascism’s development, and the motivations of individual fascists, should not be overlooked. 
His belief that such factors were inadequate negates an important political factor in post-First 
World War Europe. 
 
Generic Fascism and the beginnings of consensus of Fascism 
 
There are said to be four accepted marks or tenets of the Fascist spirit: nationalism and 
racism, a cult of violence and war, irrationalism, and revolutionary presumption. Although 
these marks or tenets are not exhaustive, according to George L. Mosse, they help us to 
understand the appeal of fascism during the first half of the twentieth century. Particularly 
where democratic institutions were weak, and resentment bred by the First World War 
festered.43 While Nolte’s interpretation of fascism as primarily metaphysical is largely based 
on historical reference, his reference to a ‘fascist minimum’ has formed a base for analysing 
‘generic fascism’. Fascism began from the 1960s to emerge gradually as coherent and 
distinct, rooted in wider intellectual currents of its historical context.44 Eley contends that by 
the 1960s, historians entered into fascist studies, in a field previously dominated by social 
scientists.45 However, he continues by stating that if ‘generic fascism’ can be theorised as 
comparative, a working definition from an ‘empirical study of classic European interwar 
movements’, needs to be found.46 ‘Generic fascism’ has also seen the rise of at least a limited 
consensus in the 1990s, in the belief that it is possible to identify a radical fascist ideology. 
This approach among others came to be typified by among others Roger Griffin and Stanley 
Payne. Even so, as Stanley Payne alludes to ‘generic fascism’ as never having ‘existed in 
pure empirical form’, but rather ‘serves as a conceptual device, clarifying analysis of 
individual political phenomena’.  
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This, Payne finds through a methodology of what he calls ‘descriptive typology’, which 
emphasises the similarity of fascist movements, as well as negations. Fascist similarities, or 
common goals, according to Payne include the creation of a new authoritarian and nationalist 
state, not based on existing traditional models and empire, and a positive reaction and 
interpretation of violence. Fascist negations according to Payne include anti-liberalism, anti-
conservatism, and anti-communism.47 
 
Payne’s descriptive typological model has been praised by, among others, Griffin. Griffin 
praises Payne’s typological definition as being an ‘ideal type’, a ‘deliberately schematised 
and simplified model, which identifies what fascisms have in common’, rather than 
highlighting their ‘complexity and uniqueness’.48 Griffin also states that to apply ‘fascism’ as 
a term denoting a phenomenon outside of Italy is to change its status to a generic one.49 
Payne’s ‘descriptive typology, however, was not an interpretation of fascism. It does though 
help to weed out the myriad of authoritarian radical right groups and movements proliferating 
throughout Europe, but which were not necessarily fascist. It is therefore an itemised list of 
characteristics identifying fascism. It is also a blueprint for what is called the ‘new 
consensus’. The ‘new consensus’, as a definitional core, adopts a less reductionist approach, 
accepting fascism as revolutionary in its own right, yet also adopts George L Mosse’s 
‘culturalist approach’, to form a consensus on fascism as a quest for national rejuvenation, 
would around a palingenetic myth.50 This definitional core of fascism, as Griffin argues, has 
led to a ‘new consensus’ within ‘Anglophonic fascist studies’, as a base for the expansion of 
‘comparative fascist studies’.51 The ‘new consensus’, postulates that fascism as a worldwide 
phenomenon originating in nineteenth century Europe. Its three core elements, according to 
Griffin are ultra-nationalism, revolution, and rebirth.52 
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The ‘new consensus’ definition of fascism shares obvious similarities with Griffin’s, one that 
Payne seems to be in broad agreement with. Griffin, interpreting fascism through the 
paradigm of ‘generic fascism’, defines fascism as a ‘genus of political ideology whose mythic 
core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism’.53 Griffin 
surmised therefore that fascism is a utopian ideology, at whose heart is a ‘political 
revolution’, though one that is prolific in the ‘sheer number of manifestations it can 
assume’.54 Payne interprets Griffin’s definition as ‘epochal’, and not subject to a particular 
social class, but produced by specific ‘historical, political, social, and cultural conditions’, 
which arose from the crisis of the fin de siècle.55  
 
Both ‘generic fascism’ and the ‘new consensus’ however, face empirical criticism. These 
criticisms and disagreements have focused on how far the concept could be applied, and what 
inevitably would have to be discarded. Aristotle Kallis contends that only Fascist Italy and 
Nazi Germany were able to emancipate themselves institutionally from their initial political 
sponsors, and exercise power autonomously, consolidating their power virtually unopposed 
by ‘other domestic actors’.56 If Kallis’ criteria are to be applied, then logically, only Nazi 
Germany and Fascist Italy could therefore conceivably be considered as examples of ‘generic 
fascism’, thus negating other mimetic fascist movements and regimes throughout Europe. 
Also, how similarly ‘fascistic’ were the Italian Fascist Regime and National Socialist 
Germany? Kershaw’s objections to ‘generic fascism’ starts from what he views as its 
‘extended inflationary fashion’, inclusive of movements of ‘wholly disparate character and 
significance’.57 Renzo De Felice, writing that Italian Fascism and German National Socialism 
are ‘two different worlds’, echoes this view.58 De Felice continues by stating that the ‘fascist 
negatives’, of anti-liberalism, and anti-communism, are similar to German National 
Socialism, but that ‘fascist positives’ show marked differences.59 Griffin disagrees with De 
Felice, stating that Nazism was indeed a form of ‘generic fascism’, but indeed its most 
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important representative because of the ‘horrifying extent’ to which its revolutionary goals 
were pursued.60  
 
George L. Mosse, while not denying or ‘negating the possibility of a general theory of 
fascism’, states that ‘every country developed a fascism appropriate to its nationalism’, saw 
fascism as an ‘attempt to capture and direct bourgeois dissatisfaction with existing industrial 
and political reality’.61 He continues by stating that Nazism was anti-modernist in the sense 
that it repudiated ‘Germany’s European heritage’ of the Enlightenment and the French 
Revolution.62 What separated the ‘German revolution’ in Mosse’s words, was that it was too 
‘restricted’ and narrow in its mystical Germanic ideology based on an ‘anti-Jewish 
revolution’.63 This obsession, along with the subordination of the ideal of fascist revolution to 
racial mysticism, differentiated German National Socialisms from all other fascisms. Mosse 
looked more to Nazism in particular as being part of German intellectual tradition, 
disseminated through Völkisch ideology.64 He also did not view National Socialism as a 
break with the German past, or as a unique response to defeat in the First World War, or the 
Great Depression. What Mosse emphasised, outside of ‘generic fascism’, was fascism as a 
new form of Cultural Revolution. In this sense, National Socialism was a crystallisation of a 
specificity of German tradition. 
 
The concept of ‘immunity thesis’ refers to the impossibility of misidentification when self-
ascribing attributes and thoughts that are gathered introspectively.65 In this manner, when an 
individual claims that he is fascist based on personal assessment of his actions, intentions, 
and beliefs, the claim will always be true and valid.66 Committing a mistake by wrongly 
identifying the attribute of oneself based on internal mental processing is not possible. In a 
similar manner, this thesis will not merely focus on identifying whether Ljotić was a fascist 
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or not, but it will go beyond that and explore how such distinction from fascism, if any, can 
explain the creation, values, and development of the ZBOR movement. 
 
Within the theoretical framework of ‘generic fascism’, and the growing influence of non-
Marxist interpretations of fascism in Anglophone studies, ZBOR’s status in terms of ‘fascist’ 
or ‘non-fascist’ was fairly static. In Payne’s estimation, ZBOR falls into the category of a 
‘radical right’ group, a halfway point between authoritarian conservative nationalism and 
fascism. Culturally and philosophically, the ‘radical right’ according to Payne, took 
inspiration from both conservative nationalism and fascism, depending on localised socio-
economic and political conditions, as well as history.67 Moreover, the ‘radical right’, while 
wishing to destroy a liberal political system, was usually hesitant to embrace radical forms of 
authoritarianism, preferring rather a re-organised monarchy, or a neo-Catholic type of 
corporatism.  
 
In the work of David Carroll, he attempted to describe fascism as an alternative to western 
democracy.68 Carroll claimed that fascism is a logical consequence to aestheticism and the 
cultural ideals of a nation.69 Carroll focused on the interplay between literature, culture, and 
politics, within the context of literary fascism. Through this literary approach, Carroll 
provided an analysis of essays, newspapers articles, and novels to show how fascism has been 
rooted on cultural institutions and practices has been seen as “soft” and deficient in ways of 
defending or condemning the French literary fascism based on ideology and moral value.70  
Such an explanation of fascism shows a different tone to the usual strong-willed and powerful 
claims of other known fascist. In relation to Ljotić, Carroll’s focus on culture and aesthetics is 
an aspect of fascism that would not feature prominently in the ideology of Ljotić or ZBOR. 
There would be no pomposity, little attempt (as will he shown) at mass appeal and mass 
mobilisation. In this manner, a distinction between the philosophies of the two movements is 
again highlighted.  
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In a different light, fascism was highlighted in a positive aspect through the writings of Susan 
Sontag.71 In the article, Fascinating Fascism, Sontag claimed that fascism is more than just 
the image of brutishness and terror that it has to several societies. Instead, fascism places 
importance of positive values of life, art, culture, and community, which are all persistent in 
today’s society.72 More interestingly, Sontag showed that the negative aspect of Fascist Italy 
and Nazi Germany are resurfacing in the sense that these two movements are both being 
popularised more for their negative connotation than for their positive implications. In her 
writing, Sontag called for a change in the perceptions of Italian fascism as a play between 
master and slave and other negative images, which is how most of the individuals and 
societies perceive it to be. Such call for a change in fascisms image is different from how 
historians relate fascism to Ljotić or ZBOR. In most cases, Ljotić has been identified as a 
fascist for his strict nationalism, collaboration, and strident anti-Semitism. 
 
Geoff Eley, however, is of the opinion that the radical nationalists in Germany were in effect 
the ideological precursors to the Nazis, through a joint nationalist-elite ‘populist’ campaign to 
inspire confidence in the people.73 In Payne’s opinion however, ZBOR was ‘essentially a 
right-radical movement that propounded a general Yugoslav nationalism’.74 Payne also is of 
the opinion that ZBOR was for the maintenance of the status quo. This would be correct, if 
the implication is applied solely to the 6th of January regime and its dictatorial character, 
which ZBOR supported as a defensive mechanism against liberal democracy and 
communism. Griffin meanwhile refers to ZBOR as ‘fascist candidates’ in that, while adopting 
a number of fascist features (corporativist theory, anti-Semitism, anti-communism, cult of the 
leader), and blending Christianity with ultra-nationalism, it was nevertheless proto-fascist.75 
Griffin qualifies his ‘proto-fascist’ classification of ZBOR because according to him, ZBOR 
lacks a ‘palingenetic myth’, focusing on a ‘regenerated Yugoslav national community’.76 
ZBOR’s classification as either ‘radical right’ or ‘proto-fascist’ by both Payne and Griffin 
raises interesting questions not just about the heuristic analytical devices used to quantify 
such conclusions, but also about whether in Yugoslavia, or indeed the Balkan peninsula, there 
was anything close to what could have been deemed ‘generic fascism’. 
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Fascism in Yugoslavia, Yugoslav Fascism, or Fascism in the Balkans? 
 
Based on the former official Yugoslav historiographical precepts, ZBOR and Ljotić were 
considered fascist, justifiably for their collaboration with the Nazis and struggle against the 
Communist-led Partisan resistance movement. Stefanović stated that ZBOR were ‘traitors’, 
and of being complicit in terror activities in the service of the Nazis.77 Branko Petranović 
also describes Ljotić as ‘wishing for the inner rebirth of the Serbs upon fascist principles’. 
Writing in 1992, Petranović maintains that Ljotić was a ‘national socialist’, and a ‘propagator 
of Hitler’.78 Ljotić’s open admiration of Hitler, as will be shown, certainly influenced and 
marked ZBOR. But Petranović’s assertion of Ljotić personally as being a National Socialist is 
contentious. Ljotić’s core ideological nexus would not be drawn from fascist beliefs, even if 
elements of what he saw as the mainstays of his ideology, Christianity, anti-communism, and 
the peasant as the ‘carrier of tradition’, were co-opted by fascists. Branislav Gligorijević, 
writing nearly twenty years before Petranović, agrees, stating that the 1929 ‘world crisis saw 
the formation of political movements based on new bourgeois theories’. These theories, 
‘during a deep crisis of capitalism’, preached national renewal,79 in broad reference to the 
post-1929 Yugoslav political climate. Gligorijević adds that ZBOR followed a hierarchic 
principle and showed its fascist character through its corporatism.80 Stefanović goes further 
and states that Hitler and Mussolini primarily influenced Ljotić.81  
 
Stefanović’s work widened the documentary basis of scholarly investigation, being the only 
full and in-depth study of ZBOR, but it fails to overcome, understandably, the ideological 
limitations imposed by official government sanctioning of Marxist historiography and the 
Marxist approach to fascism. As the trend in fascist studies moves away from Marxist 
interpretations of fascism, both Griffin and Payne deny ZBOR’s categorisation as fascist. 
Moreover, Stefanović’s study offers little in the way of source criticism, and there is no real 
analysis of ZBOR’s ideology apart from how it relates to Marxist interpretation of fascism. 
This is especially evident in that the majority of the book deals with ZBOR’s actions during 
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rasturanje Ljotićevog Zbora,” Istorijski Glasnik 2 (1963), 52. 
81 Stefanović, Zbor Dimitrija Ljotića 1934-1945, 21. 
 30 
the Second World War, taking its collaboration as a given because of its supposed National 
Socialist character. This work differs from those of Gligorijević, and especially of Stefanović 
in that it does not presuppose a fascist character for Ljotić and ZBOR. It will analyse Ljotić’s 
writings on a more in-depth level, and in relation to European trends, as evidenced through 
the example of the Action Française, and scrutinise the main tenets of ZBOR’s ideology, thus 
filling a gap on the origins of, and main points of, ZBOR’s politics.  
 
Gligorijević’s work pertaining to the formation of ZBOR is detailed in its analysis. While it 
deals only with the formative phase of ZBOR’s development, Gligorijević accurately shows 
how the Yugoslav Action (Jugoslovenska Akcija, hereafter JA), and the Slovenian-based 
Association of Combatants of Yugoslavia (Združenje borcev Jugoslavije), frequently referred 
to by the acronym BOJ, overcame (for a time) minor ideological issues in order to create 
ZBOR, with Ljotić as its elected head. Well researched, Gligorijević’s central premise is 
again tied in to the supposed fascist nature of ZBOR. In this case however, it was not so 
much ZBOR, or rather Ljotić that was a fascist, as the JA, who Gligorijević claimed to have a 
clear National Socialist character. Like Petranović, a real analysis of ZBOR’s ideology is not 
their aim, but rather those instances where ZBOR’s ideology overlaps with fascism that 
serves as a buttress to their premise of ZBOR as inherently fascist. 
 
ZBOR’s status, as referred to at the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, 
was both collaborationist and traitorous.82 It is certainly true that Ljotić and ZBOR were 
collaborators, and as a consequence, traitors, inasmuch as they were working on the behalf of 
their nation’s occupiers. However, the nexus of Ljotić’s thought, and ZBOR’s ideology 
predated fascism, and the Marxist approach’s reductionist argument of fascism as being a 
crisis in the capitalist does not account for ZBOR’s formation. Its formation based as it was 
on external events, the 1934 assassination of King Alexander, as its main catalyst. Works 
written under the Marxist historiographical framework dictated by the politics of the day 
tended to emphasise ZBOR’s links with Fascism and National Socialism, implying mimesis 
and synthesis. One work that of Todor Kuljić, gives a religious veneer to ZBOR’s supposed 
fascism by stating that the ‘Orthodox ethos’ of ZBOR was a fascist trapping. 83 Ljotić’s 
personal religiosity was certainly imparted onto ZBOR. It was both austere and extreme. 
Ljotić however was no theologian, and apart from Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović (to be 
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discussed in Chapter 1), he had no real support amongst the Church hierarchy. Kuljić 
continues by stating that ZBOR intended to but failed to ‘implement a fascist programme’.84 
That ZBOR was quantified as fascist, through its collaboration and anti-Marxist rhetoric, was 
a given, and understandable in the political changes of post-war Yugoslavia. However, it was 
not the only, nor the most extreme version of extreme-right wing politics in both Yugoslavia, 
and the Balkan Peninsula. For both Croatia, both as a part of Yugoslavia and during its brief 
1941-1945 independence, and Romania, spawned movements that would eclipse ZBOR in 
rhetoric and action. 
 
The Balkan Peninsula, according to Constantin Iordachi, exhibited most of the social factors 
that generally facilitated the emergence of fascism. The most important of these, Iordachi 
continues, are ‘structural, regional, and ethno-political’ cleavages related to a specific stage 
of the nation-building process. 85  Due to these existing cleavages, a plethora of radical 
political movements arose in the interwar Balkans, plagued with ideological fluidity and 
organisational instability. Their instability and obscurity has created difficulties on an 
empirical level of separating fascist parties from more radical right but non-fascist parties. 
The most significant radical right and fascist movements in the Balkans were the Legion of 
the Archangel Michael (Legiunea ‘Arhanghelului Mihail), also referred to as the Iron Guard 
(Garda de Fier), in Romania, and the Croatian Revolutionary Movement Ustaša (Hrvatski 
Revolucionarni Pokret – Ustaša), in Yugoslavia. Though there were ideological 
convergences, these groups would go farther than ZBOR in their call for palingenetic 
renewal, revolutionary aims, their utilisation of violence, level of organisation, and their party 
structure greatly surpassed ZBOR. Iordachi states that ZBOR could conceivably be thought 
of within fascist studies as an intermediary taxonomical classification as a hybrid between the 
radical right and fascism, under the general taxonomical classification of ‘generic fascism’.86 
This perhaps is the closest to any real categorisation of ZBOR. It was not a fully fascistic 
movement, not at least from its legal 1935-1940 existence. That said, its rhetoric, and 
especially its actions in the Second World War with the collaborationist Serbian Volunteer 
Corps shows that fascist influence was gradually, but continuously gaining currency amongst 
ZBOR members, if not Ljotić personally.  
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That the Legion of the Archangel Michael, and the Ustaša movement were considered the 
most significant examples of fascism in the Balkans is not hard to fathom. Empirically, these 
groups, also as regime types, came closest to ‘generic fascism’, by dint of their strong 
paramilitary units, notions of national rebirth, and the capability to implement their political 
visions. This would be contrasted with the situation of ZBOR, who as will be shown in 
Chapter 5, even under Nazi occupation, would only in Smederevo, under Ljotić’s personal 
(albeit detached) rule, be able to even contemplate any implementation of ZBOR’s ideology. 
Ljotić’s case in Smederevo therefore should not be used as a microcosm of ZBOR activity 
throughout Occupied Serbia, as the situation in Čačak will show.  
 
The Iron Guard was epitomised by its leader and founder, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu.87 In this 
sense, groups such as the Iron Guard were noted for, and defined by, the charisma of their 
individual leaders as much as by their ideology. This can be said to be the case of ZBOR, 
though Ljotić’s charisma came more from his personal and familial connections than to any 
real personality traits. The Legion was founded on 24 June, 1927, when Codreanu and some 
followers resigned from the National Christian Defence League, led by Alexandru Cuza.88 
Payne argues that the Legion would develop the Romanian variant of fascism, becoming the 
‘most unique of the entire genus’, except for the German Nazis.89 Mann agrees with Payne, 
stating that the Legion was essentially home grown, but that it borrowed from both the 
German Nazis and Italian Fascists.90 The Iron Guard, founded as a sort of party militia, was 
formed in 1930, yet due to government repression and banning, the Iron Guard would 
become synonymous in the vernacular with The Legion of the Archangel Michael.91  
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The Iron Guard’s supposed specificity and uniqueness lay in its quasi-religious nationalist 
mysticism, which manifested itself in a hybrid of racial and religious anti-Semitism, 
combined with total identity and devotion to the Romanian Orthodox Church, especially its 
use of symbolism. The blending of nationalist and religious mysticism would see violence 
and murder become sacralised as necessary for the redemption of the nation. This 
sacralisation of violence would result in the 1933 assassination of Prime Minister Ion Duca, 
blamed for the outlawing of the Iron Guard.92 The Iron Guard would assassinate another 
Prime Minister, Armand Călinescu, in September 1939, ostensibly for his actions against the 
group. 93  Ljotić referred to Călinescu’s assassination as a potential coup, but more for 
geopolitical reasons stating it had a ‘clear anti-Slavic and pro-German character’.94 Amidst 
its violence, the Iron Guard defined itself as a ‘movement’, that was both anti-parliamentary 
and anti-establishment, extremely anti-Semitic, and embraced youthful ‘action’ and peasant 
populism.95 Parliament was to be replaced by a corporate assembly, but the Legion put more 
emphasis on the creation of a new spirit, the omul nou (new man), rather than a concrete 
political programme.96  
 
This would change however from 1932, when The Legion realised that in order to expand, it 
would have to ‘diversify’ its propaganda and appeal, began focusing more on economic 
matters, adopting a corporatist economic policy, under a former minister and governor of the 
National Bank, Mihail Manoilescu.97 However the violence perpetrated by the Iron Guard, as 
well as its ambiguous relationship to the monarchy, meant that political repression became an 
everyday reality, provoking active and violent responses on behalf of the Iron Guard resulting 
in further government repression. 
 
In Codreanu, Ljotić saw aspects of himself, especially as a man who ‘fought against 
corruption’. He felt that the judicial and political processes against Codreanu were indicative 
that the ‘problems facing Romania have not been solved’, because if they were, Codreanu 
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‘would not be viewed as a threat to the regime’.98 To Ljotić, the Iron Guard was a ‘reaction to 
the corruption in Romanian society as well as a reaction against the Jews’. In this regard, the 
Iron Guard was, as far as Ljotić was concerned, parallel to ZBOR. However, Ljotić also felt 
that by turning to terrorism, the violence of Codreanu and his followers ‘was a tragedy’, and 
that ‘he who lives by the sword dies by the sword’.99 He made only vague mention of the 
Iron Guard, and then only in relation to Romania’s geopolitical orientation, nor would he 
attempt to emulate the violent actions and rhetoric that brought a degree of success and 
popularity to The Legion. But his admiration for both The Legion and Codreanu, especially 
his religiosity, was both open and sincere. He would however, show no level of affinity with 
or sympathy for, the Ustaša movement, and its leader, Ante Pavelić.100 
 
Ante Pavelić created the Croatian Revolutionary movement, known as the Ustaša, in 1929. 
Initially made up mostly of members from the Croatian Party of Rights, the Ustaša movement 
would initially reflect its ideology. In November 1932, Ustaša members in the Velebit area of 
Croatia attacked gendarmerie posts in the hope of sparking a Croatian revolt. In 1934, Eugen 
Kvaternik, an Ustaša member, organised the 9 October 1934 assassination of King Alexander 
in Marseille. A noticeable tilt towards totalitarianism and fascist influence was noted form 
1936, coinciding with Pavelić’s Italian exile. On the 10th of April, 1941, the Ustaša 
movement was given command by the Germans of the newly created Independent State of 
Croatia, with the movement being the sole legal political movement until its dissolution and 
banning in 1945.101  
 
The Ustaša reflected the antithesis of ZBOR’s political perceptions. Whether or not the 
Ustaša can be considered a fascist movement or not is one of conjecture. Its small size and 
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relative unpopularity was perhaps more so than ZBOR’s! Whereas ZBOR stood for the unity 
of the Yugoslav state, before it was divided in the Second World War, even when still under 
the Karadjordjević dynasty, the Ustaša dreamed of an independent Croatian state. Where 
ZBOR, as will be shown, however superficially, stood for ‘Yugoslavism’, though during the 
Second World War it had no problem re-inventing itself as a purely Serbian movement, the 
Ustaša would reject the Serbs as a foreign and parasitic element to be removed from an 
independent Croatia. The Ustaša self-proclaimed justification for independence was 
developed as part of the Ustava Ustaša, hrvatske revolucionarne organizacije (Constitution 
of the Croatian revolutionary organisation Ustaša), published in 1932.102 This was followed 
up with the 1933 publication of the Načela hrvatskog Ustaškog pokreta (Principles of the 
Croatian Ustaša movement).103 The Principles, in essence, was the early political formula of 
the Ustaša movement. Its premise and justification for Croatian independence was presented 
in the first Principle that asserted the Croatian people as ‘an independent ethnic and national 
unit’, with a unique ethnic and national character.104 In this regard, the 1918 creation of 
Yugoslavia was, for the Ustaša, the ‘ultimate denial’ of Croatian national integrity in ‘all the 
history of the Croatian nation’. Moreover, argued the Ustaša, this was because the Croats 
were non-Slavic, in fact they were superimposed on the Slavs, and gave the ‘spirit of 
freedom’ to the Slavs.105 Yugoslavia, to the Ustaša, had interrupted the supposed historical 
continuity of the Croatian state, giving the Croats, according to Principle 8, a ‘legitimate 
right’ to seek a return to this continuity by ‘any means necessary’.106 
 
There were allusions to religion, though this was through the use of messianic language, as 
opposed to a distinct focus on Catholicism. This becomes evident in Principle 11, whereby 
the Ustaša stated that ‘only a peasant can fulfil the organic connection between the people 
and the land’.107 Such use of the term ‘organic’, taken to denote a Romantic nationalist form 
by which a state derives its legitimacy as a consequence of those who were born in a 
particular ‘culture’, was also heavily utilised by ZBOR.108 Though obviously diverging in 
their end goals, both the Ustaša and ZBOR would show signs of convergence, especially in 
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regard to what they deemed as the ‘core’ of their organic thought, the peasantry. For the 
Ustaša, this was more the influence of Croat nationalist intellectuals in the 1930s, who began 
taking more of an interest in peasant life, as the ‘real’ Croatia, both anti-capitalist and anti-
bourgeois, seeing the countryside, according to Rory Yeomans, as the ‘repository of national 
regeneration’.109  
 
Yet the Ustaša would also show itself to be much more anti-bourgeois and ‘revolutionary’ in 
rhetoric than ZBOR, going so far as to argue during the Second World War for a distinct 
form of ‘Croatian Socialism’, based on Fascist corporatism, as an instrument of social 
control.110 This extreme anti-establishment rhetoric highlights the fact that the Ustaša, unlike 
ZBOR, represented the frustrations of a ‘minority nationalism’ amongst elements of the Croat 
elite who resented the fact that the ‘Croat nation’ was part of a larger political entity. 
 
Many scholars argue that Ustaša ideology was either incoherent, or contradictory.111 Payne 
describes Ustaša ideology as a ‘proto-fascist’ movement that only moved toward Fascism and 
nationalism in 1936 and 1937.112 Griffin states that while the Ustaša showed a high level of 
violence, they lacked a ‘palingenetic mission of mass mobilisation for the post-destructive 
phase’, concurring with Payne that it would remain a ‘proto-fascist’ movement because of 
this deficiency.113 Recently, scholars such as Nevenko Bartulin have been focusing on Ustaša 
racial ideas, in the context of the movement’s ideology. During the Second World War, 
Bartulin argues, the Independent State of Croatia was Nazi Germany’s closest ally in regard 
to racial ideology, and policies towards racial and ethnic minorities.114 Alexander Korb, in 
his work argues that the Ustaša did not have the ‘cultural’ and ‘racist motivations’, which 
usually serve as the ‘reason for genocide’.115 Korb’s study, based on his doctoral dissertation, 
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is thought provoking in regard to this premise concerning the contradictions of Ustaša terror, 
challenging the belief of the Ustaša movement as mere imitators and puppets of the Germans, 
by highlighting their own conceptualised interests. 
 
As much as being influenced by Fascism and National Socialism, the Ustaša would also 
claim ideological influence from, and claim to be the inheritors of, Ante Starčević. 
Starčević’s ideas would go furthest in formulating Ustaša racial concepts, especially 
concerning the Serbs. This was done through the appropriation of what Starčević deemed to 
be ‘Slavoserbs’. ‘Slavoserb’ as a means of classification did not, in Starčević’s perception, 
have a distinct ethnic or racial differentiation. Starčević divided the ‘Slavoserbs’ into five 
distinct categories, based on personal characteristics deemed detrimental to the Croatian 
nation.116 The term was, however, used periodically by Starčević to denigrate the Serbs, and 
it was this denigration that was appropriated by the Ustaša to justify their own racial theories 
regarding the ‘corrupted nature’ of the Serbs.117 It should be noted, however, that Starčević’s 
own thinking did not specifically call for persecution against the Serbs, believing that the 
Serbs could be assimilated into Croats through intermarriage.118 He would also view race 
through the lens of ‘master’ and ‘slave’ nations, within the context of the Habsburg Empire, 
centring on ‘historic’, and ‘non-historic’, nations and nationalisms.119 He would, however, 
deny the Serbs the status as a people, and a nation, which would then be expanded on through 
misappropriation by the Ustaša. It would culminate in the mass persecution and genocide 
visited upon Serbs, Jews and Romani peoples living in the territory of the Independent State 
of Croatia during the Second World War. 
 
The Five Stages of Fascism  
 
In relation to the different developments in the history of fascism and fascist society, Robert 
Paxton has developed the Five Stages of Fascism.120 In his writings, Paxton claimed that 
because of the complexity of fascism as a political phenomenon, it could not be defined by 
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their supposed nomadic lifestyle bereft of spiritual values, exposed to the corrupt and inferior ‘Greek spirit’. 
118 Ibid. 348. 
119 Bartulin, The Racial Idea in the Independent State of Croatia, 138. 
120 Robert O. Paxton. "The Five Stages of Fascism." The Journal of Modern History 70, no. 1 (1998), 1-23. 
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using its ideology alone. Instead, Paxton focused on the political context of fascism as well as 
its functional development to identify five stages that occurs for each fascist movement. It is 
important to note that Paxton stated that only Nazi Germany and the Fascist Italy have 
completed and reached the fifth stage of the development.  
 
According to Paxton, the first stage of fascism is intellectual exploration, which is the initial 
precondition to any fascist movement.121 This is the phase in the development of fascism 
where there is disillusionment with democracy, and liberalism, as viable forms of 
governance. The distinct characteristic of these initial explorations and opposition to the 
current dominant ideals is the proposition that a new and fresh idea is better that the dominant 
one and ever better than the existing alternatives.122 In the case of Ljotić, he claimed that the 
ZBOR movement developed primarily from the socio-political troubles and challenges facing 
its members.123 Moreover, just as stated in Paxton’s first stage of fascist development, the 
critical thinker of the group, who happens to be Ljotić for ZBOR, proposed a new movement 
rather than proposing that an existing alterative is available to address the troubles they 
experienced. Therefore, based on the first stage of fascism development, Ljotić and ZBOR 
satisfy the criteria for this categorisation. Nevertheless, Paxton also claimed that almost all 
movements that have similarities to fascism undergo this phase.124 
 
According to Paxton, the second phase of stage of fascist movement development is rooting, 
wherein a movement becomes a party that has active participation in the political scene.125 It 
is certainly true ZBOR played an active part in the political scene in Yugoslavia. 
Nevertheless, based on the description of the second phase of fascist movements, Ljotić and 
ZBOR again fulfil the criteria for this categorisation. However, according to Paxton, most 
fascist leaders, during this second phase of the development, tend to form alliances with 
conservative groups to facilitate their rise to power at the expense of losing some of the 
hardline support during its militant purpose of the first phase.126 However, with the decision 
to participate in elections in 1935 and 1938, ZBOR showed itself as weak, evident in their 
lack of popular support. This is a clear distinction of Ljotić and ZBOR to Paxton’s second 
state of fascism. These will be further discussed in the latter part of this thesis. 
                                                        
121 Ibid. 11. 
122 Paxton, Five Stages, 11. 
123 Ljotić, Rumunija, 3. 
124 Paxton, Five Stages, 12 
125 Ibid. 13 
126 Ibid. 13 
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The third phase of fascism is the arrival in power.127 In this phase, conservatives, who are 
aiming to control the fascists as they increase in strength and power, invite the movement to 
share in an even greater power. In this manner, fascists see that in order to obtain power, they 
must cooperate with conservatives. Paxton showed that neither Hitler nor Mussolini came to 
power by force. Even with a high degree of violence that both known leaders tolerated and 
encouraged in the early 1920s, they were able to take office through peaceful invitation of 
their respective heads of government, and which they willingly obliged through the process 
of cooperation.128 Paxton highlighted that in most cases, fascist movements fail to reach the 
third phase because of their failure to cooperate with conservative elites. 129 Some resorted to 
the use of a coup d’état, which led to a dictatorship rather than fascism. For the case of 
ZBOR, they were not able to achieve the third phase largely because the movement was too 
small, too disorganised, and faced an acute shortage of members. This may be one of the 
distinguishing factors that make Ljotić’s ideas different from fascism. Moreover, Ljotić did 
not see ZBOR as a movement that was to last indefinitely, which was contrary to the vision 
and goals of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. They were to be lasting, and revolutionary 
regimes. For Ljotić, once the goal of ZBOR has been realised, he believed that the movement 
would no longer be needed, which is the opposite aim of successful fascist movements.130 It 
is this belief and value that may have led to the demise of the ZBOR movement, despite 
failing to fully realise its purpose in the end. 
 
The fourth and fifth phases of fascism development are exercise of power and radicalisation 
or entropy. In the fourth phase, the movement and its leader get to control the state while 
balancing their status by coordinating and cooperating core institutions of the state, such as 
the police, religious leaders, and business magnates.131 The key in this phase is balance. 
Balance between employing party ideology and the values of core institutions. The fifth 
phase, on the other hand, which is radicalisation or entropy, refers to the two possible states 
                                                        
127 Ibid. 16 
128 Ibid. 17 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ljotić in his publication “What we are fighting for” mentioned that: Fascism and Hitlerism have a need to 
last. In their concept of a country they consider that the state even after it becomes structured as they see it still 
needs them. They consider that for the country to last in needs to keeps Hitlerism and Fascism, and when they 
disappear the country will fall. 
Unlike that our movement considers itself passable. It should help the state and people and when certain 
problems are solved it should fade away. 
131 Paxton, Five Stages, 19 
 40 
that a fascist movement may lead to in the long run. This means that in order to survive, the 
movement has to turn to more radical methods; otherwise it will inevitably dwindle and 
gradually decline. Therefore, Ljotić and ZBOR did not manage to reach these last two stages 
of development, regarding the path of fascism. Furthermore, they were already comprised 
amongst the wider Yugoslav public for their obvious pro-German sentiment and as will be 
shown, their supposed intrigues with Nazi Germany. Second, ZBOR was exposed by its 
inability to cooperate with leading institutions, such as the traditional elites of the society 
(e.g., head of state, clergy leaders, and business executives), which, with their overall 




ZBOR would have no distinct racial theory, and thus a further point of divergence from the 
Ustaša, Fascist Italy (post-1938), and Nazi Germany emerges. Part of this may be due to the 
fact that while the concept of Yugoslavism argued for the unity of all South Slavs, it stressed 
a core component of Serbian-Dinaric stock.132 ZBOR, as a majority Serbian organisation, 
would then, theoretically, have no need to formulate a separate racial theory since 
Yugoslavism, under a Serbian monarchic dynasty, would preclude this. Ljotić himself 
seemed to dismiss the idea of ethnic purity stating that ‘the Balkans are home to many 
different nationalities and faiths’, so that we (in reference to Balkan countries), ‘are mixed in 
each in Balkan country’.133 This was then contrasted with the anti-Yugoslavist, Croatian 
particularist viewpoint of the Ustaša. But it was not only the Ustaša who utilised racial 
anthropology as a means of differentiating Serbs and Croats. By the 1930s, elements of 
Croatian nationalist and non-Ustaša intelligentsia, Filip Lukas, Ivo Pilar, and Ćiro Truhelka, 
made use of anti-Yugoslav and racial anthropological arguments and attempted to popularise 
and legitimise them outside of Ustaša discourse.134  
 
What can therefore be surmised is that unlike ZBOR, where the personal ideology and figure 
of Ljotić added much to the movement, Pavelić seems to have been less of an ideologue than 
                                                        
132 See Nevenko Bartulin, “Intellectual Discourse on Race and Culture in Croatia 1900-1945,” Review of 
Croatian History 8, no. 1 (2012), 185–205. 
133 “Sad je Balkan došao odlučan čas – ili će Balkan biti čekić ili nakovanj”, in Novi Put, 29 October, 1939, No. 
33. 
134 See Ćiro Truhelka, Studije o podrijetlu. Etnološka razmatranja iz Bosne i Hercegovine (Matica Hrvatska, 
1941). This work point to the ‘outsider’ nature of the Serbs, as being incompatible with Croats and Croatia. 
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Ljotić, even though he was hailed as Poglavnik (Leader) by his followers, exalted more than 
Ljotić ever would be. However, in order to understand and deconstruct ZBOR’s ideology, 
outlining key ideological crystallisations and evolution in Ljotić’s thought is essential. In the 
writings of Pavelić, it is clear that he was influenced primarily by Fascist Italy throughout his 
career.135 However, the only difference between his ideology and that of Fascist Italy was his 
intense anti-Semitism. Pavelić’s rhetoric towards the Jews was cruder than that of Ljotić’s. 
Italian Fascism, although by 1938 had become influenced by Nazi anti-Semitism, did not 
have the extermination of Jewish influence as a goal. Ljotić, while an outspoken anti-Semite, 
and speaking on the dangers of Jewish influence throughout the world, did not formulate any 
plan or expressed any desire to deal with the ‘Jewish influence’ outside of warning the 
general public.  
 
In fact, Mussolini met with many prominent Zionists before the start of the war. This 
however was short-lived, as he viewed Zionism as an instrument of British imperial policy, 
and detrimental to his own efforts to foster anti-British sentiment amongst Arabs.136 He also 
praised Italian Jews for their success and ability to integrate into Catholic Italy. Hence, it may 
be seen that in the latter life of Ljotić, he was more similar to Italian fascism (Mussolini) as 
compared to Pavelić, in that he did not express any extreme intention to remove Jews from 
his land.   
 
Fascism has evolved together with a set of different assumptions regarding the past, present, 
and future of our world. As Raymond Aron noted during the latter years of the 1930s, fascism 
was a ‘secular religion’, which has a complete vision of life that brooked no pluralist 
opposition. Political style was substituted for ideology in the name of a new nation, which 
looked to the future without the burdens of the past. This substitution was crucial to the 
fascist style, though Futurism, in alliance with fascism pursued its own cause and created its 
particular propaganda, which was not always identical with that of fascism. Nevertheless, 
unlike that of the ideologies of Marxism, fascism has crossed social class divisions. In a 
similar manner, Mosse described that fascism brought a ‘sacralisation of politics’ that made it 
demonic but allowed it to sink its hooks deep into the soul. 
 
                                                        
135 See Paul N Hehn, “Serbia, Croatia, and Germany 1941-1945: Civil War and Revolution in the Balkans”, 
Canadian Slavonic Papers, Vol.13, Iss.4 (1971), 344-373. 
136 Susan Zuccotti, The Italians and the Holocaust: Persecution, Rescue & Survival (University of Nebraska 
Press, Lincoln, 1996), 32. 
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Ljotić considered fascism the only form of resistance to future global Jewish control.137 He 
applauded and praised Hitler for exposing the conspiracy that was masterminded by the Jews 
and dubbed him the saviour of Europe.138 His praise and admiration of Germany may have 
partly been influenced by his fascination with the country's military power and his fear of its 
political ambitions. Although Ljotić’s ideology shared several parallel aspects with other 
European fascist movements, he often emphasized ZBOR’s difference from the fascist 
movements in Germany and Italy. Most authors describe Ljotić as a fascist, but the Croat 
historian Jozo Tomasevich writes that this view is ‘too one-sided a characterization’.139 
 
In recapping his life and ideology, Ljotić shows himself to have certain pro-fascist views, 
among them anti-Semitic, anti-democratic, and anti-parliamentary beliefs. However, this does 
not necessarily entail total fascist encapsulation. The main focus of this thesis is to analyse 
the different aspects of Ljotić’s ideology to show that, despite having aspects of fascism in 
his ideology and beliefs, Ljotić’s core ideological nexus predated fascism, nor was it totally 
in sync with it. This therefore belies any real or strict paradigms for categorisation. Through 
this thesis, the detailed review of the life of Ljotić and his ideology in relation to the 
foundation and ideology of his ZBOR movement will show that, though similar to fascism, 
there are important distinctions that will support existing literature by providing justification 
as to why both Ljotić and his ZBOR movement are not entirely congruent with numerous 
definitions of fascism.  
 
This thesis will also show that more than its similarities to fascism, Ljotić is an advocate of a 
synthesis of monarchism, Pan-Slavism, and Christianity, and through this syncretistic 
ideology, he may have similarities to fascism, but it is also the reason for distinction. This 
study will also illustrate how Ljotić and his ZBOR movement, even with these specific 
distinctions, cannot be treated as entirely discriminate from each other, because he, as the 
founder and leader of ZBOR, with his personal beliefs, were influential in the development 
and functioning of ZBOR. Hence, this study will illustrate that in a sense, Ljotić as a person, 
with personal beliefs and ideology, cannot be treated entirely different from ZBOR and its 
organisational ideology, despite the fact that there may have been inconsistencies in the 
ideology between and among ZBOR leaders and its members. 
                                                        
137 Ramet, 2006, 101. 
138 Raphael Israeli, The Death Camps of Croatia: Visions and Revisions, 1941-1945 (Transaction Publishers, 
2013), 14. 
139 Tomasevich, War and Revolution, 187. 
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However, the main and most significant contribution of this thesis to the existing relevant 
literature is that, aside from discussing the stand of the author, the ideology of Ljotić and 
ZBOR are beyond the boundaries imposed by definitions of fascism. This thesis will add to 
existing literature by providing not just the political development of Ljotić as a person, but 
also the development of ZBOR as a movement in relation to Ljotić’s ideology and to 
Yugoslav political and social life in the interwar era. Hence, this study will provide an 
analysis on the ideology of both Ljotić and ZBOR, and provide elements of both political 
biography and an analysis of the ideology developed by Ljotić and some of his collaborators 
within ZBOR. Furthermore, another important contribution of this study to existing literature 
is to provide detailed and in-depth exploration, explanation, and analysis of why and how 
Ljotić and his ZBOR movement are situated within a wider context of their era, both within 










In order to comprehend ZBOR, and Ljotić’s ideological development, it is imperative to point 
out key chronological events that helped to shape these ideological crystallisations, as well as 
key historiographical themes later associated with ZBOR. Such an undertaking is necessarily 
narrative, and descriptive, yet the signs are there for a clear coalescing and gelling of certain 
ideological trends, which will be expanded on in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, with added 
explanation related to their application in a wider European and local Yugoslav political 
context. In relation to fascism, it is important to determine similarities and distinction 
between Ljotić’s beliefs and ideology to that of fascism in order to properly evaluate the 
progress and development of ZBOR as a movement based on its unique characteristics and 
values. 
 
In order to understand the evolution of Ljotić’s ideological thought, analysing his early 
writings is of crucial importance. This however is not simply a linear process, especially with 
the debates surrounding Ljotić and ZBOR focusing on their similarity and affiliation with 
Fascism and National Socialism. However, more than identifying similarities and distinction 
between Ljotić or ZBOR and fascism, the identification of the uniqueness that makes Ljotić’s 
ideas distinct from fascism is the key to furthering a deeper understanding of ZBOR. By 
accentuating the differences of Ljotić with fascism, readers will hopefully begin to 
understand the rationale for the development, and ultimately the demise, of ZBOR as a 
movement in the latter stages of the Second World War. Understanding ZBOR during its 
short existence may just provide a different perspective and narrative to Dimitrije Ljotić.  
 
Scholars and historians (as the previous chapter as shown) have often used Ljotić’s formative 
political development as a buttress for the wider polemical fascist/non-fascist argument. At 
the expense of being interpreted in its own right as part of a wider right wing, anti-
democratic, monarchic, and conservative European thought pattern. Unfortunately, reliable 
information on Ljotić’s early life is scarce. Scholars, among them Mladen Stefanović and 
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Jovan Byford, have made use of Ljotić’s autobiography Iz moga života1 (From my Life). This 
autobiographical work gives us the essential (albeit circumspect) primary literature of his 
ideological formation. This work will be no different, but will also look to make use of the 
chronicle of the Ljotić family, written by Ljubica Ljotić, Dimitrije’s mother. 2  Ljubica’s 
memoirs read almost like a hagiography, and deals primarily with the coming and 
establishment of the Ljotić family to the Smederevo region from what is today’s Republic of 
Macedonia. Though there is scant documentation of Ljotić’s early life, there has been little 
attempt at analysis and interpretation of the evidence he presents in his autobiography, and as 
a consequence, little secondary literature focusing on Ljotić’s early ideological formation, 
(i.e., a more in-depth analysis of his early ideological influences).   
 
The early ideological influences of Ljotić included a wide range of eclecticism and a degree 
of synthesis of various strands of political thought, ranging chronologically from the so-
called ‘Christian Anarchism’ of Leo Tolstoy,3 to the 19th century Slavophile4 movement in 
Russia. He was influenced by elements of Christian socialism, Nikolai Berdyaev’s 
philosophy on the relationship between God and Love, to the Action Française and the 
writings of Georges Valois,5 and Blaise Pascal,6 just to name a few. This eclectic synthesis 
would later be fused in what Ljotić perceived as existing indigenous national and religious 
Serbian traditions, in part postulated by Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović7 in the 1930s as part of 
                                                        
1 Ljotić, Iz moga života. 
2 See Ljubica Ljotić, Memoari (Munich, 1973). A typed version of this work is also found in AJ 115 Dimitrije 
Ljotić. Both were consulted. 
3 Leo Tolstoy  (1828-1910). His Christian beliefs centred on the Sermon of the Mount, which he used as 
justification for pacifism. For further reading see Rosamund Bartlett, Tolstoy: A Russian Life. (London: Profile 
Books, 2011). 
4 Slavophilism was a 19th century intellectual movement centred on personalities such as Aleksei Khomiakov, 
and Ivan and Pyotr Kireevsky who were concerned with Russia’s increasing Westernisation, and whether the 
country had its own specific national mission to follow. For further reading see Laura Engelstein, Slavophile 
Empire: Imperial Russia’s Illiberal Path (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).; Nicholas Riasanovsky, 
Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles: A Study of Romantic Ideology. (Harvard University 
Press, 1952).;  Andrzej Walicki, A History of Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to Marxism (Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1979). 
5 Born as Alfred-Georges Gressent (1878-1945), a French syndicalist who for a time was a member of the 
Action Française.  His creation of the Faisceau movement in 1925 was the first fascist movement outside Italy, 
though by 1928 he had founded the Republican Syndicalist Party and had returned to the extreme left. For 
further reading see Allen Douglas, From Fascism to Libertarian Communism: Georges Valois against the Third 
Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). 
6 Blaise Pascal (1623-1662). A French mathematician, inventor, and Catholic philosopher.  Inventor of the 
mechanical calculator, he was active in writing treatises on geometry, in particular projective geometry, as 
opposed to existing Euclidean geometric models and space. Ljotić in particular was influenced by Pascal’s 
Pensées (Thoughts). 
7 Nikolaj Velimirović (1881-1956). Studied in Russia, was awarded an honorary Doctorate of Divinity by the 
University of Cambridge in 1916. By the 1930s he had undergone a transformation by which he repudiated his 
earlier ecumenical sentiments, and claimed to be a leading influence of the ZBOR movement. Immigrated to 
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his Svetosavlje8 theory. Ljotić clearly identifies the effects of certain ideological currents on 
particular stages of his life in his autobiography Iz moga života, as well as in Videlo u Tami 
(Translated in English as Light of Truth).9 For thematic purposes, it is both beneficial and 
logical to follow the chronology of Ljotić’s thought evolution as outlined in the 
aforementioned works, temporarily in respect to his early youth to the Balkan Wars, his 
experience in Paris, and the First World War and its aftermath. Such an approach will 
necessarily focus on highlighting and analysing specific ideological similarities, and 
particularities of pre-existing European Christian, monarchic, anti-democratic, and 
nationalist thought.  
 
These early influences may be said to end by 1920, by which time Ljotić had entered 
mainstream politics as a member of the Narodna Radikalna Stranka10 (People’s Radical 
Party). This of course did not preclude his later evolution in the face of authoritarianism, 
dictatorship and fascism, rather it served as a basis for his early ideological and thought 
crystallisation. 
 
Ljotić’s early ideological formation: Christianity and the Army 
 
Russian Philosophy, Slavophiles, and Christianity 
 
Dimitrije Ljotić was born on 12 August, 1891, in Belgrade, but would regard the nearby 
Danube town of Smederevo as home. His family, settled in Smederevo, was wealthy, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
the United States after WWII, he died in 1956; the Serbian Orthodox Church on May19th, 2003, canonized 
him. See Radmila Radić, “Džepna istorija Srpska pravoslavne crkve,” Pešcanik FM 3 (2005), 173–200. 
8 Svetosavlje was a term coined by Church circles close to Bishop Velimirović in the 1930s, as a reaction to 
perceived, cultural, ideological, and political threats faced by the Serbian Orthodox Church.  These perceived 
threats, were expressed through the fusing of religious thought and a secularly based nationalism as a means of 
conceptualising the relationship between the nation-state and nation, and between religion and religious 
communities. For more on its theoretical aspects, see Maria Falina, “Svetosavlje. A Case Study in the 
Nationalization of Religion,” SZRKG 101 (2007), 505–527.; John T. S. Madeley and Zsolt Enyedi, eds., Church 
and State in Contemporary Europe: The Chimera of Neutrality (London ; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2003). 
9 For an English translation see Dimitrije Ljotić, Light of Truth: Philosophical, Moral, and Political Ideas of 
Dimitrije Ljotić (Birmingham: Lazarica Press, 1984).  
10 The People’s Radical Party was founded on 8 January, 1881. Led and dominated by the personality of Nikola 
Pašić, initially the Radicals called for more local self-government, constitutional and educational reform in the 
Kingdom of Serbia, and were inspired by French radicalism. After the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes in 1918, the Radical Party provided prime ministers for eight of the ten years of 
parliamentary life until being dissolved with the proclamation of royal dictatorship on 6 January, 1929. For 
more see Milan St. Protić, “Sources of the Ideology of the Serbian Radical Movement 1881-1903”, in 
Balcanica: Annual of the Institute of Balkan Studies, Volume 37, 2007, 125-143 ; Dejan Djokić, Pašić and 
Trumbić: The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Haus Publishing Ltd, London, 2010). 
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prominent, and close to the Karadjordjević dynasty, with his grandfather serving as secretary 
to Prince Alexander. 11  The close association of the Ljotić family to the Karadjordjević 
dynasty, founded under Djordje Petrović, stems from the Ljotić family’s participation in the 
1804-1813 First Serbian Uprising, part of the larger Serbian Revolution, against the Ottoman 
Empire.12 Dimitrije’s father, Vladimir, spent many years abroad in Europe, was reputedly one 
of the first to translate Marx’s Communist Manifesto into Serbian.13 In 1858, the Obrenović 
dynasty, which was the rival of the Karadjordjević dynasty, had seized power in Serbia; thus, 
forcing Prince Alexander Karadjordjević into exile. Following the Obrenović takeover, in 
1868, Ljotić's father was forced out of the country after being implicated in a conspiracy 
against the Obrenović dynasty and Prince Milan, the dynastic representative. After Prince 
Milan stepped down in 1889, Ljotić’s father returned to Serbia. Vladimir was also close to 
the then future King Peter’s maternal great-grandfather, Knez (Prince) Stanoje, who was an 
outlaw who was killed by the Turks in January 1804. Given this familial background of 
Ljotić, it can therefore be surmised that his family has been ardently loyal to Serbia and its 
rulers. This may have conceivably influenced the nationalism that Dimitrije Ljotić himself 
manifested throughout his lifetime and ideology. 
 
Ljotić stated in his writings that from his early youth he was religious, yet he was unable to 
identify from whence this early religiosity stemmed. From an early age he writes that he was 
attracted to the Church, attending Divine Liturgy, memorising the Liturgy in its entirety, 
without grasping its true meaning.14 In fact, Ljotić’s first ambition was to become a priest.15 
Christianity would play a central role in both his early and later ideological formation. 
Moreover, Christianity was, and would remain, the mainstay and bedrock of his 
weltanschauung (worldview). It was with Christ, Ljotić contends, that the world saw both 
truth and love. Ljotić elaborates by stating that in search for the truth, man inevitably turns to 
prayer, through which Christ, as personification and messenger of truth, can be perceived in 
its entirety.16 Love, as described by Ljotić is not something that can be attained without man 
first being free. The concept of freedom, and of love, would be constant themes in Ljotić’s 
writing, though as later chapters will show, his conception and definition of freedom and of 
love was to undergo alterations, leaving us with a rather contradictory and incoherent set of 
                                                        
11 Nebojša Popov, “Populizam Dimitrija Ljotića”, in Filozofija i društvo, Vol.4, 1993, 82 
12 Ljotić, Memoari, 56-57. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Dimitrije Ljotić Odabrana dela. I Knjiga (Munich, 1981), 272. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ljotić, Light of Truth, 22. 
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ideas. This freedom involves first and foremost the detachment of all prejudices relating to 
the person and the personality, which Ljotić describes as the ‘freedom from self-love.17  
 
Ljotić’s writings on Christianity, as being the foundation of truth and love, and of the Church, 
as a defence of tradition as much as souls, shares broad similarities with the Russian 
Slavophile movement, of which Ljotić would have undoubtedly been aware, even if he did 
not acknowledge its influence in his early writings. His writing also shows a somewhat more 
tenuous link with the philosophy of Nikolai Berdyaev. 18  These similarities can be 
summarised as Ljotić’s attempt to adapt the essentials of the Slavophiles’ ‘Russian-Orthodox 
orientation’, as well as the supposed ‘world mission’ of Russia, while attempting to navigate 
through the somewhat contradictory lack of Slavophilia amongst the Slavophiles. Attempting 
to highlight similarities between Berdyaev and Ljotić is a somewhat more complex 
undertaking, though the argument can be anticipated in view of, Berdyaev’s concept of 
freedom. 
 
Berdyaev’s philosophy can be said to begin at freedom. According to him, freedom is the 
basis of all else. He continues by stating that ‘Freedom is the ultimate: it cannot be derived 
from anything. Freedom is the baseless foundation of being: it is deeper than all being’.19 
However, this freedom that Berdyaev so highly extolled was also one of self-isolation, and to 
be turned inwards. Speaking on the development of Russian thought, Berdyaev is of the 
opinion that original, free, and creative thought only appeared in Russia in the 19th century.20 
It attempted to answer the on-going dilemma of Russia’s special mission, what God intended 
for Russia. Berdyaev’s spiritual evolution began with an early enthusiasm for Marxism, 
where he adopted a transcendental ideal along with the Marxist social programme. 21 
Berdyaev ultimately however, rejected Marxism. When Marxism officially began entering 
the realm of religion, Berdyaev was of the idea that a Christian could reject all in Marxism 
                                                        
17 Ibid. 
18 Nikolai Berdyaev (1874-1948). A Russian political and religious thinker, who was a Marxist in his early 
youth and strongly identified with the concept of ‘Christian universalism’, by which all souls lost through sin, 
will eventually be reconciled with God through love and divine mercy. Unwilling to support Bolshevik rule in 
Russia, he was exiled in 1922, traveling first to Berlin, then to Paris, where he died in 1948. For further reading 
see Nikolai Berdyaev, Self-Knowledge: An Essay in Autobiography, trans. Katherine Lampert, Reprint ed (San 
Rafael: Semantron Press, 2009). 
19 Nikolai Berdyaev, The Meaning of the Creative Act, trans. Joakim, Boris, Reprint ed (San Rafael: Semantron 
Press, 2009), 145. 
20 Nikolai Berdyeav, “O Kharaktere Russkoi Religioznoi Mysli XIX-do Veka,” Sovremennye zapiski, no. 42 
(1930), 309–343. 
21 VV Zhenkovsky, A History of Russian Philosophy Volume 2 (Routledge, 2003), 760. 
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that is false, while embracing that which is true. Berdyaev in his autobiography states that he 
received no religious ‘training’ at home, and by the time he had returned to Christianity, it 
was more philosophy rather than the Bible, which aided him in his decision.22 Based on his 
ideas of Christianity, Ljotić stated that God ‘created the world and Man as an expression of 
His love’.23 
 
Berdyaev states that God desired an ‘other’ and a reciprocal answer to His love, and hence 
created the world.24 That being said, Berdyaev’s unique and somewhat convoluted writing 
style meant that his ideas, no matter how seemingly basic, were often presented in 
fragmentary fashion, thus somewhat negating a logical flow of thoughts. Berdyaev’s own 
contribution to this development of thought can be defined as ‘uncreated thought’ and ‘God-
man’.  
 
It is with the ‘God-man’ that Ljotić would have conceivably, yet speculatively, been 
influenced by. Berdyaev’s ‘God-man’, which stipulates that in order to achieve the fully 
divine life, personal and existential cooperation between God and man is essential.25 God, 
according to Berdyaev’s analysis possesses characteristics and capabilities similar to man. In 
order to prove this theory, Berdyaev analyses the experiences which frequently act as carriers 
of such emotions and phenomenon such as love, pain, and suffering.26 Ultimately, the ‘God-
man’ is seen as a rebirth, a renewal of man, linking him with the idea of the ‘New Adam’. By 
this, God became man in order to raise him to divinity. Though in Berdyaev’s analysis, this 
did not mean that through divinisation, that redemption of morality would take place.27  
 
Such expression of thought has seen Berdyaev labelled as a ‘Christian existentialist’, 28 
though Berdyaev’s eclecticism moves him away from a total association with the term. For 
Ljotić, without love, there can be no truth. Love, according to Ljotić, was both ‘many-eyed 
and well hidden’, and that it can ‘see farther than hatred’, that only ‘opens up vision to 
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darkness’, like the ‘haunted owl’.29 Speaking about God, the relationship between God and 
man, and the attainment of salvation, Ljotić writes that ‘we cannot come into contact with the 
broadcasting station that God is on, because we do not know the waves on which it works 
on’.30 However, Ljotić believed, like Berdyaev, that cooperation between God and man is 
essential, with his 1945 pamphlet Svetlo Istine31 (Light of Truth) providing his own terms for 
such a relationship. God, according to Ljotić is love. In order to be filled with God’s love 
according to Ljotić, we must ‘throw out all hatred from our hearts, and it is place, God’s love, 
for God is love and we are hate’.32 Ljotić’s second condition is that God is truth. God’s truth 
must fill our entire being for Gods truth and we are lies.33 The third condition is that God is 
purity. Ljotić continues that ‘we must become pure, as pure as the One that God sent to us as 
a model of purity’.34 Once these conditions are met, man may then enter into contact with 
God through what Ljotić describes as Podvizavanje.35 When this occurs, according to Ljotić, 
man will be able to feel Christ within us, and then, and only then would man be able to begin 
to comprehend the full measure of the Fullness of Christ.    
 
Ljotić never mentions any influence from Berdyaev; indeed, any evidence of argument is 
speculative at best. However, that does not negate the genius of Berdyaev, especially 
regarding his role in the permeation of ideas in Russian philosophy, and insights into the 
early Soviet Union, as well as thoughts on aspects of Russian philosophy. Among the 
disparate representatives of Russian philosophy were the ideas of the Slavophiles, which 
could have conceivably been adopted by Ljotić in his own search for originality and answers. 
 
Ljotić and the Slavophiles 
 
In essence, the Slavophile movement began as a literary movement, being primarily active in 
poetry, and concerning itself with the position of Russia, and a re-acquaintance with its 
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culture, in the face of increased westernisation. In this sense the Slavophiles sought to 
redefine their understanding of Russia, against the templates they had constructed of the 
West.36 As a result of such inward thinking, the Slavophiles claimed to have rediscovered 
Russian Orthodoxy, as a foundation of Russian culture, and as a new way to lead Russia to 
her national destiny. Therefore ‘Slavophilism’ in this case denotes a cultivation of Russia’s 
past, through the symbolism of its Slavonic element, as opposed to a real feeling of solidarity 
with other Slavs. Of the disparate Slavophile movement, one personality stands out as being 
its central, albeit indirectly, ideologue. This was Aleksei Khomiakov.37   
 
There is no direct evidence indicating that Ljotić acknowledged the Slavophile movement in 
his writings. However, through such broad similarities, primarily relating to issues of social 
hierarchy and social structure, along with Khomiakov’s interpretation of history, it is not 
entirely speculative to assume that Ljotić’s own thought, and theory on social re-organisation 
would have been influenced by those of Khomiakov and of the Slavophiles as a whole. 
 
Khomiakov believed that the Russian commune, as a community (obshcinnost), was a perfect 
cultural form of communal life, buttressed by a feeling of love, and not a sense of profit or 
security.38 Ljotić’s writings on his utopian ideal of society reflect Khomiakov’s sense of 
community through the South Slavic concept of the zadruga.39 Ljotić describes the zadruga 
as being a part of the ‘third way’, between communism and capitalism, and that it this is an 
essential part of the ‘organic state’.40 To further emphasise this point, Ljotić writes that the 
individual as a rule does not live outside the community. As a result, the individual needs the 
community for his/her own good. Rather than focus on the egocentrism of personal desires, 
the focus should be on the betterment of the community as a whole.41 Thus, the collective 
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will of a society will be put forward for the betterment of its people. However, if one deviates 
from the collective will, through individualist action, it harms the community. This bond 
however, according to Ljotić can only be felt on a subconscious level. It is not enough simply 
to be a part of an ethnic, linguistic, or national community. That by itself does not denote 
collective will. Instead, what Ljotić stresses is an unconscious bond, which draws and binds 
individuals together.  
 
While not explicit as to what this unconscious bond refers to, the sentiment shares similarities 
with Khomiakov’s thought, of the Church, and the commune, as the pillars of Russian 
culture. Working symbiotically for the good of Russia, the commune reflected the universal 
sense of love and freedom, illuminated by Christ and the Holy Spirit. However, it was 
realised through the Church, as a free and open Eucharistic community, permeated by the 
trust that springs from a shared faith.42 Russian society therefore, according to Khomiakov, 
was like the Russian church in the sense that it was a ‘unity in the face of God’, that would 
‘submit willingly to grace’. 43  Seeing the Church as all encompassing, and working in 
harmony with the commune, the Slavophile utopian ideal began to emerge.   
 
However, the Slavophiles were hardly enamoured with government. While recognising the 
necessity of government, they considered all forms of the state as evil. Thus autocracy, as 
limiting the burden of power to a few, was the way forward. The Slavophiles insisted that 
government should not encroach on the free life and spirit of the people. Its main aim was to 
provide defence, and the necessary elements of formalism and compulsion. 44  On an 
economic level, through periodic land distribution, a proper and permanent adjustment 
between man and labour could be created. This gives credence to Khomiakov’s assertion that 
every human society, including the state, must be based on moral principles, in particular 
Christianity. For Khomiakov, the state exists for the individual, not vice versa, and cannot be 
deified because of the principles of change and relativity that predominates within it.45 This 
synthesis has been christened as the abstract noun sobornost, from the Slavic sobor (which 
has the triple meaning of cathedral, council, and gathering). Its supposed nature is organic, 
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consisting of the multiplicity and unity in the Orthodox Church, involving the fact that the 
Church is based on the principle of councils.46  
 
The Slavophiles saw themselves as defenders of the supposed national bases of Russian 
traditional life, the commune and a resurgent and ascendant Orthodoxy, which were 
supposedly under attack from reforms. 47  What they were in effect however, was a 
manifestation of the evolution of Romantic nationalist ideology. From a historical 
perspective, Slavophile ideology shares affinities with German Romantic thinkers. Both 
Russia, and the numerous German-speaking states that would unite to form Germany were 
economically under-developed and faced the need to modernise. The need for modernisation 
would result in new political and social systems, provoking a reaction. This, according to 
Andrzej Walicki, made it easier for criticism, giving conservative thinkers a wider 
perspective making it easier to ‘idealise patriarchal traditions’, and ‘archaic social 
structures’.48 
 
In his autobiography Ljotić makes no reference to Slavophiles, but does indirectly hint at the 
notion of his Slavophile influence by stating that ‘Marxist thought does not speak for the 
Russian soul’. Neither does atheism, materialism, or class struggle. These are the thoughts of 
others’, he explains, but does not give any indication as to who the ‘others’ are. In its native 
thought, Ljotić writes, ‘Russia has neither atheism, materialism, nor class struggle’.49 Vidkun 
Quisling, future leader of the National Socialist oriented Norwegian Nasjonal Samling 
(National Union) party, who, between 1922 and 1929, worked and travelled extensively 
throughout the Soviet Union agrees, though it is unlikely that he and Ljotić were ever in 
contact. According to Quisling, ‘Marxism’ was attempting to ‘capture the masses and the 
Russian national spirit’, in order to create a new proletarian or new Socialist culture’.50 
Berdyaev counters this opinion stating that while Russia’s vastness negated any real organic 
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unity, it was Russian history, which determined the limits of Russian communism and shaped 
its character.51  
 
In his early adolescence (during the first few years of the 1900s) Ljotić began to doubt his 
religious beliefs. This happened when he was studying at the Serbian school in Salonika 
(modern Thessaloniki) where his father was consul. It was here that Ljotić entertained 
thoughts of applying for the Foreign Service, being attracted to its cosmopolitan lifestyle and 
nature.52 It was only when he returned to Belgrade to undertake his studies at the Faculty of 
Law at Belgrade University that his religious beliefs were rekindled. This occurred in 1909 
when he discovered one of his first outlets for political and moral expression. 
 
Ljotić and Tolstoy’s interpretation of Christianity 
 
During this time, Ljotić fell under the influence of Tolstoy’s interpretation of Christianity.53  
Tolstoy, in The Kingdom of God is Within You, outlines what he believes to be the failure of 
‘Church doctrine’, in emulating the doctrine of Christ, specifically Christ’s commandment of 
non-resistance to evil by force. 54  The Kingdom of God is Within You is considered a 
culmination of 30 years of Tolstoy’s thoughts not just on Christianity, but also of the 
application of a literal Christian interpretation to state and society centred on Christ’s Sermon 
on the Mount, found in the 5th to the 7th chapters of the Gospel of Matthew: Sermon on the 
Mount: righteousness of the Kingdom (5:1 – 7:29).55 Tolstoy took the Sermon on the Mount 
as a literal justification for what he described as ‘non-resistance to evil’, being himself 
influenced by correspondence from American Quakers who had proved that the duty to the 
‘non-resistance to evil’ exposed the Church’s error in allowing war and capital punishment.56  
 
Acceptance of Tolstoy’s interpretation of Christianity came during a period when Ljotić’s 
early religiosity had cooled, but had returned by 1909, when Ljotić was enrolled in the Law 
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Faculty at Belgrade University. 57  By his own admission, Ljotić, became a ‘vegetarian’, 
abstained from eating meat, and became devoted himself to what he said was the ‘virgin soul 
of Christ’. Tolstoy’s interpretation of Christianity was not just simply a religious or moral 
ideal for Ljotić. In fact, it worked into Ljotić’s early conceptions of the state, and society, 
whose enforced links Ljotić opposed, considering the state as a ‘creator of all-evil’. 58 
Through such statements, Ljotić asserted his identification as a ‘Tolstoyan Christian 
Anarchist’, claiming that if he were to be conscripted into the army, he would rather go to jail 
for his beliefs than take up a gun.59 It was also under said influence that Ljotić greeted the 
arrival of the First Balkan War in 1912. Although conscripted before the war, he refused to 
swear an oath, and in the end, was not called up. Instead, he travelled to Bulgaria with the 
intention of becoming a war correspondent, though he does not state for which publication.60 
He was refused accreditation, but managed to attach himself to the retinue of Bennet 
Burleigh, the official war correspondent of The Daily Telegraph.61 
 
Upon arriving in Bulgaria, and having his correspondent status refused, Ljotić asserts that he 
was immediately arrested in Svishtov, which he claims was due to his pacifistic outlook, and 
his ‘Tolstoyan sermons’, which were not well received.62 After his release from prison, thus 
being denied the status of a war correspondent, Ljotić returned to Serbia where he 
volunteered to serve in the medical corps stating that while he ‘could not go where there is 
killing’,63 he felt the need to do something. He spent the remainder of the First Balkan War in 
the medical corps, and would remain devoted to Tolstoy’s interpretation of Christianity. This 
personal and early liking for Christianity was an influential and foundational factor to the 
development of Ljotić’s religiosity. Under the spectre of fascism and anti-Semitism, such 
loyalism to religion can justify an exclusive, unwelcoming view and perspective toward other 
religions, such as the Jews.   
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However, there were signs of a fissure between Ljotić’s devotion to Tolstoy and events in his 
life, namely the death of his father, Vladimir, in 1912. Ljotić was extremely close to his 
father, and believed that he shared a ‘closeness of soul’ with his Vladimir and found that 
Tolstoy’s interpretation of Christianity was unable to comfort him in the wake of his father’s 
death.64 While still committed to Tolstoy’s Christianity, Ljotić, in 1913, would find that his 
belief in Tolstoy would be shaken, due to world events, which, whose effects on Ljotić, given 
the strength of his convictions, could not have been foreseen.       
 
The Second Balkan War 
 
No sooner had the First Balkan War ended, in May 1913, with the Ottomans losing most of 
their European territory to the Balkan League (made up of Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia), 
then had the Second Balkan War began. This time amongst the former allies of the Balkan 
League, with Bulgaria being unsatisfied with its territorial gains, especially in regard to 
Macedonia (or lack thereof), attacking its former allies, Greece and Serbia on 29 June, 1913. 
The Ottoman Empire and Romania, who were also engaged in territorial disputes with 
Bulgaria, joined the anti-Bulgarian ‘league’. With the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest, on 
10 August, 1913, the war was officially over, and Bulgaria was forced to give up Southern 
Dobrudja to Romania, and a large part of Eastern Thrace, but managed to retain an Aegean 
port at Alexandroupoli. Territories it had conquered during the First Balkan War. Having 
finished his legal studies in the summer of 1913, Ljotić decided on serving in a military 
hospital. His reasoning, was that ‘under the mask of Tolstoy’, he was avoiding all risks and 
hazards.65 Hence his decision, and eventual successful application to the cholera ward as an 
orderly. On 13 July, 1913, he arrived at the cholera ward at the field hospital of the 3rd Dunav 
(Danubian) Division in Kumanovo.66.  
 
Ljotić’s service in Kumanovo had a profound effect on him.  He claims that from 1 July until 
14 August, 927 people died, not just from cholera, but also from ‘yellow fever’, with 60067 of 
those deaths coming at a time when he was present. Working as an orderly, it is unsurprising 
that Ljotić describes these scenes as hell, especially in the case of the ‘yellow fever’, during 
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which he was administrating ‘yellow medicine’ (opium and cognac) every two hours. This, 
coupled with the fact that he was working in a contagious, and therefore extremely dangerous 
environment, being exposed to death and suffering daily, must have surely made a lasting 
emotional and psychological impact. It was surely with memories of death and suffering that 
would influence Ljotić to favour demobilisation and peace in his future thought. Moreover, it 
ultimately led him to break away from Tolstoy’s ways. As discussed previously, his 
idolisation and praise of Tolstoy’s teachings became the foundation for his development of 
religiousness and religious loyalty. However, his eventual breaking away from the teachings 
of Tolstoy shows that Ljotić was more than just a imitator. Instead, he was more of a critical 
thinker, with his own personal ideology. Though influenced by other people or similar 
ideologies, his ideas were ultimately based on his own interpretations, perceptions and 
beliefs. He did not blindly follow others—he may have been strongly influenced by other 
people or ideology, but he would not hesitate to go against the natural teachings of the said 
influential person or ideology to stick to his own preferences and beliefs. This may then 
justify why his ideology, though likened to fascism, are claimed in this study to be not 
entirely fascist in nature, but instead were brought about in part through his nationalism and 
religiosity.  
 
France: Ljotić, Pascal 
 
After demobilisation and the threat of war behind him (for the time being), Ljotić began his 
studies in Paris under the orders of King Peter. Ljotić writes that he was not keen on going to 
Paris, because it was against his father’s dying wishes that he go to another country, i.e., to 
learn its customs, history, laws, and soul, without first knowing those of his homeland.68 
Only after seeing the personal notes made by King Peter in a copy of the programme of 
study, did Ljotić agree to take up studies in Paris in the fall of 1913, feeling a sense of love 
and devotion to the king .69 Ljotić’s ten months in Paris had a profound impact on him, which 
would manifest itself more clearly in his political ideology during the 1930s. Part of Ljotić’s 
reasoning for accepting a scholarship to study in Paris was to acquaint himself with the study 
of ‘exact sciences’ and the art of reasoning, as they were ‘lying in his way for complete faith 
in Christ.’ He had a feeling that there was an incompleteness of Christ’s person in Tolstoy’s 
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interpretation of Christianity.70 This again shows how Ljotić was not the type to simply 
follow existing structures, ideology, and beliefs, but developed and built on his own beliefs to 
simply a crude imitation of fascism.  
 
Ljotić’s search for a complete Christ in his journey to Paris—in a nominally Catholic 
country—as a devout Orthodox Christian, raises certain interesting points The question is 
whether Ljotić viewed himself as Christian, encompassing all of Christianity’s 
denominations, or more narrowly, as Orthodox, just as he viewed himself as not a follower or 
imitator of fascism, but a unique person with his own ideology and belief. However he 
ultimately never seemed to have answered this internal struggle. Yet it was manifested onto 
ZBOR, which would claim to be a moral, and Christian movement, but one in which Muslims 
were allowed to join. To Ljotić, the Qur’an reputedly was a ‘divine book’, and that he stated 
that there were ‘ethical and moral’ people outside of Christianity.71 Ljotić’s internal struggles 
with Tolstoy’s influence notwithstanding, in Paris he was exposed to a vault of new 
knowledge and influence. These made their greatest impression upon him in the form of 
churches, libraries, and museums’.72  It was in the libraries that Ljotić’s thought formation 
would be impacted the most. He was a voracious reader, and anything that he could lay his 
hands on, he read with gusto. As such, Ljotić, at this stage may be viewed as an individual 
who, while being religious, was not narrowly restricted to any religion, idol, or prominent 
influence. Instead, he may be viewed as someone who looked into options and determined 
which were amenable to him and which he would embody in his daily life and ideology. In 
short, he was a seeker.  
 
As a result, after Tolstoy, Ljotić’s next lasting influence in keeping with a Christian 
philosophy was Blaise Pascal. Ljotić mostly credits Pascal’s influence in regard to his 
‘Christian life’, which was to mark Ljotić’s later thought. In Pascal, Ljotić saw a soul with a 
‘shining light’, a ‘teacher of proper thought’, whose Christian life, though not filled with 
much peace, showed that even a miserable life, can, when filled with the peace and joy of 
Christ, be rich and filled with light.73 Tellingly, Ljotić did not fully embrace all the ideologies 
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of Pascal down to their specifics. Instead, he seemingly took only Pascal’s Christianity and 
explanations of Christian life as signs of his greatness. Pascal’s methods of investigation, 
especially in regards to what was deemed superficial, had a lasting impact on Ljotić’s own 
search for truth. Ljotić credits Pascal with showing him how to seek the ‘truth with love’, a 
concept which would mark his later writings. He also credits Pascal with showing him how to 
master the art of reasoning. 
 
At this point, certain specificities about Ljotić’s thought began to crystallise. Certainly he was 
a devout and religious man. His early religiosity, Tolstoyan influence, and time spent in the 
Churches of Paris left him an admirer of Catholic missionary and social work, he also thought 
highly of its theological education and the preparedness of its priests. Ljotić criticised the 
Serbian Orthodox Church for abandoning its ‘internal mission’, deriding those who wished to 
lead it in such a direction as atheists or Protestants.74 Ljotić found the influence of Pascal in 
the libraries, which, coupled with frequent visits to museums, would lead him to his next 
major influence.  
 
This influence resulted in Ljotić’s reinterpretation of history in general. After frequent visits 
to Paris’ museums Ljotić stated that he ‘started to reject the interpretation of history as 
progress’, 75  and began to form a negative opinion about the then accepted mainstream 
interpretation of the French Revolution. Ljotić would later write about the effects of the 
French Revolution, one of which being the concept of individualism. The birth of 
individualism was not only a detriment to ‘organic thought’, but also a means of engaging in 
materialism, democracy, and capitalism; thus resulting in the current materialist-democratic-
capitalistic society.76 Speaking in relation to his ‘experience as a lawyer’ from the early 
1920s, Ljotić would begin to form a negative opinion of those who ‘defended for money’, for 
whom in general, the accumulation of money and wealth was a ‘soul-stealer’.77   
 
Marxism, which according to Ljotić, is born from its twin, capitalism, is taken as a clear 
example of individualist thought. Philosophy also suffered as a result of the French 
Revolution in Ljotić’s mind. Where once there was unitary thought and purpose, 
individualism, brought by the Revolution supplanted those qualities and installed atheism 
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and materialism.78 Ljotić also rejected the onset of ‘human reason’ brought by the French 
Revolution, and argued against its supposed freedom by stating that ‘there is no danger of 
freedom, but when people are equal and in brotherhood, why then are they not free’?79  
 
According to Ernst Nolte, the rejection of the French Revolution and its supposed values was 
seen as an intellectual or cultural precursor to fascism. 80  Certainly, interwar fascist 
politicians were conscious of the effects (perceived or otherwise) of the French Revolution. 
However, the argument here is whether they viewed it through a polemical, or historical 
context. Some fascist movements, notably those who were not anti-modernising, saw aspects 
of the French Revolution as beneficial in the formation of a ‘new spirit’. 81  This same 
principle, however, can be applied to the overlap between fascist/radical right, and how 
radical conservatives viewed the French Revolution. For many radical conservatives and 
nationalists, Ljotić among them, who were highly nationalistic, the French Revolution upset 
the social order, instituting a rule of democracy, liberalism, and capitalism. 
 
To Ljotić, the French Revolution overthrew all the customs, faith, thought, and institutions of 
the French.82 Though not entirely uncritical of the Catholic Church in France, and of the 
monarchy at the time, for Ljotić, the victory of ‘individualism’ over the ‘organic’ was 
anathema, and he put his efforts into rectifying this ill, which he believed gave rise to the 
societal malaise of his day. Culturally as well, individualism was making itself felt. This was 
especially the case, as Ljotić believed, in the study of history, which to his mind, glorified 
the French Revolution as a vessel of humanity and progress, a depiction he found all too 
prevalent in the museums of Paris. 
 
For the study of history, Ljotić surmises that it must be scrutinised three-dimensionally: in 
length, width, and breadth. Only then would one be able to solve the puzzle of historical 
happenings.83 History was essential to Ljotić. It was essential for the establishment of any 
national community. On one hand it is directed towards the future, and on the other, it is 
connected with the past, especially tradition. Of course, at the same time it links them. This 
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linkage between the future and past, through the medium of tradition would guide Ljotić’s 
ideological evolution as both a point of continuity, but also of legitimacy and social relations. 
It was also in the museums, seeing evidence and history of the revolutions of 1789, 1848, 
and in the case of France and the Paris commune, 1871, that Ljotić began to ponder the 
nature of freedom. Ljotić saw that, for him, freedom had two meanings. A real or ‘true’ 
freedom, which could only be attained by the ‘right’ kind of person, and the freedom of the 
‘human animal’, by which man was simply deceived into believing he was free, while in 
reality he was lead around with the mentality of a herd animal. It was only this ‘right’ man 
who would be able to attain freedom, for no matter what happened to him, he would be 
free.84 It would be these questions that Ljotić posed. It was the rejecting of the interpretation 
of history, freedom, and the French Revolution as progress that saw him became enamoured 
with the thoughts and ideals of Charles Maurras and the Action Française. 
 
Ljotić, Maurras, and the Action Française 
 
The Action Française (hereafter also referred to as the AF) came to life in the aftermath of 
the Dreyfus affair of 1894,85 and was originally a journal concerned with literature and art. 
Stewart C. Doty characterised the AF as fascist because of its link to one of its first founders, 
Maurras, who had been synonymous to the AF in the later years of his life and even 
beyond.86 Through Charles Maurras’ sermonising on ‘style’, as simplicity, the perception of 
simplicity, essentiality, and the total subordination to its central theme, this ‘style’ soon was 
applied to politics.87 Though it never generated mass popular support, it became the most 
enduring organisation on the radical right in France and amongst Francophones in North 
America. During the active years of Maurras, there was an increase in attraction among the 
Franco-American elite to fascism.88 Maurras did not fail where Ljotić had: in attracting the 
elite (or perhaps more precisely, elements of it) to his own ideas and gaining their support 
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somewhere in the middle of the reign of AF.89 At that time, Maurras was determined to 
overthrow of France’s republican parliamentary regime through the establishment of a 
determining climate of opinion. It made, according to Leon Roudiez, its ‘resounding voice 
ring daily between 1908 and 1944’ through Maurras’ official paper.90 Nevertheless, Maurras 
showed how easily he could shift views depending on the benefits to be gained from each 
partnership, or alliance with traditional elites. Maurras went through the task of attending 
mass for as long as it was in compliance with his political convenience; however, he did not 
think twice about calling the Pope pro-German, when the Vatican condemned the AF.91 Due 
to the high literary and cultural content of the AF, it established a secure elite position from 
which to propagate. Its core principles consisted of legitimist monarchism, and corporativist 
representation under a neo-traditionalist state.92 Its uniqueness, according to Stanley Payne 
was that it forged a synthesis of 19th century traditionalism and combining them with radical 
nationalism.93 With this seemingly unnatural synthesis, a new type of nationalism, that of 
‘integral nationalism’, began to make itself known in nationalist discourse. For Ljotić, the 
AF, but in particular Maurras, helped to form his later considerations on democracy in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the thought that ‘man yearns for justice’, but that 
‘justice is difficult to approach if you look at man’.94   
 
One of the aspects for which Maurras has been criticised was his thought of action as driven 
by words instead of deeds.95 The problem was that the AF attracted many individuals as 
followers who are eager for direct political action.96 But being led by a man who perceived a 
role that is likened ‘action’ as an abstract theoretical, this is where confusion can occur. 
Some of Maurras’ followers may have wanted for their leader to play an overtly active role 
in their counter-revolution, and install them in positions of power. On the other hand, 
Maurras, as leader, focused on developing a climate of opinion that would encourage 
someone to seize power and pave the way for a newly re-established monarchy.  
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Ljotić’s search for ‘truth with love’ evidenced by his admiration of Pascal, attests to his 
genuine and positive sense of religiosity. Under the influence of Maurras and the AF, we 
begin to see a greater emphasis on detail being placed in the social and political sphere of 
Ljotić’s thought, which up to a point, contrasted with his existing positive religiosity (his 
Tolstoyan influence of the state as all evil non-withstanding). For Maurras, applying his 
criticism of art and literature to society, he came to the conclusion that not all ‘traditions’ 
whether in culture or society are equal, thus this principle, when applied to nations, proves a 
nation’s superiority over others. We can see a clear example of Ljotić later adapting this 
view in Za izgradnju nacionalne kulture (For the evolution of national cultures). In it Ljotić 
writes that the best conditions for the evolvement of culture are to be found in the Christian 
spirit, and national traditions. Only through the realisation of the spiritual potential will 
national potential be able to bloom, and that national traditions symbolise experience 
(conceivably a metaphor for culture).97 For Maurras, success in every sphere of life was 
dependent on man being reasoned, cultivated, and above all disciplined, and the decadence 
that was found in existing art and culture was mirrored by the decadence found in society.98  
 
Maurras, just like Ljotić, viewed the Jews negatively and outside of the national community. 
As a result of his extreme nationalism, Maurras has been an anti-Semite throughout his 
existence in the mainstream political scene.99 As seen in his preferences in the form of 
leadership and government, Maurras saw that an anti-parliamentary regime requires a ruler 
based of bloodlines and heredity, which means there is enough continuity in the form of 
leadership to avoid instability in the government and the nation.100 Maurras’ anti-Semitic 
mores and beliefs may have added to Ljotić’s anti-Semitism. Ljotić was influenced greatly 
by Maurras’ nationalist ideologies, which reinforced his deep patriotic character; hence, the 
existence of similarities between the AF and ZBOR. However, Maurras and Ljotić are 
different in the sense that Ljotić was highly also influenced by his sincere Christian beliefs, 
while Maurras despised and discontinued his practice of Christianity despite being born into 
a Catholic family.101 This distinctive trait that differentiate Ljotić from Maurras will be 
evident in the latter years of Ljotić and the development of his ideology. 
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Above all, Maurras was a monarchist, and society was to be restructured around it. 
According to Maurras a monarch was necessary not only for society’s structure, but also for 
tradition, and the maintenance of patriotism. An eventual monarchic restoration was a pillar 
of what Maurras believed would lead to an eventual French recovery from the defeat of the 
1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War.102 For Maurras, the monarchy, like the Church, were state 
structures, pillars of society. In the eyes of Maurras and the AF, the monarch, in a position of 
unchallenged authority, would not only serve as a guarantor of patriotism, but also for 
maintenance of tradition and law and order. In his L’Enquête sur la monarchie (Survey of 
the Monarchy), Maurras writes of the hereditary nature of the monarchy, rhetorically asking 
whether it being anti-parliamentary and decentralised is not a societal good. Ljotić’s later 
writings on the monarchy would not always follow a strict Maurrassian line, though it would 
not be beyond the realm of speculation to surmise that Ljotić by this point (1913-1914) 
would already have been a committed monarchist. While Maurras argued for a decentralised 
monarchy, Ljotić would later argue for a seemingly more central role of and acceptance for 
the’ King with the entire soul, as he is divine through God’s grace as the standard bearer of 
freedom and the shield of God’s work: faith and the Church, unity and family, people and the 
Fatherland and all every freedom and justice’.103  
 
On the whole, Ljotić’s later writing, would retain similarities to the Maurrassian formula for 
the monarchy as outlined in the Gazette de France from 6 May, 1899 in which Maurras in 
his manifesto Dictateur et Roi (Dictator and King) states that ‘to the hereditary institution of 
the family, and the prominent ruling entities of the commune and the province, and the 
professional stabilising institution of political authority’.104 Following this formula, Ljotić 
would try to adapt elements of it to the socio-economic conditions in post-World War One 
Yugoslavia, and attached great importance to this as a means of ‘educating’ the nation and 
people. 
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The reorganisation of society was a high priority of Maurras and the AF. Both called for 
class co-operation as opposed to the Marxist call for class warfare, in the hope of reconciling 
employers and workers, which would result in the integration of the workers, both morally 
and socially in the national whole. By doing so, class co-operation would then prove to the 
workers that their natural interests would lay in the prosperity of their trade, of which the 
welfare of employer and employee was one. 105  The corporatism of the AF was not 
coherently clarified until 1922, and then it was George Valois, rather than Maurras, which 
gave the organisation its structure of corporatism. What it would show was the difference in 
both opinion and ideology of Maurras and Valois, with Maurras especially, relegating 
economic matters. Valois however, partly due to his previous leftist background, was much 
more economically sophisticated, and began a campaign for an États-Généraux (Estate 
General) as a precursor to a neo-monarchic corporatism. This Estate General would fuse 
together modes of French production, by bringing together industrial and union leaders 
together in a movement representing social and economic realities that the nation must bring 
under control. 106  It would further represent the realities of French society, by bringing 
together the family, the province, corporations, public servants, and the Church in order to 
co-ordinate the national focus.107  
 
Much of Ljotić’s writing would reveal a commitment to what he would refer to as 
domaćinstvo. 108  In Ljotić’s vision of Yugoslavia, God, King, and domaćin were to be 
mainstays of the new social order. According to Ljotić, the domaćin were to form an 
unofficial council of local leaders, who in cooperation with similar councils would create a 
spirit of understanding and readiness to help, anywhere in the nation. This equation could 
then also be applied to the ideal kingdom. In Ljotić’s view, the ‘supreme ruler’ of the 
domaćinstvo was also the supreme ruler of the universe, God. The temporal ruler, according 
to Ljotić, can only derive his ‘guiding principles’ from the teachings of the Christian Church. 
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This same formula would apply to the domaćin in its relation to organising the life of the 
family.109 God invests the King in majestic lustre and royal prerogatives, and which far 
surpasses ordinary human logic.110 In his role of protector of those things that are Godly, he 
becomes the King-domaćin, second after God, and the embodiment of the nation. Without 
the domaćin, Ljotić argues, there would be no accomplishments. All work, no matter how 
laborious, does not count, without the domaćin. Ljotić describes toil as the blossom, and the 
accomplishment as fruit. Therefore, the people (Yugoslav) rejoice in accomplishment.111  
 
This concept of domaćinstvo would be unique only it its appearance in a Yugoslav domestic 
concept. While there were others, especially the Croat philosopher and ethno-psychologist 
Vladimir Dvorniković, who, as a strong proponent of ‘integral Yugoslavism’, wanted to mix 
the best elements of the Serbian and Croatian character, especially the image of the ‘heroic 
bandits’, the hajduks. The hajduks would serve as an ideal type for his Dinaric patriarchal 
culture, which was to form the basis of the Yugoslav entity.112 Yet Dvorniković would not 
envision a social order based on domaćinstvo, nor would he refer to anything similar in his 
writings.  
 
Ljotić assumes that ‘Yugoslavs’ are somehow naturally inclined to the domaćin system, and 
those who attempt to seduce the people from their natural paths, Marxists, are simply the 
manifestation of society’s malaise brought upon through individualism. Arguing for the 
reorganisation of the nation into staleži (estates), Ljotić claims that the ‘state lives off class 
estates’, and that they are linked with ‘humanity’s natural society’, and that they will remain 
inside, outside, or despite the state’.113 As a utopian vision, Ljotić presupposes that the 
establishment of the domaćinstvo system would immediately result in the cessation of any 
conflict, whether they are cultural, economic, political, or social. On the other side of this 
supposed formula for harmony, there is the argument that replacing economic liberalism with 
a co-operative order (corporatism), based on guilds, could in theory, take the power away 
from the workers. This rejection of democracy and parliamentary in favour of a new societal 
hierarchy, and economic system could just as likely to be seen as having elitist implications 
as having utopian ones. As a result of his exposure to the ideas of Maurras, Ljotić’s ideas and 
                                                        
109 Miloš Martić, “Dimitrije Ljotić and the Yugoslav National Movement ZBOR, 1935-1945”, 230. 
110 “Potvrda Iskustva” in Dimitrije Ljotić, Videlo u tami, 55. 
111 Dimitrije Ljotić, Light of Truth: Philosophical, Moral, and Political Ideas of Dimitrije Ljotić, 56. 
112 Vladimir Dvorniković, Karakteroligija Jugoslovena (Belgrade: Kosmos, 1939), 548-553. 
113 Dimitrije Ljotić, Govori i članci Sveska 3 (Munich, 1954), 41. 
 67 
nature of the state and of authority began to shift away from the anarchical and Tolstoyan 
variation of the state as the creator of evil to a more nuanced view of the necessity of 
authority, but an authority that not everyone was entitled to. The event though, which caused 
a radical change in elements of Ljotić’s thinking was as yet unforeseen, but drawing ever 
closer.   
 
Ljotić and the First World War 
 
The assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June, 1914 in Sarajevo, 
occurred at a time when Ljotić was in Serbia on vacation. The assassin, Gavrilo Princip, was 
a member of Mlada Bosna (Young Bosnia), which called for the union of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina with Serbia, and of all South Slavs into a unitary state.114 As a consequence of 
the assassination, the First World War (1914-1918) broke out when Austria-Hungary 
subsequently issued an ultimatum to the Kingdom of Serbia, which was partially rejected, 
thus, provoking Austria-Hungary to declare war. By November 10, 1914, Ljotić was with his 
unit, the 3rd platoon, 4th battalion, 5th infantry regiment near the Kolubara river115 (in western 
Serbia). Less than a week later, his regiment was on the defensive from an Austro-Hungarian 
offensive culminating in the Serbian victory at the Battle of Kolubara from, 3 December to 9 
December, 1914. In the midst of war, Ljotić describes his experiences in the army. His first 
experience, which he takes pains to point out, is freedom. This freedom according to Ljotić 
came as a part of his duty. This first appeared in the aftermath of the Battle of 
Kajmakčalan, 116  in 1916, which saw the Serbian Army finally manage to dislodge the 
Bulgarians from the peaks of Kajmakčalan, and forced them on the defensive. During this 
time Ljotić’s duties primarily consisted of writing battle and evaluation reports that he 
describes as both ‘sharp and sarcastic’, and of operations and higher officers.117    
 
Ljotić recalls that he did not find the army ‘difficult’ and that he undertook his duty with 
dedication and with free will. Ljotić goes further by stating that between the ages of twenty-
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three to twenty-nine, his six years in the army was the best period of his life.118 By dint of his 
participation in active combat duty, as opposed to his previous war experiences as a medical 
orderly, Ljotić turned his back on Tolstoy’s interpretation of Christianity. He states that at 
this time he wasn’t entirely within the ‘reach of the Church’, but he was steadily moving in 
that direction. He felt shame that he was seemingly ‘hiding away’ while others were risking 
their lives, and felt compelled by honour (and paradoxically, love) to do his duty. His 
wartime experience was marked not only by personal courage, but also by the witnessing of 
immense suffering, of which affected Ljotić greatly.    
 
It was while at the front that Ljotić became acquainted with the basic political philosophy of 
Georges Valois, through Valois’ L’Homme qui vient: Philosophie de l’autorité 119  (The 
Coming Man: Philosophy of Authority). Given that he was under the stress and danger of 
combat, thinking of one’s own existence, mortality, and for what it is being risked for, Ljotić 
can perhaps be forgiven for not having a clear perspective of what he would later perceive to 
be authority, at this point. L’Homme qui vient was to influence Ljotić greatly. Valois and 
Ljotić shared similar wartime experiences, so it is perhaps unsurprising that he would turn to 
Valois as a means to understand what was going on around him. It was this work, which lead 
Ljotić to conclusions about the nature and relationship of authority to the state. 
  
Ljotić, Valois, the path of least resistance, and the nature of authority 
 
Valois had previously been attracted to a form of anarcho-syndicalism, before becoming a 
member of the AF. In L’Homme qui vient, Valois outlines his social and economic doctrines 
that would later serve as the basis for his later thought and action. Much of this thought was 
based around a synthesis of what Valois described as a scientific law, and a historical myth. 
Valois’ scientific law, which he called the ‘law of least effort’, argues that ‘human energy 
follows the path of least resistance’, by which humankind tends to avoid pains, though 
Valois stresses that ‘any prolonged effort creates fatigue, and eventually pain’.120 Valois 
refers to historical myth as ‘following the law of least effort’ in that humanity does nothing, 
and that after having their fill, simply lay down.  It would be among this mass, that one man, 
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stronger or more ambitious, would impose his will, to force others to produce for him.121  It 
should be noted that for Valois, as is evidenced in the nuanced way in which he approaches 
it, social Darwinism is a continuous theme. Valois contends that in nature, brute force and 
slavery is necessary in order to oblige men to work, and that the only constants in life are 
strength and struggle.122 As a result, the best form of government would be the person with 
the greatest interest in the continued prosperity of the state. Valois found the answer to this 
question by postulating for the return of a hereditary monarch, even if he would need 
prodding to accept such a position.123  
 
Ljotić was extremely interested in questions pertaining to man’s inclination, and to the nature 
of man’s relationship not just with God, but also with himself. He picked up on Valois’ 
observation on man’s inclinations, stating that ‘all nature, animate and inanimate’ like man, 
pursues the same goal, that of least resistance.124 It is only the saintly and the brave who 
manage to overcome their self-inertia in order to work. The heroic character, and of will, as 
defined by Valois was also taken by Ljotić. To Ljotić, the foremost characteristic of bravery 
is that of sacrifice. This sacrifice would not simply take the form of a physical self-sacrifice, 
but the willingness to sacrifice for others, and for higher ideals.125 As veterans of the First 
World War, Valois and Ljotić had the same, shared front-line experience, which in this case 
would coalesce around the issue of the ‘will’ and of the nature of authority.   
 
As man was by nature inclined to idleness and the path of least resistance in the minds of 
Ljotić and Valois, it was the ‘will’ of an individual, which made them act, and made them 
brave. Ljotić credits his firmness and his ‘will’ on the army, and on war.126 This firmness 
was evidenced not only by a strong individual will, but also of the appearance of having 
strong willpower in the eyes of others. This thinking of the will was also tied to freedom. 
For, Ljotić, the will, or an ideal, can only be attained at the costs of effort, pain, and sacrifice. 
Ljotić tied a sense of will to the mastery of one’s self, the completion of ‘whole man’, or 
‘whole woman’ would come after one first attained a spiritual mastery over their inclinations 
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and desires.127  Personal cleansing, especially in times of great suffering and strife was a sign 
of not just will, but of bravery, and the desire for freedom.  
 
Ljotić was theorising and pondering during a time, between 1915 and 1916 of great upheaval 
not just for himself, but also for the entire Serbian army, and for Serbia itself. In 1915, 
Ljotić, along with the majority of the army, retreated from Serbia into Albania, in the 
eventual hope of reaching Allied lines. This hardship, termed the Great Serbian Retreat,128 
saw Ljotić as a direct witness to the deprivations of disease, starvation, lack of logistics, and 
constant harassing attacks from all sides. It is therefore not surprising that a ‘strong will’ or 
‘firmness’ was necessary in order to keep one’s self together. It was at this time that Ljotić 
saw his wartime observations coming to light. While passing through Kosovo, Ljotić 
recognised what he deemed to be the ‘Serbian mission’. Serbs likened the Serbian retreat 
through Kosovo as ‘Christ on the cross’.129 
 
Ljotić saw the trials and ordeals of the Serbian military as providential not just for the army, 
but for Serbia as a whole. There was a real chance, in Ljotić’s mind, of attaining ‘freedom’, 
and real ‘will’, through trials and tribulations in order to build the perfect man, and the ideal 
state, with God at its head. However, at this time, and under the influence of Valois, Ljotić, 
using what he saw in the army as a microcosm for his later writings on societal organisation, 
and for society in general, began seriously pondering the relationship of the state to 
authority. As a result, he would, based on his ‘conclusions’ of his wartime experience, break 
from his earlier mode of thinking of the state, and society, as being detached from authority. 
 
Ljotić’s first ‘conclusion’ was on the direct relationship of authority to society. He writes that 
after careful consideration and observation (from the frontlines), that authority is closely 
linked with human society, as an organic and inseparable authority. 130  Ljotić was also 
concerned with, and critical of, those who power is vested in. Again, using his war time 
experiences (his aforementioned freedom), as a basis for his later thinking, he saw a far 
greater role being placed on training, and on supposed qualifications, rather than personal 
                                                        
127 Ljotić, Light of Truth, 50. 
128 A result of Serbia’s encirclement and invasion by the forces of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Germany.  
Soldiers and civilians alike joined in the general retreat, and were subject to poor transport, lack of medical 
supplies, and constant threat and attack from all sides.   
129 “Iz moga života”, in Dimitrije Ljotić, Odabrana dela. I Knjiga, 319.  
130 Ibid. 296. 
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character. Here, as with bravery being a foremost characteristic, so, according to Ljotić was 
honesty. For without honesty, Ljotić surmised, there can be no trust, and without trust, no 
action, or work. The actions of certain officers at the front, in Ljotić’s mind, directly 
correlated to the link between honesty, bravery, and real power.131 Therefore, Ljotić’s third 
‘conclusion’ was tied in with his second ‘conclusion’. Basing his observations on the actions 
of higher officers, he came to the decision that in times of dangerous situations, such as war, 
a ‘heroic higher staff’ was needed, in terms of bravery, honesty, will, and sacrifice. Fourthly, 
Ljotić saw that society, in his eyes, could not be built without struggle.   
 
He continues by saying that human society cannot be expected from ‘peace, joy, and a state 
of happiness’. 132  This is likened to his earlier belief in the providential mission of the 
Serbian nation, which he began writing on in the aftermath of the Serbian 1915 retreat. Ljotić 
also recognises providence in regard to his own person. While being wounded twice, Ljotić 
concedes that without God’s protection, he truly is weak, and also freely admits to his own 
weakness. He welcomed the creation of Yugoslavia on 1 December, 1918, and in that he saw 
it as providential. He would later lament however, that South Slavic unity was not complete 
without the Bulgarians, and that Yugoslavia, but the enthusiasm welcoming the new state 
was a great force.133 At this stage, Ljotić’s early formal influence can be said to end. He 
would of course, continue to be influenced by domestic and foreign events in the future, but 
a crystallisation of thought and ideology were starting to take form. 
 
Conclusion   
 
There is nothing inherently outlandish about Ljotić’s ideological progression. For him, 
atheism was anathema to human perfection, to the collective will, and to society. Ljotić’s 
writings attest to his religiosity, with the theme of God, and God as love, God as purity, and 
God as truth, being evident early on. His religious belief also showed itself in his approach to 
social organisation and hierarchy. His strong Christian values, based on his perception of 
faith may be a possible predictor of his anti-Semitism. These will be further discussed in the 
succeeding sections of this thesis. Moreover, the early experiences of Ljotić, especially 
pertaining to his wartime experiences have been essential to the formation of his ideas, and 
                                                        
131 Ibid. 303. 
132 Ibid. 309. 
133 Dragan Djukić, “Pedagoško-andragoška misao i rad Dimitrija Ljotića (2),” 22. 
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of the tribulations and challenges that would arise because of it. The strong grounding in 
faith and in God, and sincere nationalism certainly informed his opinion of the importance of 
being of service to others, especially for people belonging to his nation, through his actions. 
According to Paxton, the beginning of fascism development is the desire to deconstruct the 
existing system because of its flaws and create a new system for the betterment of society. It 
was (partly as will be shown) through this drive that Ljotić created ZBOR as a means of 
freeing society from the unfairness of the dominant philosophies and as a means of 
collectively addressing the common troubles of people within his nation. His determination 
to create his own movement, as a solution to his perceived crisis or problem, is a trait that 
may liken him to fascist. But this however, is just the initial stage of fascism, which may be 
considered a superficial basis for claiming comparability between the two entities: Ljotić and 
fascism. As will be shown, Ljotić’s call for a new system would be able to find, for a time, 
tolerance under a dictatorial monarchic regime. 
 
Using the concepts of zadruga, and the domaćin, Ljotić, under the influence of the Russian 
Slavophiles and the AF, calls for a harmonious union and organisation of society, based, not 
unlike the Estates General of pre-Revolution France. This ‘organic union’134 was to have 
God at is head, though the King is to be vested with God’s grace and act benevolently to his 
subjects, who are in turn organised within their industry, community, and family, along 
similar lines as outlined in Ljotić’s domaćinstvo.  
 
Atheism, according to Ljotić was a part of a much larger malaise that had afflicted Europe 
since the French Revolution. This malaise was the Revolution itself, with Ljotić identifying it 
as the harbinger of the modern ills of individualism, capitalism, atheism, materialism, and 
Marxism. Marxism, a topic on which Ljotić wrote extensively, and its negation was to be a 
major influence on his worldview, viewed through a religious and nationalist lens. Ljotić 
feared a Communist revolution for the bloodshed and anarchy, which he felt would surely 
arise from such an endeavour, which in part explain is vision of the state. 
 
                                                        
134 Organic nationalism, shaped and formed through elements of romanticist thought, hold that the world has 
always consisted of natural nations, and that these nations are bedrocks of history. These differing nations can 
be easily ascertained by pointing out cultural differences. This assumption of primordialist nations and 
nationalism, was utilised by Maurras and Ljotić, borrowing from de Maistre, to legitimise and justify their 
conception of social hierarchy and order. For more see; Anthony Smith, Nationalism and Modernism (London: 
Routledge, 1998). 
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The state, in Ljotić’s early thinking underwent radical changes. In his early years, under the 
influence of Leo Tolstoy, Ljotić gravitated to a so-called Christian Anarchism, and accepted 
Tolstoy’s interpretation of the state as the creator of all that is evil. He would later come to 
completely reject this view, though it is worth pointing out that to the Slavophiles, though 
they were autocrats, were in their own way, anarchists as well. Nicholas Riasonovsky makes 
this point by stating that the Slavophiles were ‘anarchists of a peculiar kind’. They regarded 
every form of the state as evil, but were convinced that the state was also a reality that 
couldn’t be avoided.135 Ljotić’s conception of the state underwent changes as a result of his 
war experience.  Basing his views on society in part through the hierarchy he was subject to 
in the military, in addition to a religiously based corporativism, he saw that the state and 
authority were in inevitably linked, or else anarchy would reign. By that token, there was the 
question of the ‘will’. Qualifications, or position alone were not enough to denote or rather to 
command respect.  
 
What were needed in Ljotić’s opinion were bravery, honesty, and a willingness to sacrifice. 
A strong will was needed, and based on Valois’ law of least resistance, in order to lead, 
because it was only with a strong will that man would overcome his natural inertia and be 
inclined to effort. Above all, based on his experiences, Ljotić believed that life was a 
struggle, a constant conflict. This enlightened him to his purpose of addressing this conflict; 
hence his future creation of the ZBOR movement. In his mind one should not expect to 
achieve a harmonious society without struggle, just like one has to struggle against one’s 
own personal interests and inclinations in order to achieve spiritual regeneration, and 
perfection. One form of struggle that Ljotić envisioned was the need for the creation of a new 
society through his ZBOR movement in order to address the troubles of his time. His 
personal struggles became his driving force (but not catalyst, as will be shown) toward 
envisioning the creation of ZBOR that is needed to end unfairness in society. The perception 
of the need for a radical change may also be similar to fascist ideals, but Ljotić’s methods 
were different from Fascist Italy and other known fascists, as will be seen in the succeeding 
sections of this thesis. Establishing these distinctions is essential to understanding ZBOR and 
its progress through its lifetime, as what will be discussed in the succeeding sections of this 
thesis. 
 
                                                        
135 Nicholas Riasanovsky, Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles: A Study of Romantic 
Ideology, 149. 
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Another constant in Ljotić’s early formation, and one not previously thoroughly covered, is 
the wider European context from which he drew his influences. In this European context, 
Ljotić viewed everything negative as stemming from what he viewed as values installed by 
the Enlightenment136(as a historically specific conception), and embodied in the French 
Revolution. This rejection of supposed ‘Enlightenment values’ was a mainstay of earlier 
conservative philosophers who viewed the revolution in France with disdain for the suffering 
it caused. Among these philosophers was Joseph de Maistre,137 who appealed to what he 
perceived to be empirical facts of history, and human behaviour, to discredit the political and 
social changes of the French Revolution. He preached sacredness of the past, and the virtue 
of subjugation to monarchies, whether temporal or spiritual, as counterweight to the 
incurable and corrupt nature of man. This was in direct contrast to the top-down ‘civil 
religion’, by which elements of popular, or folk religion are incorporated into the 
glorification of either nation or political culture.   
 
Maurras, and later Ljotić, not only adapted elements of de Maistre’s social hierarchy, they 
also continued his tradition of anti-modernism, especially in regards to nations and 
nationalism, as constant ‘organic entities’, which, in the twentieth century, would be an 
attempt to render modernist discourse as superfluous and irrelevant. What this shows, is that 
far from originality of thought, Ljotić, was immersed in currents of pre-existing 
heterogeneous political and philosophical thought. What would add to Ljotić’s ‘originality’ 
was this application, based on his personal interpretation of such ideas, into what he 
perceived to be as Yugoslav, and later a narrower Serbian sense of ‘tradition’, and the 
domestic situation in the new Yugoslav state. This interpretation would change again, with 
the occupation of Yugoslavia by Nazi Germany, whose ideological influences would begin 
to assert itself in Ljotić’s synthesis of his syncretistic ideology.  
 
                                                        
136 The trans-national term ‘Enlightenment’ has become interchangeable to the point of confusion.  For a 
narrower focus, the ‘enlightenment’ had its social centre in France, as such that the tenets of its beliefs were 
most widely disseminated there. As the term itself is not clear, ‘enlightenment’ as a generic concept will be 
taken to mean the replacing of darkness with light, which, taken metaphorically can be applied to the replacing 
of ignorance with wisdom. 
137 Joseph de Maistre, known as Joseph-Marie, Comte de Maistre (1753-1821) was a defender of hierarchical 
order and monarchism in the immediate aftermath of the French Revolution. Viewing the Revolution as 
providential for the monarchy’s promotion in France of the atheism of the ‘philosophes’, de Maistre viewed 
rationalism as a cover for chaos and violence, and is considered to be a leading proponent of a European 
conservatism, though of a more authoritarian strand of ‘throne and altar’, which can be transliterated into 
support for monarchic autocracy. His writings would leave a lasting impression on Charles Maurras. For more 
see Joseph de Maistre, Considérations sur la France. Suivi de Essai sur le principe générateur des constitutions 
politiques. (Editions complexe, 2006). ; Joseph de Maistre, Oeuvres, ed. Glaudes, Pierre (Robert Laffont, 2007). 
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The early ideology of Ljotić can be seen to be composed from a sense of nationalism, partly 
from familial experience, but also from his understanding of history. Moreover, his devotion 
to his family and familial ties further strengthened his nationalism and loyalty to the 
monarchy. These initial set of ideology that developed in his early years as a young adult 
served as a significant aspect of the foundation of his development. Through an analysis of 
Ljotić’s ideological precursors, and a crystallisation among themes such as monarchism, 
anti-democratic, and anti-modernist thought, a particular trend begins to emerge, which 
would lead to its expression in the early decades of the twentieth century through the 
politically extreme radical right.  
 
What is also evident, especially in the case of Ljotić, is the deep complexity and 
heterogeneity of not only his individual ideological development and formation, but that of 
the radical right as well, as distinct from fascism, or from a more moderate yet ‘traditionalist’ 
mainstream conservative thought. This amorphous ‘grey area’ also leads to numerous 
problems in attempting to label Ljotić and the ZBOR movement. While initially 
authoritarian, neither Ljotić nor ZBOR were clearly delineated as fascist outside of the 
Marxist camp of interpretation. This is contrasted with the turmoil and instability of Nazi 
occupation where ZBOR, and Ljotić personally, would exhibit signs of Nazification while 
attempting to maintain what he felt was his original and traditional thought and ideology.  
 
This then poses the question as to where does ZBOR fit in a European context, and where, if 
we take ZBOR as an organisational manifestation of Ljotić’s ideological evolution, does it fit 




Chapter 2: Ljotić’s thought in a wider European context 
 
        
Ljotić frequently praised Charles Maurras and the AF. Hence the question that arises is 
whether Ljotić wanted to impart and implant elements of Maurras’ thought into a Yugoslav 
context. If so, then was it to be a full imposition or one sensitive and flexible in adapting to 
local conditions? This chapter will highlight Ljotić’s ideological development within an 
already existing European monarchist and nationalist current, as exemplified by Charles 
Maurras and the AF. Maurras and the AF exerted the greatest influence over the formation of 
both Ljotić and ZBOR in regard to ideology and social policy, under the tripartite slogan of 
‘God, Monarchy, and Province’, (in ZBOR’s case province would be substituted by 
domaćin).1 This is not to downplay the importance of Slavophile and pan-Slavic mystical 
thought in Ljotić’s evolution. However, on an organised political level, the AF would exert 
much more influence than the more romantic and abstract thinking of the Slavophiles who 
never managed to organise themselves into a cohesive movement. These policies, with slight 
alteration would be adopted by Ljotić and applied, albeit abstractly and arbitrarily into the 
political life of interwar Yugoslavia. It would be perceived by ZBOR as an attempt at a ‘third 
way’ between capitalism and communism, striving for national, political, and social harmony 
and unity. The emphasis on ‘abstract’, as will be shown in later chapters, will refer to the 
supposed superficiality of ZBOR’s ideology, which was often little expounded upon by 
Ljotić, or was couched in semi-mystical nuances and metaphors rendering it largely 
incomprehensible and incoherent to even potential supporters.   
 
This was in contrast to the writings of Maurras, and the political activities of the AF, who 
seemingly had a well-defined and clear political program, namely, the return of the monarchy 
by any means.2 As this chapter will show, Ljotić and ZBOR would define its ideological core 
                                                        
1 The term applies both to ‘host’, and ‘household’, and is intending to portray a sense of order and harmony 
within ZBOR’s social hierarchy, based on as will be shown, on the socio-political and socio-economic formula 
of ‘God, King, Nation’.  
2 Much has been published in both English and French historiographies in regard to the AF, both from an 
ideological-political, to a more cultural-literary approach. For more see Victor Nguyen, Aux origines de l’Action 
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through various radical-right and authoritarian strands present within the AF, the foremost 
being monarchism, nationalism, and the AF’s corporatism, though not always as a direct 
imitation. ZBOR’s ideological formation would show more similarities in the interwar era to 
the model of the AF than Fascism or National Socialism (to be expounded on in the next 
chapter), when viewed through an authoritarian radical right wing, and monarchist prism, 
which would incorporate fascist elements, as opposed to a strictly narrow or imitative fascist 
paradigm. This would be in contrast, on a domestic Yugoslav level, with the more fascist like 
the Croatian Ustaša movement, which espoused a virulent Croatian nationalism, and like 
ZBOR, would collaborate with the Axis powers during the Second World War, but 
emphasised a more strident revolutionary and racist aspect to its ideology.3  
 
Secondly, in a wider European context of interwar nationalism and monarchism, the 
appearance of the AF saw a modern dimension to the discourse-surrounding counter-
revolutionary thought. The AF’s ideological framework and template would become a sort of 
brand name for numerous organisations, chiefly for the Integralismo Lusitano (Lusitanian 
Integralism) in Portugal, and to a lesser degree, for the Associazione Nazionalista Italiana 
(Italian Nationalist Association) in Italy, and the literary Acción Española (Spanish Action), 
in Spain. Thus a breakdown and analysis of the AF’s key ideological tenets, is critical to 
understanding ZBOR’s ideological antecedents within a pre-fascist, nationalist, monarchist, 
and traditionalist context of ‘counter-revolutionary’ discourse and thought.  
 
Furthermore, even though ZBOR’s appearance on the political scene in 1935 coincided with 
the formation of numerous imitative fascist movements and parties throughout Europe, its 
formation would not be inspired on the whole by fascism. This chapter, therefore, will 
contribute to a better understanding not only of the ZBOR movement, its ideological 
antecedents, and its ideological and organisational application in a local Yugoslav context. It 
will also however contribute to the debate surrounding the non-static phenomenon of extreme 
right movements as a whole and their adaptation to mass politics and local political cultures 
throughout Europe, specifically their later partial appropriation by Fascism and National 
Socialism. This will add further nuances to the complex picture of Ljotić and the ZBOR 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Française: intelligence et politique vers 1900 (Paris: Fayard, 1991).; François. Huguenin, L’Action française: 
une histoire intellectuelle (Paris: Perrin, 2011).; Jacques. Prévotat, L’action française (Paris: Presses 
univesitaires de France, 2004).; Weber, Action Française : Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth Century France. 
Maurras’ ideas were most clearly defined in Charles Maurras, Mes Idées Politiques. Les grandes études 
politiques et sociales (Paris: A. Fayard, 1937). 
3 For more on the Ustaša see introduction. 
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movement, and contribute to the understanding of ZBOR as a movement primarily of the 
mainstream European interwar radical and authoritarian right.  
 
 The Action Française: Origins and Thought Development 
 
The AF has long been perceived as the ideological and intellectual depository of Charles 
Maurras. While no doubt true, the structural origins of what would later become the AF were 
formed without Maurras. The founding of what would later be the AF, an abstract theoretical 
and esthetical concept began in 1898, with the founding of the journal of L’Action Française 
in April of that year. Under the initial leadership of Henri Vaugeois, and Maurice Pujo, 
L’Action Française soon evolved into a more organised political movement, the Comité de 
l'Action Française French Action Committee), officially proclaimed at a conference on 20 
June, 1899.4 The founding of a literary review, the Revue de l’Action Française on 10 July, 
1899, followed this act.5 What the founding of the AF would show, would be a markedly 
different initial and formative stage from that of ZBOR, with Maurras’ initial political aims 
and thought, as will be shown, being markedly different from Ljotić’s. 
 
In its initial phase, Maurras, as previously stated, had no involvement with the founding of 
the French Action Committee, which attempted to portray itself as a non-party movement, 
similar to a pressure group, whose interest it was to influence elections towards a nationalism 
based on national unity. In fact, neither Pujo, nor Vaugeois were monarchists (initially), and 
the committee espoused republican, conservative, nationalist, and traditionalist ideals, similar 
to that of Maurice Barrès.6 Maurras at this time was embarking on his journalist career, 
turned to political polemics in the aftermath of the Dreyfus affair.7  
                                                        
4 Henri Vaugeois, L'Action française, conférence du 20 juin 1899, Paris, Bureaux de l’Action française, 1899. 
5 Weber, Action Française : Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth Century France, 20. 
6 Maurice Barrès (1862-1923). A French journalist and politician, best known for his trilogy ‘The Cult of the 
Self’ between 1888-1891. A romanticist and individualist, and anti-Dreyfusard, he founded a short-lived literary 
review ‘La Cocarde’ from 1894-1895, which attempted to bridge the gap between extreme left and extreme 
right, of which Maurras was an occasional contributor to. Close to the AF and Maurras, he was anti-monarchist, 
and along with Maurras, conceived the nation in terms of ‘ethnicity’ His virulent anti-Semitism differed from 
Maurras’ in its base in pseudo-scientific racial theories, as well as his stringent anti-monarchism. For more see  
Michael Curtis, Three against the Third Republic: Sorel, Barrès, and Maurras (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2010).; Robert Soucy, “Barrès and Fascism,” French Historical Studies 5, no. 1 (1967), 67–97.; 
Zeev Sternhell, Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français (Brussels: Complexe, 1985). 
7 The Dreyfus Affair was a political scandal that divided and radicalised France from 1894 until 1896. Seen as a 
gross case of injustice, the scandal centred on the case of Alfred Dreyfus, on trial for treason. In the context of 
German annexation of Alsace, after the traumatic French defeat of the 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War, 
Dreyfus’ Jewish origin would also see an increase in nationalism and anti-Semitism. The Affair resulted in a 
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To Maurras, the Dreyfus Affair clearly showed that the French Third Republic was powerless 
to resolve state affairs.8 His political journalism started with his articles in Le Soleil (The 
Sun) in May 1895, which he claimed to have agreed to do by reading the Philippics of 
Demosthenes.9 By 1899, he had set up his own literary review, the AF, as an offshoot of the 
existing journal of Pujo and Vaugeois, which began publication on 1 August, 1899.10 It was 
through this journal, which Maurras attempted to turn the existing French Action Committees 
of Pujo and Vaugeois into a more thoroughly monarchist oriented movement, based on his 
political ideals.  
 
What then, were Maurras’ ideas? How did he decide on monarchism as the best form of 
government in which to unify, and protect, and regenerate and reorganise France? What were 
the ideological antecedents of his thinking and how did they fit into the political thinking of 
the early twentieth century, and why did they become an ideological beacon for a European 
nationalist political mobilisation? 
 
Charles Maurras: Art and Politics as Aesthetics 
 
Maurras’ early biographical chronology shows his being raised in a partially monarchist and 
Catholic environment on his maternal side. In the aftermath of the 1871 French defeat in the 
Franco-Prussian War and the societal slide to Republicanism, with even many monarchists 
accepting this as inevitable.11  In his early youth, Maurras, under the influence of noted 
Provençal poet Frédéric Mistral, became a disciple of the regionalist and federalist Félibrige 
                                                                                                                                                                            
deep political cleavage between the Republicans and nationalists, as well as accentuating anti-Semitism in 
France in all social strata. 
8 The French Third Republic was a Republican form of government in France from 1870 until 1940. Its shape 
was codified by the French Constitutional Law of 1875, which saw the creation of a Chamber of Deputies and 
Senate to serve as legislature, with executive power in the presidency. With the Radical-Socialist coalition 
victory in the 1936 elections, sweeping reforms, based on trade union wishes were introduced thus exacerbating 
existing polarisation.  It fell with the Nazi invasion of France in 1940. For more see Philippe Bernard and Henri 
Dubief, The Decline of the Third Republic 1919-1939 (Cambridge University Press, 1988).; Pierre Miquel, La 
Troisième République (Fayard, 1989). For a monarchist and AF view of the Third Republic see Jacques 
Bainville, La Troisième République (Arthème Fayard, 1935). 
9 Curtis, Three against the Third Republic, 59. 
10 Ibid. 96. 
11 Within the last twenty years, Maurras has been the subject of numerous political and intellectual biographies, 
thus cementing interest in him amongst certain academic circles within France. See particularly Olivier Dard, 
Charles Maurras. Le maître et l’action (Amand Colin, 2013). ; Stéphane Giocanti, Maurras: le chaos et l’ordre 
(Paris: Flammarion, 2008). ; Toby Kunter, Charles Maurras. La Contre-Révolution pour héritage (Nouvelles 
Editions Latines, 2009). 
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movement.12 Maurras fostered a deep love for his native region, and it would seem logical 
then that he would then later argue for a decentralised monarchy, which would theoretically 
protect the local rights and customs of the various regions that made up what he considered to 
be the French state. His championing of Provençal linguistic and cultural particularity would 
evolve into a wider ‘French’ emphasis on cultural collectivity as opposed to individuality. 
Indeed, Maurras’ primary influences were artistic, and not political. He considered order 
within art and literature as tantamount and indeed a precursor to art in society. Maurras’ 
artistic aesthetics were such that he argued for an artistic reformation based on a renewal of 
style, and of order and movement, which Maurras took to the organisation of one’s 
thoughts.13   
 
Maurras’ origins and early influences show a marked change from Ljotić. Ljotić’s thinking 
would be largely abstract, based primarily on his usage of religious metaphors and mysticism. 
As a result, his conception of culture, as will be shown, and indeed of civilisation would be 
based on a sincere Christian belief. This could not be said of Maurras, who championed a sort 
of artistic reformation and claimed he is a champion of France’s Greco-Roman civilisational 
past. Ljotić would not invoke any memory of Greco-Roman civilisation, as civilisation for 
him, as will be shown, was given and enhanced through Christianity, and local customs. The 
source cultural inspiration of both men would be reflected in the histories of their respective 
countries.  
 
The essence of this artistic reformation according to Maurras was to achieve simplicity, to 
perceive what is essential, which could be found in tradition, though tradition, like nations, 
were not equal, which in Maurras’ mind, reflected the superiority of man, or of nation, over 
another. Maurras believed himself to be the champion of classicism, linking aesthetics and 
politics in his indictments and accusations against the French Third Republic. This 
classicism, especially the Athenian polis of Socrates, for Maurras represented the pinnacle of 
human society, and that the nature and degree of man’s dependence on a social and political 
                                                        
12 The Félibrige movement, from the Provençal word Félibre (follower), was the creation of the noted poet 
Frédéric Mistral in 1854. Its original function was to promote, and indeed to protect, the Occitan language, and 
its various dialects through literature, music, theatre, and art. Organised into sections from 1862, based on the 
regions making up Occitania (Aquitaine, Auvergne, Catalonia Gascony-Haut-Languedoc, Languedoc, 
Limousin, and Provence), each section was headed by a board composed of a trustee, vice-trustees, secretary, 
and treasurer. Charles Maurras dedicated an article to the movement. See Charles Maurras, “Les Fèlibres. 
Barbares et Romans,” Le Plume, no. 53 (1891), 213–237. Written in memory of the death of Joseph Roumanille, 
who was a member. 
13 Weber, Action Française : Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth Century France, 10. 
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community that determined the quality of his life, both ethical and material.14 Classicism, in 
Maurras’ thinking, was the essence of France’s inheritance of civilisations best aspects. In 
Maurras’ mind, this classicism, representing reason, discipline and order, was being replaced 
in both art and politics by romanticism, which symbolised anarchy, and the passions. It was 
classicism, which made France unique, as classicism was the pinnacle of human civilisation, 
so to was France, as an inheritor and guardian of such a civilisation. 
 
It was Maurras’ opinion of classicism, which would form the basis of his later political ideals 
much like the idea of the Slavic commune and pan-Slavism would for Ljotić. Maurras’ 
classicism was as much literary as political, and would act as a cornerstone of his later 
politics. His travels to Florence and Athens, ostensibly to view the Olympics, were published 
in 1901 as Anthinéa. 15  This interesting and stylistically verbose work in part political 
expression and in part travelogue, reads as a personal pilgrimage, where the nature, 
landscapes, and heritage of Greece are compared to Maurras’ beloved Provence. Politically, it 
helped shape Maurras’ later views on democracy. His arrival in Greece saw him reject 
everything that he viewed as un-Greek, or rather un-Attic.16 It is an easy step to substitute 
‘Greek’ for ‘French’ in Maurras’ thought process, and his entire trip, leading back to 
Provence, is characterised as ‘linking that which hold us together’, which in Maurras mind, is 
a classical, Latin, and Mediterranean culture, of which France was a leading light. France, 
and France’s classical tradition were under threat to be replaced in aesthetic terms by 
romanticism, and in more concrete political terms by the rise of liberty and anarchy, which 
were associated with democracy and individualism. A France, where such social diseases 
such as democracy had not tainted the classical tradition, was a main premise of Maurras’ 
later politics, under the guise of the regenerative and restorative monarchic institution. 
 
Ljotić would not share Maurras’ views and predilection towards ancient Greece and Rome. 
Or at the very least he never publicly disclosed them. His public views and writings on 
                                                        
14Michael Sutton, Nationalism, Positivism, and Catholicism: The Politics of Charles Maurras and French 
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New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 29. 
15 Charles Maurras, Anthinéa; d’Athènes à Florence (Paris: Félix Juven, 1901). 
16 It is here that Maurras introduces the term métèque, from the Greek métoikos, which refers to those who have 
literally ‘changed location’ as a reference to those elements, which he deemed harmful to France’s unity. 
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culture, as will be shown, would be largely based on and shaped by Romanticism, though he 
applied it in a highly reductionist manner. 
 
Democracy as an evil 
 
Democracy to Maurras was the natural state or recourse of primitive societies and states 
fallen into barbarism.17 Maurras attacked democracy as the harbinger of individualism and 
decadence. 18  Ljotić would later follow Maurras’ counter-revolutionary anti-democratic 
thought from its inception, but would differ in application. In his own words, Maurras states 
that he took his views on democracy ‘from Renan, who took them from de Maistre and 
Bonald, who took them from the great traditions of the human mind’.19 At its core, Maurras 
argued, democracy was ‘unnatural’ and ‘inorganic’, society was a fact of nature, as opposed 
to the democratic ‘contract of wills’. 20  Democracy was supposed to signify a decadent 
‘regime of profit and immediate pleasures’, which would forget the past and neglect the 
future.21 For France, the results of democracy were clear. According to Maurras, ‘democracy 
is evil, democracy is death’. 22  In Maurras’ thinking, democracy and individualism were 
intrinsically linked. Maurras’ attack on democracy, and indeed on the existing French 
parliamentary regime was based on the idea that democracy was individualist, decadent, and 
deadly, which would undermine the natural and organic unity of society. Those whom 
democracy was supposed to benefit, the ‘people’, were viewed by Maurras as inorganic 
collectives, who were unable to think with reason.23  
 
Maurras viewed liberty, linked with democracy, as unrealistic due to its being built on the 
‘ignoble lie’ of popular sovereignty,24 where interests that were detrimental to the state took 
precedence. To this end, Maurras propagated what he called nationalisme intégral25 (Integral 
Nationalism), as a practical means with which to combat democracy. This integral 
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nationalism, the union of patriotism and a hereditary monarchy, using French national interest 
as a starting point, would reinvigorate and regenerate France, as well as institute a break 
between the political and social.  However, it would only be achievable through the return of 
the monarchy.   
 
The AF’s first official refutation of individualism and democracy came in the form of the 
Declaration of 15 November, 1899. In this declaration, the AF set out themes for society’s 
survival: unity and discipline. The rule of an impartial arbiter, devoted to the general interest, 
would reconcile and unite the country. Democracy, or rather rulers who take democracy as 
their source of legitimacy, lacked the authority to make government truly effective. Kings, 
above all interests, were associated with the general interest of the realm and its subjects.26 
The aim of this declaration was to prove that society, built on the existing liberal order, was 
less free than the proposed monarchic solution. What was needed in the interim was 
authority. This authority would be a product of organic certainty. This certainty was to be 
found in the institution of the monarchy, one that was supposed to be the guarantee of 
France’s future rise to its former glory.   
 
What was becoming salient in Maurras’ ideological evolution was that submission to 
authority was in itself a form of freedom, of stability, and continuity. This was buttressed 
with his idea that the individual owed more to a natural social order, than the reverse. This 
certainty was to be built along the lines of what Maurras called politique naturelle27 (natural 
politics), which focused on a natural inequality in life. Inequality to Maurras was the basis of 
human society, which coalesced around a supposed ‘organic’ hierarchy as opposed to the 
democratic lie, which was at ‘odds with nature’.28 Democracy, by giving the rule to the 
masses, whom Maurras viewed with contempt, was unable to make competent ‘political’ 
decisions. It was with Maurras’ influence, that Ljotić would formulate his views on 
democracy, though by no means, could he be regarded simply as a sycophant. As will be 
shown, Ljotić would use the AF’s template for his own. However, he was operating in a 
political climate that was both monarchic and after 1929, authoritarian, he was already, in 
theory, working from a position of relative advantage. The monarchy would not have to be 
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restored, but the perceived threats of the nation, its path to national unification, and the 
structure and make up of its socio-economic component, would differ vastly from the 
conditions faced by Maurras in France.  
 
Ljotić on democracy 
 
Ljotić saw democracy through a similarly narrow prism, which would be based on Maurras’ 
critique of democracy. Ljotić, viewing democracy and individualism as results of the 
influence of the French Revolution, saw the effects of democracy as divisive. Also, as Ljotić 
would constantly question, in whose interests did democracy really lie? For Ljotić, the 
peasantry and artisan class were the mainstays of society. Democracy, in the interests of the 
banking, or business class, did not therefore always agree with the interests of the peasantry 
or artisan class.29 Such opposition to democracy may be a superficial similarity between 
fascism and Ljotić’s beliefs. However, the reason why Ljotić viewed democracy as 
unnecessary and unworthy to be used is that the concept of democracy favours just the 
majority, which usually builds one class, which has opposite or disagreeing values and needs 
compared to other groups. Ljotić continues by stating that if ‘democracy means ‘fair 
management and the rewarding of hard work, then all parties, even those against democracy, 
are democratic’.30 While democracy, in Ljotić’s opinion cannot create because it is built on a 
‘colourful lie’, it is only through ‘hard work’ that it can create, and build for society.31  
 
Democracy, therefore according to Ljotić is an illusion that constantly boasts of its slogan of 
‘working for the people’, when it reality, it is in the interests only of a small plutocratic ruling 
elite, who in Ljotić’s opinion, enrich themselves at the expense of the people. What Ljotić 
wanted was inclusive and radical change that will be felt by all and not just the majority. In 
essence, this concept of looking at a society as a collective group of individuals may not be a 
fascist way of perceiving things. Fascists tend to look into an individual independently that is 
why they tend to focus on the internal reconstruction of a nation based on individual 
improvement instead of focusing on both the social and national aspect of occurrences, which 
is more descriptive of Ljotić’s beliefs and ideals.  
 
                                                        




Moreover, Ljotić later claimed that Jews were responsible for the advent of liberal 
democracy, as well as Freemasonry and Communism, which makes them enemies of both 
ZBOR and the Yugoslav state. 
 
Ljotić’s criticism of democracy, like that of Maurras would be steeped in terms of economic 
freedom and liberation from capitalist atomisation and individualism, which decays national 
unity. Ljotić goes further by stating that there is no freedom in those who are forced to sell 
their labour just to maintain themselves at a minimum sustenance, at the expense of 
capitalism.32 A democratic system could not be maintained not only because of its supposed 
irresponsible and disorderly nature, but also because of the threat it posed to social order. He 
considered democracy and parliamentary closely linked to liberal capitalism.33  
 
He did however make an exception for the United States, which was liberal, yet not 
parliamentary, it was nonetheless a result of ‘un-organic’ methods.34 Great Britain on the 
other hand, was ruining its own great traditions with the attempts of British conservatives to 
maintain global capitalist production.35 ZBOR called for a break with democracy, for it was 
an ‘empty shell’, and called for the creation of a social order, based on the old Slavonic 
concept of zadrugarstvo,36 which would protect the ‘vital interests of the people’.   
 
This break was necessary in Ljotić’s thinking because of his opinion of communism as the 
logical outcome of the chaos of liberal democracy.37 The concept of ‘work’ as an antithesis to 
democracy, while not clearly defined, was tied in with the concept of ‘order’, and 
‘discipline’. Maurras as well, referred to the ‘order of work’, by which the way to worsen the 
condition of national unity was to stop working. Work, was not the only prism through which 
democracy was scrutinised. The belief that democracy was inevitably tied in with 
modernisation, industrialisation, and social and economic factors, was at the forefront of both 
men’s analysis of democracy. 
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Both Ljotić and Maurras therefore, focused on tying democracy with liberal economics. Their 
focus on economics was given more prominence in the aftermath of the 1929 Great 
Depression, though Ljotić could not be said to be prolific in economic matters. Maurras 
however, was equally abstract and uninformed in his writing on economics, and both men 
tied their criticisms of modern capitalism and economics in with the effect both had on their 
conception and perception of traditional peasant life, and the plight of the superfluous ‘little 
man’. Maurras however, went further than Ljotić in terms of his willingness to pay lip service 
to the concerns of the industrial urban working class. Maurras found it natural (briefly) for 
nationalism and socialism to align in opposition to the ‘revolutionary bloc’, and argued for a 
socialist resolution to the working class problem (again vaguely defined), posed by 
industrialisation.38  
 
Nevertheless, for Maurras, the peasantry represented the ‘real France’, and was perceived by 
him to be naturally monarchic, socially conservative, and obedient to both hierarchy and 
authority. Maurras in particular, paid scant attention to economic matters, especially with 
regard to the effect that economics had on politics. Rather, he focused on the effect that 
politics had on economics, though he would never develop or fully explain his thought in this 
regard. Ljotić’s economic writings (to be expanded on later) would reveal a base 
understanding of economic fundamentals, but his view was restricted to what he perceived to 
be of economic importance for the ‘peasantry’ and agricultural workers.  
 
Maurras would criticise the machinations of capitalism, and of individual capitalists, but 
would fall short of attacking capitalism itself, partly out of a lack of economic understanding, 
and partly out of fear of angering his base conservative and upper class support. For Maurras, 
man, a ‘social animal’, and the atomisation of industrialisation thus strip the ‘social’ away 
from man. It was in the peasantry, or within the artisan class, where the specific talent and 
service to society, act as the best safeguard against the machinations of finance and 
capitalism.39 It also provided a sense of freedom and independence. Capitalism, according to 
Maurras, was the greatest bane of contemporary intelligence in that intellect was geared 
towards the search for an economic commodity.40 For Maurras however, in linking politics 
and art, capitalism was not only a political threat, but also one, which devalued and 
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devalourised literature. Maurras lamented that as the social order was increasingly threatened 
by capitalism and industrialisation, so too was literature, and intelligence as a whole, which 
were in direct competition with industry, to the detriment of the former. 41  In Maurras’ 
thinking, intellect, or rather intellectual production as a commodity, was a result of increased 
capitalism and industrialisation.  
 
Anti-capitalism to both men meant political freedom. Ljotić was certainly of this opinion. He 
stated that he too wants an economic liberation from the games of private and un-organic 
economic interests who have the people’s sweat and tears at their mercy.42 Freedom, which 
would be found through discipline, order, and hierarchy, would ideally be achieved through a 
hereditary monarchy, which, like society, was organic and harmonious. 
 
Maurras’ Classicism notwithstanding, towards the end of the nineteenth century, his political 
aesthetics were becoming more salient in his thinking, as the theme of decadence, mirrored in 
art through society, was coming to the forefront. Decadence was the emphasis of what 
Maurras deemed ‘foreign elements’, which would rot France from within. It was at its most 
apparent and evident, when civilisation in Maurras’ perception was under threat. It was the 
triumph of Classicism that would rectify this malaise. Maurras sought to counter this 
decadence to regenerate and renew France along his lines, and in accordance with his vision 
of ‘classical tradition’. It was here that the AF and Maurras had their greatest effect on Ljotić. 
Though it must be again stressed, specific local and political conditions within Yugoslavia 
shaped the nature and structure of Ljotić’s adaptation of the AF’s theories, Ljotić, like 
Maurras, would look to monarchism for national growth and unity.  However, the opinions of 




With the beginning of his political journalism in 1895, Maurras immersed himself in politics, 
publishing one of his first overt political pieces, in favour of decentralisation. He wrote that 
‘decentralisation was an economic, and not a national issue’, pointing to the decentralised 
politics of ‘monarchies and republics such as Switzerland, Prussia, Austria, and Belgium’, 
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and the ‘lack of local liberties in France’.43 This was followed two years later by his 1898 
publishing of L'idée de decentralisation (The idea of decentralisation), where he argued for 
the subjugation of the nationalist idea to decentralisation as a means of national and local 
regeneration, with the federated provinces united under the monarchy. 44  For Maurras, 
centralisation was akin to a form of slavery as conceivably witnessed under Bonaparte’s rule. 
His emphasis on decentralisation worried the Félibrige movement so much that he was 
expelled from the movement in 1898 for fear of it being thought as secessionist.45  
 
In essence, Maurras’ decentralisation, as a form of federalism, predated his monarchism. It 
was at this point that we begin to see a distinct change in Maurras’ politics. His focus on 
decentralisation, based partly on his exposure to his monarchist mother and maternal 
grandmother, and his attachment to Provence’s local cultural specificities would be 
overshadowed by his own unique synthesis of a modern conception of French ethnic 
nationalism (the French of course, not being a race), combined with an existing yet stagnant 
monarchism that he aimed to re-vitalise. It was with this combination that Maurras began to 
find an audience, not only through his writing, but also through his personality. It was the 
method of its monarchism of Maurras, which gave the AF its distinctive flavour. Far from 
being passive, Maurras would look to a revolutionary monarchism that would not hesitate to 
use any means necessary to bring itself to power.   
 
Maurras’ monarchism however, was not one based on a providential religious metaphysical 
conception like that of Ljotić. His monarchism was that of a systematic search for an 
institutional form of government that would best protect the nation’s national interest. This 
search would turn into an analytical attempt to solve France’s decline. Maurras takes as his 
monarchist credentials from his 6 May, 1899, article in La Gazette de France, in which he 
writes that ‘to the hereditary institution of the family, add the permanent ruling entities of the 
commune, and the province, and the professional stabilising institution of political 
authority’,46 which would thus complete the perfect monarchic formula. Realising however, 
that the monarchic ideal amongst the majority of the French populace was non-existent, 
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Maurras, in L’Enquête sur la monarchie47 (Survey of the Monarchy), a series of testimonials 
and reflections, but in effect a sales pitch of monarchism, asks whether a traditional 
monarchy, decentralised, hereditary and anti-parliamentary, will lead to a public salvation. A 
monarch, Maurras argues, is necessary from the point of view that he is the best guarantor 
and protector of patriotism, and for the maintenance of tradition and social order. The 
establishment of the monarchy according to Maurras is the real objective of the AF, to affect 
a royalist and monarchic change in France.48 The monarch, in a position of unchallenged 
authority, would not only serve as a guarantor of France, and of instilling patriotism, but 
being supposedly rulers by their authority alone, monarchs would not interfere with the 
private lives of citizens and of representative bodies.  
 
In effect, it was through publication of L’Enquête sur la monarchie, which solidified 
Maurras’ budding monarchism. Maurras poses the question as to what patriotic Frenchmen 
must do if they are truly patriotic. The answer for Maurras is simple. If ‘you have resolved to 
be a patriot, you are obliged to be a royalist’, since that is ‘what reason wants’.49  The 
monarchy for Maurras would be the best stabiliser and support for the establishment of a 
harmonious order and discipline. To this end, Maurras advocated the establishment of a 
personal, hereditary, and traditional monarchy. The establishment of such a monarchy in 
Maurras’ thinking, which would see the centralisation of political power in the person of the 
king and ruling dynasty, would therefore avoid divisive political and electoral struggles. 
Maurras writes that ‘in order to spare ourselves fruitless and dangerous electoral contests’, 
‘power must be entrusted to a family’.50  
 
By giving the reins of power to a king or dynasty, Maurras based his opinion on the premise 
that the king, or indeed the ruling dynasty’s wellbeing and survival, is linked with the 
maintenance and promotion of national unity. Above all, with the return of the monarchy, 
Maurras was convinced that power would be firmly in French hands again, as opposed to 
what he deemed to be the ‘anti-national forces’. 
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 The ‘Foreigner’ in Maurras’ conception of Monarchy and Social Order. 
 
Placing Maurras’ thinking regarding the monarchy, social order, and identity in proper 
context is an important component of understanding not only counter-revolutionary theory, 
but also how local conditions shaped the evolution of counter-revolutionary thought. While 
the AF and ZBOR would share superficial external similarities, socio-economic, cultural, and 
political differences between their respective countries would lead to a divergence of self-
interest, in the context of local conditions. Maurras was preoccupied with the idea that 
foreigners ruled France and that the monarchy was the best protection against further foreign 
influence, which weakened the French core through the introduction of foreign ideas such as 
democracy, parliamentary, and the onset of decadence. Republican rule in France according 
to Maurras was in effect foreign rule. Maurras’ theory rested on what he considered to be a 
conspiracy of foreigners to destroy French values through social institutions, as well as 
through the abuse French resources and materials. A good government therefore, would 
protect the national interest instead of forcing the individual to act as a protective barrier in 
defence of the common interest and French industry. To Maurras, the real rulers of France 
were those forces, which held power through money, and oligarchy, to the leaders of the 
socialist movement.51 Contrary to this vague condemnation of France’s internal enemies, 
Maurras had a clearly delineated and outlined theory of who the foreigners were. They were 
delegated by Maurras to be the Etats Confédérés (Confederated States), made up of 
Freemasons, Protestants, Jews, and the Métèques.52   
 
Ljotić had nothing comparable to Maurras’ classification of ‘foreigners’. While there is 
overlap with Maurras in his views on Jews and Freemasons (to be expanded on later), there 
would be no system of categorisation of Jews and Freemasons in separate ‘confederated 
states’ as foreigners, as is evident with Maurras. For Ljotić and ZBOR, ‘foreigners’ were 
usually taken to mean ‘non-Slavonic’. But they were not seen as necessarily inherently 
hostile, except with the Jews, as will be shown, to Yugoslavia’s national security. This does 
not however, negate the fact that Ljotić considered Yugoslavia under foreign domination, and 
that the myriad of perceived internal threats had to be neutralised. However, there was no 
systematic scheme or ranking system based on perceived threats such as the case with the AF.  
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The Freemasons, according to Maurras brought cosmopolitanism to France, and were servile 
to the ruling decadent and corrupt republican elite. Maurras considered Freemasonry the only 
oligarchy capable of actually achieving victory, continues Maurras, due to the number of 
masons in political life.53 Owing their allegiance to an outside force, which hindered the 
organic and unified society of which the monarchy was to usher in. Protestants were deemed 
as Swiss, English, and above all, German. The ‘spirit of Protestantism’ according to Maurras 
threatens the ‘French spirit’. The prosperity of certain nations confessing Protestantism 
argues Maurras is misleading, in that the intellectual basis of Protestantism is a ‘perfect 
individualism’, which Maurras describes as ‘anarchy, which dissolves society’.54  
 
On an aesthetic level, Maurras condemns ‘Protestant iconoclasm of having ruined the arts’.55 
The German spirit had disrupted the continuum of European religious unity, and more 
gravely, ‘Greco-Roman heritage’.56 Worse still, Romanticism had entered politics and the 
arts through Johann Gottlieb Fichte. For Maurras, Romanticism, as a prophet of the Ego, was 
typically German in that its anarchic tendencies, which could be traced, back to Luther.57 
Romanticism, like Classicism, acquired for Maurras the status of a half symbol, half 
analytical tool. To ZBOR, criticism of Romanticism, or indeed of the aesthetics of art and 
literature was negligible. ZBOR’s ideas were simply not on the same intellectual level as the 
AF, nor would they ever permeate into society to the degree of the AF. The AF criticism of 
Freemasonry, and Protestantism, through a seemingly theological lens, should not be taken as 
evidence of Maurras as a believing Catholic. Indeed, his view on Catholicism was more for 
the cultural continuity associated with the papal institution, which aided in the goal of 
‘organic unity’. However, it was Maurras’ attacks on the Jews, which would hold the most 
vitriolic venom.  
 
For Maurras, the Jew was a member of the ruling body. Like the Freemasons and protestants, 
they were carriers of individualism, and revolutionary ideas, unwanted and inassimilable 
elements harmful to France’s national integrity and unity. His anti-Semitism, as he argues, 
was not a religious issue, but rather one of national defence. As a foreign element, the Jews in 
Maurras’ thinking were a ‘unified state’ within France, joined with Jews in other European 
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states.58 That Jews in France and abroad were somehow unified in Maurras’ mind meant that 
they represented a mortal danger to France. It was not the Jews as a racial group which 
threatened France, inasmuch as it was their ‘nonlinear history’, and their potential as an 
inseparable anti-nation, anti-Church, and anti-royalist principle of revolution to him, was 
nothing less than the evil incarnate of Satan himself.59 The AF’s anti-Semitism would be 
mirrored, as will be shown, by Ljotić’s personal anti-Semitism. 
 
Maurras’ publication of ideological polemic began with the anti-Semitism surrounding the 
Dreyfus Affair. The AF, and especially Maurras, never let the memory of the Dreyfus Affair 
die, as it served as a reminder of the decadence of the republican regime in power. It was not 
so much Dreyfus, but rather his supporters upon whom the AF spewed their polemic. 
Maurras, perhaps providing the clearest insight into his thoughts on the guilt or innocence of 
Dreyfus sums it up as ‘I don’t want to go into the debate on innocence or guilt’, Maurras 
writes. His ‘first and last opinion on this was that if by chance Dreyfus was innocent he 
should be named Maréchal (Marshal) of France, but we should execute a dozen of his 
principal defenders for the triple harm they caused France, peace, and reason’.60  
 
Dreyfus therefore, must be sacrificed for the greater good of France’s national interest, 
regardless of his innocence of guilt. Maurras’ opinion on Dreyfus personally however was 
not always so moderate, if the term could be applied. Writing on 29 January, 1912, Maurras 
states that the ‘Jewish traitor’ Dreyfus will pay for the crime of betraying France.61 The Jews 
however, like all foreign elements were to be removed from public life and from the French 
body politic and nation. The method of removal however, was never fully elaborated on by 
Maurras, and would never be realised. However, through his indefatigable xenophobic 
polemic against the enemies of France, and through the physical action of his followers 
against them, under the monarchy and integral nationalism, there is no reason to doubt that 
serious persecution and abuses would take place in the name of reclaiming and ‘cleansing’ 
France. 
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The 9 October, 1934 assassination of King Alexander was a galvanising catalyst for ZBOR’s 
creation, in a similar fashion to the Dreyfus Affair and the AF. However, ZBOR would not be 
an organisation that was fighting to install a monarchy, but one, which agitated for an 
increased presence of the person of the monarch. It wanted to maintain and strengthen the 
status quo, but on its own terms. In this context, it would be inevitable that ZBOR’s 
monarchism would focus more on the supposed semi-divine and mystical qualities of the 
monarch. This was indeed the case, however it was only through Ljotić that ZBOR’s 
monarchism would find any degree of political expression, based largely on his own syncretic 
ideals of how the monarchy should be, and its interaction with its subjects.  
 
Ljotić’s concept of the Monarchy 
 
To Ljotić, there was no question as to the validity of monarchism from an ideological point of 
view. His belief in the divine status of the monarchic institution as gifted by the ‘Grace of 
God’ was indeed both heartfelt and sincere. While not alluding directly to his early 
monarchism, given his family background, and his coming from a tradition of monarchic 
support for the Karadjordjević dynasty, the argument that Ljotić’s attachment to monarchism 
as being genuine has greater substance. In his Prvo Pismo Kralja Aleksandra 
Karadjordjevića (First letter to King Alexander Karadjordjević), Ljotić professes his sincere 
(and there is no reason to doubt it) loyalty and love for the monarch, stating that the public 
good depends on the monarch.62 For Ljotić, the monarchy offered a God given shield and 
protector of national unity, who with the ‘will of the people’ would represent leads.63 To 
Ljotić, the monarchy was the state, and without a monarchy, a nation was condemned to 
slavery. Speaking of the Serbian experience under Ottoman rule, Ljotić asserts that it was the 
historical memory of past monarchs, and the belief in a coming monarchic saviour, which 
helped to sustain Serbian national identity.64  
 
 As Ljotić saw it, government is just, when it is given according to God’s law. Such a 
government could only be established as a monarchy.65 In his role of protector of those things 
that are Godly, the king becomes the King-domaćin, second after God, and the embodiment 
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of the nation. Without the domaćin, Ljotić argues, there would be no accomplishments. All 
work, no matter how laborious, does not count, without the domaćin.66 Ljotić describes toil 
as the ‘blossom’, and the accomplishment as ‘fruit’. Nationalism, in Ljotić’s view, was part 
and parcel of monarchism, just like it was for Maurras. The difference here lies in that for 
Ljotić, it was a result of the supposed divinity of the monarchy which lead him to 
nationalism, while for Maurras, it was nationalism, or rather the conception of French 
national interests, which lead him and the AF towards monarchism.  
 
In Ljotić’s opinion, the monarchy was divine. The king was made divine through God’s grace 
as the standard bearer of freedom and the shield of God’s work: faith the church, unity the 
family, people, the fatherland, and freedom and justice.67 The king therefore, in Ljotić’s 
conception must remain, since the monarchy would feel each minute a need to protect the 
nation against a slide into anarchy. Ljotić warmly greeted the monarchic dictatorship 
established on 6 January, 1929, which he viewed as a positive gesture from the king, one that 
would bring his divine personification to the political, social, and economic forefront. During 
the Second World War, Ljotić would remind King Peter II68 (Alexander’s son), of his and his 
family’s ‘one hundred and forty-year loyalty to the dynasty’, while at the same time 
chastising the king for not adhering to his ideas as a safeguard against Nazi invasion.69 The 
monarchy, for the AF, was stripped of its sacral meaning, where loyalty lay with the 
institution itself, not, like in ZBOR’s case, where it lay in the person of the monarch himself. 
Maurras likens the monarchy, in a rationalistic manner, to geometry, stating that ‘like a 
geometrical position, the monarchy defends and develops the state in which it is 
incarnated’.70   
 
This peculiar view can be best understood through a summary of Maurras’ political 
conception of the ‘natural order of things’ or the raison d’État. This natural order saw the 
public interest placed before the interest of either parties or individuals. Coupled with 
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Maurras’ core idea that the national interest transcends ethical concepts such as morality, 
justice, and religion. This transcendence coalesced around Maurras’ assertion that the politics 
of the monarchy overrides the providence of it.71 The king, using his personal power, would 
thus guarantee that the natural order would not be subverted by the machinations of party 
politics. For any hope of social, economic, or moral order to be instituted in France, a 
monarchy must first be installed. For Maurras, the slogan la politque d’abord (politics above 
all), sums up his approach to not just the monarchy, but also to how he conceived of his 
‘natural order’.   
 
Societal (Re)- Organisation  
 
Social hierarchy and societal re-organisation was given a high priority by both Maurras and 
Ljotić. Both men viewed society as organic, and natural, with the monarchy being the most 
logical choice of government because it was at its base the most ‘organic’ and natural to 
humanity. However, as will be seen in the case of the AF, the search for a societal order, 
which would preserve national unity, was to undergo fissures and schisms before a theoretical 
solution could be found. ZBOR would show more solidity regarding its ideas on social 
organisation, though this can partly be explained through gross political naivety and largely 
abstract political expression. For all of Maurras’ talk of monarchism, and the need to preserve 
and regenerate France, the social policy that would be agreed upon by the AF; however, was 
never fully defined. This was partly due to the internal fissures within the movement between 
a paternal corporatism, and a more active attempt at directly courting potential working class 
supporters through revolutionary syndicalist language and action. The AF, unlike ZBOR, 
would never fully articulate even a semi-coherent social policy. Similar to ZBOR however, 
neither would have any resonance in the changing industrialising and modernising world in 
which each inhabited.  
 
This fissure occurred first and foremost due to Maurras’ personal indifference to the social 
question, which would lead sectors of younger AF supporters, who saw that in order to widen 
a potential base for mass popular support to compete with the existing political parties, a clear 
social policy would have to be put forward. These young supporters were both seeking 
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solutions abroad, and losing patience with Maurras’ perceived conservatism.72 Writing in the 
aftermath of the 1940 French defeat, Lucien Rebatet, a French author and intellectual, who 
contributed articles to L'Action française, criticised Maurras as being out of touch with 
reality, and being content with ‘mere opposition’, whose royalism amounted to nothing.73 
Rebatet’s animus was such that he adroitly christened the AF as the ‘Inaction française’.74 
Because of his preoccupation with politics alone, Maurras however, did have a reference 
point for a vision of what society should be and along what lines it should be organised.  
 
This organisation was based upon a return to a medieval corporative like guild system, which 
according to Maurras, and as will be shown Ljotić (in a Yugoslav context), represented 
French society at its zenith. Maurras looked to ‘old France’, which referred to France pre-
1789, though his concept of ‘old France’ was vague, based, on a highly selective view of 
history, in that he used only what supported his claims, and honed its expression through his 
rhetoric. Due to the vagueness of his theory on ‘old France’, there is no definitive starting 
point, with Maurras instead preferring to accentuate an impression of the past, which held 
true to the supposed virtues of an earlier time. Maurras’ notion of the ideal was pre-
revolutionary France, in which the French state was ‘monarchic, hierarchical, socialist, and 
community-minded. This ‘Old France’ had ‘its own constitutions born of the races and 
territories that composed her’, and which ‘professed traditional Catholicism’.75  
 
In a geopolitical context, the French Republican system necessitated Maurras’ tactics of 
politique d’abord, in that any conceivable method to overthrow the Republican system was to 
be utilised. In Yugoslavia, Ljotić would be perfectly happy working within the confines of 
monarchism, provided that it was not parliamentary (in a democratic, not corporative sense), 
and that power was vested primarily in the King.  
 
Ljotić’s concept of corporatism and social organisation 
 
In Ljotić’s vision of Yugoslavia, God, King, and domaćin were to be mainstays of the new 
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social order. Speaking about the domaćin76 Ljotić states that they were to form an unofficial 
council of local leaders, who in cooperation with similar councils would create a spirit of 
understanding and readiness to help, anywhere in the nation. This was broadly similar to 
Maurras’ version of a return to a medieval like corporatism. There was however, no question 
of compromising one’s principles, like in the case of the AF, and Maurras in particular. 
Working towards a better society when the preferred system of government already in power, 
certainly would help expedite matters. To Ljotić, subordinating society to a medieval like 
guild system meant that ‘a variety of occupations and professions would be joined in a 
professional association for their mutual benefit’.77 Ljotić however, criticises this type of 
social organisation, stating that ZBOR neither wants nor desires such staleži (estates),78 much 
less a professional association. To Ljotić, basing his premise around the ‘spiritual 
development’ of Yugoslavs, what was needed was a different social organism based on the 
‘Yugoslav’ national development through history.79 The natural system of the Yugoslavs 
arose from the zadruga,80 which Ljotić laments has been forgotten in favour of ‘land reforms’ 
brought under the aegis of the liberal capitalist system, and other foreign ideas that could 
never understand the ephemeral ‘Slavic soul’.81 Under this patriarchal system, the domaćin, 
as head of the household was not just the main source of material income, but also a fount of 
spirituality.  
 
To Ljotić, the zadruga formed not just the basis of South-Slavonic (read Yugoslav) 
hierarchical organisation, but also the basic formation of its economic mode of production. 
This collectivism bears more similarity to the Slavophile obshcinnost of Aleksei 
Khomiakov,82 which was motivated and buttressed by a feeling of love and community, as 
opposed to any sense of profit or security. The organic building of Yugoslavia’s new social 
order was to be, according to Ljotić, dictated by the needs of the zadruga. This would see 
social organisation along the ‘social, economic, and social-cooperative needs’ of the 
zadruga.83 While criticising the western guild like style organisation of professions, Ljotić in 
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fact argues the very point stating that ‘trades and professions must be organised in estate like 
groups’.84 Each separate ‘estate’ was to have its own function, and special features, such as 
transportation, and agriculture, which would then make up and develop the social, economic, 
and spiritual needs of the organic national body.  
 
Ljotić’s attempt at differentiation from Maurras’ vision of ‘Old France’, or Valois’ ‘social 
monarchy’, based on a highly mystical Slavophile notion of the ‘Slavic spirit, fails to mark 
his form of corporatism as any different from what would be propagated by Maurras and 
other counter-revolutionary theorists. Ljotić laments however, the lack of understanding of 
the true essence of the zadruga, stating that too many times has it ‘wandered into 
communism’,85 based on its collective identity and structure. It was with the peasantry that 
Ljotić’s ideal vision would be geared towards, not solely because he viewed it as the most 
‘untainted’ by foreign influences, but also because of the ‘peasant character’ of Yugoslavia, 
who exhibit a greater degree of ‘estate’ consciousness than the more class conscious 
proletariat of more highly industrialised nations.86  
 
Ljotić’s insistence on the lack of classes in Yugoslavia, pointing to the staleži as the only 
organised social groups reflects his negation of the reality of class conflict. This was based on 
a presupposition of popular acceptance and the need for, a pastoral idyllic and highly 
selective interpretation of history. Liberal democracy and parliamentary were also deemed to 
be enemies of Ljotić’s social vision by dint of its supposed ‘political and economic slavery’, 
which under Ljotić’s vision, would result in economic, political, and spiritual freedom. Ljotić 
however was forced to backtrack on this view and acknowledge the existence of classes, but 
argued that it was solely a Marxist concept that undermined national and organic unity, and a 
that his vision was the best guarantee of individual and collective rights under the security of 
the ‘solidarity of interests’.87  
 
Much of Ljotić’s vision would, theoretically at least, remain vague beyond calls to a mystical, 
morally pure, and pious peasant as head of an individual domaćin, organised into a zadruga, 
which make up one body in the national polity. As will be shown in later chapters, Ljotić’s 
only position under the puppet regime of General Milan Nedić, as the ‘Associate Commissar 
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for the Renewal of Smederevo’, would see his vision put to practice on a specific local level, 
along with his vision of who was included and who wasn’t in his social order. 
 
While both Maurras and Ljotić, while prolific writers, they were neither original in their 
thoughts on the monarchy or social organisation, nor in their criticisms of democracy and the 
French Revolution. Where Maurras was original however, was it his application to mass 
politics and mass society, from which Ljotić benefitted. What both men would reveal is that 
their views were manifestly unpopular, and due to the vagueness of their rhetoric, (more so in 
the case of Ljotić) not easily understood. While adapting such criticisms and ideas to fit their 
specific local conditions, their rhetoric had been outlined during the 19th century political 
philosophers who took their starting point as the rejection of the interpretation of perceived 




Counter-revolutionary thought, which Ljotić and Maurras represented, were two different 
elements of a larger whole. This whole coalesced to form a wider radical right wing counter-
revolutionary theory. Yet as has been shown through the aforementioned organisational 
examples, typology in regard to counter-revolutionary theory remains complex, since it was 
ambiguous, superfluous, and spanned a wide spectrum of political thought.  
 
For all its later similarities with fascism, which will be shown to be a significant overlap, 
ideological differences remained. The concept of collective or combined thoughts and belief 
is a central theme in the ideology of Ljotić, in such a way that he highlights the subordination 
of man to society, instead of the glorification of man as the central and most important aspect 
of a community or a nation. Ljotić pushed for a cohesive and united nation wherein every 
individual values the society as much as his self, because he believes that society is not just 
the mathematical or simple sum of each of its individual members. Pursuing an individual’s 
personal goal will not be enough for a society to prosper. Instead, there is a need for a 
common goal of society prospering in order for the individual to prosper. Understanding this 
goal of Ljotić and his ZBOR movement is something that even contemporary society could 
conceivably learn from.  
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As differing strands represented counter-revolutionary theory, so do the differing stands of 
the authoritarian and radical right. The key, according to Martin Blinkhorn is to analyse the 
correspondence, or lack thereof, between the ‘subjective distinction and objective reality’.88 
As Blinkhorn sees it, elements of counter-revolutionary theory were indeed co-opted by 
Fascism and National Socialism. However, it would be incorrect to state that fascism in its 
mission was based solely upon a more conservative, monarchic, and traditionalist base, even 
if it shared the same ideological genus.  
 
That being said, on an empirical level at least, the discrepancies and incongruences of counter 
revolutionary theory’s application are glaring, at least in ZBOR’s example. The phenomena 
of the AF in France, the Associazione Nazionalista Italiana (Italian Nationalist Association 
hereafter ANI) in Italy, the Integralismo Lusitano (Lusitanian Integralism hereafter IL) in 
Portugal and the Acción Española (Spanish Action hereafter AE) in Spain as relevant agents 
of counter-revolutionary theory, based on the anti-modern idyllic past, and anti-democratic 
and anti-liberal sentiments, had massive socio-economic, cultural, and socio-religious change 
at their core. Interwar Yugoslavia was no exception in this regard, being a newly constituted 
state as of 1918 and had numerous ethnic and political cleavages and fissures.  
 
The key difference however may be the position and influence of religious institutions in said 
countries. France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, apart from being majority Catholic, at least 
nominally, also, at different points throughout their modern histories had, issues with the 
regulation and position of the Church in their respective societies in relation to the Vatican.89 
The polarisation of this issue within each country gave rise to a ‘reaction’ of amalgamated 
groups coalescing around ‘tradition’, in order to ‘restore’ or ‘create’ a new past present and 
future. 
 
The French Revolution is a logical starting point for the counter-revolution. As much as it 
defined counter-revolutionary theory, the French Revolution played a more ambiguous role in 
fascist thought. It was not, in the whole, considered an event, which influenced it, and if 
fascists bothered to think about the Revolution, it was to oppose it as a symbol of materialism 
and liberalism. It did however provide an important influence to the fascist conception of 
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politics, whereby it created a civil religion. This civil religion would be buttressed through 
modern nationalism.90  
 
Where groups such as the AF, IL, and ZBOR differed in this regard was in their vision of the 
future. These groups looked to an idealised past, which they hoped would be instituted once 
again, as opposed to fascist and ANI visions of future revolutions. Neither the AF nor ZBOR 
represented a singular homogenous strand. The AF declared itself as an intellectual heir to 
Joseph de Maistre, yet went beyond him and counter-revolutionary theory in his calls to 
violence and as a result of his royal condemnation over his violent tactics and rhetoric. On 8 
January, 1927, the Pretender to the French crown, the Duc de Guise, stated that the AF ‘acted 
under its own responsibility’, and that there was ‘no identity between royalists and the AF’.91  
 
For all of Maurras’ efforts at garnering support from actual monarchic candidates themselves, 
they remained decidedly aloof from the AF’s advances, stressing their own traditionalism in 
the face of Maurras’ radicalism. In a sense, the ‘integral nationalism’ of the AF and like-
minded groups was an intellectual ideological experiment, radically opposed to political 
modernisation that gave it a degree of legitimacy, coherence, and radicalisation. Maurras’ 
increasing radicalism in lieu of his monarchic dream shows that ‘radicalism’ as a political 
term, had ceased to be the preserve of the left. The ‘right’, which had formerly stood for a 
conservative maintenance or established rights and a balance between different class and 
societal interests, began reclaiming the rhetoric of nationhood. This lead to a split in the right 
wing which saw the establishment of an authoritarian and radical right wing, emphasising an 
anti-parliamentary and authoritarian political order, not necessarily monarchic, but strictly 
anti-democratic.  
 
The other strand, which would become more suspect to fascist influence, emphasised the 
nation as being subject to a total rebirth and regeneration, with the emphasis on nationalism 
that would further emphasise a social, and even biological revolution.92 As Sternhell states, 
this was the meshing of integral nationalism with a new ‘revolutionary’ right, along with 
Sorelian revolutionary revisionism that, saw France as a true birthplace of fascism.93 Tribal 
                                                        
90 George L. Mosse, “Fascism and the French Revolution,” 5. 
91 Charles Maurras, “Monsignor Le Duc de Guise,” L’Action française, 12 January, 1927, Year 20, No.12, 1. 
92 Haynes and Rady, In the Shadow of Hitler, 3. 
93 Zeev Sternhell, Mario Sznajder, and Maia Ashéri, The birth of fascist ideology: from cultural rebellion to 
political revolution (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 4. 
 102 
nationalism evident in much of these groups was also combined with a social and biological 
Darwinism. This was more evident in the case of the ANI, with Enrico Corradini’s notion of 
proletarian nationalism, and elements within the AE, clamouring for an all-encompassing 
right-wing unity incorporating monarchists and the more radical secular nationalist right. 
Corradini and the ANI represent an interesting case. Where the ANI deviated from counter-
revolutionary thought was in its appropriation of Marxist and syndicalist language and 
propaganda for nationalist ends. This became what was termed proletarian nationalism. To 
Corradini, nationalism, syndicalism, and imperialism represented the ‘rebirth of the valour of 
collective experience’.94 It could also not be tied specifically to the conservatives, because 
according to Corradini nationalism was ‘only tied to the nation’, and that the ANI would do 
nothing in the event of the ‘proletariat rising against the bourgeoisie’.95 The living conditions 
of a nation, according to Corradini, was based and determined on the living conditions of 
another nation which can then result in the ‘economic and moral subjugation’ of the 
dependent country, even if politically independent. 96  Struggle therefore, according to 
Corradini was not class versus class, but nation versus nation, using Marxist terminology 
applied to social Darwinism and nations. In this scenario, Italy, as a resource and land 
deficient nation was dependent, and subjugated to the whims of Great Britain, France, and 
Germany.  
 
The AE represented an umbrella grouping of anti-democratic monarchists and rightists under 
a cultural association and a literary journal. Its most well known intellectual personality was 
Ramiro de Maeztu, who gave the movement a clear cultural and ideological perspective.97 
This perspective would be summarised as Hispanidad (Spanishness). To de Maeztu, the 
concept of Spanishness was universal, though tinged with a deep sense of colonial 
superiority. In his mind, the ‘civilising’ and ‘evangelising’ mission undertaken by Imperial 
Spain, was akin to virtue itself, coming almost as instruments of God.98 While Spain was no 
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longer a major colonial power, what it lacked it prestige it made up for in in spiritual power. 
Spiritual power in de Maeztu’s thinking would be almost identical to Ljotić’s in that both 
men saw this focus on a metaphysical spirit, as salvation against atheism and modernity. The 
work of de Maeztu, like that of Ljotić, seemingly harked back to an idealised pre-modern 
utopia, where the supposed law of God ruled supreme. The ills of the modern world, both 
men argued, were the root causes for their respective nations going astray from their 
respective paths. The Enlightenment to de Maeztu meant a turning away from Spain’s 
historic mission, which subsequently resulted in decadence and decay. 
 
The IL, similar to ZBOR, during the interwar era, would represent a more strictly 
authoritarian nationalist stand, viewing the nation as a cultural community, with shared 
traditions, especially in the Yugoslav case. Under the leadership of António Sardinha and 
Luís de Almeida Braga, the IL argued for the originality of its ideology in the tradition of 19th 
century counter-revolutionary thought, combined with Portuguese cultural traditions. 
Outlined as an extra parliamentary movement from 1914, the IL envisioned the return of a 
‘conservative and absolutist ethos’ of the supporters of King Miguel I, a supporter of 
absolutist government. 99  This revision of Portuguese traditionalism was, according to 
Sardinha, to be ‘popularised with the doctrines of the AF’, whom Sardinha claimed was 
totally unknown in Portugal, in order to ‘teach counter-revolutionary theory’.100 While both 
groups stressed the need for a ‘revolution’, and in the IL’s case, the Monarquia do Norte 
(Monarchy of the North) cemented its willingness to use force, both the IL and ZBOR 
emphasised revolution in its spiritual element, the struggle not just to purify one’s self, but 
also the a new conception of politics as ‘moral and pure’, and the introduction of morality, 
and the consolidation of ‘national spirit, faith, and traditions’.101 Romanticism, long derided 
by Maurras, was both championed by the IL and ZBOR as being in keeping with their 
national traditions, and in their conceptions of monarchy and monarchic government.  
 
Maurras’ monarchic vision was authoritarian without being totalitarian in its inception, but 
given the specific conditions in France, the rise and strength of revolutionary syndicalism and 
social democracy, his preference, briefly, was to try to co-opt the more ‘nationally’ minded 
syndicalist in the naïve belief that they could be won over to the monarchist cause.  
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This caught the AF in the dilemma of being a radical political group who either compromises 
its political rigidity and principles for the sake of influence, or continues on its singular 
course. This failed alliance, nevertheless, gave rise to the accusation of a more total 
revolution and beginnings of fascism on the part of the AF, which has long divided historians 
in France.102 While the overlap between the radical right and fascism is indeed significant, 
both sharing the same opponents, and forming tactical alliances Ljotić was happy, for a time, 
working under the confines of the 6th of January dictatorship and the personal rule of the 
king, and Maurras, for all his opposition to the Republic, never went beyond, what Rebatet 
has claimed, to be ‘mere opposition’, which resulted in the generational fissure and the 
proliferation of more clearly fascist like organisations in France.   
 
But what was the catalyst for Ljotić’s political participation? And how did this cataclysmic 
event correspond to ZBOR’s later ideology? 
 
                                                        
102 This debate has not only centred on the existence of a French fascism, but also as to the constitution of fascist 
ideology as a left wing or right wing phenomena. The numerous nationalist ‘leagues’ of the 1930s, as opposed 
to the veterans ‘leagues’ of the 1920s, adopted certain fascist trappings such as militarism, and an expansionist 
hyper-nationalism. In the case of Georges Valois and his ‘Le Faisceau’ movement, it was borne out of Valois’ 
earlier collaboration with the AF. For more on this debate see: Philippe Burrin, La dérive fasciste. Doriot, Déat, 
Bergery 1933-1945 (Paris: La Seuil, 1986).; Pierre Milza, Les fascismes (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1985). ; 
Pierre Milza, Fascisme français, passé et présent (Paris: Flammarion, 2000). ; Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism. ; 
Robert Soucy, Le Fascisme français, 1924-1933 (Paris: PUF, 1992).;  Zeev Sternhell, La droite révolutionnaire 
(1885-1914). Les origines françaises du fascisme (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1976). ; Zeev Sternhell, Neither 










ZBOR’s creation would come at a time of political crisis: the assassination of King 
Alexander in Marseille on 9 October, 1934. It perceived itself as a bulwark of defence for the 
monarchy and of national unity. Elements of counter-revolutionary theory, specifically anti-
democratic thinking, combined with an aggressive anti-communism were needed, as ZBOR 
as saw it, to restore national unity. However, Ljotić’s political trajectory did not always give 
the impression of the course he would follow. Following his demobilisation on 20 June, 
1920, he talked about the difficulty of readjusting to civilian life, filled as he was with the 
‘ethos of war and heroism’.1 Originally not wanting a career in politics or public service 
because its spirit did not appeal to him, and because of his anti-parliamentary view, Ljotić 
intended to return to Smederevo as a lawyer.2 It was through his legal practice, but not 
because of it, that Ljotić states he entered political life. While stating that he was satisfied 
with his legal practice, his family, and the tools for the ‘religious-moral education and 
enlightenment of his immediate environment and co-operatives’,3 Ljotić seems not to have 
resisted a temptation for political participation. Indeed, while stating no particular party 
preference, Ljotić claims that the Radicals considered him one of their own, by dint of his 
father’s association with them, and thought it unthinkable that he would not join them.4   
 
Even though he claimed to be against entering into politics due to his anti-parliamentary 
stance, evidently he considered himself capable enough to force a change of thought and 
ideology within the Radical Party, more than his own assertion of following ‘duty and 
                                                        
1 “Iz moga života”, in Dimtrije Ljotić, Odabrana dela. I Knjiga, 357.  
2 Ibid.  
3 Ibid. 360.  
4 Ibid. 362. Vladimir Ljotić, Dimitrije’s father, was a former Serbian consul in Salonika, as well as head of the 
Smederevo municipality for a time. He was among the founding members of the Radical Party in the 1880s. For 
more see chapter 1. 
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tradition’.5  Even so, Ljotić stressed his opposition to the democratic, parliamentary, and 
national sovereignty principles of the Radical Party, and opposed its ‘partisanship’. 6 
However, elements of what the Radical Party claimed to stand for, Ljotić would later 
incorporate into ZBOR, despite his claim of opposition to the principles of the Radical Party. 
Chief among these was the advocacy of the development of Serbian material, mental, and 
moral strength, and the belief that Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were ‘one’ indivisible nation, 
with similarities emphasised through the peasantry.7  
 
If Ljotić’s political actions, in his own words, started in 1920, his ideological work would not 
begin until after he had abandoned mainstream politics (the first time). As a diligent and loyal 
member of the Radical Party youth organisation in Smederevo, Ljotić was to remain a loyal 
Radical member until 1926, when he began having doubts not just about the mission of the 
Radical Party, but about party structures and party participation within the constitutional 
monarchy of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. Ljotić asserts his idealisation of 
political life, hence his later disillusion with party politics as a whole, through the microcosm 
of his experience in the Radical Party.  
 
For Ljotić, entering politics with a plan to ‘turning the party onto the road I wanted to 
follow’, he soon found that the Radical Party, while welcoming him, ‘was confident of 
bending me to its own terms’.8 This internal opposition however did not stop Ljotić from 
twice being nominated as a candidate for district deputy on the Radical Party’s list.9 While as 
a self-proclaimed ‘dissident’ operating on the fringe of the Radical Party, Ljotić’s political 
development was greatly affected by the King’s proclamation of 6 January, 1929,10 by which 
political parties were outlawed, and all power was vested in the person of the king. 
                                                        
5 Ibid. 361.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Ljubodrag Dimić, Kulturna Politika Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1918-1941. Knjiga 1 (Belgrade: Stubovi Kulture, 
1996), 193–195. 
8 “Iz moga života”, in Dimitrije Ljotić, Odabrana dela. I Knjiga, 362. 
9 “Rekonstrukcija Vlade,” Politika, February 17, 1931, No.8183, 1. 
10 The Šestojanuarska diktatura (Royal dictatorship of 6th January, 1929) was the outcome of political instability 
and incompetence, which culminated in the assassination of the Croatian Peasant Party leader Stjepan Radić   in 
late June, 1928, by Puniša Račić, a Radical Party member. With the ongoing political crisis as a result of the 
assassination, King Alexander abolished the 1921 Constitution, dissolved parliament, and declared a royal 
dictatorship. For more see; Mark Biondich, Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass 
Mobilization, 1904-1928 (University of Toronto Press, 2000).; Ferdo Čulinović, Jugoslavija između dva rata 
(Zagreb: Jugoslovenske akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1961). ; Djokić, Elusive Compromise. ; Petranović and 
Zečević, Jugoslavija 1918-1988.; Mira Radojević, “On the Problem of Democracy and Parliamentarism in 
Yugoslavia between the Two World Wars,” Istorijski Zapisi 85, no. 3–4 (2012), 99–110. ;  
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As Ljotić saw it, the proclamation of the king in 1929, was a pleasant surprise. Especially, as 
he claimed, that King Alexander intended to ‘attack partisanship and parliamentarism’, and 
increase state regulation, which, in his opinion, would allow for the ‘harmonious 
development of all national powers’. 11  Ljotić’s surprise notwithstanding, his personal 
relationship to King Alexander, stemmed from 1922, with Ljotić writing to the king twice, in 
October and December, warning him of the dangers facing the new state. In his first letter, 
Ljotić points out that the ‘monarchy is in grave danger’, and that this danger ‘does not come 
from foreign sources’.12 This danger according to Ljotić stems from how the king supposedly 
reacts to the troubles facing his person and that of the state.13  
 
The king to Ljotić, here showing similarities with AF monarchism, was necessary, and the 
people should feel the monarch in all aspects of their lives. The evident ease and comfort 
Ljotić had when addressing the king, going as far as to tell the king what must be done, 
shows the beginning of what would later become a rigid ideological inflexibility,14 as well as 
a seeming personal ‘need’ to take matters upon himself to speak the ‘truth’ of the current 
state of affairs. Though such writing with a ‘hard heart’ would always be followed by a ‘pure 
devotion’.15 With the proscribing of all existing political parties as a result of the dictatorship, 
Ljotić returned to his legal practice in Smederevo, and would from time to time engage in 
local municipal politics.16 His official status within the Radical Party, proscribed in 1929, 
elements of which either joined the new government, or continued under Aleksa (Aca) 
Stanojević called for an end to dictatorship and return to localised rule, was not resolved until 
1934.17   
 
                                                        
11 “Iz moga života”, in Dimitrije Ljotić, Odabrana dela. I Knjiga, 370. 
12 “Prvo pismo Kralju Aleksandru Karadjordjeviću,” Nova Iskra, March 1996, 28, 27–29. 
13 Ibid. 
14 NA FO 371/20435 R 142/42/92. “Leading Personalities in Yugoslavia. R. Campbell. 9 January, 1936”. 
Minister Plenipotentiary Ronald Campbell’s report states that while Ljotić is honest, he is extremely 
uncompromising in his views. 
15 “Prvo pismo Kralju Aleksandru Karadjordjeviću,” 27–29. 
16 Nebojša Jovanović, Smederevo je bilo Dobro Obnovljeno. Dimitrije Ljotić i delatnost Izvanrednog 
Komesarijata 1941-1944 (Smederevo: NIGP, Radojković, 2001), 16. 
17 NA FO/371/33496 R 3046/3046/92 “Mr. Rendel, Foreign Office. Yugoslav Personalities. Referring to the 
dispatch of 12 July, 1939”. Ljotić claimed in his autobiography that had the royal dictatorship not happened, he 
would have left the Radical Party much earlier. In his letter to the Foreign Office however. Mr. Rendel, in his 
capacity as Minister Plenipotentiary to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia maintains that Ljotić had indeed, by 1934, 
officially left the Radical Party in order to found ZBOR. 
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The main aim of the royal dictatorship was the resolution of the ongoing political stalemate, 
and a reconciliation of the constituent peoples to the new state. In the wake of the popular 
disillusionment with politics and politicians, it was assumed that with the king taking direct 
control, the national interest would be put above individual and party interests. To this effect, 
King Alexander on 3 October, 1929, changed the name of the country to the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia, with the country being re-organised into banovinas (provinces), based more on 
geographic than ethnic criteria.18 In essence, this move, as King Alexander hoped, would 
solve the on-going ethnic debates and issues by imposing the moniker of ‘Yugoslavs’ on 
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It was hoped that it would also contribute to the weakening of 
traditional and regional loyalties in favour of a homogenous Yugoslav identity. This was to 
be combined with the king’s personal and authoritarian rule, as the mainstay of uniting the 
country. 
 
Ljotić greeted the imposition of the royal dictatorship as a welcome sign. He was certainly 
not unusual in that regard, as Vladko Maček, head of the Croatian Peasant Party, initially 
supported the king’s proclamation as a means to attaining Croatian autonomy. 19  Ljotić 
zealously attests to the fact that he became certain that the ‘carriers of the government were 
not spreading the mission of the dictatorship’. Ljotić’s supposed opposition had nothing to do 
with the king’s authoritarian rule, but rather with the founding of the Privilegovana Agrarna 
Banka (Chartered Agrarian Bank). The founding of this bank was part of the king’s 
restructuring attempts of the financial sector, which was based on an earlier attempt at 
restructuring by the central bank to have several large state owned banks with branches 
throughout the country. The dictatorship continued on this trend towards increasing state 
intervention in the financial sector, with state capital being provided for the founding of the 
Agrarian Bank.20  
 
For Ljotić, the founding of the Agrarian Bank gave undue privilege to individual credit, at the 
expense of cooperative credit, which would make it easier to take out a line of credit at the 
state owned banks as opposed to the local cooperative. This to him represented a ‘rise in 
                                                        
18 Djokić, Elusive Compromise, 72. 
19 Ibid. 70. 
20 Ivo Bićanić, Željko Ivanović, “Croatian Banking during the 1926-1936 Depression”, in Edwin Green, John 
Lampe, and Franjo Štiblar, eds., Exploring the History and Archives of Banking at Times of Political and Social 
Stress (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004), 69. 
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individualism’.21 However, despite his opposition, in reference to his accession to the post of 
Minister of Justice in 1931, Politika reported that Ljotić, while being the president of both the 
local savings bank and the local plum growers cooperative, was also a board member of the 
Agrarian Bank.22 Thus Ljotić’s involvement in local agricultural and economic life meant 
that his personal and financial interests were as much an issue in his opposition to the 
Agrarian Bank, as was the individualism he claimed to see arise from its credit policy, and 
that which would suit a later ideological position. 
 
Already by December 1930, Ljotić writes that he began hearing the rumours of him being 
touted as a future minister of justice, though he claims not to have believed it.23 Nonetheless, 
the king’s proclamation did give Ljotić avenues for advancement, such as his becoming 
regional deputy of the Smederevo district, and elected to the council of the Danube 
banovina.24 These ‘rumours’ however came to fruition with the existing minister of justice, 
Dr. Milan Srškić, was appointed as the Prime Minister by the King, and Ljotić acceded to the 
post of minister of justice on 17 February 1931, 25  in the government of General Petar 
Živković. The choice of Živković as prime minister was not coincidental. He was an active 
participant in the coup to overthrow the Obrenović dynasty, to be replaced by the 
Karadjordjević dynasty. As a leader of the Bela ruka (White Hand) organisation, who was 
appointed as head of the palace guard in 1921, Živković was again among the main 
orchestrators of the 6th of January dictatorship.26 Through Živković, the King was able to take 
a more active role in political decision-making, without actually being seen as involved in 
politics, thus giving the illusion of being above politics. 
 
Ljotić as Minister of Justice 
 
In his memoirs, Ljotić writes that upon taking up the post of minister of justice, he set a 
certain code of conduct for himself, which he claimed would guide him during his tenure. 
Among these were that ‘service was to be first’, that the ‘Ministry of Justice was to be order 
                                                        
21 “Iz moga života”, in Dimitrije Ljotić, Odabrana dela. I Knjiga, 374. 
22 “Rekonstrukcija Vlade,” February 17, 1931, 1. 
23 “Iz moga života”, in Dimitrije Ljotić, Odabrana dela. I Knjiga, 383. 
24 Miloš Martić, “Dimitrije Ljotić and the Yugoslav National Movement ZBOR, 1935-1945,” 220. 
25 Živko Avramovski, Britanci o kraljevini Jugoslaviji: godišnji izveštaji Britanskog poslanstva u Beogradu 
1921-1938. Knjiga II (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 1986), 44. See also “Rekonstrukcija Vlade,” February 17, 
1931, 1. 
26 Todor Stojkov, Opozicija u vreme šestojanuarske diktature 1929-1935 (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1969), 73–76. 
 110 
itself’, the ‘judiciary must be free in the dispensation of the law’, and that he himself must 
‘know each and every organ before giving personal endorsement’.27 It was in that vein that 
Ljotić’s brief ministerial career would have liked to be seen by him. Unfortunately, little is 
written about how his brief ministerial reign was seen by others. Though his ever-evident 
personal inflexibility and uncompromising stands was certain to cause a degree of 
unpopularity. One of his first acts was authorising the transfer of future Partisan leader Josip 
Broz (Tito), from Lepoglava prison to Maribor. This move was a result of Broz and other 
communists being seen as ‘dangers to order and peace’28 while within prison. Certainly, apart 
from lending Ljotić a certain amount of credibility as a minister, his tenure, lasted until he 
offered his resignation on 28 June, 1931.  
 
The reasons for his resignation lie in the King’s refusal to accept Ljotić’s draft for a new 
constitution based on what he deemed to be an ‘organic’ constitution.29 This constitution 
would see a hereditary monarchy, of the Karadjordjević dynasty, both non-democratic and 
non-parliamentary, with society organised on a corporate model of economic, cultural, and 
charitable associations. The King, as head of government, would also accept a certain level of 
decentralisation.30 Given that the current trend of the 6th of January regime, towards state 
centralisation and unitarism, it is not surprising that the king, who would have undoubtedly 
felt that Ljotić’s constitutional plan would be unworkable, rejected the proposal. His choosing 
to present the king his proposal on 28 June, had a double symbolism. Not only was it 
sacralised in Serbian national mythology as the day of the Serbian Kingdom’s loss of 
independence to the Ottomans, but it was also the date on which the Vidovdanski Ustav (St. 
Vitus’s Day Constitution) was proclaimed in 1921. This Constitution saw the centralisation 
of the state as a constitutional hereditary monarchy, and parliamentary.31 The rejection of his 
                                                        
27 “Iz moga života”, in Dimitrije Ljotić, Odabrana dela. I Knjiga, 387–388.The other points included the right 
of employees to hold any political opinion, as long as it did not interfere with the decisions of the court or 
ministry. That the Ministry of Justice is duty bound to keep records of court cases and of the functioning of the 
courts and the ministry. The Ministry will have no more employees than is absolutely necessary, and that laws 
are to be passed only after careful consideration  for the consequences. 
28 Josip Broz, Tito, Sabrana Djela. Tom Treći. Mart 1935-Novembar 1937 (Belgrade: Izdavački Centar 
“Komunist,” 1982), 180. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes outlawed the Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia formed in 1919, on 29 December, 1920. See “Obznana Kraljevske Vlade,” Politika, December 30, 
1920, No.4559. 
29 According to former ZBOR member Milutin Popradović, Ljotić was encouraged by the King to propose a 
new constitution. See Milutin Popradović, D.V. Ljotić i Komunistička Partija Jugoslavije 1935-1945. Prilozi na 
istinu o JNP ZBOR (Iskra, 1990), 19. 
30 “Iz moga života”, in Dimitrije Ljotić, Odabrana dela. I Knjiga, 397. An emphasis on decentralisation would 
disappear by 1935, with Ljotić being vehemently against any sort of decentralised rule, which he likened to a 
weakening of the state. 
31 The St. Vitus’s Day Constitution was divided into 14 sections totaling 142 points. 
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proposal however lead Ljotić to resign from his ministerial office on the same day, which was 
formally announced on 3 September, 1931.32  
 
The new Constitution, in place of the dissolved 1921 Constitution was also proclaimed on the 
same day, reaffirming the state as a constitutional and hereditary monarchy, with national and 
state unity symbolised in the image of the king. Political parties remained outlawed, 
proscribed under the provision that there could be no ‘associations of an ethnic, religious, or 
regional basis’.33 However, a degree of moderation was noticeable in the fact that there was a 
semblance of constitutional rule and political pluralism. This pluralism was channelled into 
the establishment of a ‘peasant democracy’ through the Yugoslav Radial Peasants’ 
Democracy.34  
 
The king not heeding his warning, regarding the reorganisation of both society and the 
constitution along his line of thought, led Ljotić to resign and a return to private life. 
However, in his memoirs, the future Serbian Orthodox Patriarch Gavrilo recalls that Ljotić 
came to him in August 1931 wanting to resign his position. Gavrilo writes that ‘he (Ljotić) 
said that he could no longer associate with his colleagues, whom he accused of corruption’, 
adding that ‘they kept lists on who was Democrat and Radical’, and tried to get him to 
transfer judges throughout Yugoslavia based on this sole criterion.35  
 
The semblance of constitutionalism, and the blueprint for the future establishment of the 
Yugoslav Radical Peasants’ Democracy, meant that Ljotić no longer viewed the regime as 
moving into the direction which he thought best, and that any compromise to parliamentarism 
or constitutionality was a sign that the regime was being run by interest groups, and not the 
                                                        
32 “Rekonstrukcija Vlade,” Politika, 3 September, 1931, No.8375, 4. 
33  Ibid.1-3. 
34 The Jugoslovenska Radikalna Seljačka Demokratija (Yugoslav Radical Peasants’ Democracy) was founded 
in May 1932 as the party of the regime. It was made up of disparate and dissident elements of former political 
parties such as the Radical Party, the Democratic Party, as well as nationalist organisations such as the 
Organizacija Jugoslovenskih Nacionalista (Organisation of Yugoslav Nationalists). In May 1933, it was 
renamed as the Jugoslovenska Narodna Stranka. Its aim was to promote a distinct yet homogenous Yugoslav 
identity amongst Yugoslavia’s constituent peoples, while championing the Karadjordjević dynasty. For more 
see; Aleksandar Rastović, “Program Jugoslovenske Narodne Stranke,” Zbornik Matice srpske za istoriju, no. 74 
(2006), 125–132. 
35 Memoari Patrijarha srpskog Gavrila (Belgrade: SFAIROS, 1990), 78. 
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national interest. For Ljotić, there could only be ‘one political expression’, 36  which he 
believed could only be found outside of the existing political system. 
 
Towards the foundation of ZBOR 
 
Ljotić’s initial mainstream political life ended with his resignation from Živković’s 
government in 1931. His political work however, would begin shortly after, in the beginning 
of 1932 when he formed the Otadžbina (Fatherland) group, which would hold weekly 
discussions.37 This group would begin publishing a journal by the same name in 1934, and 
would become the first publication associated with the ZBOR movement. The king allowed 
the formation of Otadžbina, when most ‘political’ groups were proscribed.38 Otadžbina, and 
by essence Ljotić, stated that it ‘did not want power, only for the healing and health of 
national life’.39 The 6th of January regime did not scare Otadžbina, but what did scare them 
were ‘political parties, now and before the Royal proclamation are unable to heal national life 
and to create a new moral foundation’.40 The king knew that Ljotić was a monarchist, and 
that he could conceivably use the group as a further buttress for his regime. In this sense, by 
working outside of the system, yet in support of it (being relegated to the margins of 
organised activity by its insignificance), Otadžbina was viewed as no danger to the stability 
of the regime. Among the earliest collaborators in the Otadžbina was Dr. Stevan Ivanić, who 
would later join ZBOR and be a prominent commissar in the Serbian collaborationist 
administration in 1941.41  
 
It would be through his participation in Otadžbina that saw the creation of the nucleus of 
what would later be ZBOR. By 1934, Ljotić began using the journal to propound his political 
                                                        
36 Dimitrije Ljotić, “Dve revolucije,” 2. In this article Ljotić accuses the 6th of January regime, but not the King, 
of not doing enough to stifle party coteries and partisanship, which exist through the JNS and the JRSD. 
37 “Iz moga života”, in Dimitrije Ljotić, Odabrana dela. I Knjiga, 419. 
38 Jovan Byford, “Willing Bystanders: Dimitrije Ljotić, ‘Shield Collaboration’ and the destruction of Serbia’s 
Jews”, in Haynes and Rady, In the Shadow of Hitler, 297. 
39 Dimitrije Ljotić, “Ko smo i šta hoćemo,” Otadžbina, June 10, 1934, No.16. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Stevan Z. Ivanić (1884-1948). Graduated in Medicine from Vienna, and finished his specialisation in Vienna, 
Hamburg, and Warsaw. An active participant in the Balkan Wars and World War One, he was active on the 
Salonika Front against the malaria outbreak (where Ljotić also participated). After the war he became 
administrator of the Smederevo hospital, before becoming docent at the Medical Faculty of Belgrade in 1933. A 
founding member of ZBOR, he would serve as Commissar for Social Politics and People’s Health in the 
Aćimović administration from 30 April, 1941, until 29 August, 1941. He would die in Germany in 1948. For 
more see Simo C. Ćirković, Ko je Ko u Nedićevoj Srbiji 1941-1944. Leksikon ličnosti slika jedna zabranjene 
epohe (Belgrade: Prosveta, 2009), 207. 
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ideals for the first time to a wider (though still limited) audience.42 Otadžbina however, was 
not the only non-party buttress for the regime. King Alexander encouraged the proliferation 
of such groups, which either attracted or recruited elements of nationally minded ‘Yugoslav’ 
youth.43 Amongst such groups was the Jugoslovenska Akcija (Yugoslav Action), which was 
formed in Belgrade on 7 January, 1930. Originally, the Jugoslovenska Akcija (hereafter 
known as JA) was founded as a national association, with its goal of ‘gathering enlightened 
youth’ for the ‘strengthening of Yugoslav national awareness’, and ‘solidifying national 
unity’.44 Despite being formed in 1930, the JA’s existence was guarded until its first congress 
on 22 May, 1932 in Zagreb, due in part to its lack of a codified program and numerous 
fissures.45  
 
The JA was in effect an actor and element of consolidation for the regime, and functioned as 
a defence against every revolutionary, national, and social movement deemed a threat to 
national unity.  Much of the impetus behind the JA was in part due to the injection of former 
members of the Organizacija Jugoslovenskih Nacionalista (Organisation of Yugoslav 
Nationalists), commonly referred by its acronym ORJUNA. ORJUNA was initially founded 
as the Jugoslavenska napredna nacionalistička omladina (Advanced Yugoslav Nationalist 
Youth) on 23 March 1921 by young activists of the Democratic Party.46   
 
Founded in Split, ORJUNA was initially under the aegis of the Democratic Party, and 
especially its leader, Svetozar Pribićević. 47  It took justification and legitimisation from 
                                                        
42 The journal Otadžbina began publication on 26 February, 1934. Ljotić states that while his articles were 
indeed censored, none were banned until the 29th issue, when after a re-reading of ‘Lanac odgovornosti’, the 
censor decided that while the journal was published with the knowledge of the King, said article would not be 
approved by him. See “Iz moga života”, in Dimitrije Ljotić, Odabrana dela. I Knjiga, 420.; Dimitrije Ljotić, 
Kako nastaju revolucije (Petrovgrad: Biblioteka Otadžbine, 1936), 10–14. 
43 Branislav Gligorijević, “Politički pokreti i grupe s nacionalsocijalističkom ideologijom i njihova fuzija u 
Ljotićevom zboru,” 35. 
44 Ibid. 36.  
45 Jugoslovenska akcija: stenografske beleške sa prvog šireg sastanka delegata Jugoslovenske akcije u Zagrebu 
(Belgrade: Jugoslovenska zemlja, 1932). On the fissures within the JA, see Branislav Gligorijević, “Politički 
pokreti i grupe s nacionalsocijalističkom ideologijom i njihova fuzija u Ljotićevom zboru,” 37. The JA 
coalesced around two differing factions, one, which intended it to be a strictly intellectual enterprise, and 
another that agitated for wider political participation. 
46 Jovo Bakić, “Fašizam u Jugoslaviji 1918-1941,” Nova srpska politička misao 11, no. 1–4 (2006), 27. 
47 The JNNO, later ORJUNA, was never an independent organisation in its own right, with most of the founding 
JNNO members being from the Democratic Party, especially form amongst the elements closest to Svetozar 
Pribićević. ORJUNA’s ideology consisted primarily of a strident and aggressive Yugoslav unitarist nationalism, 
anti-communism, and the maintenance of state and national integrity. Banned by the 6th of January regime in 
1929, its members drifted into numerous pro-regime associations or organisations such as the JA, and the 
Yugoslav National Party. For more on ORJUNA see Niko Bartulović, Od Revolucionarne do Orjune. Istorijat 
jugoslovenskog omladinskog pokreta (Split: Izdanje Direktoriuma Orjune, 1925).; Mladen Djordjević, 
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proclaiming itself as an inheritor of the pre-war South Slav youth movement.48 Founded in 
the context of the turmoil of the Treaty of Versailles and the rise of communism in the face of 
national consolidation of newly created states, ORJUNA worked towards the ‘nationalisation 
of the masses’.49 This nationalisation took on an added importance in the face of Italian 
irredentism. ORJUNA can be seen in part as a violent manifestation and reaction to Italian 
territorial demands against Yugoslavia. Its strident and aggressive nationalism, which lead to 
it sporadically attacking non-‘Yugoslav’ and Slavonic minorities, earned it notoriety in its 
stated defence of ‘anti-separatism’ and ‘anti-centralist’ tendencies.50  
 
Most historians on Yugoslav events have made levelled accusations about ORJUNA as a 
fascist organisation, especially as it has been described as a ‘terrorist organisation’ utilising 
‘fascist methods against the working class’.51 Niko Bartulović, a pro-Yugoslav Croat writer 
and journalist, also a leading ORJUNA ideologist described ORJUNA as ‘pure idealism’. 
Bartulović rejected the notion that ORJUNA was ‘organised along party lines’.52 ORJUNA 
according to Bartulović was meant to help ‘advance all moral, intellectual’ ideas, and in the 
event of antagonism the, ‘physical strength of their members’, in the service of the defence of 
‘culture and politics’, would form the ‘base unity of the Yugoslav people’.53 Part of this help 
included close links with the militantly nationalist Narodna Odbrana (National Defence) 
organisation, who periodically sent ORJUNA arms, and helped drill its Action Squads in 
military fashion.54 These uniformed Action Squads, reminiscent of earlier Fascist squadristi, 
are indicative of ORJUNA’s fascistic influence. It valorised and glorified the direct action 
undertaken by the Action Squads attacks against communist groups primarily, but also 
against those they deemed as separatist. Italian interests, and supposed separatism, were 
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Robert Gerwath, and John Horne, eds., War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 158. 
49 Stevo Djurašković, “Ideologija Organizacije jugoslovenskih nacionalista (ORJUNA),” 231. 
50 For instances of ORJUNA attacks, see “Savez ORJUNA-HANAO (izveštaj Politici),” Politika, March 4, 
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constant targets of ORJUNA in their quest internal security and unity based on their 
interpretation of integral Yugoslavism. 
 
As a sign of further fascistic influence, ORJUNA advocated a ‘national revolution’, attacking 
both bolshevism and ‘degenerate parliamentarianism’. It called for a break with party politics 
and for the introduction of a non-party dictatorship with the king at its head. Once installed, 
this dictatorship would then pave the way for what ORJUNA deemed a ‘corporative 
democratic movement’.55 On a wider geo-political level, ORJUNA displayed elements of 
Pan-Slavism, believing Bulgaria an integral part of Yugoslavia, while advocating for the 
future joining of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and even Russia, to ensure the ‘primacy of the 
Slavonic race’. 56  Anti-Semitism also had its place in ORJUNA ideology, though this 
depended on regional conditions, with it being more pronounced in Croatia, where 
ORJUNA’s Zagreb branch called for an open struggle against ‘Jewish capital’.57 
 
As ORJUNA spread from its Dalmatian powerbase, it became active throughout Croatia, 
Slovenia, and Vojvodina in Serbia. In Vojvodina at least, according to Milan Koljanin, 
ORJUNA’s growth was the attempt by the ‘Serbian bourgeoisie’ to ‘displace the leading 
economic role of the German minority, Jews, and Hungarians’. 58  To this end, writes 
Koljanin, it organised terrorist attacks on German and Hungarian publishing houses, 
especially in Novi Sad and Subotica.59 By 1923, ORJUNA was active throughout Serbia, 
with its Belgrade branch being established in March 1922. The movement was most active in 
Slovenia, though it was helped in Serbia by the Četnik association,60 under Kosta Pećanac, 
and Ilija Trifunović-Birčanin.61 
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As it was closely associated with Svetozar Pribićević, after the 8 February, 1925, 
Parliamentary Elections, Pribićević’s breakaway Samostalna demokratska stranka 
(Independent Democratic Party) garnered 4.8% of the vote. 62  Pribićević’s political 
marginalisation also affected ORJUNA, who from 1925 would increasingly lose influence as 
well as organisational infrastructure.63 In 1927, the movement moved its headquarters to 
Belgrade, mostly as a result of its loss of influence in its former powerbase of Split and 
Dalmatia. Stevo Djurašković identifies three chronological stages of ORJUNA’s 
development. First there was the period from its 1921 founding until 1922, where ORJUNA, 
in the face of political and internal instability, was at its most radical and violent. From 1922 
to 1925, ORJUNA was dominated by increased ideological clarification, and organisational 
development. After the 1925 elections, ORJUNA entered what Djurašković describes as a 
‘political crisis’. With the loss of Pribićević’s support, ORJUNA would not be able to sustain 
itself.64  
 
ORJUNA’s Pan-Slavism, integral Yugoslavism, and call for a palingenetic cultural 
renovation would find resonance with ZBOR after 1935, though many of those ORJUNA 
members who would later gravitate to ZBOR first went through the medium of the JA. 
 
The JA would have more of an influence on the future ZBOR organisation, and after the 
royal proclamation of 1929, many ORJUNA members gravitated to the JA. During its first 
congress in 1932, it elected Velibor Jonić as general-secretary, who would later, for a time, 
become ZBOR’s general-secretary as well as a minister of education in the collaborationist 
regime during the Second World War.65 The JA, like most of the small nationalist and pro-
regime pressure groups, did not receive official backing from the king. Given that the JA had 
no real leadership and organisation, leading naturally to internal disputes, it could hardly be 
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considered an influential or beneficial for the king.66 That being said, it was one of the most 
clearly defined and ideologically coherent of the myriad pro-regime groups. It described itself 
as ‘nationalist youth free from tribal considerations’, putting ‘Yugoslavia above all’; it was a 
youth group that advocated for ‘generational change’ in order to promote ‘real Yugoslavism’, 
anti-federalist, anti-clericalist, and advocated a re-organisation of society along corporatist 
lines.67 The AF was aware of the JA, announcing in its press that the JA was a group made up 
of young intellectuals, looking to break the ‘malaise of partisanship present in the 
government and opposition’. The remedy therefore, was the ‘accession to power of the 
energetic youth’ of the JA.68  
 
Like Otadžbina, similar groups were closely monitored, and in the case of ORJUNA and the 
JA, proscribed when deemed unnecessary by the regime. These groups would have most 
likely remained what they were, small marginalised groups with hardly any influence outside 
of their own circles, had not King Alexander been assassinated on 9 October, 1934, in 





In the aftermath of the assassination, amidst fears of further political and ethnic tensions, 
elements of these disparate groups and associations held meetings to try to decide on 
unification into a larger political bloc. With the exception of the JA, most of these other 
groups, like Otadžbina were without any semblance of organisational form, and any appeals 
were done through their respective journals. The assassination quickened the pace at which 
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talks of unity proceeded, for before his death, the king was hinting at a unified regime 
propagating movement. Such was the case with the ZBOR (referred to as ‘small ZBOR’) 
movement in Hercegovina of Ratko Parežanin, which did seek out Otadžbina, for such a 
purpose.70 It would appear that during this process of unification, it would be Parežanin’s 
ZBOR group, along with elements of the JA, and a small Slovenian veteran’s group, 
Združene borcev Jugoslavije – BOJ (Associated Combatants of Yugoslavia - BOJ), which 
was a promoter of the regime in Slovenia,71 that sought out Otadžbina. Ljotić at this time 
most likely had good reason to be cautious about any sort of unification agreement, especially 
with the JA, given its on-going friction with the official regime party, the Jugoslovenska 
Narodna Stranka (Yugoslav National Party).72 Also, given his caution, it was likely that he 
would mull over any proposal given to him, including the proposed role of Otadžbina by 
Parežanin.73  
 
Two informal meetings did take place, the first, in Belgrade on 6 October, 1934, three days 
before the king’s assassination, and the second, in Zagreb, on 14 December, 1934, which 
gave Ljotić and Otadžbina a leading position in the negotiations.74 For both BOJ and the JA, 
these negotiations were of a more pragmatic than ideological character. BOJ, embroiled as it 
was in internal dissent, saw a minority element move towards ZBOR, while for the JA’s 
problems with the JNS were putting it under increased scrutiny and calls to be banned.75 In 
order to legitimise its own political existence, a merger with ZBOR, through which it could 
conceivably control it, seemed logical and feasible for the JNS.  
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The reasons for Ljotić’s rise to prominence in these negotiations are not hard to fathom. As a 
former minister, Ljotić’s name leant a certain degree of respectability. His personal 
relationship to the deceased king, plus his family’s reputation, made him a stand out amongst 
the other potential candidates (among who were Jonić and Parežanin). It was thought that if 
the new movement were to have any wider popular appeal, it would be because of the 
aforementioned qualities and personal characteristics surrounding Ljotić. These negotiations 
would culminate in the announcement of ZBOR as a political movement on 6 January, 1935, 
on the sixth anniversary of the 6th of January regime. It would be the personality and royal 
connections of Ljotić that ensured him the position of president of the newly reconstructed 
ZBOR.76   
 
ZBOR – Beginnings of an organisation 
 
ZBOR, which translates to ‘rally’ in Serbo-Croatian, was itself an acronym. According to 
Parežanin, the founder and leader of the small Hercegovinian localised ‘small ZBOR’, ZBOR 
was an acronym for Zadružena Borbena Organizacija Rada (loosely translated as United 
Fighting Labour Organisation). Parežanin states that it was united in the sense that the 
movement stood for a ‘united and co-operative life’, fighting, because ‘without struggle, we 
cannot achieve what we want’, organisation, because ‘we are for organisation, for work, for a 
plan’, and labour, because ‘we value true labour, while crushing the idlers’.77 As its heraldry, 
ZBOR chose a shield with a piece of wheat chaff intersected by a sword. This was explained 
as heroic, and signified ZBOR’s return to the heroic spirit and past of its ancestors.78 In order 
to broaden its wider appeal, the movement decided on the prefix of Jugoslovenski Narodni 
Pokret (Yugoslav National Movement), to ZBOR, to make the full name of the movement the 
Jugoslovenski Narodni Pokret ZBOR (or JNP ZBOR). Unlike the AF, where Maurras joined 
an already existing movement and converted it into his ideological laboratory, Ljotić was one 
of many existing candidates for the role of the head of a united amalgamation of disparate 
groups, who would later implant a personal ideology into this new amalgamated movement. 
This imposition of ideology would be seen in the publication of ZBOR’s Osnova načela i 
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smernice (Basic principles and guidelines) in 1935.79 It was this publication, presented on the 
day of ZBOR’s foundation that would initially set and define the movement’s ideology and 
political life.  
 
The Ideology of ZBOR in the context of Yugoslavist thought 
 
ZBOR’s basic guidelines and principles were its first attempt at political clarification and 
orientation. Its guidelines rested on the inevitability of the unification of Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes, and on the state acting as the defender of ‘Yugoslav’ moral, spirit, and culture. The 
king, representing a sort of divine will, was above reproach. Rural life and the village would 
act as the criterion, or the norm, of state social policy. The mainstay of the economy would be 
agriculture. Private property and capital were to be subordinated to the needs of the whole.80 
The guidelines, were supposed to ‘answer the pressing questions of the day’, included clauses 
concerning Ljotić’s wish for a ‘free judiciary’ and the ‘impeccable personal correctness’ of 
all civil servants, and that ‘real government’ under the administration of the state, would 
solve all administrative issues.81 Focusing primarily on issues of governance, the guidelines 
stated that ZBOR was for ‘government need not exceeding national economic strength’, and 
that the village, as the ‘racial-biological source of the people’, should not only have its 
‘culture protected, but its organic health’, and should be incorporated into all aspects of 
political life.82 The state was to act as a mediator between capital and labour, in order to 
maintain social harmony.83 
 
Despite the publication of its Osnova načela i smernice, ZBOR’s ideology, as will be shown, 
was rife with inconsistencies, contradiction, simplicity, lack of pragmatism, and 
incompleteness. The movement claimed to be arguing for a ‘new conception of politics’ to 
show people that politics was not just a morass. Part of this problem of translating its thought 
stemmed from ZBOR’s short legal political life, giving it little time to structurally organise. 
But ZBOR’s own ideological rigidity, simplicity, lack of appeal, and later accusations of 
fascism would hamper any real development. Moreover, Ljotić could not seem to decide if 
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his movement should remain outside of the political mainstream. He also did not know when 
participating, what form it should take and to what end. As will be shown, he also focused his 
attention on ideological matters, thus leaving ZBOR as an organisational entity extremely 
weak and basic.  
 
However, there was a clear crystallisation amongst certain linked themes and layers in 
ZBOR’s ideology from 1935-1940. Among them were nationalism/monarchism, 
Yugoslavism, anti-communism, anti-democracy, anti-Semitism, anti-capitalism, and a 
corporatist type of social organisation and policy. While some of these themes were part of 
Ljotić’s earlier ideological crystallisation, it is important to put them into the political and 
ideological context of ZBOR. These themes would remain constant, and would form a 
cornerstone on which ZBOR hoped to build its ideology and support base. 
 
Ljotić’s monarchist sentiments went hand in hand with his nationalism. His slogan of ‘God, 
King, and Domaćin’ was echoed by Maurras in the cry for ‘God, King, and Fatherland’. This 
also shared in its synonymous meaning with the ‘Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality’ 
slogan of Russia under Tsar Nicholas I.84 In ZBOR’s Osnova načela i smernice, the king was 
to be absolute, and above reproach, embodying state unity and totality. He was also the 
safeguard of ‘faith, Church, unity, family, the people, the Fatherland, and all laws and 
freedoms’.85 In the specific case of Yugoslavia, the issue of nationality saw an imposition of 
identity from above, justified through an ‘organic’ concept of South Slavonic unity. Ljotić 
saw his nationalism as part and parcel of his monarchism, and vice versa. The king was 
supposedly a gift of God’s mercy, and acted as a ‘beacon of liberty, and the protector of our 
unity’.86 Ljotić’s monarchism and nationalism were part of an earlier ideological formation 
before the founding of ZBOR, which has been shown earlier. But a new corollary was added 
to this monarchist/nationalist dimension. This corollary was that of Yugoslavism.87  
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Ljotić’s Yugoslavism put a strong emphasis on the unity of the Yugoslav ‘tribes’. There was, 
as will be shown, a high level of ambiguity regarding his personal conception of 
Yugoslavism, which would be disseminated through ZBOR publications. Initially, given that 
Yugoslavism was seen by elements within Yugoslavia as akin to state centralisation, Ljotić’s 
concept of Yugoslavism rested on the assumption that Yugoslavism was ‘organic’ in the 
sense that Yugoslavia was a historical inevitability. In ZBOR’s conception of Yugoslavism, it 
would remain incomplete so long as the Bulgarians were not incorporated into Yugoslavia. 
Bulgaria, according to Ljotić, was ‘part of the national body’,88 and therefore could not 
remain outside of any South Slav unification. Within his form of Yugoslavism however, there 
was a clear hierarchical demarcation. This was evidenced by Ljotić’s claim of the Serbian 
‘active’ element, and the Croatian ‘complementary’ element,89 within Yugoslavism, which 
were supposed to work in tandem and harmony. This harmony was due in part to 
Yugoslavia’s supposed inevitability. Ljotić explained his Yugoslavism in that ‘there can be 
no Bulgarian, Croatian, Serbian, or Slovenian tribe without a unified state’, for when these 
tribes ‘form independent states, they are doomed to fall’.90  
 
Much of Ljotić’s writing on Yugoslavism was within the paradigm of the ‘national question’. 
This would not only open ZBOR up to accusations of being Serbian dominated (which it 
would be), but more insidiously, of using Yugoslavism as a cover for Serbian nationalism.91  
 
Yugoslavism, as ZBOR perhaps inadvertently portrayed it, was deeply intertwined with the 
question of centralisation or federalism. This intermeshing of state administrational issues 
with ethnic debates gave rise to the ‘national question’, and the closely linked ‘Croatian 
question’. 92  Rather than Parežanin’s stated opinion that ‘Yugoslav thought’ permeated 
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Ljotić’s mind, Ljotić’s ‘Yugoslav thought’ went only so far as to reinforcing state integrity 
and state unity. His way of doing this was to hark to the ‘spirit’ of Yugoslavia’s people, as 
proof that they were indeed one and the same.93  
 
The Yugoslav national idea had by the end of the interwar era become associated with 
conservatism, and centralism, for many non-Serbs. Ljotić’s Yugoslavism would have been no 
exception to a majority of non-Serbs (and perhaps Serbs as well), as it was in essence little 
more than that centralisation view of the Radical Party. It is here where ambiguity arises, for 
while the Radical Party initially opposed any open declaration to ‘unitarism’,94 Ljotić at first 
subscribed to it. However, his Yugoslavism would be predicated by the same dictates of the 
Radical Party, in that the policy of Serbian hegemony presupposed a centralist state 
organisation. Therefore, Ljotić, like the Radicals, was forced to accept elements of 
‘unitarism’ in order to keep its ideology Serbian centred. The national problem however, was 
not ended with the 6th of January regime. To Ljotić, the ‘problem of the tribes’ remained, as 
did the ‘religious problem’, by which there was a ‘cleavage in Christ’s Church, which our 
country has the unfortunate accident of bisecting’,95 becoming ever more hostile. To ZBOR, 
the ‘national question’, was greatly exacerbated by the Croatian question because the 
Croatian question was framed as a problem of ‘spirit’, and of tradition, against which the 
Croats were accused of turning. 
 
More so than the national question, it was the Croatian question that ZBOR saw as 
problematic as it viewed it through a strictly mystical and one-dimensional paradigm, that of 
national and state unity. In essence, the national question, in ZBOR’s view morphed into the 
Croatian question, and the movement presented it in an uncompromising and venomous light. 
For ZBOR, the Croatian question was not one that could be solved by the signing of any 
treaty or agreement. For Ljotić, the Croatian population could be divided into two groups. 
The first group consisted of ‘those who are for repairing the socio-economic and moral-
political life of the nation’.96 The second part was made up of ‘Frankists’ who hold ‘hatred 
for Yugoslavia and any community with the Serbs’. 97  It was the Frankists, 98  and their 
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disassociation of any idea of unity, to which Ljotić greatly objected. Not only being content 
with an independent Croatian state, Ljotić accused Croatian separatists of wanting a personal 
union with Hungary (a belief ascribed perhaps only to a small number of diehard Habsburg 
supporters), which would result in the Hungarians having their maritime border.99  
 
For Ljotić, the Frankists were unable to ‘conceive Yugoslavia as their homeland due to their 
‘small heads’, and ‘small souls’, by which he meant that Yugoslavia was simply ‘too big and 
too broad’ for their comprehension. As they did ‘nothing to create it’, destroying Yugoslavia 
was to be no issue for the Frankists.100 As for a solution to the Croatian question Ljotić felt 
that the onus of responsibility lay with the Croats. He harangued the leader of the most 
popular political party in Croatia the Croatian Peasant Party (Hrvatska Seljačka Stranka –
hereafter HSS), and its leader Vladko Maček.101 Ljotić went so far as to accuse Maček of 
trivialising the struggle against Communism as a simple ‘fear of the reactionaries’, as a sign 
of government inactivity against Communism.102  
 
Maček, in Ljotić’s view, as representative of the Croatian people, was key to pushing Croatia 
towards independence with insistence on the Sporazum (Agreement) of 26 August, 1939, 
which created an autonomous Croatian banovina that was largely self-governing, except in 
defence. The Sporazum was made possible under royal encouragement for negotiations 
between the government and Maček. This supposed drive towards Croatian independence 
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saw Ljotić conceive of two possible outcomes. Either the Croatian masses would turn more 
radical and fully support the Frankist cause, or they would reject it and turn towards Stalin.103  
 
Yet, Ljotić recognised that Yugoslavism was created in Croatia, by what he called the ‘finest 
sons of Croatia’.104 Yugoslavism started with the creation of the Illyrian movement and based 
its views on South Slavonic national identity upon the ideal of the national awakening of the 
French Revolution. What Ljotić resented the most however was what he deemed to be the 
tragedy and betrayal of ‘Zagreb entering into conflict with its past’.105 Yet he also blamed the 
Serbs for not ‘taking Yugoslavia into their souls’,106 and claimed that the Croatian question 
would remain until this is resolved. However, Ljotić also saw this as a sign to increase his 
influence amongst the disaffected Serbs in Croatian majority provinces, especially in the 
aftermath of the Cvetković-Maček agreement, which gave Croatia autonomy within 
Yugoslavia.  
 
At the expense of his stated Yugoslavism, he began taking interest in the Serbian Cultural 
Club (Srpski Kulturni Klub –hereafter SKK107). He seems to have reached out in late 1939, 
meeting with a favourable response, asking for his presence at conferences and meetings to 
‘express the true conditions in the country’, as a means of strengthening the SKK.108 He also 
seems to have made an impression, at least initially, on the SKK leadership, especially 
through his eloquence as a public speaker.109  
 
On a wider scale, his involvement in the SKK saw the proliferation of the ‘Serbian question’ 
as a corollary to Croatian autonomy. Numerous Serb intellectuals and organisations began 
questioning the role of the Serbs within Yugoslavia, and a low-level conflict arose between 
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emergent Serb nationalism and the state.110 In effect, the continued existence of the Croatian 
question was to ZBOR a sign that the government did not intend to solve the problem, and 
ZBOR blamed it for its continued existence. Thus it forced the Serbs’ hand (in Ljotić’s view) 
in rectifying the situation.  
 
What also becomes clear is the level and attachment of Ljotić to Yugoslavism. He certainly 
considered the Serbs as the primary element in Yugoslav thought, even though historically it 
had been conceptualised in Croatia almost a century previously. More importantly however, 
it shows how ZBOR’s Yugoslavism became a cloak for Serbian nationalism, inasmuch as 
Ljotić evidently agreed with the SKK on the need for a strong Serbian element as integral to 
Yugoslav national and state unity. As the Yugoslav state was primarily built upon the pre-
existing institutions of the Kingdom of Serbia, this is perhaps understandable. But as the 
Serbs were a plurality in the Yugoslav state, as well as possessing independent prewar 
institutions, under a Serbian monarchy, it is easy to see the conflagration, between ‘Serb’ and 
‘Yugoslav’.  
 
It was also a sign of the conflagration between centralism and federalism. State unity was a 
prime value for ZBOR, because the ‘state is the most important element of human society’, 
and ‘without the state, there can be nothing’.111 However, in a seeming contradiction, ZBOR 
argued for centralisation as the driving element for state unity. At the same time there was a 
tendency towards ‘organic decentralisation’, as opposed to what was deemed ‘bureaucratic 
decentralisation’. 112  This obvious contradiction could be construed as a screen for the 
government handling of the national and Croatian question and for ZBOR’s core belief that 
its root causes were of a deeper moral malaise, coupled with political incompetence.  
 
The end of Yugoslavia as a constitutional monarchy came in January 1929, with the country 
being invaded and dismembered in April 1941. For Ljotić’s Yugoslavism, in the context of 
collaboration, occupation, and the Second World War as will be shown; he would go no 
further than Serbia. At the same time, he would appeal to ‘Slavdom’, though making scant 
mention of any reconstituted Yugoslavia. What was tantamount was the salvation and 
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continued existence of the Serbian people; ‘with the only help that we can expect besides 
ourselves is that from Germany’.113 
 
ZBOR and democracy 
 
Social democracy of the time made the fatal mistake of assuming that those who had been 
crippled by thousands of years of patriarchal power were capable of democracy without any 
further preliminaries and was capable of governing themselves. Just as Christianity and 
anarchy did, social democracy lived on the compromise of the masses between happiness and 
irresponsibility.114 Officially, it rejected the rigorous scientific efforts (e.g., those of Freud) to 
comprehend the complicated nature of human beings. Hence, it was forced to assume 
dictatorial forms within its own ranks and to make compromises outside of them.  
 
The theme of anti-democratic rhetoric and thought was prominent to both Ljotić and ZBOR. 
Like Yugoslavism, it was interlinked with numerous other issues, which then coalesced into a 
wider ‘anti-democratic’ thought that had its basis within anti-modernism. Among them would 
be criticisms of capitalism, and parliamentary, as corollaries to his anti-democratic thought. 
Ljotić’s criticism of democracy predated ZBOR.115 However, given the unfortunate lack of 
documents, it is difficult to put ZBOR’s anti-democratic stance within a more specific socio-
political Yugoslav context. Nonetheless, as will be shown later, anti-democratic thought in 
Yugoslavia did find a degree of fermentation within universities, and amongst elements of the 
middle class. Among the most glaring contradictions are, that while Ljotić and ZBOR 
agitated for an end to democratic rule (if it existed in interwar Yugoslavia), and all it entailed, 
the organisation was openly (for a time) able to operate and function within it. Ljotić’s time 
as a member of the Radical Party left him in doubtless as to what he perceived to be as the 
artificial nature of both democracy and political parties. Neither of them, according to Ljotić, 
is ‘organic’, and that liberal democracy, which is founded on political parties, will ‘ultimately 
lead to destruction of both state and society’.116  
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Self-interest, as opposed to the collective interest was another assumed symptom of 
democracy, especially ‘through the ballot box’, where ‘voters care mostly about themselves, 
and have been led astray by those who are supposed to speak on their behalf’.117 Those that 
spoke on their behalf, the national representatives, were not convincing according to Ljotić, 
even if they were well meaning citing a ‘difference of mentality’.118 A democratic system, 
wrote ZBOR member Milosav Vasiljević, was ‘not conducive to any sort of free choice’,119 
as a buttress to Ljotić’s critique of democrats as out of touch with society. If, according to 
Ljotić, a candidate with 1000 votes that beat the candidate with 999 votes, it was not the 
candidate with 1000 votes that won, but rather that one voter who tipped the balance.120 Here 
Ljotić’s criticism of democracy shares similarities with that of German radical conservative 
philosopher Oswald Spengler, in that both viewed democracy, especially its supposed self-
interest, as a battleground of party cliques and the ‘ready intervention of money’. 121 
Spengler’s writings are of relevance in that he saw the decline of European civilisation as a 
result of the French Revolution, and saw the ‘West’ in particular, as being ruled by 
materialism and money; hence, he believed it was doomed.  
 
Vasiljević, in writing about democracy’s supposed inherent weakness, is of the opinion that 
‘once a democratic system is imposed, citizens lose the right to choose another system’, when 
democracy claims that ‘it brings freedom’.122 To both Ljotić and Spengler then, democracy 
signified a declining civilisation, in a kind of transitional state between civilisation and decay. 
Though unlike the Marxist model of historical development, Ljotić’s view was more 
philosophical than material. Rather than Marx’s belief in capitalism’s inevitable demise 
resulting from ‘bourgeois’ or a capitalist class rule, Ljotić would never show much beyond a 
rudimentary knowledge as to democracy’s application.  
 
As previously stated, democracy’s dissemination throughout Europe was, in Ljotić’s opinion, 
due to the French Revolution’s ideas, with Ljotić writing, that liberal democracy was allowed 
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‘free reign on the European continent’.123 The paradigm through which democracy advanced 
under the aegis of the French Revolution was deeply ingrained in many critics of the French 
Revolution, from whom Ljotić took inspiration.124 It was later adopted and elaborated on by 
radical conservative intellectuals within Weimar Germany.125 Amongst them was the cultural 
historian Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, who wrote in 1923 that ‘German revolutionaries of 
1918 made the German Revolution a Western-parliamentary one, on the English and French 
models of 1688 and 1789’. In the meantime, it was claimed that the ‘West has accustomed 
itself to Liberalism’ (read democracy), and that it has taught the West to ‘turn its principles 
into tactics to deceive the people.126  
 
This idea of 1918 as the springboard for democracy in Germany made a deep impression on 
the emerging Nazi ideology. In one of his first speeches, from 1 February, 1933, Adolf Hitler 
proclaimed that democracy and liberalism inevitably led to social democracy and 
communism, with the effects of the degeneracy of Weimar showing its depth.127 The result of 
democracy’s spread was a proliferation of political parties, urbanisation, social mobility, and 
eventually electoral franchise. This would result, according to ZBOR, in the ruination of 
culture, and an increase in industrialisation, which would destroy not only urban life, but the 
‘keeper of both rural and urban tradition’, the village.128 Though Ljotić was careful not to 
publicly disparage ‘the masses’, his only real experience with large crowds or groups of 
individuals was through the semi-feudalistic and paternalistic appeals to agricultural workers 
and peasants, primarily as a result of his work in agricultural co-operatives.  
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Where ZBOR made statements on ‘the masses’, it was usually in regard to the contradictions 
of democracy, that they have ‘lost the interest and motivation to vote for ideological 
reasons’.129 Where Ljotić was disparaging of the people however, was in believing that the 
people had no individual or collective will. This lack of will was due, Ljotić believed, to the 
idea that voting, as a hallmark of democracy, brings about a contrary result to the peoples 
will, thus sapping it. It is only the opinion of political parties, who believe that a vote is in the 
general interest.130 The concept of ‘will’, which was also superfluous with Ljotić’s concept of 
‘spirit’, in that Ljotić maintained that ‘democracy goes against the spirit of Yugoslavs. Spirit, 
taken to mean a feeling of collective identity, was described as heroic, a concept in the 
creation and defence of Yugoslavia, all the way back to the first Croatian, and Serbian 
principalities and kingdoms.131  
 
Ljotić considered democracy as a perceived ‘collection of equal individuals’. Yet, the ‘spirit’, 
or ‘will’, would be expressed through the varying functions, working in mutual harmony for 
the maintenance of the multiple units of the national whole. 132  Through the conduit of 
democracy’s implied equality, freedom and justice become mainstays of public and societal 
discourse. Ljotić, however, viewed such strengths of democracy as weaknesses that bring 
chaos above which ‘one can never rise’. He was never able to view democracy as anything 
other than through his perception of ‘individualism’. However, one time ZBOR youth leader 
Danilo Gregorić formulated an idea undoubtedly close to that of Ljotić that the ‘sociological 
beginnings of individualism proceeds from materialism, as a means of solving human societal 
events, those concerning the individual and his personal well-being’. Its appearance was 
created through the development of Western thought, and which postulated that ‘nature is 
made up of indivisible atoms, moving mechanically according to eternal natural law, behind 
which there are no ethics or deities’.133  
 
Ljotić, viewing democracy as a sort anarchy, wherein personal interests took precedence over 
the collective, saw discipline and order as the necessary correctives. That is why, Ljotić 
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argues, hierarchy, in the form of an absolute monarchy is preferable, for it posits discipline, 
as a means of achieving freedom, in tandem with the ‘Christian spirit’. This freedom was to 
be further found through God, and would be granted on earth through the king.134 
 
Parliamentarism, synonymous with democracy, removes deputies from the issues facing the 
nation, and entrenches corruption. 135  To Ljotić, parliamentarism was the ‘crown of 
democracy’, only allowed to exist in countries with established political parties, where the 
government was made up of undisputed leaders, ‘dictators’, 136  according to ZBOR. 
Moreover, parliamentarism 137  signifies the confusion of government with disorder and 
irresponsibility. To that end, ZBOR proclaimed itself to be against parliamentarism because 
‘parliament comes from parties’.138  
 
What Ljotić and ZBOR argued for instead was a National Assembly. This National 
Assembly, as will be shown later in this chapter, would be based on Ljotić’s view of societal 
organisation, amongst differing staleži (estates/corporations), who would elect their 
representatives. It would be the Assembly that would make and pass laws, leaving the 
government the courts free to administer justice.139 This system of a semi-parliamentary 
nature, would also act as the best check and defence mechanism against corruption. 
 
Corruption, as a by-product of democracy and parliamentarism, was taken by Ljotić as a real 
sign of democracy’s moral degeneracy and decay. ‘The people’, wrote Ljotić, who know ‘the 
material damage that corruption does to them, do not know the damage it causes the state’.140 
The main damage of corruption, according to Ljotić, is that ‘corruption regards the state as a 
tool serving individual interests, not the general interest’. Many people talk about ending 
corruption, Ljotić wrote, but ‘they talk through their mouths, and not through their hearts’.141 
For Ljotić, corruption, more than being a sign of the civilisational degradation brought by 
democracy, was an attack on the body politic, on the living organism of the state, as the 
primordial embodiment of the Yugoslav peoples. 
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ZBOR’s anti-democratic thought was fraught with incoherence. While Ljotić’s argument 
followed a line of thought not unlike the mainstream European radical right, in expressing 
fear of democracy as an element of modernisation, there was never any real analysis apart 
from slogans demonising democracy as a symptom of the degeneracy of modernisation. The 
superficiality of ZBOR’s criticism of democracy is unsurprising. Among the most important 
factors for sustaining a constitutional and democratic system were those of economic 
development and modernisation, along with a resolution of various religious and regional 
issues. These of course, when taken on their-own were not enough to preserve a 
constitutional government, but taken as a whole, they can be said to account for the major 
differences.142 Yugoslavia unfortunately, was lacking in economic modernisation, subject to 
dictatorship, and suffering numerous regional and religious issues. One of the most enduring 
of ZBOR’s slogans however involved anti-capitalism. As will be shown, ZBOR linked free-
market capitalism to liberal democracy, as a type of cultural and economic degradation and 
oppression. This allowed for the idea that within a Yugoslav national context, only a 
corporative social hierarchy could save the nation from further degeneracy. 
 
In essence, ZBOR was instinctively anti-democratic and anti-parliamentary. However, Ljotić 
claimed that the movement, though anti-parliamentary, is not against parliament. In fact, 
ZBOR claimed support the involvement of those who are chosen by the people in their 
country's laws and supervision of the government. ZBOR emphasised true governance and 
accountability; as long as a government, specifically a true parliament, is able to govern the 
nation properly without confusion and irresponsibility, then ZBOR favours it. This view of a 
government (i.e., parliament) goes a way to showing ZBOR’s ambiguity in relation to a 
characterisation of fascism, especially since fascism is not open to supporting an institution, 
such as a government, that will put their rule under scrutiny. 
 
ZBOR: Anti-capitalism and corporative social organisation 
 
Like many of its ideological ideas, ZBOR’s criticism of capitalism can be seen through an 
anti-modernist lens. If we take anti-modernist to mean the erosion of traditional sources of 
meaning and belonging, combined with mass industrialisation, which caused social 
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disruption, as an affront to national unity, a paradigm is formed. Through this paradigm, we 
can begin to put ZBOR and Ljotić’s anti-capitalism into context; this will also be done in 
tandem with Ljotić’s views on social organisation. In this vein, capitalism was taken as 
representing individualism, materialism, profit making, and the brute force of the market, as 
both anti-social and un-Christian. Industrialisation and modernisation, the spawns of 
capitalism, were parasites on the moral values of healthy agrarian societies.143 Capitalism 
underwent a certain demonisation amongst elements of religious believers and European 
public opinion in the interwar era. This was not just the identification of economic liberalism 
as a cover for capitalism. Capitalism became a scapegoat for the cause of the disastrous 
economic and social realities of millions of Europeans. It was also blamed for the stagnation 
and laxity of moral and spiritual values, as well as for the worship of money. 
 
Criticism of capitalism was among the first of ZBOR’s ideological tenets. Its attack on 
capitalism went deeper than economic malaise. For Ljotić there was no doubt of capitalism 
being tied in with democracy. In practice, anti-capitalism for ZBOR became a corollary for a 
wider anti-democratic sentiment, which in itself was part of a wider criticism of modernism. 
Ljotić admitted as much by declaring that ‘we are against liberal democracy because we are 
against the injustices of liberal capitalism, as the expression of liberal democracy’. 144 
Speaking in Petrovgrad (today’s Zrenjanin) in September 1935, Ljotić talked about replacing 
the existing capitalist system with a planned economy. This, in association with various co-
operatives, would limit private interest, and subjugate, but not destroy, private property.145   
 
However, capitalism, as an idea, and as a theoretical application, was not to be done away 
with, just subordinated to what ZBOR viewed as the general interest. If, as ZBOR claimed, 
‘capitalism has for too long put itself at the service of one estate only, its solution was to 
propose heavy state intervention in the economy and the reorganisation of society along a 
corporative model’.146  
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Capitalism therefore, had to return to the services of society, the state, and the general 
interest, rather than a single class or ‘estate’, and in doing so it, would cease to exist. Ljotić 
however recognised and admitted the positive aspects of what capitalism had brought. 
Capitalism ‘facilitated the ease of the exchange of goods, improved technology, and raised 
industries’. However, whatever good it had brought was overshadowed by the misery with 
which the very wealth that it brought had created. This wealth was then exploited by what 
Ljotić called the ‘capitalist class’, who, taking advantage of technological advances, threw 
out ’40 million workers with their over 200 million family members’, causing a decrease in 
production, as there were fewer people to produce for’. This then caused an economic crisis 
as business moved backwards’.147 It is therefore the responsibility of the state, in ZBOR’s 
conception to act as a ‘giant co-operative’, where jobs were ‘calculated to give prosperity to 
all, and not just its individual members’.148  
 
Clearly Ljotić’s and ZBOR’s opinion on ‘liberal capitalism’ as a lack of state intervention, 
and the greed and avarice of individuals, could never form a sustained economic policy. 
Indeed, the movement never formulated anything close to resembling an actual economic 
policy with real solutions. However, there was an actual socio-economic element to ZBOR’s 
anti-capitalism that was centred on the conditions of the peasantry. In its 1935 program, one 
of ZBOR’s main principles was the assertion that the entire Yugoslav economy was 
‘interdependent on its agricultural foundation’. At the same time, it romanticised the concept 
of the ‘village’, which was deemed to be the ‘racial-biological, spiritual, and economic life 
force of the Yugoslav people’.149  
 
The ‘village’ was to be preserved for two reasons. Firstly, the ‘village’ and the peasantry 
served as a basis for society. Secondly, it served as the healthy guardian of culture. More than 
a socio-economic class entity, the peasantry was a ‘moral defence’ force. Its collapse would 
lead to decay.150 But this decay was not to be just cultural and spiritual. The thought that 
‘money’ would lead to ruin was prevalent in ZBOR’s ideology. The ‘village’, and 
specifically the peasantry, was to be the main sources of cultural, economic, moral, spiritual, 
and national renewal. ‘Wealth, accumulated in the towns, and the degeneration of modern 
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nations’, wrote one time ZBOR member and intellectual Svetislav Stefanović. Stefanović 
continues by claiming that ‘the latifundia destroys the modern state, and big cities destroys 
our race, exhausting its life energy, when the village has more than enough life reserves in 
which to fill the cities’.151  
 
Such thinking on the degeneracy of urban life was prominent amongst radical right anti-
modernist thinkers. Oswald Spengler described the city as the ‘Megalopolis’, the ‘daemonic 
creation’, which ruined the ‘ecology’ of the village through uprooting its inhabitants, a 
process he likens to ‘racial suicide’.152 The peasant, as the embodiment of Yugoslav spirit as 
the guardian of culture, was assigned combative characteristics, being ‘steadfast, and tough, 
in his relation to the land’, and of ‘not mixing his blood with the foreigners who wanted to 
keep him in slavery’.153 The peasant was also said to be free of the contagious influence of 
Jews, for to ZBOR, agriculture was the one socio-economic activity that was still in 
‘Christian hands’.154 To this end, state economic policies were to be formulated based on 
peasant and rural considerations. 
 
As a result, ZBOR’s economic policies were dictated by the perceived needs of the peasantry. 
As a head of an agricultural commune, Ljotić tied his own economic interests with those of 
the peasantry.155 Capitalism and capitalist nations, according to Ljotić dictated prices on 
Yugoslav peasants through the ‘purchasing of our nation’s produce at the so-called 
international price, and sold industrial products at so-called national prices’. The ‘national 
price’, argued Ljotić, based on foreign capital, and in ‘whose hands the majority of our 
industry lies’, was determined by high tariffs. By buying ‘our agricultural produce cheaply 
and selling industrial produce at inflated prices, our people are looted twice’156 rages Ljotić. 
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Thus the peasant farmer became a debtor as opposed to creditor, which caused widespread 
impoverishment.157  
 
Increasing demands on the peasantry, to reach certain levels of productivity, were also, 
according to ZBOR, leading to peasant deprivation. Increasing needs of ‘development’, and 
‘production’, according to Ljotić, lead to an increase in the peasant need for agricultural 
credit, to buy agricultural goods, while most of the produce is sent to the market, leaving the 
producer with less.158 What it also meant, in ZBOR’s view, was the exploitation of the 
peasantry by both the ‘small trader’, and the ‘artisans’, along with the result of ‘capitalists’ 
who would both profit for themselves at the expense of the peasants and the national whole. 
This view that supports the peasantry and opposes capitalism is an important aspect of ZBOR 
in that shows its reflexive nationalism, wherein any abuse of the locals is viewed as 
intolerable.  
 
Ljotić’s seemingly anti-capitalist position was hardened by his own personal stake and 
ambitions amongst the peasantry. As the president of a fruit growers’ co-operative, it was 
easy for him to mask his own economic and personal ambitions within a wider rhetoric of the 
capitalist exploitation of ‘the little man’. Yugoslav agriculture, like much of East-Central 
Europe of the interwar era, suffered from an increasing rural population, which resulted in an 
increasing scarcity of land. Modernisation and industrialisation threatened rural labourers 
with unemployment, and most peasant smallholdings yielded a low harvest capacity.159 There 
is also the element of paternalism evident in ZBOR’s ideology and in Ljotić’s conception of 
interpersonal relationships. As Jozo Tomasevich writes, despite being the most numerous 
social group in interwar Yugoslavia, the peasantry, especially in Serbia, found political 
expression difficult. That is why, as Tomasevich writes, it needed ‘allies from the city in 
order to help it organise politically’. Those who did help the peasantry were labelled as 
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‘honest’, in that the city was viewed through a prism of differing social and cultural norms 
from that of the countryside.160  
 
Ljotić’s activities in agricultural co-operatives would conceivably fit into this paradigm. 
ZBOR seemingly had enough knowledge of peasant and rural grievances to re-orient itself as 
a contradictory movement of traditionalism, change, and protest. It would also help in part, to 
explain his pro-German stance, as while Ljotić bought agricultural products directly from its 
producers at an above market price, most of these products were later exported to 
Germany.161 
 
 Indeed, by 1936, Germany was the main purchaser of Yugoslav products, at 25.4%, with 
Great Britain falling into eleventh position at 11.4%. 162  This was part of a wider and 
concentrated German attempt to cultivate links with producers in Southeast Europe as 
substitutes for raw materials and foodstuffs that were no longer available from the British and 
American markets. To this end, a German-Yugoslav commercial trade treaty was concluded, 
on favourable terms for Yugoslavia, giving the country a large market for its agricultural 
produce, in exchange for a stipulated amount of German manufactured and semi-
manufactured products.163 Such a deal would in the end be disastrous for Yugoslavia, for 
such manufactured goods would hamper many Yugoslav domestic industries in favour of 
German imports.  
 
Given that the actual German products were exchanged without the use of convertible 
currencies, in Ljotić’s case, both he and the respective co-operatives would ostensibly profit 
through such transactions. German military re-armament, (though he admired the country’s 
political development as will be shown in the next chapter), the encroachment of German 
economic influence would have no doubt been seen as a sign of German might by Ljotić. Yet 
he failed, or refused to see the threat to which such German policy held for Yugoslavia, and 
indeed for the wider Balkan region. 
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What it led to in effect was to Yugoslav economic dependence on Germany, opening the 
country up to German diplomatic and political pressure. It was part of a more far-sighted and 
sinister German plan to make its economy indispensable to the nations of South-east 
Europe. 164  A British cabinet report from November 1938 accuses the Germans of 
‘swallowing Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia economically’, so that it would be 
able to dominate them politically.165 The report stressed that the Germans were paying at 
above market prices, and paying in cleared marks, which could only be used by its recipients 
for the purchase of certain German exports. However, as the memorandum states, it would be 
difficult for Britain to increase imports from Yugoslavia, as ‘in the present situation, it is 
hardly favourable to the granting of credits’, so another means of ‘showing friendly interest’ 
was to be found.166  
 
Watching the widening of German economic, military, and political influence throughout 
Europe, Ljotić, like many of his contemporaries, would have been undoubtedly filled with the 
duality of fear and admiration. Yet, as will be shown, given Ljotić and ZBOR’s worldview, 
part of German economic and moral renewal could be explained through a corporative re-
organisation of society, something for in Yugoslavia. However, much like its anti-capitalism, 
ZBOR’s conception of ‘renewal’ would remain metaphorical and limited, in that it was to be 
subjugated to an already existing order. ZBOR’s capitalism was to be subsumed without 
being destroyed. There was to be no land redistribution to the benefit of the peasantry. 
ZBOR’s capitalism represented Ljotić’s own social milieu and position of landowner and 
local notable who in increased industrialisation, modernisation, and competition from foreign 
markets saw his own economic position as head of an agricultural cooperative under threat. 
This is perhaps why the for him the issue of ‘foreign capital’ was ‘the loss of economic 
independence and death of traditional economy, and that Yugoslavia was the nation suffering 
most from foreign capital.167 ZBOR’s anti-capitalism was therefore, in essence, as much a 
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critique of capitalist civilisation through a utopian and conservative romantic nationalism as 
much as it was from personal stake and ambition.  
 
ZBOR’s Corporatism and social organisation 
 
ZBOR’s corporatism reflects a mixture of ill-defined economic paternalism and romanticised 
notions on the peasantry as carriers of tradition, which would ensure social harmony. 
Combined with a superficial criticism of capitalism, corporatism was to help bring around a 
national renewal that the degenerate twinning of modernism and democracy had brought. 
Corporatism in ZBOR’s conception was in keeping with much of European right wing and 
religious thought. It was conceived as the socio-political organisation of society based on 
major interest groups (the differing corporations).168 The expression of corporatist theory in 
political philosophy has its elements within early Christian thought. Biblical conceptions of 
corporatism show this, citing Paul’s letter to Christians at Corinth (I Corinthians 12:12-31). 
In the letter Paul suggests the fusing of society of politics to create an organic, and 
harmonised whole, ‘just as the parts of the human body are interrelated’.169  
 
Modern corporatism stems from the early nineteenth century in reaction to individualism, 
social atomisation, and new forms of central state power arising from the French Revolution 
and modern liberalism.170 Its definition, superfluous as it is, shows similarity to its Biblical 
antecedents. Philippe Schmitter provided perhaps the most succinct definition of corporatism, 
describing it as a system of ‘interest representation in which the constituent units are 
organised into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically 
ordered and functionally differentiated categories’.171 In this arrangement, it would be the 
state that would give licence to the existing corporative associations.  
 
In the context of interwar Europe, corporatism became associated with a ‘new’ way, and a 
‘new’ conception of economics. Here it was postulated as an alternative economic and social 
system to both capitalism and socialism. The main incentive being that this type of social and 
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economic organisation would best embody the needs of the general interest through the 
harmonisation of all social and economic components. The newly harmonised elements 
would then be overseen by the state, acting as regulator and mediator. Commonly associated 
with the economic policies of fascism, social democratic governments supported tripartism, a 
type of corporatism based on the tripartite contracts between business, labour, and state, 
within the economy, in Norway and Sweden.172  
 
Corporatism was never a unified theory in itself, showing the cross-political application and 
acceptance. Throughout the interwar era however, right wing exponents of corporatism 
would look more to state centred corporatism, rather than a social corporatism.173 
 
 In the context of interwar Yugoslavia and ZBOR’s ideology, Ljotić considered corporatism 
as enabling all people, of any social rank, to undertake positive work. A corporate system, 
argues Ljotić is for fair taxation, the replacement of an unordered and anarchic economy with 
a planned and organised economy, the socialisation of large companies and concerns to serve 
general needs, and the introduction of order into public finances to solve all social and 
economic problems.174 Amidst the incoherence and shallowness of ZBOR’s rhetoric, this 
statement from Ljotić gives a grain of coherence to his usually ideologically mangled 
expression. It also stands out as an actual attempt to define corporatism and how it would 
benefit the country from an economic and, surely in Ljotić’s mind, practical point of view.  
 
Corporatism in ZBOR’s ideology was often framed through the paradigm of the zadruga.175 
The zadruga meanwhile, was in itself, a paradigm within existing counter-revolutionary 
thought focusing on a romanticised notion of peasant life. Both the zadruga and the stalež 
were often used interchangeably by ZBOR, though the zadruga can be seen as the end result 
of society’s organisation into staleži, with each separate stalež collectively forming the state 
imposed zadruga. Both were also viewed as primordial, as opposed to the artificiality of a 
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class system theorised by Marxism. Although, wrote Ljotić in 1937, the staleži were 
subverted by ‘individualist philosophy that pits one stalež against another’. Furthermore, it is 
not only the stalež, which wars against itself, but social classes warring against each other, 
with families pitted against their own members’.176  
 
ZBOR’s idea of a large collectivist society and social harmonious state, rested on 
assumptions of pre-industrial myth and reality. Yet ZBOR claimed that it rejected a medieval 
‘guild-style’ corporatism. Its corporatism was claimed to be that of the nuclear family, which 
was denoted as a ‘Slavonic ideal’. It went deeper than a sense of family community in that 
the nuclear family in itself was a co-operative wherein the senior (father-figure) would be not 
only the material, but also the spiritual leader.177  
 
This however was not an original concept of Ljotić’, or ZBOR’s. Svetozar Marković, the 
eminent 19th century Serbian socialist, literary critic, and philosopher saw both the zadruga 
and family in Serbia as inextricably linked. 178  Marković also idealised the zadruga, 
advocating for its implementation. However, he differed from Ljotić in that he saw the 
zadruga as an element of democratic federalism, as opposed to a more state centralised 
monarchic version of Ljotić’s ideal. As part of Ljotić’s ideal, the formation and organisation 
of the staleži were to be determined by the social, economic, and political needs of the 
zadruga (taken here as the organic whole, or nation). This would then pave the way for a 
smooth transition to a corporative system. In the context of interwar Yugoslavia, ZBOR 
closely followed the agrarian theories of Smederevo native, and the founder of the first 
agricultural co-operative in Serbia, Mihailo Avramović.179  
 
Avramović saw cooperatives as the first social process of humanity to produce or barter for 
food, construct shelters, and acquire new territorial space. Therefore, to Avramović, 
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corporatism was also a result of a ‘complex process’. 180  Cooperatives, according to 
Avramović, were the ‘expression of each nation’. Therefore, they were an essential 
component of society. In a Yugoslav context, Avramović highlighted three main points of 
cooperatives. These involved, firstly the restructuring of cooperatives to fit current societal 
needs, secondly, a better understanding of the functions of cooperatives, based on social and 
environmental studies, and thirdly, a ‘cleansing’ of the cooperative apparatus, to emphasise 
‘natural’, and ‘ethical’ cooperatives.181 Avramović’s focus on a ‘natural’, and ‘ethical’ form 
of corporatism was to be picked up on by Ljotić. In his opinion, Avramović, like Maurras, 
was a ‘shining light’. Avramović knew, says Ljotić that ‘only the personal responsibility of 
those in charge’, can provide the ‘necessary stability’ in order for both society, and 
cooperatives to function.182 
 
Once installed, ZBOR’s corporatism envisioned the creation of a National Assembly. This 
assembly would consist of permanent delegates and would act as a stalež in its own right, and 
would decide on laws and certain other administrative acts. 183  The National Assembly 
envisioned by ZBOR would act in more of an advisory and mediatory role, whose main 
function was to solve disputes amongst the existing staleži. Unfortunately, the idea of this 
assembly was never elaborated on by ZBOR. Ljotić took pains however to differentiate what 
he viewed as corporatism by stating that National Socialism had neglected its corporations. 
By giving them more functions, it subtracted from their effectiveness, thus rendering them 
useless.184 Fascism has destroyed its corporations as well, because they were not allowed 
freedom of action within a state organised corporative system.185  
 
Given that Ljotić never fully defined his corporatism, it could never be fully applied. Yet it 
was conceptualised, however theoretically, as an almost utopian ideal of paternalistic 
feudalism, couched in terms of romanticisation of the very element on which it based itself, 
the peasantry.  
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The entire corporative organised society was to be predicated on the needs and demands of 
the peasantry as the basis and backbone of Yugoslav culture, tradition, society, and 
economics. Yet, as Ljotić admitted, a peasant based corporative organisation could not 
survive on its own.186 It needed doctors and engineers. In short, it needed an elite. This 
however would still leave the majority of people unaccounted for and undefined within a 
corporative system: chiefly the urban workers/ proletariat,187 women, and youth. 
 
Apart from its glorification and romanticisation of the peasantry, it was perhaps the only 
social and economic group with which Ljotić had practical experience, his legal practice 
notwithstanding. Urban life, viewed through the lens of anti-modernism, as the destroyer of 
rural and national life and traditions, bringer of atheism and communism, highlighted part of 
ZBOR’s contradiction and incoherence. Though unfortunately little is written on peasant 
opinions in interwar Yugoslavia, there are clear congruencies in ZBOR’s appeal to the 
peasants, and its anti-urban polemics. If, as Tomasevich writes, the city was viewed by the 
peasantry as a form of government bureaucracy, through the collection of taxes or of 
conscription, it was also the market, where peasants sold their produce cheaply, and bought 
for inflated prices. It was also the source of much peasant and rural credit, which was 
sustainable at rates bordering on usury’. If taken into consideration ZBOR’s appeals to the 
peasantry can be seen less through honourable intentions and more through a simplified 
attempt at exposing what it viewed as modernist degeneracy. For the sake of national unity 
and growth however, the city and countryside needed each other, and it was only ZBOR, that 
could bridge that divide and ensure national survival.188 Though ZBOR viewed the peasantry 
as a means of national renewal and strength, the urban worker would feature much less in 
ZBOR’s ideology. 
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188 ZBOR’s Čačak leader, Radenko Lazović speaking to agricultural workers. “Konferencija JNP ZBOR u 
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Urban industrial workers 
 
ZBOR attempted to appeal to the proletariat through the assumption that the interests of the 
Yugoslav worker were tied with the interests of the state. While speaking in Kragujevac in 
1940, Ljotić claims to have been asked by a ‘worker’, about his party’s stance on workers’ 
rights. Ljotić, expansively yet cryptically answered that ZBOR ‘does not think about the 
rights of just one class, since to think about just one class would cause harm to the others, so 
that in general we do not think about rights’.189 Rather, as Ljotić continued, the talk about 
rights should be substituted by ‘duty’, through which there will be ‘enough rights left over to 
spare’.190 Such remarks show the dearth of knowledge that ZBOR had towards the urban 
workers. It also shows a degree of contradiction in that while appealing specifically to 
peasants, almost as a separate class, or certainly as a distinct status within ZBOR’s social 
hierarchy, the idyllic village life, and the urban industrial workers were to be simply 
juxtaposed into the movement’s agrarian utopia. Being ‘urban’, they were already 
theoretically outside ZBOR’s narrow and fantastical understanding of what constituted a real 
basis for national renewal, being associated with that which was degenerating and corrupting 
the country and people.191  
 
Ljotić however did not blame his ideological shortcomings and naivety for ZBOR’s lack of 
appeal amongst urban workers. That was the fault of capitalism. Capitalism, according to 
Ljotić, resulted in the workers’ exclusion for the national community. Its technique for doing 
this was the concentration of workers in cities, for as Ljotić argued, ‘where industry was 
created, so were cities’.192 As a result, the city provided the worker with a view to a life that 
well exceeded his own, and in doing so, stoked the envy of the worker.193 As a result, it was 
easy for socialist ‘agitators’ to play on the envy of workers, thus precipitating class warfare, 
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cementing the worker’s exclusion from the national community. What capitalism had started, 
in Ljotić’s thinking, communism had finished in regard to the workers.  
 
That ZBOR’s economic policy rested on a romanticised agrarian ideal, where urban workers 
were outside of its scope, was not taken as a weakness of ideology. The bulk of its extremely 
limited appeal was centred in Serbia, whereas the major industrial areas in Yugoslavia at the 
time were to be found primarily in Croatia and Slovenia; this was where ZBOR’s influence 
would be even more marginal than in Serbia. ZBOR did however, recognise that most urban 
workers were lost to them, in the sense that the movement saw them as communist 
sympathisers, and yet urged them towards ZBOR by constantly trying to conjure up examples 
of ‘communist treachery’.194  
 
At the same time, ZBOR appealed to the ‘heroes’ of both city and countryside by lionising 
the value of their ‘work’, in contributing to the national whole. It also utilised elements of 
Communist rhetoric, especially in its appeals to non-intervention in an ‘imperialist war’, as 
not in the interests of a ‘working nation’. This rhetoric can also be seen in the slogans of, the 
‘right to strike’, ‘free doctors’, and the slogan that ZBOR would never be ‘a party of 
bankers’.195 This attempt, however, should not be taken, as a sign of a wider ZBOR attempt 
to court the working classes, for indeed it wasn’t.  
 
The movement simply did not understand, or in many cases care, for the needs of the urban 
workers. On a wider national level, elements of ZBOR’s calls for the protection of the ‘little 
man’ would be echoed by the regime. The JRZ founded a workers union, Jugoslovenski 
Rudnick saves (Yugoslav Workers Union), or JUGORAS, headed by future prime minister 
Drags Cvetković, who criticised legislation concerning the workers as ‘creating such a 
bureaucracy that even a most bourgeois society could not envision’. 196  JUGORAS was 
Stojadinović’s attempt to ‘create a strong national movement that would encompass all 
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national and productive elements of the nation, for service in the state’.197 In ZBOR’s case 
though, with the acute sense of an acute rural-urban dichotomy, coupled with its anti-
modernist rhetoric, the movement simply did not understand how to approach urban workers. 
This was contrasted to the superlatives heaped upon the peasantry. Yet for all its crassness, 
the movement did manage to gain, initially and without any real intent, a pre-war following 
of youth, from which the party began to build, and who were most likely attracted to ZBOR 
for its extremist ideology and solutions. Ironically, it was also one segment of the national 




ZBOR’s popularity which was subjectively based on perspectives of youth, was odd and 
unexpected, given that Ljotić did not conceive ZBOR as a movement for such a demographic 
or age group. Indeed, speaking in Banja Luka on 10 April, 1938, Ljotić concedes that ‘none 
of us went into a secondary school to preach the message of ZBOR’. Initially, Ljotić viewed 
youth disdainfully, admitting that he considered a political movement with many youthful 
members a sign of weakness.198 Yet a week later, on 17 April, Ljotić was attesting to the fact 
that ‘ZBOR is becoming a youth movement’, which was attributed to ZBOR’s ‘spirit’.199  
 
Ljotić’s followers, and ZBOR members responded to the Cvetković-Maček Agreement with 
anger and violence. They clashed with the youth wing of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia 
(KPJ). These incidents reputedly attracted as many as 5,000 new members to ZBOR who 
belonged to the youth sector; thus, leading to the formation of a ZBOR student wing known 
as the White Eagles.200  
 
ZBOR’s increasing profile amongst elements of Yugoslav youth was primarily the result of 
one-time ZBOR youth leader Danilo Gregorić. It was Gregorić who convinced Ljotić of the 
importance of reaching out to youth, perhaps attempting to adopt a more fascistic cult of 
youth rhetoric in the process. Gregorić called for youth involvement in ZBOR, youth who 
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would become ‘uncompromising fighters for ZBOR’s eventual victory’.201 There was also a 
spirit of sacrifice and duty, that according to Ljotić, the youth must first embrace and embody 
before being considered ZBOR members.202  
 
ZBOR’s eventual youth organisation would feature prominently in later years, especially 
during the Second World War. However even in 1935, the trend towards increasing youth 
involvement in ZBOR was being noticed. In his report to the Foreign Office on the political 
situation in Yugoslavia from February 1935, Minister Plenipotentiary to the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia, Neville Henderson wrote that Ljotić, apart from being characterised as 
independent, could ‘also be seen as representing the youth’.203 On 23 October 1940, the 
White Eagles gathered outside the campus of the University of Belgrade.204 The president of 
the University of Belgrade at the time of the riots was Petar Mićić, who happened to be a 
sympathiser of ZBOR. The Belgrade police, who were alleged to have had foreknowledge of 
the riots, withdrew from the area before violence erupted. 205  The White Eagles then 
threatened the members of the entire university community, including the faculty and 
students, with the use of pistols and knives. Some White Eagle members reputedly stabbed 
some of these teachers and students while hailing Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini as their 
heroes as they all shouted ‘Down with the Jews!’ Members of Slovenski Jug (Slavic South), a 
Serbian nationalist movement, also participated in the riots, which were blamed on Ljotić, 
who supposedly hoped that violence would provoke martial law and thus bring about a more 
centralised system of control in the university. The Serbian public responded to the riots with 
outrage. On 24 October, the Yugoslav government revoked ZBOR's legal status.   
 
After its 1940 banning, it was youthful ZBOR supporters or sympathisers, who actively 
distributed ZBOR pamphlets and leaflets.206 Because of these riots, on 2 November, the 
Ministry of Interior sent a list of identified ZBOR members, mostly amongst the White 
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Eagles, to all municipal administrators in Serbia for them to be tracked down and arrested. 
The government cracked down on ZBOR by detaining some 100 members. This government 
crackdown forced Ljotić into hiding. The exhibition of violence that may well have been the 
start of the end for ZBOR as a solid movement showed how Ljotić’s lack of control over his 
supporters led to an uncontrollable and unfavourable fate not just for these radical young 
members of ZBOR, but to Ljotić and the movement itself. Such lack of a central control over 
the movement and its counterparts throughout the country will again prove to be a role in the 
state of ZBOR during the era of Occupied Serbia as shown in the succeeding discussions of 
Čačak in the latter part of this thesis. 
 
During his time in hiding, Ljotić stayed with friends in Belgrade while remaining in constant 
communication with Nedić and Velimirović. Although the government was undergoing an 
investigation that would result in ZBOR being found guilty of treason, on the (contested) 
basis of accepting German funds, the authorities were careful not to arrest Ljotić in order to 
not provoke the Germans. Ljotić was placed under government surveillance, but authorities 
quickly lost track of him while in hiding.  
 
However, it cannot be assumed that ZBOR held a large percentage of votes amongst youth 
and students. Moreover, it is unfortunate that, little information on youth involvement in 
ZBOR is readily available. Nevertheless, it does seem that within ZBOR, youth were an 
active element.207 This element however, would most likely have been drawn from those 
young people, primarily males, of a conservative, nationalist, and religious milieu.  
 
Youth was also an important social element that was worth ‘protecting’, from the supposed 
damaging moral and political influence of communism, especially at schools and 
universities. 208  By exposing them to ZBOR ideology, the movement recognised and 
attempted to gain a broader appeal through youth.  
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ZBOR would not attempt to use the same rhetoric it did in relation to peasants or industrial 
workers, in its views of women. Contextually, most extreme-right organisations during the 
interwar era saw women as reproducers of the nation and preservers of national culture and 
tradition. This essentialist argument, that women were viewed only through the lens of 
certain characteristics, defined women’s roles and as separate to men. Conforming to such 
existing gender roles was seen among anti-modernists as true ‘women’s behaviour’.  
 
Women in Yugoslavia had participated in interwar civil society. Yet that was framed and 
shaped within a specific political and historical context that for the most part was patriarchal 
and subordinated women.209 In this sense, most women felt that politics was outside of their 
realm, rendering their political opinions for the most part invisible.210 Inheritance also, based 
on the zadruga as a familial pillar, usually bypassed women completely, thus encoding their 
inferior status.211 Ljotić and ZBOR, operating within this paternalist and patriarchal context 
did not make any grand statements on the roles of women, which they felt, were already 
clearly defined.  
 
Feminism was then, according to Ljotić simply part of the modernist degeneracy formulated 
in the aftermath of the French Revolution. It was coupled with the increasing urbanisation, 
technological advances, and social mobility, which were seen as a threat to the existing 
traditional-patriarchal order.212  
 
Speaking on the concept of the modern woman, Ljotić talks on his ‘anti-feminist stance’. This 
stance was borne out of what he describes as a ‘totally different point of view to that of the 
feminists’, as opposed to ‘thinking that women are less than men’. Women and men were 
said to complement each other. The ‘arguments of the feminists, according to Ljotić, did not 
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have a rational basis’.213 Speaking to the National Socialist Women’s Organisation in 1934, 
Hitler stated that ‘women’s emancipation is a creation of the Jewish intellect’, and that then 
Germans were living a ‘good life’, ‘German women never had any need for emancipation’.214 
Ljotić would have most likely agreed with Hitler’s viewpoint, in that as long as women 
played their ‘natural’ roles in society, there would be no conflict between the sexes, and no 
mention of ‘emancipation’. Women too, like youth, were to be ‘protected’, to ensure their 
purity and innocence. They were warned, in one ZBOR December 1939 leaflet to ‘protect 
their Slavonic familial morals’, against the influence of female Jewish communists.215  
 
Women, as much as the peasantry, were romanticised as innocent and pure, willing and ready 
to do their duty, just as men were. Women seemed to be almost helpless in ZBOR’s ideology, 
unless within the household, where the matriarch was venerated. The main duty of women 
however was to ‘prepare themselves to become mothers of our race’.216 In this, ZBOR’s male 
chauvinism reflected a large segment of social and cultural milieu not only of interwar 
Yugoslavia, but also of much of interwar Europe, especially in nations where women were 
not given electoral franchise. What it resulted in was the subordination, or the negation of any 
specific issues relating to women. The lack of ZBOR documents or materials pertaining to 
any specific women’s issues, apart from superficial denunciations showed the lack of 
importance that ZBOR attached to it. 
 
For all its rhetoric, ZBOR’s ideology has been difficult to quantify due to its unimportance on 
the Yugoslav political scene, its small membership base, its lack of any real organisational 
structure, and its lack of a concrete and coherent political platform. Yet despite its 
unimportance, the movement was considered vociferous and strident in both its anti-
communism, and anti-Semitism, which was evidence to many, of the movement’s supposedly 
clear Nazi character. 
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Anti-communism and anti-Semitism? The makings of a Nazi movement? 
 
Despite ZBOR’s total unimportance on the political scene, the strength and polemical nature 
of the movement, along with its anti-communism and anti-Semitism brought ZBOR a 
notoriety and publicity hugely disproportionate to its size and influence.217 ZBOR would see 
communism and perceived ‘Jewish influence’ as the man factors for the persecution it felt 
that it faced. Like much of ZBOR’s ideology, both its anti-communism and anti-Semitism 
were linked. There was a great deal of overlap in both ZBOR’s portrayal and condemnation 
of Jews, as well as its anti-communism. The image of Jews, as will be shown, as the force 
behind both capitalism, and communism would feature prominently in ZBOR’s political 
discourse. 
 
Anti-communism featured prominently in interwar Yugoslav political life. It was part of 
official government policy, evidenced by the fact that Yugoslavia was one of the last nations 
to officially recognise the Soviet Union, finally establishing diplomatic relations on 24 June, 
1940.218 The KPJ, though it was outlawed by the Obzana (announcement) of 29 December, 
1920, did participate in the Constitutional Assembly elections in November 1920, obtaining 
198,736 votes, corresponding to 12% of the popular vote.219 The reasons for its banning, was 
the result of the conspiracies of Radical Party leader Nikola Pašić, and interior minister 
Milorad Drašković (a Radical Party member), who saw the KPJ accused of inciting violence 
and attempting to destroy Yugoslavia, in the pay of foreign agents, and inciting violence.220  
 
The narrative of communism as a ‘destroyer of the nation’, and of being subordinate to a 
foreign power was prominent in the anti-communist discourse within interwar Yugoslavia. 
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The subordination to a foreign power was deemed to be the Soviet Union. In this the KPJ did 
not help its cause by proclaiming that the Soviet Union was ‘the true motherland’, and that 
the Soviet Constitution was the only ‘real constitution’.221  
 
Where ZBOR differed was, in the allowing of anti-Semitism to enter this anti-communist 
narrative. Jews became, by the 1930s, whether generalised as capitalist, liberal democrat, or 
Marxist, the ‘destroyer of the nation’, the ‘foreign agent’ subverting the nation, or the prime 
mover and actor of destructive social change.222  
 
Separating Ljotić’s anti-Semitism from his anti-communism would prove no easy task due to 
the degree of overlap between them. Ljotić’s personal religiosity, and that of many ZBOR 
members, certainly influenced the paradigm that shaped their views on both Jews and 
communism. Christianity was to be a central aspect of the renewal of Yugoslavia, and later, 
more specifically, of the Serbian nation. Combined with the trauma and deep cleavages 
following the abdication of the Tsar, the Russian Revolution and the imposition of 
Bolshevism upon Russia, Ljotić’s anti-communism would begin to develop more anti-
Semitic overtones and mask a more sinister undercurrent of his anti-modernist discourse.223 
 
This discourse involving the meshing of anti-communism with anti-Semitism would, in 
ZBOR’s ideology, become identified with the concept of ‘Jewish communism’, a corollary to 
a wider anti-Semitic conspiracy of Jewish world domination. The identification of Jews with 
both communism and the emergent Soviet Union proved to be a potent weapon in interwar 
anti-Semitism, and would form a strong basis for Hitler’s worldview. This myth was based on 
two popular sentiments, that of anti-communism and anti-Semitism.224 For the Nazis, its 
brand of anti-communism bore little relation to actual criticism of Marx’s philosophy. What it 
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found noxious was its championing of internationalism, pacifism, and democracy, which 
made it susceptible to Jewish manipulation.225  
 
Ljotić undoubtedly believed such, myths, considering the Jews to ‘hold the keys of the 
world’s coffers: every bank and channel through which money is circulated is in their hands’, 
as are ‘all markets’, and ‘all industries’.226 Jewish economic theory, according to Ljotić, was 
based ‘on the theory of money’.227 Money, in Ljotić’s thinking, drove both capitalism and 
communism, thus emphasising ‘Jewish duplicity’, and complicity. It would be the Russian 
Revolution of 1917 however, and the pre-1917 anti-Jewish policies of the Tsarist regime that 
saw Jewish myths and stereotypes reoriented to the notion of Jews as malevolent 
revolutionaries who were ready to punish guilty Russia.228  
 
The ease of the spread of anti-Semitic stereotypes was partly due to the manipulation of the 
idea of the Jews, as an enemy, of being guilty by association. This is true for ZBOR’s case. 
That being said, Ljotić, however superficially, was able to conceive Marxism as divorced 
from anti-Semitism.229 Marxism was just a by-product of individualist thought according to 
Ljotić. To Marxists, writes Ljotić, the individual is everything, and any form of human 
organisation is the sum of its individuals. 230  Therefore, there could be no community, 
interest, or society outside of this sum. Ljotić even went so far as to praise Marx, when he 
claimed that capitalist society, left to its own development, would lead to the fall of 
capitalism.231  
 
Regarding Marx as a ‘Jewish genius’, Ljotić however criticises him for failing to see the 
strength of the national community, as opposed to the existence of an oppressed class of 
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labourers.232 The very concept of ‘class’, was rejected by Ljotić and ZBOR, for ‘class’ was 
not an ‘organic phenomenon’, but a ‘mechanical’ one. ‘Class’, in Ljotić’s view is intertwined 
with assets, and property, as matters of chance. For circumstances of chance change, and ‘one 
person could be in one class one day, and in another the next’.233   
 
Marxism’s first goal, according to Ljotić was atheism. Its second goal was materialism, by 
which the soul and spirit are characterised as psychological manifestations of material things. 
The third goal of Marxism, according to Ljotić is class warfare, by which the nation is made 
up of enemies divided into two classes and engaged in constant struggle.234 Its appearance 
due to the inequalities of capitalism, yet both are spawns of individualism, as are atheism, 
Bolshevism, and Marxism.235 Yet Ljotić credits communists with being acute enough to see 
the significance of unfolding events. ‘We both conclude that a deep societal crisis has arisen, 
mainly due to the crisis of the liberal capitalist system’. However, the solutions for this crisis, 
as Ljotić points out are fundamentally different. ‘Communists’, says Ljotić, ‘want a 
mechanical solution, while want to introduce an organic solution’. ‘Communists want to 
abolish private property’, Ljotić continues, ‘abolish private initiative, the family, and the 
proclamation of the dictatorship of one class over another’.  
 
ZBOR, on the other hand, was to stand for ‘the primordial crystals of human existence, and 
the limitation of the omnipotence of individual interest in economic, political, and social 
relations’. 236  Communists therefore stood against the domaćin. 237  Not only against the 
domaćin with three hundred hectares, but also against the domaćin with three hectares, writes 
Ljotić.238 Ljotić also accuses the communists of not fighting against the ‘Jewish capitalists’, 
stating that the communists are themselves ‘mercenaries of Jewish capitalism’.239 
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For ZBOR, communism was the main enemy.240 The myth of communism’s influence and 
the Jew as its harbinger would shape ZBOR’s later stances on foreign issues. Soviet state 
organisation, according to ZBOR, was done through, and as a result of ‘Jewish-Masonic 
thinking’ resulting in all Christian nations being under the communist-Jewish yoke, part of 
the ‘Jewish master plan’.241 Soviet Russia was not Russia. The ‘spirit’ of Russia, monarchic, 
peasant, and Orthodox had been weakened by a parasite. That parasite was the Soviet Union. 
The Soviets, according to Ljotić were ‘expecting world revolution as a saviour, gives only 
blood, slavery, and starvation’.242  Marxism in general, according to ZBOR, was able to 
evolve its tactics and policies, but doctrinally, it would always remain rigid because Marxist 
doctrine was a ‘closed system, whose components are logically linked to one another’.243  
 
The question that remains to be asked is whether anti-Semitism was a corollary to ZBOR’s 
anti-communism or the other way around? Bearing in mind the circular reasoning of ZBOR’s 
anti-communism and anti-Semitism, a consensus remains elusive. Yugoslavia’s political 
system in the aftermath of 6 January, 1929, left no political space except for those quasi-
official associations and organisations ‘tolerated’, or encouraged by the government. Thus 
anti-Semitic expression would have to be channelled through existing forces. ZBOR was one 
of the movements with an aggressive policy towards the communists, bordering on 
irrationality. The myth of ‘Jewish communism’, gained currency amongst those conservative, 
nationalist, and religious anti-communist elements willing to listen, few in number though 
they were. 
 
 Ljotić’s personal religiosity, which he brought into ZBOR, was expounded on in the 
previous chapter. It certainly shaped his anti-Semitic attitudes, but there was also a more 
pragmatic and political character to his anti-Semitism.244  The continuous and seemingly 
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Antisemitism (University of California Press, 1996), 311. 
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irreversible German advances in the Second World War would also harden, or rather 
radicalise the language of anti-Semitism used by ZBOR, which will be elaborated on in 
chapter 5. 
 
Ljotić consistently denied any accusations of anti-Semitism, while paradoxically justifying 
his prejudices towards the Jews. ‘I am not an anti-Semite, but I am wary of the Jews and I 
find my distrust to be fair’, Ljotić wrote in 1935. Ljotić characterises the Jews as a ‘racial-
biological, social, and religious wonder’, which he finds himself admiring. The paradox 
continues in that Ljotić praises the supposed religiosity of the Jews, for maintaining their 
‘purity’, while bemoaning that the ‘majority of proponents of atheism and materialism are 
Jews’. 245  Ljotić’s anti-Semitism was masked as a form of ‘self-protection’, in politics, 
economics, and morals. It was the ‘Jewish spirit’ that was an obstacle however, because it 
both ‘uses and defends capitalism, democracy, individualism, materialism, and atheism’.246 
ZBOR was also the only legally organised movement in which anti-Semites were given a 
platform. Between 1933 and 1940, of the fourteen officially banned anti-Semitic tracts in 
Yugoslavia, almost half were associated with ZBOR.247 
 
However, ZBOR’s views and expressions of anti-Semitism were not equal among its 
members. While Ljotić, ZBOR’s founder tended to shy away from making direct statements 
on racial anti-Semitism using the Nazi’s manner of declaration, the same cannot be said for a 
personality who embodied a more strident Nazi style racial anti-Semitism, Milorad Mojić.248 
Mojić was much more vociferous and viral in his denunciation of Jews than Ljotić. As 
ZBOR’s general secretary from December 1937, Mojić added an aggressively and 
prominently racial type of anti-Semitism to ZBOR, which Ljotić did nothing to countermand. 
Mojić’s anti-Semitism was so virulent that the authorities censored his articles and the state 
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prosecutor in Petrovgrad brought him to charges on account of his anti-Semitism.249 Ljotić 
did not attempt to censor Mojić, and his silence on the matter shows a marked trend toward 
Nazi influence, or at least acquiescence in that while Ljotić’s own anti-Semitism was 
primarily religious, it was not immune to an increasing racialised discourse of anti-Semitism.  
 
Mojić based his anti-Semitism on a pseudo-intellectual criticism of the Talmud (i.e. the 
collection of Jewish laws and texts). He believed that the Talmud shaped the character and 
genetic marker of the Jews so that they could not escape what they were. His method of 
attack was showcasing the ‘anti-Gentile’ nature of the Talmud, likening non-Jews to animals, 
and non-Jewish women as prostitutes. 250  Jews were said to be able to mask their true 
feelings, almost giving Jews a hypnotical or supernatural ability to deceive, and to 
manipulate.  
 
Like Ljotić, Mojić emphasised an element of self-preservation as a form of his anti-Semitism. 
The fact that the Jews were said by Mojić to be able to mask their true intentions so well 
somehow justified anti-Semitism and distrust. This would all culminate in a grand ‘Satanic 
Jewish plan’, which, according to Mojić was world domination. Again, Mojić cites the 
Talmud as his example, by which the Jews were to establish a worldwide ‘Jewish Kingdom’, 
through communism and freemasonry.251 Communism then, along with capitalism was a 
weapon of the Jews through which they would establish their world kingdom. This, according 
to Mojić, was not only part of their religious obligation, but also because of their genetic 
code. 
 
Furthermore, Ljotić’s and ZBOR’s polemic and vitriol would become more pronounced and 
extreme in parallel with increasing Nazi influence throughout Europe. But ZBOR was not 
alone in this. The Belgrade daily Vreme (Time, or Epoch) had by the start of the Second 
World War devoted more attention to the position of Jews in Europe, and the ‘Jewish 
Question’. While not strictly anti-Semitic, debates over the supposed ‘racial’ qualities and 
origins of the Jews were noticeable from late 1939.252 In ZBOR’s case however, what can be 
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deduced is that its anti-Semitism was not simply expedient. It could not just be turned off 
once turned on, for it became part of ZBOR’s political existence. The ‘Jewish question’ soon 
occupied a central position in ZBOR’s propaganda and ideology. This became obvious from 
the start of the Second World War. Ljotić undertook a lecture tour entitled Drama 
Savremenog Čovečanstva (Drama of Contemporary Humanity), which was later turned into a 
book, that was largely was a regurgitation of ZBOR’s anti-Semitism, with themes of Jewish 
world domination, through capitalism, democracy, atheism, and communism. 253  ZBOR 
member Milosav Vasiljević declared in November 1939 that ZBOR’s task was to bring the 
‘Serbian people back to the spiritual path’, rejecting the spread of the ‘Jewish fallacies of 
communism and democracy’.254 Communism and democracy, according to Vasiljević, were 
the ‘levers of the Jews’, who used them to become ‘masters of the world’.255 Speaking on the 
‘Dangers of the Jews’, from 1938, in the aftermath of the German Anschluß256 (Connection) 
with Austria, Ljotić concludes that ‘it is the Jews who are the biggest racists’, when asked 
about his thoughts on the ‘Jewish question’. The ‘exclusive racism’ of the Jews, Ljotić says, 
has allowed them to keep their ‘purity as a race’, in a way that ‘maintained their spiritual 
origin, linked with their religion that forbade mixing with non-Jews’.257 Jews represented a 
danger to Ljotić for two reasons. Firstly, they were a ‘foreign element’, appearing as a 
‘destructive acid for every national system. Ljotić saw the Jews ‘as the acid that destroys the 
living spirit of a people’. Jews were the ‘destroyer of faith, economics, and morals’.258  
 
The second reason was the pace in which Jews were increasingly gaining influence, in order 
to ‘become masters of the world’.259 The Jews were the perennial outsiders, says Ljotić, not 
only would they ‘mask their true feelings’, but that the ‘very nature of their souls changed’ 
because they were always living in another’s homeland. 260  Despite this, ZBOR, and 
specifically Ljotić, consistently, and incorrectly, maintained that ZBOR was not an anti-
Semitic movement. Ljotić attempted to mollify the authorities in an attempt to modify his 
position in relation to the Jews by stating that he ‘was only against world Jews’, not ‘our 
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Jews’. Ljotić claimed not to be against Jews as a religious or national minority, but because 
they are ‘tentacles of a large Jewish spider that is enveloping the world’.261 Ljotić however 
would apply generalisations to all Jews, specifically accusing them of creating the conditions 
for war, labelling them as ‘directors’, who ‘organise the game’. It is the Jews, asserts Ljotić, 
who are the only ones ‘who know the meaning of the events taking place’.262 These people, 
in reference to the Jews, were ‘scattered like chaffs of wheat throughout other people’s 
lands’, who have ‘forgotten their ancestral language’, yet speak ‘the world’s languages’.263  
 
The ideological forces of Judaism and communism, according to ZBOR, were pushing for 
war. Speaking on the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936, Ljotić likened Spain to 
a garden, where the ‘satanic thought of communism’ was planted and eventually bloomed.264 
Communism, as a Jewish creation, writes Ljotić, was a ‘punishment for Hitler’s anti-Jewish 
position’. On the other hand, Ljotić claims, a world war will see Jewish power increase, at the 
expense of European Christian civilisation.265 As a result, it would not be Hitler, but rather 
the Jews, through the prism of communism, who wished for a world war in which 
Christianity and all national states would be destroyed. Within this paradigm, Ljotić’s 
apocalyptic end of times scenario would be played out. It shared broad similarities with the 
forged Protocols of the Elders of Zion, especially in its views of Jewish ‘power’, and ‘capital’ 
as a form of Jewish despotism over the world, under the guise of ‘economic war’.266 Not only 
did the Protocols of the Elders of Zion do much to publicise the conspiracy myth surrounding 
‘Jewish power’, its influence played into Ljotić’s increasingly millennial apocalyptic views, 
especially in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution. These views, as will be shown, 
would express themselves fully during the Second World War. 
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ZBOR was much clearer and concise regarding what it was against then what it stood for. 
The movement called for change, yet only so much as to conform to the 6th of January 
regime, and the king’s personal rule. It could offer, at least in aspects of its corporatism, 
slivers of actual substance. It would be able to present eloquently its anti-communism and 
anti-Semitism, as a type of self-protection from the world, but it would never gain any 
tangible results. Ljotić and Mojić attempted to introduce anti-Semitism into a political and 
social context that would find little resonance. While an uncompromising anti-communist, 
anti-modern, and anti-Semitic worldview would shape ZBOR, it would only highlight and 
isolate the movement from wider society as a whole. ZBOR’s ideological rigidity, even in its 
incoherence, would be mirrored by its actual miniscule and inconsequential political life, 
internal structure, and organisation. For a movement deeming itself countrywide, as will be 
shown, its members and sympathisers were to be few and far between. 
 
In terms of policies, ZBOR spanned an eclectic ideological spectrum. While glorifying the 
peasantry and rural values, as a form of agrarianism, its avocations of a planned economy, 
ostensibly to help relieve peasant debt, and heavy state intervention was more akin to a type 
of agrarian socialism, which was also culturally conservative, rather than a dynamic and 
revolutionary totalitarian movement. Ljotić attempted to work out a specific niche for his 
ideas within a Yugoslav context, but ideological incoherence and vagueness, coupled with a 
strident and almost racially based Nazi style anti-Semitism, would make the movement much 
more susceptible to the label of ‘fascist’, as it was understood by Yugoslav public opinion, as 
an oppressive and totalitarian ideology. However, disregarding the politicised evaluation of 
ZBOR its ‘fascist status’ can be disputed. Partly, this can be attributed to its lack of emphasis 
on a strong national rebirth.267 Moreover, Ljotić’s nationalistic views were also said to be 
vague and misaligned, as they were drawn from so many different sources during his 
lifetime.268 This is evident in his varied references to the interchangeability of the ‘Yugoslav’ 
and Serbian nation in his writing. It could also go toward explaining how during the Second 
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World War, ZBOR would seamlessly morph into a Serbian national movement as opposed to 
a wider Yugoslav movement.  
 
Incoherence and vagueness would also afflict ZBOR’s organisational structure, with Ljotić, 
focusing more on ideological matters than administrative, would prove to be a weak 
organiser, hampering ZBOR’s already miniscule membership and appeal even further. His 
weakness as a leader would best be highlighted in the relation of ZBOR to the electoral 




 Chapter 4: ZBOR: organisation and activity in political life. 1935-1940 
 
 
The external image of ZBOR is one that is anti-communist, anti-Semitic, and anti-
democratic. To some, this was the equivalent of fascism. However, its internal structure was 
disjointed with the presence of differences of some of opinion amongst its prominent 
members. The so-called ‘movement’, was at odds on how to decide on a semantic 
nomenclature to define itself, let alone organise a workable internal structure. Part of this 
stemmed from its marginal existence on the periphery of interwar Yugoslav life. Another 
reason would be the internal struggle within ZBOR regarding to participation in 
parliamentary elections. In choosing to participate in elections, ZBOR would haphazardly 
look for candidates in areas where no base of support existed, or where ZBOR was a total 
unknown entity. A larger part stemmed from its political difficulties namely in government 
repression along with accusations of fascism and German funding.  
 
While such actions would dent an already limited and narrow appeal, ZBOR’s participation 
in the 1935 and 1938 parliamentary elections would bring the reality of its unpopularity and 
rejection by the electorate. ZBOR was politically insignificant during its 1935-1940 
existence, including the 1935 and 1938 parliamentary elections. Its insignificance would 
transfer itself into a party organisation that as will be shown, displayed greater rigidity and 
control then its ideology, but was severely dampened by a paucity of members. This 
reinforced a severe organisational weakness and inefficiency at all levels. The movement 
would begin and end with its founder and leader, Dimitrije Ljotić, who would be more 
interested in and show more aptitude for, ideological development, rather than political 
organisation, thus negating the perception of Ljotić as possessing political acumen and 
tactical knowledge.  
 
Participation in elections, in a political system that the movement viewed with disdain, was a 
glaring contradiction. The public’s accusations of ZBOR as fascist would severely damage 
any legitimacy the movement might have had in public perception. Whatever the reasons, 
such examples of ZBOR’s unpopularity would tie into a larger theme, that of perceived 
repression. Repression brought from either the Stojadinović government (1935-1939), or its 
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eventual banning under the Cvetković government (1939-41),1 was taken by ZBOR as a sign 
of its popularity and government fear. This would fuel ZBOR’s propaganda of Jewish-
communist and government collusion against its alternative ‘truth’. This would lead to a large 
discrepancy between the volume of ZBOR’s propaganda, and its lack of translation into any 
tangible results and successes. 
 
ZBOR’s organisational structure and membership 
 
For a party that, as will be shown, had a very limited popular appeal, ZBOR would portray a 
certain level of central organisation that went well beyond its actual popularity and level of 
support. That being said, the movement would never achieve much more than a basic 
practical organisational form, and its growth would be hampered by government interference, 
repression, and riven with internal dissent and animosity. It would also, suffer from an 
inability to explain and translate its ideology and goals to the wider populace. Neither would 
it exhibit any organisational competence, dynamism, or efficiency. Nevertheless, it was able 
to impart at least a skeletal organisational structure throughout interwar Yugoslavia, though 
by no means was it, as will be shown, always able to sustain itself independently, nor even to 
exist in all areas of the country.    
 
As early as 1935, ZBOR had already theorised a party structure that it would attempt to 
implement. Initially however, such theories were primarily abstract. In its legalisation letter 
to the Ministry of Interior, ZBOR accepted, and used for its own framework, the law 
stipulating that political movements organised in regional councils must have a minimum of 
thirty members. These would be further organised into half the total number of districts in the 
nine banovinas.2 Apart from its launching and headquarters in Belgrade, by 1935 there were 
ZBOR branches appearing, primarily in Serbian majority populated areas.3 Unfortunately due 
                                                        
1 Milan Stojadinović was appointed Prime Minister on 24 June, 1935, before being removed by Prince Regent 
Paul on 5 February, 1939. Dragiša Cvetković served as Prime Minister from 5 February, 1939, until 27 March, 
1941. 
2 AJ 102-7-19. “Uputstvo za organizovanje JNP ZBOR. 08 November, 1935”. The submittal for legalisation was 
2 September, 1935. See also Stefanović, Zbor Dimitrija Ljotića 1934-1945, 35. 
3 ZBOR spread to Niš in 1935, with a merchant, Petar Vuković, at its head. Zoran Vuković, son of Petar, headed 
the local ZBOR youth organisation. See Nebojša Randjelović,  and Vladimir Vučković, “Jugoslovenski pokret 
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to a lack of available documents, membership and the existence of ZBOR as a local political 
phenomenon are difficult to quantify.4 The one detailed list of a local organisation found by 
the author was for Belgrade during the occupation, listing ninety-nine of its members.5 
However, there is evidence to support that ZBOR’s membership was marked by a degree of 
fluidity, in that there were instances of ZBOR members also holding membership in other 
organisations, primarily the Jugoslovenska Narodna Stranka (Yugoslav National Party). In a 
report to the Foreign Office, John Balfour, a British diplomat, claims that ‘ZBOR is intent on 
co-operation with the Yugoslav National Party’.6  
 
This was particularly noticeable in Niš, where ZBOR and the JNS were in close co-operation 
with each other, with evidence of membership fluidity between the two groups.7 This can be 
explained due to the relative unpopularity of both movements, which shared broad 
ideological similarities. Perhaps both groups, wishing to increase membership and influence 
saw an opportunity to cooperate with the other, while maintaining their independence. 
Alternatively, it can be taken as a sign of ZBOR’s lack of a strong central organisational base, 
small membership, and even smaller appeal that it relied initially on co-operation with more 
established organisations for political expression and survival. As will be shown later, when 
ZBOR did stand on independently, the result was disastrous, as it failed to win a single seat in 
the 1935 and 1938 elections.   
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Though founded in 1935, it was not until March 1937 that an attempt was made by Ljotić to 
organise ZBOR into a solid organisational structure. This attempt was codified through 
special ordinances that re-organised ZBOR internally in a top-down fashion. Accordingly, 
ZBOR’s executive organisational structure was to be headed by the decisions made by the 
‘Supreme Committee’. It was within the president’s purview to dissolve any internal ZBOR 
body except the ‘Supreme Committee’.  The ‘Supreme Committee’, made up of 120 
members, was elected by ZBOR’s ‘advisory board’ made up from the ‘Supreme Committee’, 
and was supposed to meet on the first Sunday of each month.8 Membership in the ‘Supreme 
Committee’ was open to senior members of ZBOR’s ‘General Secretariat’, ZBOR provincial 
leaders, and heads of organisational areas.9 Within the ‘Supreme Committee’, there was a 
special fifteen-person subsection called a ‘Parliament’, chosen from amongst the ‘Supreme 
Committee’. 10  The ‘Supreme Committee’ gave ZBOR its ideological, tactical, and 
organisational guidelines. Its decisions would then be debated amongst ZBOR’s ‘parliament’, 
and only if passed would they be given to the president. 
 
ZBOR’s organisational structure type would share, mostly superficial, similarities with other 
authoritarian and fascist movements throughout Europe. This was evident especially in its 
hierarchical structure under a single leader, as opposed to a bureaucratic democratic structure, 
akin to Mussolini’s National Fascist Party. ZBOR was largely dependent on Ljotić’s 
personality, and his initiative for any real development. While Mussolini would be able to 
turn a loose organisational National Fascist Party structure into a party subject to his 
authority,11 ZBOR’s lack of members and clear ideological and organisational dependence on 
Ljotić meant that if he didn’t take over or create an organisational structure, ZBOR might 
have remained an obscure and unorganised group that would have existed contently under the 
6th of January dictatorship. However, other aspects of ZBOR, at least in how the movement 
wished to be viewed, were not totally aligned with fascism, since (up to the outbreak of the 
Second World War) Ljotić took pains to stress that ZBOR does not deify the state and treat it 
as the ultimate and only priority, which fascism is centred on.12 Looking at a concept or an 
entity as a deity may be seen as taking an atheistic and non-Christian worldview, which to 
                                                        
8 AJ 102-7-19. “Pravilnik o Organizovanju Savetodavnog Odbora Jugoslovenskog Narodnog Pokreta ZBOR. 
Dimitrije Ljotić”. 12 March, 1937. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Dante L. Germino, The Italian Fascist Party in Power: A Study in Totalitarian Rule, 14. 
12 Dimitrije Ljotić, “Ni fašizam ni Hitlerizam,” Otadžbina, 3 March, 1935, No.48, 2.  
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Ljotić was anathema, and therefore against ZBOR principles, which held religion as one of its 
central tenets for change. Deification of the state is not something that ZBOR, as Ljotić 
conceived it, stood for. Instead, the King, invested by God, was the closest approximation of 
deification. Also, since ZBOR to some extent supported the existence of parliament, provided 
that it is a true parliament based on their preferences,13 it differs from fascist thought in such 
a way that fascism does not support any entity, such as the government, which may scrutinise 
and overpower their own party institution. 
 
This hierarchic principle, prevalent in the organisational structure of many interwar European 
radical right wing and fascist parties would be in contrast, at least initially, to the Falange de 
las JONS in Spain, officially under the leadership of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, but this 
in effect was subject to a triumvirate consisting of himself, Ramiro Ledesma, and Julio Ruiz 
de Alda. This was due to the fact that the Falange de las JONS was a fusion of two separate 
parties, the Falange Española (Spanish Phalanx, hereafter FE) of José Antonio, and the 
Juntos de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista (Unions for the National Syndicalist Offensive, 
hereafter JONS), of Ramiro Ledesma, and Onésimo Redondo, in early February 1934.14  
 
What this convoluted merger saw was the Consejo Nacional (National Council) of the JONS, 
representing the nine local JONS groups in existence,15 meet in Madrid to vote on a merger 
with the FE. The Falange de las JONS lead by a Junta de Manto (Command Council), was 
composed of four Falangists (José Antonio and Ruiz de Alda among them) and two JONS 
members (Ledesma and Redondo), with the daily administration and leadership in the hands 
of a Triunvirato Ejecutivo Central (Triumvirate Central Executive), composed of José 
Antonio, Ruiz de Alda, and Ledesma. 16  This organised yet convoluted organisational 
structure was meant to be a compromise toward the differing personalities, and ideological 
tendencies within the Spanish authoritarian and nationalist radical right. This can be 
compared to how Ljotić’s personality and former political experience, along with his 
burgeoning ideology gave him a position of primacy. In Spain, two differing strands of 
radical-authoritarian nationalism, later fused into a hybrid Spanish type of National 
                                                        
13 Ibid. 
14 Stanley Payne, Fascism in Spain 1923-1977 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999), 99.  
15 The nine existing local JONS groups were in Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, Bilbao, Zaragoza, Valladolid, 
Granada, Santiago de Compostela, and Zafra. For more see Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, Escritos Politicos. JONS, 
1933-1934 (Madrid: E Trinidad, 1999). ; Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, Escritos Politicos 1935-1936 (Madrid: 
Encuandernación editorial, 1988). 
16 Payne, Fascism in Spain 1923-1977, 99. 
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Syndicalism,17 and fascism, would, in the pre-1936 Civil War days, find political existence 
and co-habitation increasingly difficult. 
 
As ZBOR perceived itself as Yugoslav, efforts were made at the theoretical level at least, to 
formulate a blueprint for ZBOR sections throughout the country. Following ZBOR’s 
hierarchic principle, by which the president and the Supreme Committee were at the top, this 
was to be followed in order of the decreasing authority of the provincial committees, 
organisational areas, council assemblies, and local assemblies. The provincial councils were 
composed of members of the Supreme Committee, leading members of certain organisational 
areas, and provincial representatives of ZBOR for the corresponding banovina.18  
 
ZBOR’s provincial organisation was its highest form of local organisation. It was made up of 
provincial parliaments and provincial councils and committees. Members of the Supreme 
Committee and senior leaders of the organisational areas were entitled to enter into provincial 
councils, but not the provincial parliaments.19 These provincial councils elected their own 
provincial leader, his assistant, and five members for an executive council. The provincial 
council, in agreement with the General Secretariat, appointed the provincial secretary.20 
 
The individual organisational areas delineated and outlined by Ljotić, to include areas of 
potential support was spread throughout the country. Ljotić appointed its senior members, on 
the advice of the provincial councils. All local ZBOR sections came under the supervision of 
the senior members of the organisational areas. Ljotić, as president, had the right to determine 
the organisational areas and appoint their individual secretaries. In practice, organisational 
areas would co-operate with the provincial councils, as well as with the General Secretariat. 
In Serbia alone, there were thirty-five organisational areas.21 Others among them were the 
regions surrounding Ljubljana in the Dravska Banovina, Split, Sušak, and Šibenik in the 
                                                        
17 National Syndicalism, was the result of an attempted adaptation of syndicalism to integralist nationalism. 
Founded in France as a result of the brief political encounter between Maurras and Sorel, through the Cercle 
Proudhon, it would find more fruitful political expression in the Iberian peninsula, by Ramiro Ledesma, who 
used it in an attempt to win Spanish syndicalists and anarchists to the ‘cause of the nation’ in the Falange de las 
JONS. For more see Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, “Nuestro manifiesto político,” La Conquista del Estado, 14 
March, 1931, No.1, 1–2. ; Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, “Las juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista,” La 
Conquista del Estado, 10 October, 1931, No.21,1. ; Sternhell, Sznajder, and Ashéri, The birth of fascist 
ideology. 
18 Stefanović, Zbor Dimitrija Ljotića 1934-1945, 37. 
19 AS BIA, II-69. “Dosije br. 1-A-II. Lokalna politička organizacija”. Security report on the local organisational 
structure and development of ZBOR from its inception to 1945.  
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. Unfortunately, the thirty-five organisational areas are not individually listed. 
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Primorska Banovina, Osijek, and Zagreb, in the Savska Banovina, Foča, and Užice in the 
Drinska Banovina, Apatin, Kragujevac, Petrovgrad, and Požarevac in the Dunavska 
Banovina, and Kruševac, Niš, and the Pirot regions in the Moravska Banovina.22  These 
organisational areas were thought to be able to organise least skeletal ZBOR member cells, 
and were supposed to act as nuclei for future organisational, recruitment, and consolidation 
drives. 
 
Given ZBOR’s weaknesses (small membership, lack of activity, little public exposure), 
stagnation, and unpopularity, there was little impetus, and even ability, to change existing 
organisational structures. However, on 20 May, 1943, ZBOR’s provincial bodies, as well as 
the organisational areas were abolished. These were later re-organised into ‘District areas’, 
under the command of delegates specifically chosen by Ljotić. The remaining internal 
organisational structure of the former provincial and organisational areas remained, with the 
district secretary being chosen by the General Secretariat, in agreement with Ljotić.23 As will 
be shown in chapter 5, this re-organisation was due to the chaos of occupation and resistance 
in the Serbian rump entity.  
 
With ZBOR being a visible reminder of collaboration and subservience, it presented a target 
for retribution, while engaging in retribution of its own. In lieu of law and authority, and 
because of Ljotić’s continued withdrawal from organisational matters, ZBOR’s 
organisational structure would begin to disintegrate with increased government repression 
and scrutiny, leading members to be less likely to acknowledge their membership. There 
were also factional struggles within ZBOR, which would further compromise the movement. 
 
The General Secretariat 
 
In an attempt to maximise its efficiency, and administrative work, members of the ‘Supreme 
Committee’ created a General Secretariat. As a result, the General Secretariat was divided 
into eight different organisational and administrative sections, which would deal with 
ZBOR’s everyday activities. 24  Section leaders would be chosen by the president of the 
                                                        
22 Stefanović, Zbor Dimitrija Ljotića 1934-1945, 38. 
23 AS BIA, II-69. “Dosije br. 1-A-II. ‘Lokalna politička organizacija”. 
24 AJ 102-7-19. “Pravilnik o organizaciji – Glavnog Tajništva Jugoslovenskog Narodnog Pokreta ZBOR. 
Dimitrije Ljotić”. 12 March, 1937. The sections were: organisational, propaganda, press, protection, 
intelligence, ideology building, finance, and a special section for the German minority. Along with Velibor 
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movement, and would implement the directives as laid down by the movement’s president. 
Section leaders were allowed to choose their own assistants from amongst their sectional 
members, as well as technical and support staff, all subject to confirmation by the General 
Secretariat.25  
 
The responsibility for coordinating the activities of all the sections fell to the general 
secretary. In fact, the general secretary took on almost all daily tasks of the movement, with 
Ljotić increasingly taking himself out of the daily administrative and organisational tasks, 
instead focusing on ideological and political work. ZBOR’s two general secretaries, Velibor 
Jonić, from 1935 until 1937, and Milorad Mojić, from 1938-41, and again from 1941 until 
1944, were highly idealistic anti-communists, Germanophiles, and in Mojić’s case, 
outspokenly anti-Semitic. Both men, in their personal convictions and position within ZBOR, 
added much to the movement’s synergetic ideology.26 Ultimately however, it was Ljotić who 
had final say over all matters, and in doing so, could not escape blame or responsibility for 
more extreme ideological elements entering into ZBOR.  
 
ZBOR’s organisational sub-divisions 
 
Reliable information on ZBOR’s organisational sub-divisions unfortunately, has been 
lacking. ZBOR’s propaganda section, initially headed by Danilo Gregorić, would also 
incorporate ZBOR’s press section, and technical and financial affairs section in its area of 
responsibility.27 However, there is little supporting evidence on the actual operation of this 
section. ZBOR’s section for the German minority for instance, while codified in 1937, can be 
said to have been in existence from at least 1936, mostly through the efforts of Milorad 
Mojić. As editor of the ZBOR publication Budjenje (Awakening), Mojić, by July 1936, had 
also began publishing Budjenje in German, translated as Erwache, in an attempt to expand 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Jonić as general secretary, Djordje Perić was head of the press section, and Danilo Gregorić was head of ZBOR 
youth, and of the propaganda section as well 
25 Ibid. 
26 Jonić especially, would be accused of bringing a fascistic element into ZBOR, developed during his time 
within the Jugoslovenska Akcija (Yugoslav Action) movement, especially in his calls for a ‘party shirt’ and 
paramilitary like structure of organisational areas. See Ratko Parežanin, “Sećanja na Dimitrija V. Ljotića”, in 
Borivoje Karapandžić, Srpski Dobrovoljci 1941-1981 (Cleveland, 1981), 29. See also Parežanin, Drugi svetski 
rat i Dimitrije Ljotić, 144–146. 
27 AJ 102-7-19. “Predlog za stvaranje odseka za propagandu JNP Zbor”. 14 January, 1937. The decision to 
create a propaganda section, was theoretically the first ZBOR section, thus showing ZBOR’s priorities and 
uncertainly as to its own identity and levels of organisation. 
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the publication’s influence amongst ethnic Germans living in the Banat and Vojvodina.28 The 
inflammatory anti-Semitic nature of Erwache, lead to its banning in April 1937. Undeterred, 
Mojić was also the editor of two more short-lived anti-Semitic German language 
publications, Sturm (Storm), from May 1937, and later Angriff (Onslaught), from January 
1938 until April 1938.29 The banning of such publications by the Yugoslav government 
reveals not only how much of a marginal phenomenon anti-Semitism was in interwar 
Yugoslavia, being confined to the even more marginal extreme right, but also on a wider 
scale, the attitude of the Yugoslav government and geopolitics. Yugoslavia did not wish to 
open itself up to any scrutiny or influence that could later be used to undermine its 
sovereignty, especially in regard to anti-Semitism, and as will be shown, the position of the 
German minority in Yugoslavia and Nazi ideology. 
 
Ljotić made no mention of any German members, or sympathisers of the movement until 12 
March, 1937 when he mentioned fifteen former members of the Erneuerungsbewegung 
(Renewal) movement under Dr. Jakob Awender, from Pančevo, who attended a ZBOR rally 
in Belgrade.30 Incidentally, the same day that he acknowledged the need for codifying an 
organisational structure for ZBOR. 
 
This began a brief association of a small and radicalised dissident movement within the larger 
German Kulturbund 31  (Cultural Association) movement in Yugoslavia. At its core, the 
Erneuer (Renewers), were an anti-liberal, and anti-Semitic, German nationalist, and indeed, a 
National Socialist type of organisation.32 Expelled from the larger Kulturbund movement33 as 
                                                        
28 Koljanin, Jevreji i antisemitizam u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji 1918-1941, 273. 
29 Ibid. Mojić would combine his role as editor of Angriff in particular, with his role of general secretary of 
ZBOR from December 1937. 
30 Dimitrije Ljotić, “Njihovi napadi čije nam čast i radost,” Otadžbina, 13 March, 1937, No.152, 1. 
31 The Schwäbisch-Deutscher Kulturbund (Swabian German Cultural Association) was founded in Novi Sad in 
1920 as its name suggests, a non-political cultural association of the Swabian German minority in the Banat and 
Vojvodina, though it later spread throughout Yugoslavia and was instrumental in maintaining and developing 
German language and culture in interwar Yugoslavia. With the advent of National Socialism in Germany in 
1933, the Kulturbund became increasingly political as it began to be used as a means with which to effect policy 
and relations with Yugoslavia. With the invasion of Yugoslavia on 6 April, 1941, the movement would 
officially cease to exist, though many of its members supported, and even enlisted in the German Army. For 
more see Branko Bešlin, Vesnik Tragedije. Nemačke štampa u Vojvodini (1933-1941) (Novi Sad: Platoneum, 
2001). ; Zoran Janjetović, Nemci u Vojvodini (Belgrade: Institut za novu istoriju Srbije, 2009). ; Branko Pavlica, 
“Sudbina Nemaca u Jugoslaviji,” Anali 53, no. 2 (2005), 196–236. ; Hans Rasimus, Als Fremde im Vaterland. 
Der schwäbisch-deutsche Kulturbund u. die ehemalige deutsche Volksgruppe in Jugoslawien München 
(Donauschwäbisches Archiv, 1989).  
32 Philip W. Lyon, “After Empire: Ethnic Germans and Minority Nationalism in Interwar Yugoslavia.” 
(University of Maryland, 2008), 427. 
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a result of their radicalism, its very existence became threatened because it did not have any 
legal permission to function as an independent organisation in its own right. It therefore 
sought legalisation and autonomy through an existing movement. ZBOR offered such 
expedient cover. The supposed Nazi like structure and ideology of ZBOR was a common 
theme in Mojić’s appeal to the German minority. This was combined with loyalty to the 
Yugoslav state and monarchy, and its supposed revolutionary nature, was aimed at showing 
ZBOR was a true friend of Nazi Germany.34  
 
Mojić was the visible architect of strengthening ZBOR’s influence amongst the German 
minority. However, it would seem unlikely that Ljotić would have had no knowledge of 
Mojić’s overtures, certainly as they, pertained to the potential ‘Nazification’ of ZBOR in 
order to appeal to a wider cross-section of the German minority. Most likely, in an attempt to 
increase ZBOR’s profile and membership, and due to his personal growing conviction of 
Hitler’s mission, he would have conceivably welcomed the move. Yet it also shows how far 
actual events within ZBOR had passed Ljotić by to the effect that it was not he who offered 
any real organisational solutions, leaving it to ZBOR’s general secretariat or individual 
members to try to affect an initiative on their own accords. 
 
While such an alliance might have benefitted both movements in the short term, for the 
Erneuer it turned out to be a disaster. Both the Kulturbund, and the German Embassy, as 
representatives of the Reich’s government, wanted, as part of maintaining good relations with 
Yugoslavia, to have German organisations and voters within the Stojadinović government 
JRZ party.35 The Erneuerungsbewegung movement therefore became a thorn in the side of 
both the German and Yugoslav governments. Stojadinović personally regarded the German 
minority as a barometer for relations between Germany and Yugoslavia, and took it as an 
affront, supposing that ‘various elements within the Reich’ would countenance aiding a 
movement that was against his rule.36 In any case, by October 1938, the association of the 
Erneuer with ZBOR had finished, as its main spokesman, Dr. Jakob Awender, publicly 
                                                                                                                                                                            
33 See NA FO 371/30218 R 4977/162/92. “German Activities in Yugoslavia. 14 February, 1941. Mr. Campbell”.  
Ronald Campbell, as plenipotentiary to Yugoslavia, claims that throughout 1940 and 1941, the Kulturbund had 
become almost totally Nazi, and that there was evidence of the SA and SS recruiting amongst Yugoslavia’s 
Germans. 
34 Lyon, “After Empire: Ethnic Germans and Minority Nationalism in Interwar Yugoslavia.,” 430. 
35 AJ 37-58-371/344. “Novosadski Nemci stupaju u JRZ”, in Samouprava, 14 May, No.70, 1936. 
36 NA German Foreign Ministry (Hereafter GFM) 33/53. Deutsche Gesandtschaft G. 57/37 G 1 03 March, 1937. 
Belastung der deustch-jugoslavichen Beziehungen durch die Tätigkeit unverantwortlicher deutscher Stellen. 
Stojadinović speaking to German Envoy Viktor von Heeren. 
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acknowledged that the Erneuerungsbewegung would enter into the JRZ, thus separating itself 
from ZBOR.37 He did so because he faced pressure from the German Embassy in Belgrade, 
who wished to maintain good relations with Yugoslavia through Stojadinović. On 23 
October, 1938, Awender agreed to take the Erneuerungsbewegung into the JRZ, 38  thus 
ending association with ZBOR, and forcing a further reshuffling of its organisational 
structure with the demise of the section handling relations with the German minority. 
 
In addition to the German minority, Yugoslavia was also home to a fluctuating Russian 
population that by 1941 was estimated at around 30,000, down from around 42,500 in 
1924. 39  As the majority of Yugoslavia’s Russian population were made up of political 
refugees fleeing the Civil War, and the repression of the Bolsheviks, many of the emigrants 
would have shared experiences of the violence, atheism, materialism, and anti-nationalism of 
the communism against which ZBOR warned against. The issue of émigré Russian 
involvement in ZBOR is an interesting one. Conceivably, there would have been convergence 
between the myriad of émigré anti-Bolshevik organisations formed in Yugoslavia and ZBOR. 
According to Russian historian Alekseii Timofeev, there was a ‘close relationship between 
Russian emigrants and ZBOR’.40 Unfortunately little data exists on the nature and extent of 
émigré Russian involvement with ZBOR, and Timofeev gives no references to his earlier 
claim. If there were Russian members of ZBOR, they were not organised into a separate 
organisational sub-section such as German members were. Certainly Ljotić’s pan-Slavic and 
Russophile tendencies, as well as his personal anti-communism and religiosity, would have 
been looked favourably upon. However, ZBOR did not make any mention of Russian 
members in its publications, nor did it seemingly publish materials in Russian, nor actively 
try to ‘proselytise’ amongst the Russian population as it did amongst the German minority. 
 
                                                        
37 AJ 37-62-378. Awender to Stojadinović. Already by June 1938, Awender was ready to take his group into the 
JRZ, citing to Stojadinović dissatisfaction amongst the German community due to harassment and fines because 
of association with ZBOR. 
38 Dragan Tešić, Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica u Srbiji 1935-1939 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu 
istoriju, 1997), 294. 
39 Alekseii Timofeev, Raskolotii Veter. Russkie i Vtoraya mirovaya voiina v Iugoslavii (Moscow: Modest 
Kolerov, 2013), 29. 






ZBOR’s organisational model in itself was not original. The government party from 1935, the 
Jugoslovenska radikalna savez (Yugoslav Radical Union), was structured in a similar, albeit 
much larger model. 41  The JRZ consisted of provincial assemblies, a main committee, 
regional committees and assemblies, and county and municipal councils. The main 
committee of the JRZ consisted of seventy-five members, twenty-five of whom were 
members of the provincial assembly. 42  Where it differed however was in its executive 
authority. Far from being subject to an individual decision maker, the JRZ, representing the 
diverse and nationwide base of its support, had at its administrative head, the Council of 
Delegates. This Council of Delegates was made up of seventy-five members, who were 
responsible for all administrative tasks, as well as ideological and political action.43 Where 
the JRZ differed obviously, was that being the fusion of parties, particularly the Slovene 
People’s Party, and the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation, which had strong electoral bases 
(albeit primarily ethno-religious), the JRZ was more easily able to synthesise its separate 




That ZBOR’s limited size theoretically would not hamper the level of party organisation 
meant that many areas throughout the country had no local ZBOR cell, and were covered by 
the largest existing cell within their district, or region. 44  At the basic level, that of 
membership, it is unfortunately extremely difficult to ascertain any specifics of localised 
socio-economic, ethnic, or religious variations. Establishing an approximate number of 
members therefore proves elusive. That being said, estimates at ‘no more than 5000 to 6000’ 
                                                        
41 The Jugoslovenska Radikalna Zajednica (JRZ) was created as a government party in the aftermath of the  5th 
May, 1935 elections, formed by Milan Stojadinović on 24 June, 1935, with representatives from three pre-
dictatorship parties, the Slovenske Ljudske Stranke (Slovenian People’s Party), the Narodne Radikalne Stranke 
(National Radical Party), and the Jugoslovenske Muslimanske Organizacije (Yugoslav Muslim Organisation), as 
well as members of the JNS. For more see Bojan Simić, Propaganda Milana Stojadinovića (Belgrade: Institut 
za novu istoriju Srbije, 2007). ; Tešić, Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica u Srbiji 1935-1939. 
42 AJ 37-12-16/22. ‘Program Jugoslovenske radikalne zajednice’. 
43 Ibid. 
44 AJ 102-7-19. “Uputstvo za organizovanje JNP ZBOR”. 08  November, 1935. 
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members have been bandied about. 45  Though the Plenipotentiary to Yugoslavia Ronald 
Campbell gives an estimate of up to ’50,000 ZBOR voters’,46 which most likely denotes 
sympathisers throughout the country. The aforementioned ZBOR Belgrade wartime 
membership list non-withstanding, ZBOR’s membership has been difficult to establish. 
However, a very crude and superficial inference can be made from ZBOR’s electoral lists 
from the 1935 and 1938 parliamentary elections. These electoral lists, published in a leading 
national daily, Politika, printed names of every candidate from the running parties, including 
their occupations. In ZBOR’s case, it gives a rudimentary base for inference on a socio-
economic membership base.47 ZBOR’s 1935 electoral candidates displayed a wide range of 
socio-economic statuses, from the unemployed to industrialists. Throughout most electoral 
lists, there seems to be two common socio-economic groups; peasants, and/or 
merchants/tradesmen (shopkeepers, cobblers, tailors etc.). Any inference at ethnic 
composition, based on name alone, is of course, highly subjective. In Slovene majority 
Dravska Banovina, most of the candidates listed bear Slovenian names. In the Croatian 
majority Primorska Banovina, most ZBOR candidates were seemingly Croats. In the Drinska, 
Dunavska, Moravska, and Zeta Banovinas, Serbian candidates seemingly predominated. The 
Vrbaska Banovina, correlating largely to Bosnia and Hercegovina, and parts of Croatia, 
unsurprisingly, showed the greatest ethnic mix, with perhaps a plurality of Serbian 
candidates, but also a number of Croatian and Muslim candidates. What is evident, at least in 
the case of the Vrbaska Banovina is that non-Muslims made up an overwhelming majority of 
ZBOR candidates. This base however, cannot account for the inconsistency and paradoxical 
nature of human political involvement. It cannot for instance, ascertain whether those 
candidates standing were committed ZBOR members, or even members of ZBOR. It cannot 
make any definitive statements on the ethnic composition of candidates in ZBOR’s electoral 
lists, based solely on names and places of candidacy.  
 
                                                        
45 See Martić, “Dimitrije Ljotić and the Yugoslav National Movement ZBOR, 1935-1945,” 220–221. Parežanin 
states that 150 members from ‘small’ ZBOR, fused into what would be ZBOR, in 1935, with groups in 
Belgrade, Sarajevo, Novi Sad, Subotica, and the Banat. See Parežanin, Drugi svetski rat i Dimitrije Ljotić, 45. ; 
Byford, “The willing bystanders: Dimitrije Ljotić, ‘Shield collaboration and the destruction of Serbia’s Jews”, in 
Haynes and Rady, In the Shadow of Hitler, 297. Byford gives no numbers, but estimates that ZBOR’s 
membership was primarily Serbian with a ‘diminishing number of Croats and Slovenes’. Holm Sandhussen, 
Gesghicte Serbiens 19.-21. Jahrhundert (Vienna: Böhler, 2007), 288. Sandhussen estimates between 5000-6000 
ZBOR members.  
46 NA FO 371/20434 R 3104/42/92. “Situation in Yugoslavia – Ideal of an Integral Yugoslavia. Mr. Campbell to 
Foreign Office”. 28 May, 1936. 
47 The two electoral lists in question are “Zemaljska lista g. Dimitrija Ljotića,” Politika, 22 April, 1935, 9673, 
5.; “Zemaljska kandidaciona lista Jugoslovenskog narodnog pokreta ‘Zbor’ koju je potvrdio Kasacioni sud,” 
Politika, 26 November, 1938, 10955, 9-11. 
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As an example as how the base works, within the Dravska Banovina, out of the two electoral 
districts, in the first district, ZBOR ran fourteen, and twelve candidates in the 1935 and 1938 
parliamentary elections respectively. Within the second electoral district, ZBOR ran eleven 
and twelve candidates in the 1935 and 1938 elections respectively. Taking the listed 
occupations of the candidates, and their area of residence, an inference can begin to be made 
as to the possibility of an existing ZBOR cell in Ljubljana in this instance.48 To further 
deconstruct the base, out of the twelve candidates in the first electoral region of the 1935 
elections, seven were classified as merchants, one as a doctor, one journalist, one clerk, and 
one auditor.49 This base can then be applied to all candidates running in the individual 35 
electoral districts. It cannot however, be taken for more than what it actually is, a very basic 
and superficial inference. In light of the absence of available ZBOR membership lists 
however, it is at least a start. 
 
Such a base however, is not the only medium by which inference or deduction of ZBOR’s 
membership can be utilised in the absence of official documents. The recollections of one 
time Split ZBOR member Hrvoje Magazinović,50 who by 1939 had become ZBOR’s district 
secretary of the Vrbas Banovina, in Banja Luka, under the leadership of Mirko Novković, 
also based in Banja Luka, are of particular relevance. Magazinović offers interesting insight 
into ZBOR’s localised activities in his memoir.51 He claims that even though ZBOR fielded 
candidates in Split during the 5 May, 1935 parliamentary elections, there was no organised 
ZBOR Split section. However, he maintains that sometime in the winter of 1935, at a meeting 
of ZBOR voters in Split (there were only thirty votes cast for ZBOR) lead to a creation of a 
ZBOR section under Krešimir Samodol and Dr. Marin Bego, a lawyer from Split.52 Among 
                                                        
48 Using this base, of the total number of candidates within the two electoral districts of the Savska Banovina, 
out of the eighteen candidates who ran in the 1935 parliamentary elections, seven returned to run in the 1938 
elections. They are Dr. Fran Kandare (2nd ZBOR vice-president), Vladislav Fabijančić, Julij Hmelak, Franjo 
Zupančić, Ferdo Sander, Rudolf Simnovec, and (ZBOR district leader) Artur Šturm. Furthermore, out of the 18 
candidates from the 1935 parliamentary elections, 13 were listed as being from Ljubljana. 
49 “Zemaljska lista g. Dimitrija Ljotića,” 5. 
50 Hrvoje F. Magazinović. (1913). Born in Zadar. Trained as a lawyer, as well as being a provincial advisor. 
Joined ZBOR as a student in 1935, he would, by 1939, be both ZBOR’s district secretary for the Vrbas 
Banovina, as well as an official functionary of the Banovina. He held both positions until the 6thApril, 1941 
Axis invasion. He spent the occupation in Belgrade, where he joined the Serbian Volunteer Corps in 1941. He 
fled to Italy after the war, where he was arrested in 1949 and returned to Yugoslavia where he was sentenced to 
twenty years in jail, but was released in 1959. For more see Hrvoje Magazinović, Kroz jedno mučno stoljeće 
(Valjevo, 2009). ; Ćirković, Ko je Ko u Nedićevoj Srbiji 1941-1944. Leksikon ličnosti slika jedna zabranjene 
epohe, 302. 
51 Magazinović, Kroz jedno mučno stoljeće. 
52 Ibid. 80.  
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others present were Dr. Ante Cettineo (academic), Dr. Ivo Carić (lawyer), Kuzma Gamulin 
(engineer), Marin Jožević (hotelier), Ante Lakoš (civil servant), Bartul Grgić, Milan Jakasa, 
and Darko Ilić, all students. 53  While Magazinović’s recollections may not always seem 
accurate, there is no reason to doubt his being a ZBOR member, and his recollections of that 
time. His account is interesting because it focuses on daily problems surrounding ZBOR in 
Split, which could conceivably be applied to numerous provincial ZBOR sections throughout 
Yugoslavia. Among these are the problems of funding.54 A certain credibility is leant to 
Magazinović’s account however, because in both the 1935 and 1938 elections, Marin Bego, 
and Kuzma Gamulin were listed as ZBOR’s Split regional candidates, with Gamulin also 
running on the Adriatic islands of Brač in 1935, and Hvar in 1938.55 Carić meanwhile was 
listed only as the regional Split ZBOR candidate for the 1938 elections.56  
 
The base of its appeal compounds the difficulty of establishing criteria and definitive answers 
for ZBOR’s socio-economic, and ethno-religious membership. Taking into account that 
ZBOR made itself out to be a national movement, given its ideology, as espoused by Ljotić, 
and through its publications, to who would have ZBOR appealed to? Unfortunately, no 
reliable data exists. However, through deduction of its ideology and policies, certain 
inferences can be made as to ZBOR’s potential support base. ZBOR’s Yugoslavism, 
monarchism, nationalism, and anti-communism, might have made it attractive to a wider 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Marin Bego (1881-1960).  A lawyer and writer from Split. He studied law in both Vienna and Zagreb, 
matriculating in 1909, working first in Rovinj until setting up his own practice in Split in 1915.  He was also a 
director of the Split Theatrical Society from 1928 until 1934. He was closely associated with Josip Smodlaka 
and the Croatian Democratic Party, founded in 1905, until he left in 1933. He ran for ZBOR in Split in both the 
1935 and 1938 parliamentary elections, though he left the movement in 1939 after a personal conflict with 
Ljotić. During the Second World War, he was working as a clerk for both the Ministry of Education, and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Ustaše regime. For more see Marin Bego, Vječna varka (Zagreb, 1928). 
There is evidence to suggest that Bego was also active in the JA, as he was one of the members of its Advisory 
Board that voted for full fusion of the JA with ZBOR, on 17 May, 1935. Among others were Velibor Jonić, 
Juraj Korenić, Djordje Perić, Vlado Kraljeta, Dragutin Morderčin, and Fran Kandare. See AS BIA-II-69. Dosije 
br. I-A-II- 6d.1 
53 Magazinović, Kroz jedno mučno stoljeće, 80. Though Magazinović quotes them as being present, there is no 
mention of Cettineo in particular, of having joined ZBOR.  
Ante Cettineo (1898-1956). Born in Trebinje, Cettineo studied classical philology in Prague and South Slavic 
philology in Belgrade. He worked in both Belgrade and Split as a teacher. He also wrote poetry, focusing on 
Mediterranean motifs, especially regarding Dalmatia. For more see Ante Cettineo, Laste nad ulavom (Split: 
Kobarija, 1935). 
54 Magazinović recalls the dire financial situation of ZBOR’s Split section, with appeals for members’ donations 
made in every issue of Vihor, ZBOR’s local Split publication. He also recollects the problems of electioneering 
and campaigning, citing the lack of an active ZBOR campaign on ‘not being able to afford to hire a car’, as to 
ferry candidates into the hinterland around Split, to hold rallies. He also states the problems the local section had 
with the price of paper, citing it as the reason for the lack of ZBOR posters, or electoral materials in Split. 
55 See “Zemaljska lista g. Dimitrija Ljotića,” 5.; “Zemaljska kandidaciona lista Jugoslovenskog narodnog 
pokreta ‘Zbor’ koju je potvrdio Kasacioni sud.”, 10.  
56 ‘Zemaljska kandidaciona lista Jugoslovenskog narodnog pokreta ‘Zbor’ koju je potvrdio Kasacioni sud’, 10. 
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cross section of society, as those were principles on which the 6th of January Dictatorship’s 
was based. Even so, ZBOR’s supporters have been frequently reduced to the status of 
‘disoriented youth’, or categorised as the ‘sons of priests and policemen’, ‘rich peasants, and 
mid-level clerks’. 57  In addition, some contemporary observers tended to view ZBOR’s 
members as ‘adventurous speculators’, and ‘clever rogues’. 58  On the other hand, its 
supporters have also been characterised as ‘mostly conservative, pro-authoritarian 
intellectuals, militant anti-communist students, and especially outside Serbia, young people 
of an integral Yugoslav orientation’.59 Therefore based on these two differing accounts of 
ZBOR’s ideological appeal, it would be safe to assume, given its ideology, that it would 
attract a certain following from amongst those citizens who were proponents of Yugoslavism, 
monarchism, a specific Yugoslav nationalism, and anti-communism.  
 
However, this was also a very similar ideological base to that of Stojadinović and his JRZ. 
The question then is, how did ZBOR differ from the political mainstream in Yugoslavia? 
Stojadinović’s 1938 electoral slogan of jedan kralj, jedan narod, jedna država60 (One king, 
one people, one state), was not dissimilar to Ljotić’s Bog, kralj, domaćin mantra. Unlike the 
amalgamated JRZ, ZBOR would be forced to develop an ideological, and organisational 
model from scratch, in a climate that was not conducive to any real political development 
outside of what was officially sanctioned, and furthermore, in direct competition with a 
government backed party. On an ideological level, ZBOR’s open anti-Semitism, in a country 
where anti-Semitism was not a major political or socio-economic issue, certainly 
distinguished it as outside the political mainstream. The constant appeals for a ‘planned 
economy’ based on a totalitarian model, an elusive and abstract ‘corporatism’, the total re-
orientation of Yugoslavia’s foreign policy to suit Germany’s needs, and the identification and 
rhetoric of Nazism’s anti-communism as being akin to a religious ‘crusade’ and ‘holy war’, 
went far beyond anything seen in Yugoslavia’s political mainstream. ZBOR’s extreme and 
apocalyptic ideology limited its appeal amongst Yugoslavs, yet the movement would show a 
degree of activity and support amongst youth, who from ZBOR’s inception, were never 
seriously targeted as potential sources of support. 
 
                                                        
57 Stefanović, Zbor Dimitrija Ljotića 1934-1945, 38. 
58 Jovanović, Ljudi Ljudi. Medaljoni 46 umrlih savremenika, 1975, 156. 
59 Tomasevich, War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945, 187. 
60 See Milan Stojadinović, Jedan kralj, jedan narod, jedna država (Belgrade: Izdanje sekcije za unutrašnju 
propagandu JRZ, 1939). 
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Youth would feature in ZBOR’s membership, with the youth section under Danilo Gregorić 
operational from July 1936.61 How prominently is difficult to ascertain, but as the last chapter 
showed, elements of ZBOR youth would form the nucleus of a militant anti-communist 
collaborationist auxiliary force used for the maintenance of stability in Nazi occupied 
Serbia.62 The matter however, was much clearer to the outlawed KPJ, which claimed that 
ZBOR was the ‘enemy of youth’, and ‘paid German agents’, while ‘preparing the way for a 
medieval form of slavery’63 This then gives rise to the not too unreasonable assumption, that 
the activity of elements of ZBOR youth would become increasingly radical, and under the 
occupation, would attempt to affect a mutation of ZBOR into a paramilitary structure more 
closely resembling the Italian Fascist and National Socialist models. This is the focus of the 
next chapter. 
 
The problem of ZBOR’s appeal, was compounded however by the fact that its potential 
political space was already occupied by the personal monarchic regime set up by the 6th of 
January Dictatorship. There was little space for ZBOR to navigate. As was shown in the last 
chapter, the political life of interwar Yugoslavia, especially after 1929, was marked by the 
proscription of political parties, only to be loosened by the 1931 Constitution. This would 
immediately put ZBOR in a subordinate position in regard to the state, and also the 1931 
Constitution, as only certain parties would be allowed, based on the decrees of the regime. In 
this sense, ZBOR, like the JA and ORJUNA before it, was thought of as nothing more than a 
buttress of the regime, attempting to give it a veneer of political legitimacy. In effect, even if 
it wanted to, it could not be anything more.  
 
It was within this limited space that ZBOR inserted itself into mainstream political life. 
Existing in limbo in a state where no political parties were allowed, even though certain 
political groupings, like the JA, were tolerated, with the exception of the KPJ. This 
contradictory aspect of interwar Yugoslav political life would be played out in a microcosm 
of ZBOR’s attitude and participation in elections. 
                                                        
61 See Hrvoje Matković, “Djelovanje i sukobi gradjanskih stranaka u Šibeniku izmedju dva svjetska rata,” 
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62 See Hrvoje Magazinović, “Zadaci omladine,” Otadžbina, November 27, 1936, No.141, 6. Magazinović 
heavily references speeches made by ZBOR youth leader Danilo Gregorić, especially on his dissertation, 
published as ‘Ekonomska i socijalna politika nacionalnog socijalizma i njene doktrinarne osnove’, as basis for 
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ZBOR and the electoral process 
 
Throughout its five-year legal existence, ZBOR would take part in two parliamentary 
elections, as well as local provincial elections in the Moravska Banovina in 1936.64 Yet the 
movement seemed fraught with contradiction regarding its participation in the electoral and 
democratic process. ZBOR’s January 1935 creation meant that it had little time for any real 
concerted electoral effort for the 5 May, 1935 elections. 
 
Among the important resolutions for ZBOR was the resolution to participate in the elections, 
and determine whether any tangible benefit could be gained. ZBOR’s anti-democratic stance 
has been analysed in the previous chapter, yet, according to Ljotić, ZBOR’s participation in 
elections was necessary, in order to bring around a ‘new spirit’, based on ‘traditional moral 
values’, and the belief that ‘politics is a painful struggle, that is neither fun, nor a generator of 
wealth’.65 Even so, Ljotić’s electoral sincerity can be questioned, exposing the beginnings of 
cleavages within the movement. Many former members of the Slovenian Združenje borcev 
Jugoslavije (‘Association of Yugoslav Combatants’, hereafter as BOJ) who gravitated into 
ZBOR were radicalised veterans, who under the leadership of Stane Vidmar opposed 
ZBOR’s participation in parliamentary elections.66 Vidmar feared that BOJ would become 
subject to partisan, rather than national interests and values, becoming in effect, an auxiliary 
force to a political party.67  
 
                                                        
64 AJ 37-8-46//368-372, “izveštaj Pov. br. 596 dopisnika CPB-a iz Niša od 23 September, 1936”; “Resultati 
opštinskih izbora u Moravskoj banovini,” Politika, 29 September, 1936, 10189, 5–8. Out of 1853 electoral lists 
in 759 municipalities, ZBOR had two. 
65 See Dimitrije Ljotić, “Naš izborni proglas – Smisao naše borbe,” Otadžbina, 17 March, 1935, No.54, 1–2. ; 
Ljotić, “Smisao naše borbe,” 2–3. ; “Izborna proglas Jugoslovenskog narodnog pokreta ZBOR,” Politika, March 
18, 1935, No.9638, 4. 
66 Vidmar was a former Sokol (South Slavic cultural association) member who deserted from the Italian military 
in 1915 and found himself amongst the Yugoslav Legion. After the war he left Sokol before joining with BOJ 
and later ZBOR. For more see Ljudevit Pivko, Proti Avstriji. Rame ob Ramenu. (Maribor: Klub dobrovoljcev v 
Mariboru, 1925), 98. 
67 John Paul Newman. “Allied Yugoslavia: Serbian Great War Veterans and their internationalist ties”, in Julia 
Eichenberg and John Paul Newman, eds., The Great War and Veterans’ Internationalism (New York, NY: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 113. 
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Vidmar’s association with ZBOR however would begin to suffer from 1936, and this was due 
to his being sentenced for slander of Dr. Albert Kramer, a Slovene member and parliamentary 
deputy of the JNS, of being a freemason.68 Yet there was another faction from within the 
former BOJ movement in conjunction with former leading JA members, that moved for an 
electoral campaign and participation in ZBOR, and that ultimately persuaded Ljotić to 
acquiesce.69 ZBOR’s two vice-presidents as of 1935, Jonić and Kandare, came from, the 
same background, the JA. Hence creating an ‘electoral action committee’ within ZBOR, may 
have favoured whatever decision the majority of members wanted. Therefore, it is plausible 
for Ljotić to have just agreed to accept an electoral campaign, where he could simply ride the 
current of support amongst the leadership for electoral participation. 
 
Even so, ZBOR’s semi-legal status would conceivably act as a hindrance to any potential 
electoral action. It was not until 8 November, 1935, that ZBOR’s status as an organisational 
entity was legalised thus giving it recognition and legitimacy to organise itself, under the 
law.70 That ZBOR was legally recognised is in itself not surprising, as Ljotić, from 1935 at 
least, was publicly a strong supporter of the king and his personal dictatorship. Indeed, ZBOR 
saw the acceptance of its electoral list as a victory in and of itself. The process of submission 
and acceptance was taken lionised as a ‘struggle’, with ‘peasants, workers, and the 
intelligentsia moving like an avalanche’, in order to secure ZBOR’s aims. However, this 
electoral acceptance was ‘fraught with danger’, and could, supposedly, ‘at any moment be 
cancelled’.71 
 
Yet during the 1938 elections, ZBOR displayed a modicum of political acumen, in the sense 
that it sent out feelers, and was in itself sounded out, as to possibilities of electoral alliances, 
primarily amongst opposition parties and coalitions, among them the Blok narodne sloge72 
(Bloc of national concord) in order to bring down the JRZ and Stojadinović. This means that 
at least by 1938, ZBOR’s leadership was more committed to fielding electoral candidates, 
                                                        
68 “Vodja bivših bojennikov Stane Vidmar obsojen,” Nova Doba, 21 February, 1936, No.8, 1. 
69 Stefanović, Zbor Dimitrija Ljotića 1934-1945, 41. 
70 Velibor Jonić submitted ZBOR’s statute on 16 September, 1935. See “Jugoslovenski narodni pokret-Zbor 
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72 The Bloc narodne sloge was a broad coalition made up of the Croatian Peasant Party, the Montenegrin 
Federalist Party, the Independent Democratic Party, the Democratic Party, and the Agrarian Party. As the largest 
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and was obviously seen as such by other parties.73 ZBOR played up such potential links for 
its own gain, highlighting the ‘third path’ of its slogan, in rejecting any electoral pacts, 
signalling ZBOR’s honour in remaining aloof from ‘cliques and coteries’.74  
 
Personal relations however also played a part, at least in Ljotić’s decision to refuse any 
political coalitions. As head of the Croatian Peasant Party, Ljotić viewed Maček with 
suspicion, unless he ‘first declared Yugoslavia his homeland’.75 Yet at the same time, Ljotić 
did admit to a certain respect for certain members within the Udružena Opozicija (United 
Opposition), primarily senior Agrarian leader Milan Gavrilović.76 Gavrilović was viewed as 
‘someone with whom we have sympathy and respect for’, yet ‘his political association 
prevents us from agreeing more often’.77 
 
In the attack on Maček, ZBOR could play on its defence of state borders and national 
integrity in the face of the supposed separatism of the Croatian Peasant Party. ZBOR, aiming 
to be a force of the ‘third way’, never seriously considered tactical electoral alliances or 
coalitions for the simple reasons that most of its members were politically naïve, and ZBOR’s 
confusing amalgam of political incoherence, yet inflexibility, meant that it was unclear as to 
what the movement actually stood for. 
 
The question is then, why the participation? Most likely, ZBOR was looking to capitalise on 
existing popular discontent with the regime, as well as making its existence known amongst 
the electorate, at least in 1935. Certainly, ZBOR was looking to rise on a wave of disaffection 
and protest, appealing in 1935 to the ‘social and economic freedom of the little man’.78 This 
bombastic populism deemed by contemporary Serbian sociologist Nebojša Popov as 
                                                        
73 Ljubo Boban, Sporazum Cvetković-Maček (Odeljenje za istorijske nauke, 1965), 47–48. : “Sve grupe bloka 
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‘marginal populism’, would fail to harness any existing disaffection with the regime. 79 
Furthermore, ZBOR’s initial claims for entering the political process was to ‘correct certain 
wrongs’ of the last sixteen years of Yugoslavia’s existence. Identifying democracy as one of 
these wrongs, ZBOR claimed that in order for the democratic process to be defeated, its 
members ‘must first understand the disease, then find and apply the cure’.80 
 
It can be deduced, therefore, that ZBOR’s belief that participation in elections would not only 
open the public’s eyes to the dangers of a liberal parliamentary system, but also to offer an 
alternative in ZBOR, fighting for national values and politics. However, Ljotić, at least, 
seemed to be under no illusion as to ZBOR’s appeal in 1935. He maintained that ZBOR was 
participating in the elections not for mandates, but to change the ‘existing conception of 
politics’.81 Yet not all ZBOR members shared his pessimism, as Ratko Parežanin notes, that 
many members felt ‘the time was right to spread ZBOR’s message’. It was in this vein that 
ZBOR’s electoral slogan calling for the ‘freedom of the little man’ was conceived. A national 
politic, in tandem with national values, would therefore free the ‘little man’ from the 
contempt of being immature minors in the eyes of the state, to taking their economic and 
social freedom into their own hands through ‘the value of their jobs’.82 
 
Yet there was, as will be shown, a discrepancy between ZBOR’s appeals to the ‘little man’, 
invoking the paternal authority of not just Ljotić personally, but of his family, in 1935, and its 
electoral appeals in 1938. ZBOR’s 1938 electoral campaign had a broader and more 
sophisticated appeal than a simple ‘little man’ populist slogan. This showed a modicum of 
organisation and ideological solidity belying its weakness. Its electoral platform for 1938 
revealed more depth, yet even such depth was in itself vague and incoherent, focusing solely 
on rural and artisan concerns. While ZBOR called for the entry of two hundred peasants and 
seventy artisans into the National Assembly, it also called for an end to government 
appropriation of farm revenues and produce, combined with what it deemed to be a ‘proper 
allocation of taxes’, inasmuch to ease peasant and agricultural grievances. Capital, especially 
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foreign capital was to be limited, and in doing so was to be brought back ‘into the hands of 
the people’.83  
 
However, much of ZBOR’s 1938 electioneering and populism was determined by the arrest 
of Ljotić on 26 October, 1938. The justification for his arrest came from the Belgrade city 
authorities, which deemed ZBOR to have organised illegal meetings. Ljotić was more 
sanguine, commenting that his arrest, in the context of the elections, was due to those ‘who 
hated the truth’, and took it as a sign of ZBOR’s increasing popularity.84  
 
While incarcerated, Ljotić’s cell at Belgrade’s Glavnjača prison would be adjacent to 
Dragoljub Jovanović, a Sorbonne graduate law professor at Belgrade University. Jovanović 
was also a parliamentary representative and a vocal voice in opposition to Fascism and 
National Socialism, who was arrested on 1 October, 1938, presumably on the pretext of not 
participating in the December 1938 elections, thus eliminating Stojadinović’s opposition. 
According to his political memoirs, Jovanović states that while incarcerated, he and Ljotić 
mostly talked about religion, with Jovanović attacking the role of priests in Yugoslavia’s 
political life, and Ljotić defending it.85 Jovanović was also left in no doubt that Ljotić wanted 
to be ‘our Hitler’, in reference to Yugoslavia, but that he also witnessed Ljotić ‘giving bread 
to communist prisoners’.86  
 
For Ljotić, his arrest and incarceration not only added to the supposed increased profile of 
ZBOR, but also slandered the government due to the ‘Jewish-Marxist lies’ that ‘are ruining 
our country’.87 While the populism of ZBOR evolved somewhat, its ‘target audience’ did not. 
In both electoral campaigns, the main thrust of ZBOR’s message was centred, as much of its 
ideology was, on what it perceived the needs and grievances of the peasantry to be, combined 
with a strident anti-communism. 
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payment of 518 ministerial pensions from the public, that those who damaged any state property would face 
prosecution, and to provide for the need of each and every farmer and peasant. See also AJ 37 152-21-81 
84 See Stefanović, Zbor Dimitrija Ljotića 1934-1945, 53. ; “Iz moga života”, in Ljotić, Odabrana dela. I Knjiga, 
269. 
85 Dragoljub Jovanović, Medaljoni. Knjiga III (Belgrade: Službeni glasnik, 2008), 377. 
86 Ibid.  
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ZBOR’s electoral results 
 
Ljotić’s constant claims of ZBOR not seeking or wanting votes and mandates might have 
ironically, perhaps saved the movement embarrassment, as the electorate overwhelmingly 
rejected it. ZBOR’s participation in both elections would end in a complete shamble, and 
drive home the unpopularity and utter unimportance of ZBOR as an organised political body. 
ZBOR’s attempt to forge a new ‘third way’ path in Yugoslav political life would be thwarted 
by voters whom Ljotić characterised as either voting for Stojadinović because of their fear of 
Maček, or conversely, voting for Maček because of their hatred of the regime and 
Stojadinović.88 What therefore became evidently clear was that ZBOR could never achieve 
any tangible electoral results when it remained a small, loosely organised, non-influential 
movement with ambiguous electoral leanings and pronouncements. In short, it posed no 
structural or ideological threat to the regime. 
 
While ZBOR could at least be forgiven its 1935 results due to its semi-legal status, and the 
fact that as a newly created movement, it was, at that time, still relatively unknown, its 
rejection by the populace would be total and far reaching. Working under the electoral law 
reform of 24 March, 1933, which gave the winning party three-fifths of parliamentary seats, 
plus a percentage of the remaining two-fifths, ZBOR’s position was hopeless.89 This electoral 
reform, based on an earlier law of 10 September, 1931, stated that a political party in order to 
qualify, had to present a list of candidates in every district, approved by two hundred 
registered voters of the district and by the head of the ‘county list of candidates’.90 ZBOR 
was thus forced to enter candidate lists throughout the country in districts where for the most 
part, there was no sign of any ZBOR presence. 
 
Nevertheless, ZBOR did comply with the law and managed to field candidates in every 
electoral district of the country for both the 1935 and 1938 parliamentary elections. 91 
ZBOR’s results, in both elections never polled more two per cent of the popular vote. 
However, as the results show, there were areas of the country that in 1935 contained pockets 
of ZBOR support. Ljotić’s home district, around Smederevo, in Smederevska Palanka, saw 
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ZBOR’s candidate, Milan Colić, receive 23.48 per cent of the vote. While ZBOR finished 
third in Jasenica, part of the Smederevska Palanka district, Colić received the second highest 
number of votes of all candidates.92 In the Podunavski district, incorporating Smederevo 
itself, ZBOR, under Života Todorović received a plurality of the votes, polling 47.54 per 
cent.93 Outside of Ljotić’s powerbase of Smederevo, ZBOR, in 1935, failed to make any 
inroads, with the sole exception being Brežice, in the Dravska Banovina, with ZBOR, under 
France Škrbec, polling 19.11 per cent of the vote, finishing in fourth place.94 Thus in 1935, 
ZBOR, failing to get any candidate elected, gained 25,705 votes, totalling 0.89 per cent of the 
popular vote. The loss in the election for ZBOR may be an illustration of its decentralised 
form of operation. Focusing only on Ljotić’s area of jurisdiction and hometown. Had the 
operations been centralised, ZBOR would have also made their machineries reach other area 
to gain significant percentage in the polls to attain an elected seat in the elections.  
 
ZBOR’s 1938 election results would show minimal increase in votes. While continuing to 
fare relatively well in Smederevo and its immediate environs, ZBOR was unable to mount 
any serious challenge anywhere else in the country. As in 1935, the 1938 elections saw 
ZBOR’s ‘successes’ limited to a plurality of votes in the Podunavski district (within the 
Podunavska Banovina) at 36.53 per cent, especially in and around Smederevo, with Života 
Todorović polling 5,819 votes.95 This time though, ZBOR won a relative majority in Jasenica 
with Kosta Majstorović receiving 4,747 votes. 96  ZBOR’s ‘power base’ in and around 
Smederevo, relatively speaking, also saw the movement act more aggressively towards other 
parties, particularly the JRZ. The JRZ candidate for the Podunavski district, Milan Jovanović-
Stoimirović (alternatively as Stojimirović) recalls that ZBOR’s campaign in Smederevo was 
violent and unscrupulous, however nearly ‘two thousand residents of Smederevo worship 
Mita like God’, ‘especially amongst the peasantry’.97 Overall, ZBOR’s share of votes rose 
slightly to 30,310, with its overall vote percentage also rising slightly to almost a per cent, at 
0.98.98  
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94 Ibid, 8. 
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Perhaps predictably, ZBOR maintained that instances of tampering and illegality were prime 
factors of its dismal showing. Voter fraud, and violence brought against it were among the 
reasons ZBOR gave for its poor electoral showing. Parežanin claims that in the 1935 
elections, instances of electoral fraud left ZBOR over ’50,000 votes short’, indicating that 
ZBOR would have received close to 80,000 votes nationwide.99 More sinisterly, ZBOR, and 
primarily Ljotić would hint at government repression and collusion in order to deny ZBOR a 
voice, for which the blame was to be assigned to Stojadinović. Such accusations, and a 
growing personal acrimony between Ljotić and Stojadinović would mark ZBOR from 1937 
until its 1940 banning. 
 
ZBOR: Repression and accusations of Fascism 
 
The personal acrimony that Ljotić felt towards Stojadinović became a hallmark of ZBOR’s 
opposition to the regime. It also highlighted that ZBOR was in effect Ljotić’s personal 
ideological extension. He was the main ideologue, its sole leader with any real authority, and 
as evidenced by election results in Smederevo, the only one within ZBOR who could claim to 
have even a semblance of a following or any level of support. But to what extent was this 
acrimony based on actual events? Certainly, Ljotić’s dislike of Stojadinović100 personally 
translated to a criticism of his government, but how what degree was it based on actual fact? 
From June 1935 there is little to suggest any open hostility between the two, indeed, Ljotić 
was hesitant to talk ill of Stojadinović and his first government, in that ‘we will have to see 
how they act and what they do’.101  
 
However, already by September 1935, Ljotić was agitating against the government, 
highlighting the threat it faced to ZBOR and the nation as a representative of the ‘old parties’, 
full of selfishness and corruption, and accusing the 6th of January regime of not doing enough 
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to stamp these vices out. 102  Evidently Ljotić took seriously his self-proclaimed title of 
‘opposition’, and ‘third way’, in that he constantly harangued the government for not 
acceding to his prophecies (especially in regard to a planned economy), and ZBOR’s political 
ideals. Such agitation, which was expressed solely through ZBOR’s publications, must have 
not made much of an impact on Stojadinović, seeing as ZBOR was a marginal movement in 
political life. Also, the attempted expansion of the new government party, the JRZ, into a 
nationwide force would have undoubtedly filled Ljotić with both envy and trepidation of the 
resources at its disposal.103  
 
ZBOR and the ‘Technical Affair’ 
 
What brought this more one-sided rivalry to a head were events in early 1937, namely the so-
called ‘Technical Affair’, and the banning of ZBOR meetings and rallies throughout the year. 
What become known as the ‘Technical Affair’ had its roots in German economic designs on 
Southeast Europe as part of its wider foreign policy. By 1936, Germany was purchasing more 
than a quarter of Yugoslav exports, part of a concentrated effort by the Germans at securing 
substitutes, since the closure of American and British markets, for raw materials and 
foodstuffs by cultivating good relations with individual producers in Southeast Europe.104 
The ‘Technical Affair’ grew out of such a German initiative, to incorporate accusations of 
German funding, subversion, and fascism towards ZBOR. Mladen Stefanović, states that 
from 1935, Ljotić had travelled to Switzerland in order to meet with representatives of the 
German Reich, among them Walter Malletke, a Nazi Party foreign specialist on Southeast 
Europe. Ljotić, through the intermediary activities of ZBOR member and retired judge from 
Vukovar, Dragutin Morderčin, supposedly arranged for funding from the Nazis. 105 
Unfortunately, Stefanović gives no sources to back up his claim, and within Yugoslavia, the 
issue of Nazi funding was never proven.  
 
By June 1936 however, Ljotić was again accused of being in the pay of a ‘foreign power’, 
this time by national deputy and JRZ member Života Milanović. Milanović’s accusation, 
flimsy though it was, was from an auditor’s supposed statement from Ljotić’s co-operative in 
                                                        
102 Dimitrije Ljotić, “Naš zadatak,” 1. ; Dimitrije Ljotić, “Dve Revolucije,” 2. 
103 “Organizovanje JRZ u narodu,” Politika, 1 September, 1935, No.9799, 2. 
104 See Chapter 3. 
105 Stefanović, Zbor Dimitrija Ljotića 1934-1945, 66. 
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Smederevo, stating that there were ‘untold thousands of Deutschmarks from a foreign 
state’. 106  Milanović, an elected representative and member of the JRZ, also headed an 
agricultural co-operative in his hometown of Osijek.107 In a response against Milanović’s 
accusations, Jonić, on behalf of ZBOR began a smear campaign against him alleging that 
‘Milanović lived off the public’s expense to the tune of 6 to 7 thousand dinars a month’, and 
amazed that ‘someone who has only finished fourth grade of primary school could ever 
advance’.108  
 
What the nature of the relationship between Ljotić and Milanović is uncertain. Was 
Milanović simply a proxy by which to start agitation against ZBOR? That seems unlikely 
given that ZBOR was a virtual non-entity. Perhaps the real reason lay more that ZBOR and 
Ljotić could perhaps be brought to heel, regardless of whether or not accusations of German 
funding could be proven, to drive home the fact that the movement would never become a 
significant force. 
 
It was against this backdrop of highly circumstantial evidence that a campaign began in the 
press against Ljotić that came to the fore in February 1937, with the accusation that the 
Technical Union, described by Ljotić as ‘a permanent organisation that would help in the 
facilitation of trade goods between nations’,109 was guilty of receiving funds and subsidies 
from Germany. Ljotić admitted to having contact with German officials, but insisted this 
contact was of a purely ‘economic nature’, in that it was solely for the supposed facilitation 
of agricultural goods.110 Though he himself had nothing to do with the Technical Union from 
December 1936,111 and that any ZBOR members who engaged with the Technical Union did 
so as private citizens and not as ZBOR members. 
 
In essence, the nature of the accusations lay in part due to Germany’s need for increased 
agricultural products, which meant that they directly began buying from Yugoslav producers 
at inflated market prices. This happened with Yugoslavia’s output of plums, which was 
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valued at 1.40 dinars per kilogram, but which was bought by the Germans for 2.70 per 
kilogram. The difference between the German and market price would then supposedly be 
remitted to ZBOR.112 The main office of the Technical Union in Yugoslavia was founded by 
ZBOR’s Zagreb district chief, Dr. Juraj Korenić.113  
 
Both the main facilitator and intermediary between the Technical Union and the Germans 
was Milan Danić (born Alfred Diamantstein). Danić’s origins under normal circumstances 
would not have been an issue, but seeing as ZBOR was itself a stridently anti-Semitic 
organisation, and that Danić was supposedly a previous communist who took part in the 
Hungarian Revolution of 1919, questions began to be raised as to his ideological affinities.114 
It was Danić, who, as part of the Peasant Fruit Growers Alliance, and not ZBOR, who was 
sent to Germany on a fact-finding mission and to test any potential trade opportunities. 
Ljotić’s own involvement in co-operatives, which he aggressively asserted was not in any 
way tied to ZBOR, was involved in the Peasant Fruit Growers Alliance. Once ‘facts’ about 
Danić’s life began to circulate, it appears that Ljotić ordered Korenić to resign his position in 
ZBOR if he wanted to continue in the Technical Union, so as not to further implement ZBOR 
in any further scandal.115  
 
In his defence, Ljotić accused the campaign against ZBOR being led by communists, 
accusing them in turn of being the ones ‘who without organisational or material help would 
not be able to survive’, in reference to foreign funds. He also accused ‘malicious politicians 
and the well-meaning admirers of democracy’, and then finally ‘agents of international 
capital’, scared of ZBOR’s ‘ideas of economic autonomy’.116  
 
The Technical Union, according to Ljotić, ‘was not a monopoly’, and was open to ‘investors 
from all countries’. He defended the Technical Union by arguing that ‘Germany gives the 
best rates for our agricultural produce’, and he was convinced that there was ‘a media 
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campaign against the Technical Union’.117 For his part, Stojadinović did seem convinced of 
‘credible evidence’ damning ZBOR, and he let it be known to German envoy to Yugoslavia, 
Viktor von Heeren. Stojadinović seemed certain that ‘various elements within the Reich were 
engaging with ZBOR’, and that this was now ‘becoming known to the Yugoslav public’.118 
The issues surrounding the founding of the Technical Union, and the (brief) fusion of the 
Erneuerungsbewegung movement into ZBOR was a clear to sign to Stojadinović of German 
‘economic and financial support’.119 Evidently Stojadinović feared that the Germans might 
try to undermine his regime though backing ZBOR, and he warned the Germans that ‘no one 
with my level of trust can be found anywhere in the country’.120  
 
As to the Germans, von Heeren seemed unaware as to any funding pertaining to ZBOR, 
trying to assuage Stojadinović that any economic or financial links if existing, were not on 
the basis of supporting any opposition movement to Stojadinović.121 Van Heeren sought 
further clarification from the German Foreign Ministry on the matter, though confusingly, in 
an earlier memo to the Foreign Ministry, he denied that the Technical Union was funding 
ZBOR, and that it was ‘that communist and Jew Danić’, who had ‘manipulated both the Nazi 
Party and ZBOR’, for his own aims.122 To the Germans, Danić was ‘attempting to use ZBOR 
to swindle the Nazi Party’, and that the crux of the Technical Affair was ‘that Danić was born 
Diamantstein, a Jew’.123  
 
Nothing of alleged German funding would ever be proven. In fact, most of the allegations 
made against ZBOR in this instance could not be substantiated.124 Official Reich policy, 
according to Martin Broszat and Ladislaus Hory, was to repudiate any links with ZBOR, 
though conceded that there were those within the Reich Foreign Ministry who were 
‘sympathetic’ to ZBOR.125 Perhaps that wasn’t the point. But then establishing who brought 
the issue of the Technical Union to the fore in the first place, and for what reason, cannot as 
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of yet, be established. Nevertheless, the political fallout over the ‘Technical Affair’ saw the 
opening of major cleavages within ZBOR that would be exploited by Stojadinović’s regime. 
In public opinion, ZBOR became compromised as an agent in the pay of Germany, hardening 
existing opinion that ZBOR was fascist. It also resulted in a hardening of Stojadinović’s 
personal stance towards ZBOR. From feeling that it was a nuisance, Stojadinović 
increasingly worried that the Germans might attempt to undermine his position through 
ZBOR, even while publicly and through his party press, he deliberately left out attacks on 
ZBOR to highlight the movement’s weakness and unimportance, unworthy of any 
mention.126  
 
The issue of Nazi funding was also a cause for King Carol in Romania to initiate a 
crackdown on the Iron Guard. Carol’s premise, according to Rebecca Haynes, was that by 
eliminating the Iron Guard, all German contacts would be conducted solely through the 
monarchy, thereby ensuring complete control Romanian foreign policy.127 Parallel to ZBOR, 
the issue of German funding for the Iron Guard could never be proven. The German Foreign 
Ministry preferred a policy of gradual rapprochement with Carol, founded on an economic 
basis. Thus they took little notice, according to Haynes, of the Iron Guard.128 The Iron Guard 
maintained closer links with the German Propaganda Ministry, though again, there is no 
concrete evidence of financial assistance.129 
 
ZBOR: Repression and Violence 
 
The aftermath of the ‘Technical Affair’ saw the government’s stance against ZBOR harden, 
as did, as will be shown, its perception within public opinion as a fascist organisation. Up to 
the point of the ‘Technical Affair’, Stojadinović and his government had no reason to be 
worried about criticism from such an inconsequential and minute movement such as ZBOR. 
But as ZBOR’s radicalism, fear of German funding, criticism of and accusations over 
Stojadinović increased, so too did government surveillance, and in some instances, 
repression. ZBOR’s radical rhetoric and accusations of government collusion with 
communists had its catalyst in the aftermath of a ZBOR rally in Belgrade on 28 February, 
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1937. Meeting at Triglav theatre in Belgrade, ZBOR members were attacked by ‘anti-fascist 
youth’. In the build up to the meeting, Politika reported that numerous posters from an 
organisation calling itself ‘democratic youth’ were found calling for Ljotić not to be given a 
platform, as he was a ‘paid German agent’.130  
 
Certain ZBOR members had formed a ‘flying column’, acting as a personal bodyguard for 
Ljotić, carried wooden sticks in order to menace the protesters. Yet the conflict began even 
before Ljotić arrived, when rocks were thrown at ZBOR members leaving the theatre, and 
were then attacked by the ‘Flying Column’, even though heavily outnumbered. 131  Even 
though the police arrested dozens of protesters, Ljotić, in a letter to Minister of Interior Dr. 
Anton Korošec, accused Korošec personally, and the government of ‘complicity with 
communism’, through the supposed inaction of the police, against ZBOR.132  
 
This theme of supposed use of communists by proxy was utilised again, first after a ZBOR 
rally in Preljina, in the Čačak district where on 21 August, 1938, protesters again pelted 
ZBOR members with rocks, hitting Ljotić, with ‘only a revolver being fired in the air’, 
presumably from a ZBOR member, dispersing them.133 Earlier that year, in Šibenik, on 12 
February, 1938, Ljotić accused not just the police, but also the government of fomenting a 
joint ‘communist-Frankist’ attack against ZBOR.134  
 
ZBOR’s meetings and rallies were frequently interrupted, though in most cases, not violently. 
Much of the agitation was verbal, with cries of ‘down with Fascism’, ‘down with Ljotić’, and 
‘long live democracy’ being the most common slogans. 135  Not all of it was organised 
opposition to ZBOR, there was little need for that, as ZBOR had proven itself to be an 
unpopular movement not just because of its supposed links with German funding, but 
because of its radicalism, anti-Semitism, and in most cases, incoherent and contradictory 
ideas. Ljotić’s ideological solidity was not always successfully transplanted onto ZBOR, 
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which suffered an inordinate amount of initial ideological fluidity even on such ‘core’ ideas 
such as national unity, social organisation, and a planned and corporative style of economics. 
 
With the supposed communist-police collusion, ZBOR, especially, Ljotić did not shy away 
from attacking the government, especially Stojadinović on a personal level. Ljotić went so far 
as to accuse Stojadinović, of conspiring to kill King Alexander in 1933 and 1934.136 During 
the Concordat crisis of 1937, by which Yugoslavia demarked its relationship with the 
Catholic Church in Yugoslavia and the Vatican, ZBOR continuously attacked Stojadinović, 
accusing him of giving into ‘separatist demands’. ZBOR also hinted that the sudden illness, 
resulting in the death of Patriarch Varnava of the Orthodox Church, to be God’s judgment on 
the Concordat as a ‘threat to national sovereignty’. 137  This was supposedly due to 
Stojadinović’s ratification of the Concordat. Speaking on the disturbances around the signing 
of the Concordat, which would later lead to Stojadinović’s excommunication, Ljotić warned 
the Prime Minister not to ‘make the Serbs hate Yugoslavia’, with his actions.138 
 
Stojadinović was also accused, through the Ministry of Interior, of not allowing ZBOR to 
hold rallies and organise meetings. Out of 212 supposed meetings through June and July of 
1937, only 2, according to Ljotić were allowed to take place.139 Those two that did take 
place, one, being planned in Smederevo on 16 May, 1937, as a direct protest against an 
earlier meeting that was banned by the authorities.140 
 
Stojadinović fights back 
 
Throughout these attacks on his integrity, Stojadinović was not idle. While at least until mid-
1938, he left ZBOR to its own devices, after ZBOR’s headquarters was raided on 1 August, 
1938,141 there were more instances of actual government repression visited upon ZBOR. 
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However, Stojadinović was, in December 1937 able to inflict a harsh blow to ZBOR when 
Ljotić received information of allegations of senior ZBOR members entering into contact 
with government representatives. Certainty, as to which side initiated the contacts remain 
sketchy, however, it appears that many former members of the JA who voted for fusion with 
ZBOR, were also accused of holding talks with Stojadinović’s government. Ratko Parežanin 
puts the blame on Danilo Gregorić, for initiating contact with the government, and of 
receiving money for doing so.142  
 
The most likely reason and explanation for this is that certain JA members who gravitated to 
ZBOR and were given leadership positions (Gregorić, Jonić, Perić, and Vulović), agitated for 
greater involvement of ZBOR within the political process, and for more collusion with the 
government. To ZBOR however, and especially Ljotić, this was tantamount to treason against 
the movement, and he undertook a purging of those members deemed guilty of colluding 
with Stojadinović. This resulted in a massive shake up of ZBOR’s general secretariat, and 
leadership in its organisational sub-divisions, with general secretary Velibor Jonić, head of 
propaganda and youth leader Danilo Gregorić, and press section chief Djordje Perić, expelled 
from the movement.143 Ljotić, who feared that this group of discontents was looking to steal 
the leadership away from him, labelled the dissenters and excluded members as ‘short-
sighted’, and ‘impatient’, in their attempt to force political participation. 144  To Ratko 
Parežanin, Perić’s replacement as press section chief, Stojadinović’s aims was to ‘make his 
cabinet more fascist-like’.145 Thus implying or rather conveniently deflecting any base of 
accusations of fascism strictly on those members now excluded 
 
Velibor Jonić, in his written defence to Ljotić was more damning. Jonić blamed Ljotić for 
inactivity and apathy, stating that ZBOR was almost totally inactive ‘organising no meetings, 
no rallies’, and also accusing Ljotić of not leading, stating that ‘neither the general secretariat, 
nor the Supreme Council work, orders are not given when they are supposed to, and do not 
get to their intended recipients if at all sent’. ‘Who then’, concludes Jonić ‘is guilty for this 
dormancy’?146 Obviously, to the dissenters, it was Ljotić who was to blame for the supposed 
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inactivity and lethargy of ZBOR, giving rise to Parežanin’s earlier accusation of the JA 
‘importing fascism’ into ZBOR, by dint of Jonić’s active participation. Conversely, these 
expulsions could also be used as a convenient explanation for the loss of such a number of 
senior leaders. However, Jonić, noted for his energetic involvement in ZBOR also perhaps 
represented a more practical current than Ljotić, who placed more importance on ideology 
than real political involvement. Jonić evidently had a clearer picture of the political path that 
he wanted ZBOR to follow, and this was picked up on by the Stojadinović government who 
then turned it around as a means to weaken Ljotić’s position.  
 
Apart from replacing Djordje Perić with Ratko Parežanin as press section chief, Milorad 
Mojić took Jonić’s place as general secretary, and Stanislav Krakov took over from Danilo 
Gregorić as ZBOR propaganda chief.147 Those expelled from ZBOR soon found themselves 
well compensated for their resignations. Gregorić was installed as editor of the Belgrade daily 
Vreme, Vulović was appointed to a ministerial post, and Perić was given control of the press 
agency ‘Avala’.148 The exclusion of so many former JA members also saw the JA’s Central 
Council convene in Zagreb on 9 January, 1938, under Dr. Juraj Korenić, serving as second 
secretary (undersecretary) in ZBOR, and as president of the JA at the same time. Korenić 
decided not only to back those members expelled by Ljotić, but also voted to remove the JA 
from ZBOR, claiming that ‘Ljotić deviated from the ideological practice that was the basis of 
the fusion between the JA and ZBOR’. Furthermore, as Korenić theorised the JA as a 
‘national-socialist organisation, it is leaving ZBOR because it does not see the guarantee of 
its programme and ideology’.149  
 
Thus Stojadinović was able directly, through his indirect action, to clip ZBOR’s wings by 
fomenting internal dissent and confusion. Though ZBOR should not be taken as an 
exceptional case in this regard, as the Stojadinović government was culpable in the 
infiltration of opposition parties. Even though Ljotić asserted that Stojadinović ‘does not have 
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ZBOR in his hands, no matter how many short sighted individuals come to him’.150 He was 
also, as has been shown earlier in the chapter, managed to have Ljotić arrested, on any pretext 
deemed necessary. However, and what unfortunately remains unanswered is to what extent 
any of these former JA members, or the JA at all, was able to influence the JRZ, or 
Stojadinović, most likely none, given Stojadinović’s strength of conviction. In any case, the 
JA would remain, as it had done, proscribed, and in effect, a pressure group for both 
monarchy and regime. For Ljotić, meddling in ZBOR affairs was just another sign that the 
Stojadinović regime, had failed the 6th of January Dictatorship, for it was simply a 
continuation of the climate of partisan politics and corruption that ZBOR was committed to 
rooting out. 
 
Repression and accusations of fascism linked? 
 
The theme of repression and of fascism, as it relates to ZBOR are heavily intertwined. In 
themselves, they are further compartmentalised as corollaries to the wider growing personal 
animosity between Ljotić and Stojadinović, and between ZBOR and the rest of the political 
establishment. Accusation however, came before any real or perceived repression. Already in 
March 1935, just two months after its creation, Ljotić felt the need to clarify ZBOR’s position 
in relation to Fascism and Nazism. Predictably, he ‘categorically refused any accusations that 
is a copy of fascist and Hitlerist ideology’. Where the association with fascism comes from, 
claimed Ljotić, was in ‘its similar thoughts on the corporative system, liberal democracy, and 
parliamentary’.151 What differentiated ZBOR, according to Ljotić, from Fascism and Nazism, 
was that while ‘fascism deified the state’, and ‘Nazism deified the race’, and therefore ‘see 
themselves as infallible’. 152  Ljotić rejected the fascist moniker for ZBOR because ‘as 
Christians and Slavs’, we cannot follow their lead’, because the ‘state and race are absolute 
ways in a relative world, with no conviction’.153  
 
Interestingly, ZBOR’s rejection of the moniker of fascism shares broad similarities with that 
of the AF. In its publication, on 30 March, 1933, Thierry Maulnier stated that the ‘primacy of 
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race’, or the ‘primacy’ of state’, can only result in ‘imperfect societies’.154 The AF’s critique 
of Fascism seems to be taken largely from Pope Pius XI’s encyclical Non Abbiamo Bisogno 
(We do not need) delivered 29 June, 1931, criticising Mussolini’s government for its actions 
against the Vatican sponsored organisation of lay Catholics, Catholic Action. Seemingly, 
ZBOR took the AF’s denunciation of Fascism and National Socialism, and applied it to its 
own conditions, pointing out its ‘Christian’, and ‘Slavic’ nature, as being inherently opposed 
to Fascism and National Socialism. Conversely, it could be seen as a sign of the ideological 
convergence between ZBOR and the AF. In 1935 at least, Ljotić would define his movement 
in relation to Fascism and Nazism based on the AF. What makes this convergence more 
interesting is that it is not solely limited to ZBOR. In Belgium, the Rexiste (Rexist) Party, 
founded by the Catholic authoritarian nationalist Léon Degrelle in 1935, also denounced 
Fascism and National Socialism in the same terms.155 This form of criticism could easily be 
dismissed as a weak attempt by the aforementioned groups, largely inconsequential in their 
respective countries, as not trying to appear fascist. On a national level however, Papal 
criticism and condemnation of Fascism would be utilised by António de Oliveira Salazar, 
who served as Prime Minister (in reality however a dictator), of Portugal form 1932-1968. 
Salazar, a devout Catholic, while considering Mussolini to be a ‘great man’, stresses that ‘it is 
not for nothing that he is a child of the country of the Caesars and Machiavelli’. Salazar 
continues by criticising Fascist totalitaritarianism calling it ‘pagan Cesearism’, implying that 
the state ‘recognised no limitations of legal or moral order’.156 What this emphasises is that 
movements like the AF, Rex, and ZBOR, moved in a fluid and syncretistic current combining 
authoritarian, nationalist, and religious thought. In the context of Yugoslav politics however, 
given the odious and toxic connotation of Fascism and National Socialism after Mussolini 
and Hitler’s rise to power, plus the perception of fascism amongst public opinion,157 it was 
convenient, and indeed essential for Ljotić to play down any potential similarities with 
fascism.  
 
Yet accusations of fascism were also levelled at Stojadinović, who flirted with fascist 
trappings briefly during his rule. Italian Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano records in 
his memoirs that Stojadinović is taken with the ‘idea of fascism more and more’, during the 
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latter’s visit to Italy on 5 December, 1937. 158  As Djokić notes however, Stojadinović’s 
flirtation with the external trappings of fascism should be taken into a Yugoslav context of 
internal unity, and the perceived need to preserve the nation in the face of separatist threat.159 
Stojadinović however never seriously considered adopting any real fascist policies, whether 
economic or social. He seemed to admire the aesthetics of fascist order and discipline, 
without wanting, or able to implement them in Yugoslavia. This was not the case with Ljotić. 
While open in his admiration of fascist order and discipline, along with calls for a fascist like 
planned economy (couched in terms of a non-fascist peasant corporatism), and his open pro-
German stance, leaves himself much more open and exposed to accusations of wanting to 
import the Fascist and National Socialist models into Yugoslavia. He made only vague 
references to his own (limited) understanding of fascist ideology, leading to the question of 
whether Ljotić was seen as a real fascist, or as someone who could further fascist interests 
within Yugoslavia. This question would be somewhat answered during the Second World 
War, whereas will be shown, the Germans were not entirely convinced of Ljotić’s 
commitment to the New Order in Europe, yet at the same time, saw ZBOR as most closely 
representing their ideology in Serbia. 
 
ZBOR and accusations of Fascism 
 
While Ljotić attempted to downplay any similarities to fascism, there were those movements 
and parties in Europe, among them the British Union of Fascists, who saw fascism as ‘being 
adaptable to local conditions and factors’,160 and happily adopted the moniker of fascist. In 
truth, analysis of his life and ideological evolution shows defiance to labels, which turned his 
ideologies into a multi-faceted one, where in currents of different concepts and movements 
may be found. Nevertheless, each current in his ideologies has roots to his history and 
experiences as a person throughout his lifetime. 
 
The Dutch Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging in Nederland (National Socialist Movement in 
the Netherlands), from 1931 until 1935, showed a marked difference from German National 
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Socialism in regard to its Jewish population and anti-Semitism.161 In some cases, especially 
in regard to the 1930 party programme of the Danmarks Nationalsocialistiske Arbejderparti 
(National Socialist Workers’ Party of Denmark), it was largely copied from the German 
National Socialist Workers’ Party’s 1920 twenty-five point programme, 162  to be 
superimposed on Danish political life. In ZBOR’s case, downplaying of any supposed links 
with Fascism and Nazism was countered with Ljotić’s admiration of Hitler, with no seeming 
contradiction between the two. But this admiration was, first and foremost, in regard to the 
strength of Nazi anti-communism and the action that the Nazis took against socialists and 
communists in Germany. In this vein Ljotić praised the Nazis, seeing Nazi conceptions of 
organicist thought, anti-Semitism, and the strength of national unity were corollaries to a 
wider all-encompassing anti-communism.  
 
As has been emphasised throughout the thesis, communism was the bête noire of ZBOR’s 
ideology. In this paradigm Ljotić conceded that both ZBOR and the Nazis were idealists and 
not materialists that in itself meant that they both viewed revolution as necessary in order to 
destroy communism, as the ‘denier of human values’.163 Yet there were others in ZBOR who 
were more vocal in their pro-Nazi sentiments than Ljotić. In voicing these sentiments through 
various ZBOR publications, the movement inevitably opened itself up to accusations of 
fascism. ZBOR’s one-time general secretary and youth leader Danilo Gregorić was much 
more open in his praise of Nazism, attempting to link Nazi ideology, albeit indirectly, with 
common ZBOR themes in his doctoral thesis.164 To Gregorić, Nazism was ‘not the finished 
product’, and that in order to ‘fulfil its political duty of fighting communism and liberalism’, 
a ‘strong word amongst the people was needed’.165 This was in reference to the propaganda 
machine of Nazi Germany, keeping the perceived threat level of communism and Jews at a 
maximum in order to achieve national unity. Gregorić saw Nazism as the future, a leader in 
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the fight against communism, liberalism, and in the stagnation in which Europe had 
supposedly fallen into.166 
 
For Ljotić, such considerations, with the exception of the battle against communism, were of 
secondary importance. As the strength and influence of the Nazi regime grew, so did Ljotić’s 
estimation and fear of Hitler. Especially in the aftermath of the Anschluß, Ljotić became more 
open in his praise of Hitler. Showing knowledge of Hitler’s Mein Kampf, Ljotić argued that 
the annexation of Austria was nothing more ‘than what Hitler had written about’, and 
whether or not the annexation was a good idea, or if there was a ‘danger of Germanisation’, 
then ‘it is a delusion of the so-called great democracies and the Soviets’.167 Seemingly, Ljotić 
was much more interested and in awe of Hitler as a personality, than in Hitler as a Nazi 
ideologue, if the two can be separated. Perhaps this could best be summarised by stating that 
Ljotić was in awe of Hitler and Germany less because of the intricacies of Nazi ideology, 
then with how unfolding events in Europe, centred on Germany, fit into Ljotić’s worldview 
of rigid anti-communism and emerging apocalyptic Christianity. Germany, and Hitler 
especially, would play a leading role in this regard. 
 
What Hitler brought to Germany, according to Ljotić, was a ‘change of spirit’, a change of 
which was ‘necessary in Yugoslavia’.168 Their way to achieve this spirit was to return to a 
‘natural and organic spiritual basis’.169 Hitler therefore ‘was a man of great occurrence’, and 
‘deeply thoughtful and ingenious, an organiser, a hero and apostle. He really fascinates his 
people. He has no flaws’.170  
 
Yet for all his and ZBOR’s praise of Hitler, Ljotić revealingly proclaimed his and ZBOR’s 
wider geopolitical goal. ZBOR’s basis on Yugoslav unity had its roots in earlier mystical 
Pan-Slavic thought.171 It was this mysticism and Pan-Slavism, which would guide ZBOR on 
a geopolitical level. Slavdom was, as Ljotić writes, ‘the basis of our national policy’, which is 
something that cannot be forgotten, even though ZBOR was ‘great friends of the German 
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nation.172 This wider Pan-Slavic geopolitical policy seeing Hitler, as the ‘instrument of God’s 
providence’, would, ‘through the path of least resistance’, bring down the Soviet regime, in 
doing so bringing back the monarchy, resulting in the ‘buds blossoming on the Slavic tree’, 
as a metaphor for an imminent Pan-Slavic unity.173  
 
Such gross naivety would further isolate ZBOR from the wider public, as well as creating an 
almost parallel reality amongst ZBOR members based on the strength of their convictions, 
and Hitler’s ‘honourable intentions’. As will be shown in the next chapter, the strength of 
their convictions, along with this belief in Hitler restoring the Russian monarchy, would 
coalesce and mutate into a more radical and violent manifestation with terrible consequences. 
Ljotić would seem to interject and manifest his personal roots and experiences to the ideology 
of Hitler and transform it into his own belief and goals that he will pursue through his 
movement. Specifically, the need for German living space in the East (Lebensraum), and later 
in practice, how to deal with its Slavic majority inhabitants, are some of the aspects of 
Hitler’s intentions that Ljotić interpreted through the lenses of his own experiences and 
transformed them to have different meaning for himself. 
 
Ljotić would also, through ZBOR, accuse Stojadinović himself and the JRZ, as being fascist. 
Speaking on Stojadinović’s state visits to Paris, London, Rome, and Berlin, from October 
1937 to January 1938, Ljotić states that ‘we are not fascists, nor our mission fascism’. If, 
Ljotić writes, ‘Stojadinović goes to Rome to copy Fascism, or to Berlin to copy Hitlerism’, 
then he does not ‘take our thought’, but rather ‘that of Mussolini and Hitler’.174 In ZBOR’s 
early 1938 brochure Poruka fašističkom šegrtu (Message to a Fascist Apprentice), Ljotić 
accuses Stojadinović of attempting to import German and Italian authoritarian and totalitarian 
models into Yugoslavia. The irony appears to be lost on Ljotić, in that publicly praising 
Hitler and aspects of National Socialist ideology, he accuses Stojadinović of being a fascist. 
He continues by stating that neither Salazar in Portugal, nor Kemal Atatürk (in reference to 
Mustafa Kemal) in Turkey went to either Berlin or Rome to copy their methods, but instead 
looked within their respective nations and traditions to ‘do their best for their people’.175 
Though a highly nationalistic Christian, Ljotić nevertheless was evidently impressed by 
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Kemal Atatürk, who he saw as strong.176 Message to a Fascist Apprentice would be banned 
almost immediately after its publication, on 26 January, 1938.177 Stojadinović would also be 
accused by ZBOR of complicity of the March 1939 dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, 
being in tandem with ‘Fascist Germany’, in the pay of ‘capitalist Britain’, and be accused of 
‘betraying Slavdom’.178 It would be a case of reflecting the accusations of fascism onto 
Stojadinović in an attempt to deflect further accusations of fascism at ZBOR, picking up on 
the mood of the majority of Yugoslav citizens, who were vehemently anti-Nazi. In regard to 
Czechoslovakia, Ljotić acknowledged the Pan-Slavic feelings of ZBOR members in regard to 
the Sudetenland. He agreed that no country in the world could have a foreign policy based on 
one-fifths of its population. But he would ultimately urge the Czechoslovaks to cede the 
Sudetenland to Germany, lest the ‘entire state organism is destroyed’.179  That the Nazis 
dismantled the Czechoslovak state, proved Ljotić right on the consequences. The dangers of 
constant appeasement to the Nazis though, could no longer be ignored. 
 
In his quest to appear non-fascist, he seemingly managed to convince official British 
diplomatic opinion, which viewed him as the leader of an ‘independent conservative 
faction’.180 The opinion of Ljotić personally amongst certain diplomats and Foreign Office 
members, seemed to span from Ljotić as ‘independent’, to the opinion of Ljotić as 
‘honourable’, and having a ‘good reputation’. 181  Certainly, up to 1936, Foreign Office 
officials, through information supplied by its diplomats in Yugoslavia, did not view ZBOR as 
a fascist organisation, which is a view, as will be shown in the next chapter, continued to 
persist even during the Second World War. Whether Ljotić was aware of British opinion is 
unknown. For him, Great Britain, at least up to the outbreak of the Second World War, was 
hypocritical in that while it at one time ‘preached disarmament’, while at the same time 
through its ‘imperialist policies it wants to bend half the world’.182 It was also ‘eroded by the 
                                                        
176 Dimitrije Ljotić, “Balkanska konferencija u Beogradu”, Bilten, 21 February, 1940, No. 39, 9. 
177 See AJ, 38-82-207. The State Prosecutor banned the publication on 26 January, 1938. 
178 AJ 38-86-211. “Državno Tužioštvo u Zagrebu. Kn. 2283/38. 3 October, 1938”. An untitled ZBOR produced 
brochure also calling for Slavic unity against the ‘Germanic and Latin invasions’. 
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Jewish spirit of internationalism’, it ‘wants to rule and exploit the world, yet peacefully, 
while at the same time disarming nations both materially and morally’.183  
 
Whatever the case, Ljotić’s positivity and open admiration of Hitler meant that he could not 
escape any comparisons with fascism, despite his attempts to differentiate his ideology from 
fascism. There were numerous ZBOR members, as the example of Gregorić shows, who also 
spoke positively not just about Hitler but also of the doctrine of National Socialism. No other 
political party or movement in interwar Yugoslavia spoke so favourably about Fascism and 
Nazism as did ZBOR. In that regard, it was perfectly justifiable why in public opinion, ZBOR 
was linked as ‘pro-fascist’. Simply put, ZBOR, and certainly Ljotić, were pro-fascist at the 
very least. Yet the question, or rather accusation of fascism itself, was rather more 
contentious, with Ljotić being much more guarded about being called a fascist as opposed to 
‘just’ an admirer of Hitler.  
 
Whether or not ZBOR wanted to liken itself to fascism, or develop a Yugoslav kind of 
fascism, Ljotić’s own conception of fascism remained somewhat vague. This made his 
ideologies and the syncretistic currents of ZBOR self-contradicting as a combination of 
different concepts from different ideologies.  ZBOR’s overall ideological conclusions seemed 
to coalesce around an authoritarian if not radical nationalism, harmonised with traditionalism 
and religion (primarily Orthodoxy in this case, reflecting Ljotić’s own religiosity). ZBOR’s 
economic and social programs, beyond calling for a planned economy, was based primarily 
on a paternalistic and feudalistic pre-industrial utopian thought, interjected with Pan-Slavism 
and the concept of the zadruga, wherin a morally pure peasantry would work for the 
betterment of the nation. Socially, ZBOR looked to an idyllic past for its supposed utopia, 
labelling any movement or program that was ‘modern’, as ‘decadent’, and frivolous. Ljotić 
would admire fascism as a regime, and a state type. But he had his own end goal of a Pan-
Slavic monarchic ideal, and would certainly not see fascism as a role model for social 
organisation and relations, irrespective of fascist corporatism. These negations however, 
especially amongst the youthful members of the White Eagles, would be interpreted as a sign 
that direct action was needed in order to save the nation and national integrity from further 
degradation and indeed disintegration.  
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ZBOR’s banning and concluding remarks 
 
The linked themes of repression, and accusation of fascism would come to a head in late 
October 1940, which precipitated the end of ZBOR’s legal political existence. The catalyst 
for ZBOR’s banning would be a pitched battle between members of ZBOR’s youth group, 
the White Eagles, and communist and anti-fascist students at the Technical Faculty at 
Belgrade University on 22 October, 1940. While the fracas is described as starting at a 
meeting within the auditorium of the Technical Faculty, attended by student members of both 
ZBOR and an assortment of left-wing student organisations, it appeared that ZBOR students, 
in particular a Mladen Babić, were the main instigators, calling for students to unite in the 
founding of a ‘national spirit’, thus ‘rejecting Jewish internationalism’.184 What it led to was 
a pitched battle involving weapons, resulting in several injuries and numerous arrests and 
material damage. The ferocity of the violence unleashed by the White Eagles, was described i 
in ZBOR’s press as only responding to ‘numerous communist attacks against students’.185 
 
This attack by the White Eagles was the perfect pretext for the government, citing the violent 
and radical nature of the assault, for the banning of ZBOR. The government, under the 
leadership of Dragiša Cvetković, 186  was less openly pro-German in orientation than 
Stojadinović, with Cvetković being accused by Patriarch Gavrilo of being a ‘creature of 
Prince Paul’.187 In this regard, it was also contemplating a banning of ZBOR as German 
influence and military victories brought Germany closer towards Yugoslavia.188 The stated 
reason however, was that the government felt that ZBOR was party to a right-wing 
militaristic conspiracy against the regime.189 These violent acts are in contrast to Paxton’s 
third phase of fascism development, wherein the fascist-type movement has to form alliances 
with traditional elites. These elites, include the heads of the government, in order to pursue 
the goal of gaining power for the movement, and ultimately sustaining and increasing the 
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power that the party holds. This power is needed to take steps to incorporate the party into the 
state’s system. These violent acts may be a distinctive attribute of the ZBOR movement, 
which makes it unique from fascism, in the sense that it does not have the strategies or game-
based schemes of fascism, wherein the goal is to win over the current powerful institution 
(e.g., the government), but instead focuses on the central purpose of the group, which is to 
eradicate unfair practices for the original peoples of the same nation. Nevertheless, it may 
also be this distinct trait that led ZBOR to its end. 
 
Nothing again would be proven, but it nevertheless sufficed to have ZBOR eliminated as a 
political threat. For ZBOR, the banning was yet another sign of illegal government 
repression. On 3 November, 1940, the Belgrade civil authorities closed ZBOR’s 
headquarters, and between the night of 4 November and 5 November, Ljotić asserts that the 
Ministry of Interior sent letters to ZBOR members throughout the country asking them to 
prove whether they were in fact ZBOR members or not.190 This was coupled with Belgrade 
University’s decision to close from 6 November, due to the violence between what the 
university identified solely as ‘two groups’.191 This was coupled with widespread arrests of 
ZBOR members, with 160 being arrested in Belgrade alone, among them Ratko Živadinović 
(senior youth leader), Vladimir Lenac (senior leader of the White Eagles), and Velja 
Danilović (ZBOR Belgrade section head).192 
 
To ZBOR’s leadership, this repression was yet another sign of nefarious Jewish influence 
over domestic Yugoslav affairs. In this instance, the perceived Jewish influence not only had 
the movement banned, but would also want to ‘take the regime into war on behalf of British 
interests’, and that ZBOR was banned because it had fought against this ‘unholy alliance’.193 
Only one public personality came out in support of Ljotić in the aftermath of ZBOR’s 
banning. Bishop Nikolaj Velimirović. Velimirović knew Ljotić from the latter’s time as a 
representative of the Branićevo diocese at the Patriarchal Council of the Serbian Orthodox 
                                                        
190 Dimitrije Ljotić, Sad je vaš čas i oblast tame. Ko i zašto goni Zbor (Belgrade, 1940). 
191 “Studentima Beogradskog univerziteta,” Vreme, 6 November, 1940, No.6748 edition, 6. 
192 Gligorijević, “Napad Ljotićevaca na studente tehničkog fakulteta u Beogradu u oktobru 1940. i rasturanje 
Ljotićevog Zbora,” 68. 
193 AJ-37-152-27-86. “Starešintsvo Zbora. Dragi druže”. 11 November, 1940. Internal ZBOR circular calling for 
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Church. Velimirović wrote a letter to Cvetković praising Ljotić’s ‘good character’ and ‘faith 
in God’.194 
 
Yet there were those within the JRZ who argued that repression was counterproductive and 
that the best way to destroy ZBOR was to ask to bring it either into the government, or 
through socio-economic means.195 This was the view of Smederevo JRZ candidate Milan 
Jovanović-Stoimirović, who argued that by bringing ZBOR into government, its own 
ineptitude and incoherence would ruin the movement, as it would be incapable of any sort of 
leadership. Alternatively, he continues, ZBOR could be destroyed by more thorough 
engagement with the peasantry, the bulk of Ljotić’s meagre support, especially around 
Smederevo, to show that Ljotić had his own aggrandisement at heart, as opposed to the needs 
of the peasantry. 
 
The aftermath of the official banning saw ZBOR disappear as a political entity in Yugoslavia. 
Admittedly however, while active, the movement would not go beyond voicing harsh and 
stringent opposition to the government and the communists, and yet fail in any meaningful 
way to transplant its ideas and policies onto Yugoslav political life. Ljotić’s reputation as a 
‘prophet, ‘visionary’, and ‘ideologue’ was in stark contrast to what was needed in order to 
make ZBOR, however small and inconsequential, into at least a competently organised 
movement.  
 
Ljotić as a personality perfectly encapsulated someone who wanted control, was loath to 
delegate it, but would be content to do little with it. In this regard it is difficult to argue with 
Dragoljub Jovanović’s opinion of Ljotić as someone who managed to convince himself of his 
own strength and greatness, and yet lied to his followers because he did not know what he 
wanted. 196  What he showed to ZBOR and to Yugoslavia was an extreme ideological 
inflexibility, bordering on the almost comical, coupled with an almost total lack of interest in 
any administration and organisational matters. But perhaps this is too one sided a 
characterisation of Ljotić. There is little doubt that he was an intelligent man. Brave and 
convinced enough to actually attempt at making a difference, regardless of how it was 
perceived by those whom he was trying to help and influence.   
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What little organisational and active impetus within ZBOR remained was evident within the 
White Eagles and other ZBOR youth organisations. The fact that most ZBOR members 
throughout Yugoslavia were not arrested, but simply melted away shows that much of 
ZBOR’s ideological radicalism was not imparted to any large degree on a large part of its 
membership. This is in contrast to its radicalised members, mostly youth, who as the attack 
on the Technical Faculty show were able to organise in numbers and engage in violent 
attacks. 
 
As the Second World War wore on, and defeat and occupation would become an everyday 
reality, ZBOR would undergo further ideological radicalisation and polarisation that would 




Chapter 5.  Ljotić, ZBOR, Collaboration and the Second World 
War 
 
ZBOR would turn full circle under the German occupation. Far from being a simple 
case of pro-German sentiments and accusations of National Socialism, ZBOR as a 
political movement would show regression, mutation, and incoherence under the 
brutal occupation regime of the Germans. Its worldview, seemingly justified with the 
coming of the Second World War, would result in youthful elements primarily from 
the White Eagles being radicalised to the point of militarisation, organisational and 
territorial weakness, compounded by a severely fractured chain of command due to 
German repressive tactics and in an unstable and violent environment of occupation. 
This would be combined with Ljotić’s increasing focus on ideological and 
philosophical work, evidenced by his increased activity in ZBOR’s wartime 
publication Naša borba (Our struggle), and radio addresses on the threat of 
‘international communism’ at the expense of the maintenance of ZBOR’s efficiency 
and organisational structure, as will be evidenced by the situation of ZBOR’s local 
Čačak section. 
 
ZBOR and the build-up to war 
 
The outbreak of the Second World War on 1 September, 1939 initially involved only 
Germany and Poland, with the British (and the Commonwealth), and French declaring 
war on Germany on 3 September, though not on the USSR in their 17 September 
invasion and subsequent carve-up of Poland in tandem with Germany. The Yugoslav 
government hoped to keep its territory intact, and in doing so ward off any potential 
threats, however it was caught between sympathy for the Allied powers and an acute 
fear of the Axis.1  The country lacked financial means, and technical knowledge to 
improve its armed forces and defences. Germany’s economic interests regulated its 
neutrality, with Hitler’s successes deepening the country’s economic dependence and 
isolation. Yugoslavia, as a result of the subsequent German Anschluß of Austria, and 
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later military victories in Europe, found itself increasingly unable to move away from 
what seemed to be economic dependence on Germany, as part of the 
Ergänzungswitschaft (Supplementary economy)2 theory. As a result of the 27 March, 
1941 coup, which rejected Yugoslavia’s Tripartite Pact accession on 25 March, 1941, 
the Nazi leadership capitalised on his ‘legitimate interest’ for the protection of 
Germany’s flank and economic interests, by invading Yugoslavia, which began on 6 
April, 1941, in tandem with Italy and Hungary. 
 
With the outbreak of the Second World War, Ljotić supported Yugoslavia's policy of 
neutrality in the conflict, while promoting his stand that Yugoslav diplomacy should 
focus on relations with Berlin.3 He vehemently opposed the August 1939 Cvetković-
Maček Agreement and repeatedly wrote letters to Prince Paul urging him to annul it.4 
In these letters, he advocated an immediate re-organisation of the government 
according to ZBOR ideology, the abolishment of Croatian autonomy, the division of 
the Royal Yugoslav Army into contingents of ethnic Serbs and some Croat and 
Slovene volunteers, who would be armed, and contingents of most Croats and 
Slovenes in the armed forces, who would serve as labour units and would be 
unarmed. Effectively, the purpose of all these points was to reduce non-Serbs in 
Yugoslavia to the status of second-class citizens. In 1940, the Royal Yugoslav Army 
purged its pro-German elements and Ljotić lost much of the influence he held over 
the armed forces.5 
 
27 March, 1941 looms large in the history of the first Yugoslavia, having been 
perceived as the clearest and most visible sign of the ‘anti-Nazi’ stance of the 
Yugoslavs. Serbian historian Branko Petranović claims the day as one of the most 
important dates in the history of free peoples, 6  showcasing an overwhelmingly 
majority taking matters in their own hands to force a change in policy. In truth, the 
                                                        
2 Ergänzungswitschaft in its theoretical aspect, dealt with a wider ‘Greater Economic Area’ and a 
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3 Tomasevich, 2001, 187. 
4 Cohen, 1996, 21. 
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Jews”, in Haynes and Rady, In the Shadow of Hitler, 300. 
6 Petranović, Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu 1939-1945, 84. 
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coup of 27 March was not solely a spontaneous anti-Tripartite Pact or anti-Nazi 
manifestation but rather as Tomasevich describes, ‘had been discussed for some 
months, though the final phases seemed to have been hastily prepared, with the 
knowledge and assistance of British representatives in Belgrade’. 7  British 
plenipotentiary (full title: Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia), Sir Ronald Ian Campbell was advised by the War Secretary 
Anthony Eden that he was ‘authorised to make use of any means at his disposal to 
make public opinion and leaders understand the realities of the moment, and to take 
any measures, even a coup d’état, to change the government’.8 Pavlowitch states that 
the British did indeed encourage a pro-Western group within the Zemljoradnička 
stranka (Agrarian Party), which itself was in the government, but in doing so, merely, 
according to Pavlowitch, was ‘pushing an open door’.9 
 
With indirect and tacit British support, the coup leaders, primarily reserve officers, 
though the coup’s main instigators, were serving Air Force General Dušan Simović, 
and Air Force Brigadier General Borivoje Mirković, proclaimed their willingness to 
defend with their lives the ‘independence, sovereignty, and frontiers of Yugoslavia’, 
while keeping ‘faithful to the King and Fatherland’.10 Yet the main impetus for the 
coup was what Pavlowitch describes, and contradicting Tomasevich, was a ‘pent-up 
dislike of Prince Paul’s regime and of its overall policy’ and that the coup itself was 
more ‘spontaneous than planned’, and ‘carried out by officers wanting to save the 
honour of not just Serbia, but as Yugoslavia as they perceived it’. Pavlowitch states 
that the motives for the coup were mixed, with a ‘general dissatisfaction of the 
position of the Serbs in Yugoslavia, the humiliation by Germany and Italy, a wish to 
stick to the Western powers for ideological and traditional reasons, and the belief that 
the Axis would encourage the break-up of Yugoslavia.11 
 
Clearly then, certain issues surrounding the coup are open to interpretation, namely 
the motives given for the coup, and just as importantly, the actual degree of British 
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support for the coup. Certainly, as Heather Williams attests to, there was a concerted 
effort on behalf of the Special Operations Executive (hereafter SOE), to cultivate 
links with leading Yugoslav personalities as to ‘dissuade Prince Paul from signing the 
Tripartite Pact’, and if not, ‘whether a coup could be fomented’ to overthrow Paul’s 
government.12 However the coup itself, regardless of British encouragement, was the 
result of the signing of the Tripartite Pact,13 which went against the wishes of the 
majority of Yugoslavia’s citizens. British and SOE efforts to dissuade Prince Paul 
from signing the Tripartite Pact were ultimately unsuccessful, with Prince Paul being 
fully aware of the dangerous predicament he faced if he refused signing. Once signed 
however, the Tripartite Pact initiated the downfall of Paul’s government, and led to 
his overthrow. In this regard, British and SOE efforts could be viewed as a success, 
especially in regard to propaganda, and cultivating pro-British opinion amongst 
Yugoslav politicians. But the coup itself had deeper significance than the signing of 
the Tripartite Pact itself, which was simply the catalyst in a long list of grievances at 
Paul’s government and Yugoslavia’s internal situation. 
 
While no doubt welcomed by the Allies, with Churchill famously proclaiming that 
‘Yugoslavia had found its soul’,14 the gravity of the situation was not lost on British 
plenipotentiary Sir Ronald Campbell in Belgrade, who was both dismissive and 
pessimistic of the government’s capabilities, probably in regard to a pending German 
attack. According to Campbell, the new government, having a ‘provisionary 
character’, points out the rivalries amongst the new ministers, stating that most are 
‘party hacks’, who ‘have been out of office for years’.15 This is perhaps too harsh 
towards the new provisional government, and somewhat odd given Campbell’s 
position and knowledge of Yugoslav political personalities. Vladko Maček, leader of 
the HSS, while seeing the coup as a Serbian affair, entered the provisional 
government as a sign of support and national unity. Srdjan Budisavljević as former 
minister for social affairs tendered his resignation on 24 March, as a sign of dissent 
against the signing of Yugoslavia’s accession to the Tripartite Pact. He was later 
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given the position of Interior Minister in the new provisional government having 
previously also headed the Samostalna demokratska stranka (Independent 
Democratic Party), from 1936.16 Whatever the problems facing the new provisional 
government, and there were many, the inclusion of men such as Maček (albeit in a 
limited capacity), and especially of Budisavljević, show that there were capable and 
adroit political personalities within it. 
 
Ljotić was of a similar opinion to Campbell as regard to the coup and the new 
government. Writing during the occupation, in late 1941, and describing the events of 
March 1941 while under house arrest, he compared the coup to a loss of sanity. More 
sinisterly, Ljotić hinted at a Jewish conspiracy in order to bring Yugoslavia into the 
war and bring about the country’s destruction. He accused London of ‘looking 
through the eyes of the Jews’, instead of its own eyes, which is ‘why they have lead 
an imperialist policy that will result in the weakening of their empire’.17 Sensing the 
popular mood however, in opposition to the signing of the Tripartite Pact, he saw it as 
a sign of weakness (no doubt due to his own pro-German tendency), to give in to 
public opinion, and he saw the coup as the joining of ‘café and street strategy’.18  
 
Public opinion, as it related to ZBOR’s perception of the 27 March coup, was more 
evidence of international Jewry’s plot of destroying Christian nations.19 Just a day 
before the coup, Ljotić wrote to the Serbian Patriarch Gavrilo, asking him to pressure 
the Prince Regent in forming a strong government, and to help reassure the public that 
‘freedom and independence has been preserved’.20 In Ljotić’s opinion, writing from 
his house arrest, the coup represented the beginning of the ruination of the country, 
whose members must be replaced by people in whom the populace has confidence.21 
 
His position on the composition of the new provisional government notwithstanding, 
there is evidence to support that the new provisional government, thinking such a 
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move a means of placating Germany, were willing to negotiate his possible entry into 
government. The approach, made through General Bogoljub Ilić, was to see Ljotić 
enter the government as a minister without portfolio, while having him condemn the 
pact.22 Ljotić refused, and instead demanded that the new government adhere to the 
Tripartite Pact and set about the normalisation of relations between Germany and 
Yugoslavia.23 Yet there was no talk of legalising the banned ZBOR movement, on 
behalf of the provisional government, nor was ZBOR, whether in clandestine capacity 
or not, active in any anti-coup activity or propaganda. In approaching Ljotić, it would 
conceivably more for his experience as a former Minister of Justice, no matter how 
short lived, and his supposed links to the Germans, perhaps as a means of placating 
the Germans. 
 
In essence, the coup saw the materialisation of Ljotić’s and ZBOR’s worst fears. The 
abandonment of a pro-German policy, which ZBOR unrealistically felt would keep 
Yugoslavia neutral, thus saving the country from destruction, was overturned. It was 
Germany, ZBOR thought, that was the one factor that caused and conducted events in 
the Balkans, and thus an accord would have to be reached.24 Ever since mid-1939, 
ZBOR publications, primarily through Bilten, began focusing more on military and 
foreign events, as a catalyst for a coming world war. To this end, ZBOR advocated a 
stringent internal unity, military preparedness in the hope of offsetting any German-
Italian attack, as well as dismissing all reserve officers from a ‘non-Slavic 
background’, and the creation of labour battalions made up of non-Slavic Yugoslav 
citizens.25 In an unfinished June 1940 letter to General Milan Nedić,26 later to be head 
of the quisling Serbian Government of National Salvation. Ljotić warns Nedić of the 
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potential treachery from the non-Serbian elements within the army, with its insidious 
influence potentially harming Serbian units.27  
 
Ljotić’s motives for writing to Nedić were part of a ZBOR campaign, evident from 
1939 of increasing its support within the Yugoslav military. Nedić, Minister of War 
from 1939 until 6 November, 1940, was seen as crucial in this matter. While not a 
ZBOR member, he helped ZBOR in its publishing Bilten through his ministerial 
press, and shared ZBOR’s pro-German orientation and appraisal of Yugoslavia’s 
military and political position in relation to German military advances.28 Links were 
further solidified and strengthened because Nedić’s cabinet chief, Colonel Miloš 
Masalović, a ZBOR member, facilitated contact between Ljotić and Nedić.29 
 
In addition to this, ZBOR consistently from 1935 emphasised the importance of a 
Bulgarian-Yugoslav union as a balance to any ‘foreign influence’,30 as a cornerstone 
of its regional policy as a means of strengthening Yugoslavia’s position within 
Europe. Furthermore, Ljotić sought a Balkan bloc to counter ‘Anglo-French and 
German influence’.31 Why, argued Ljotić, ‘must we give our lands to the Anglo-
French and Germans to fight on’, and ‘with what results’? Those results, according to 
him would be a ‘cultural and material destruction’, with ‘hundreds of thousands of 
dead’, and ‘millions of invalids and cripples’. 32  To this end he advocated the 
Romanian return of Dobrudja to Bulgaria in the spirit of co-operation. Despite his 
prolific writings on geopolitics from 1939 on, Ljotić’s calls for a Balkan bloc would 
be unrealistic, as his belief that Romania would willingly cede a portion of its 
territory. He had no way of convincing the government of accepting his plan, and 
especially in the case of Bulgaria, Bulgarian geopolitical interests aimed at regaining 
its own lost territories, would lead Ljotić to lament that the ‘Bulgarians are just as 
blind as we are!”33  
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His preoccupation with geopolitical interests was evidence of his growing belief in a 
coming war. This was clear from early 1939, when Ljotić had identified six ‘major 
players’, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and the United States, who, 
according to Ljotić, for their own ‘imperialist-capitalist motives, do not want to be 
thrown into a war’.34 These powers were however, being pushed into a coming war 
whether they wanted it or not. It was two ‘ideological forces’, identified by ZBOR as 
‘communism and Judaism’ 35  that were interested in fomenting war. Judaism, 
contented Ljotić, wants war because of ‘Hitler’s anti-Jewish position’, and also 
because the ‘Jews know that every war within the last one hundred and fifty years has 
seen a rise towards Jewish world dominance’. Communism, Ljotić asserts, ‘wants war 
because of world revolution’, which, according to Ljotić, is ‘vital both as a doctrinal 
goal, and as a means of salvation for the Soviets themselves’.36 Yet for all his rhetoric 
regarding supposed Jewish war aims, Ljotić thought that Yugoslav neutrality 
depended on the Italians. Claiming that ZBOR had ‘constantly defended Mussolini 
from attacks by leftists and communists’, he felt uneasy about Italian ambitions in the 
Adriatic, and on Yugoslavia, especially Dalmatia.37 
 
With the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939, ZBOR publications 
became more fearful, if less openly pro-German than before. With the outbreak of war 
in September 1939, Ljotić doubted that England or France would undertake any 
operations in defence of Poland, and considered Germany’s plan would be to 
negotiate a ceasefire after a German victory. 38  Since 1938, Ljotić had sought a 
specific policy which would avoid anything that might come between Yugoslavia and 
‘the war between the Germans and the Anglo-French.39 He was supportive of the 
German annexation of Austria, calling it a logical consequence of ‘people of the same 
blood’. Ljotić had, on 22 February, 1940, written his Prvo Pismo Knezu Pavlu (First 
letter to Prince Paul), advising the Prince Regent not to change Yugoslavia’s 
orientation towards Germany, and that the ‘enormous military might of the Germans 
would be like an avalanche for the fragmented Balkans’. 40  Though primarily 
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concerned with internal matters, Ljotić’s First Letter to Prince Paul also highlights 
where Ljotić’s neutrality, stemmed from. It was primarily a mixture of fear, and 
admiration (part ideological, part military) of the Germans, as well as a deep distrust 
of British intentions, and of democracy.   
 
For all his admiration of the Germans’ military might, and at least until the war broke 
out, of Hitler’s ‘genius’, and ‘vision’, Ljotić was scared of German intentions towards 
the Balkans, and a possible German invasion. He was however, by no means 
convinced by British calls for Yugoslavia to reject signing the Tripartite Pact. Ljotić 
reasoned that allying with Britain and France would be suicide, for both had reached 
the depths of degeneracy.41 This ‘degeneracy’, as seen by Ljotić would most likely be 
in reference to Britain’s democracy, and ‘plutocratic capitalism’, which would then 
lead to what he deemed to be ‘Jewish influence’ over domestic and foreign policy. By 
referring to Hitler as the ‘unwitting tool of communism’, Ljotić feared that the real 
victor of the war would be the Soviet Union, which was heightened after Yugoslavia 
and the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations on 24 June, 1940, which Ljotić 
feared would increase communist agitation and influence in Yugoslavia. 
 
Speaking on the outbreak of the war itself in September 1939, Ljotić considered it a 
moment ‘when the patient could see how the disease arrived’. This disease, according 
to Ljotić, sprang ‘from the deep spiritual areas, with which individualistic and 
materialistic Europe successfully administered for the last 150 years’. In this vein, he 
actively attacked Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin, for Europe’s current malaise and 
misfortune, and for their lack of moral and spiritual foundations. Mussolini was 
characterised as a pagan who ‘makes use of Christianity for political purposes’. 
Hitler, while ‘Believing in God’, does not ‘believe in God’s views, or Christian 
views’, and a ‘pagan who worships race’, and believing that ‘God’s will and laws are 
revealed through purity of blood’.42  
 
Yet it was for Stalin, for whom the most damning verdict was reserved. Stalin, 
contends Ljotić, was ‘born into the Orthodox faith’, and ‘studied theology’, only to be 
‘seduced by the theology of Marxism’, causing him to become a ‘fighter against 
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God’. In this, Ljotić contends, the ‘leading personalities of the 19th and 20th centuries 
have certain similarities’, primarily their anti-Christian positions, and in Hitler’s case, 
a selfish belief that only ‘Germans and Aryans’ can be saved.43  
 
War from a ZBOR perspective 
 
Summing up the invasion of Poland, and of the coming globalised conflict, Ljotić 
considered Hitler to be the ‘unconscious agent of the Soviet midwife, who needs a 
strong and long war’.44 Sympathising with Poland, who was viewed by ZBOR not 
only as a ‘Slavic brother’, but also acting in accordance with the ‘self-respect of a 
great nation who fights against threats to its unity and freedom’.45 Up to the invasion 
of Poland, wrote Ljotić, Hitler ‘was the master of events in Europe’, but since 1 
September, 1939, he had turned into an unwitting agent of the ‘Soviets and 
Judaism’.46 Since the signing of the 23 August, 1939, Nazi-Soviet protocol and anti-
aggression Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the coming of war has in itself been the ‘rotten 
fruit of the pact’.47  
 
Ljotić’s criticism of Germany here can be seen in lieu of the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact, which ZBOR never attempted to justify in its press. The Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact, not only saw the carve-up of a brotherly Slavic state, but in the words of ZBOR 
member Ratko Živadinović, meant that ‘Yugoslavia lost its neutrality’, in that it 
pushed the country towards Britain and France. It was the Jews, Živadinović 
continues, who ‘wanted this state of events’. 48  As the war dragged on, ZBOR 
identified ‘British imperialism and plutocracy’, as being ‘aligned with Jewish 
imperialism’, and that both ‘Anglo-Saxon plutocracy and Soviet bolshevism are 
pawns to Jewish internationalism’.49 In tandem with the belief in a ‘Judeo-Bolshevik’ 
myth, ZBOR also attributed a metaphysical aspect to the coup of 27 March, by stating 
that it was ‘the work of Satan’.50  
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Yet any real political manifestation of ZBOR against the war was muted, relegated 
mostly to leaflets and pamphlets, blaming the communists and Jews for seemingly 
goading Germany into war. ZBOR’s weakness and unpopularity, combined with 
popular support for the Allies, and ZBOR’s banning, dented any potential anti-war 
campaign. Occupation only exacerbated this. An example of this thinking comes from 
the local ZBOR youth section in Čačak. In an early 1941 leaflet, from the ZBOR 
affiliated Čačanska srednjoškolska Jugoslovenska Omladina (roughly translates as 
the Čačak Yugoslav Student Youth) accused the Soviets of duping Germany into 
attacking both Poland and France, and in the case of Poland, ‘stabbing our brother in 
the back’, and then ‘prostituting themselves in German service’, while simultaneously 
‘speaking against them’.51 Such clandestine actions were all that most local ZBOR 
sections, under banning order, were capable of. Youthful members of ZBOR,  some 
of whom, as will be shown, would play an increasingly sinister role during the 
occupation, undertook most of them. 
 
The war was seen as the fruition of ZBOR prophecies. Communism became to be 
seen as a ‘fifth column’ within Yugoslavia, with no politician, with the exception of 
Ljotić, according to ZBOR, speaking out against communist attempts to draw 
Yugoslavia into war.52 Though given ZBOR’s outspoken pro-German standpoint and 
its increasing militarism, it seemed a better fit for any potential fifth column activity. 
Speaking on Hitler, Ljotić writes that ‘many times we have paid tribute to Hitler’s 
genius, his apostolic zeal and purity, his heroic will’. Yet it became apparent even to 
Ljotić, that Hitler could not be trusted. He admitted as much in the aftermath of the 
annexation and breakup of Czechoslovakia. Poland, who, in joining Germany in 
dismembering Czechoslovakia in 1938, also opened itself up to German demands on 
its own territory.53 By annexing and dismembering Czechoslovakia, Germany, Ljotić 
warned ‘was following a dangerous path’.54 
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This rather glaring contradiction of pro-German sentiment, mixed with a fear of 
German encroachment, annexation, and invasion, as in the cases of Czechoslovakia 
and Poland, Slavic majority states, would mark Ljotić’s thinking up to 1941. He 
would revel in what he saw as the Nazi’s crushing of communist influence in 
Germany, as a model for Yugoslavia. Yet as Nazi expansionism and imperialism 
grew bolder, eventually precipitating war, Ljotić’s fear of German expansion seems to 
have begun to outweigh his admiration for elements of Nazi praxis. Neither he nor 
ZBOR however, condemned the war for what it was, refusing to see the Germans as 
aggressors but rather as victims of a wider ‘Judeo-Soviet’ plot. It was this thought 
pattern that would shape Ljotić’s response to occupation and collaboration, coupled 
with a mixture of admiration and fear of the Germans. 
 
Ljotić’s fear of the Germans would prove well-founded, as on 6 April, 1941, using the 
anti-Tripartite Pact coup as justification, Germany, with support from Italy and 
Hungary, launched a joint attack on Greece and Yugoslavia, thus drawing Yugoslavia 
into the war. Hitler saw the coup as a direct attack on German strategic interests, 
especially as it meant that he would have to secure Yugoslavia and Greece 
simultaneously. At the same time, a Nazi propaganda campaign was launched against 
Yugoslavia calling it an ‘inorganic construct’, and fabricating Serbian crimes against 
the German minority, in a move reminiscent of the build up to the invasion of 
Poland.55 Calling the operation Unternehmen Strafgericht (Operation Retribution), 
Hitler meant to punish the Yugoslavs for what he saw as their supposed treachery, and 
to ‘destroy the country without pity’.56 
 
Invasion of Yugoslavia: ZBOR and Ljotić 
 
The subsequent war was a disaster for Yugoslavia not only militarily, but also 
politically, and socially. Called the April War its declaration coincided with the 
Luftwaffe bombing Belgrade in the early hours of 6 April, beginning at 06:15.57 
Patriarch Gavrilo in Belgrade, witnessed the bombing, noted that in almost no time, 
‘Belgrade was laid to waste’. The city, claims Patriarch Gavrilo, was ‘covered and 
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shrouded totally in smoke’, with ‘devastation and immense pain at every step’.58 This 
brutal attack resulted in up to 17,500 casualties, yet even that number is disputed as 
too low. 59  The bombing and subsequent ground invasion resulted in numerous 
refugees fleeing the fighting, further hampering the defensive efforts and capabilities 
of the Yugoslav forces. Given his status as a former serving officer moved into the 
active reserve, Ljotić was mobilised as a command officer in a regiment in the Srem 
Division.60 Ljotić notes, in an official military report, on 13 April, 1941, of the apathy 
of a large portion of the troops, and warns that the soldiers ‘are beginning to 
grumble’.61   
 
Being informed of the fall of Belgrade on 12 April, Ljotić wrote to Yugoslav military 
headquarters that he would be prepared to take the most ‘vigorous and energetic 
measures’ to ensure that retreating troops do not spread defeatism amongst the 
regiment, and that the regiment should be moved due to its exposed position, which 
would result in significant loss of life if attacked.62 Mladen Stefanović makes the 
claim that both the ‘Ustaše and Zbor unreservedly helped the Germans’, from the late 
1930s until 1945.63 While this would be more true for the case of the Ustaše, who had 
a vested interest in destroying Yugoslavia, ZBOR’s repeated calls for national unity 
and integrity hardly give it to wanting Yugoslavia’s destruction. Stefanović’s thinking 
is not alone in that, as the prevailing opinion was that ZBOR was avowedly ‘fifth 
columnist’ in helping the Germans to destroy Yugoslavia.64 This claim however, does 
not stand up to what scant evidence of Ljotić’s service is available.65 ZBOR at the 
time had no legal political existence, with many of its members in prison. Ljotić’s 
existing report to divisional command would tend to support his actively resisting the 
Germans, and given his nationalism and military experience as an officer, there is no 
reason to doubt that he would have fulfilled his duty and fought.   
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There is evidence to support that ZBOR members, even if their units were not directly 
involved in the actual fighting, answered their call-up orders, and were imprisoned by 
the Germans after the surrender as prisoners of war. In May 1941, ZBOR’s youth 
section in Čačak prepared a list of 19 individuals, two of them, Radenko Lazović, and 
Žika Tomašević, were active ZBOR members in Čačak. The remaining interned were 
according to the report ‘convinced nationalists’, and in the case of Dr. Mehmed 
Hodžić from Sarajevo, even contained a non-local, and clearly non-Serbian name.66 
The aim, in writing to ZBOR’s central headquarters in Belgrade, was to bargain or 
negotiate for the release of the aforementioned individuals, in the belief that Ljotić, in 
a personal capacity, would be able to intervene. As will be shown, it was an attitude 
that many ZBOR members during the war would display. This attitude was of Ljotić 
as a patrician, a venerated patriarchal figure to whom all could turn to. 
 
In many ways, as will be shown Ljotić enjoyed his role as patrician, and facilitator. 
This would allow for a certain distance and aloofness that would characterise Ljotić’s 
dealings with ZBOR, its members, his position as party leader, and within the 
collaborationist apparatus. His role as head of ZBOR during 1935-1940 would 
suggest, based on his lack of interest in the everyday administrative and 
organisational details of ZBOR, that this attitude had been cultivated from an earlier 
stage in his life and political development. 
 
The Axis campaign in Yugoslavia, starting on 6 April, with the bombing of Belgrade, 
was effectively over by 18 April, General Simović, commander in chief of the 
Yugoslav forces, had already by 13 April, transferred command to General Danilo 
Kalafatović, with the intention of signing an armistice.67 The armistice was signed 17 
April, 1941, with General Radivoje Janković, and former foreign minister Alexander 
Cincar-Marković being designated by General Kalafatović to sign an unconditional 
surrender.68 The speed and ease with which the Germans conquered Yugoslavia, they 
might have been forgiven for being drawn into a sense of complacency. Numerous 
internal fissures, especially in relation to Croatia, where an independent state was 
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proclaimed as early as 10 April, heightened Yugoslav military and economic 
preparatory weakness.69 
 
What it would lead to would be the total dismemberment of Yugoslavia as a political 
entity, to be replaced with a puppet regime, in Croatia, direct annexation into the 
Reich, and division into Bulgarian, German, Hungarian, and Italian spheres of 
influence and occupation. The division of the country between Bulgarian, German, 
Hungarian, and Italian zones of occupation saw a substantial territorial re-organisation 
of the country. 70  Slovenia had three-fourths of its pre-war territory annexed by 
Germany, with German being proclaimed the only official language.71 The remaining 
portion of former Slovene territory, organised into the province of Ljubljana, was 
occupied by Italy.   
 
Socially and politically, the country was torn apart, with the puppet status of the 
newly formed Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (Independent State of Croatia),72 and of 
the reduction of a rump Serbia to German military control, being governed by various 
Serbian civilian administrations under strict German supervision. While Dalmatia was 
torn away from Croatia to become annexed by Italy, it was Serbia that saw the 
greatest administrative and territorial changes. 
 
In the process of national disintegration following the start of Axis occupation, Serbia 
was left with 4.5 million inhabitants, around 28 per cent of the total population of 
Yugoslavia.73 A rump and truncated Serbia, subject to German military occupation, 
also saw the Banat, a part of the former Dunavska Banovina, with a substantial 
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German population, organised as a special administrative area.74 From January 1942, 
Bulgarian troops were also used to occupy parts of Serbian territory under the 
supervision of the German military governor.75 Hungary, looking to regain territory 
part of the pre-1920 Kingdom of Hungary, also participated in the dismemberment of 
Yugoslavia, reclaiming the Bačka and Baranja regions from the former Dunavska 
Banovina, Prekmurje from the former Dravska Banovina, and Medjimurje from the 
former Croatian Banovina.76  
 
This convoluted situation was exacerbated by the emergence of various armed 
formations, whether as organs of the imposed civilian and military authorities or 
fighting against them, and which were largely delineated by ethnic as well as 
ideological cleavages. It was within this highly complex and unstable environment 
that Ljotić, and the ZBOR movement, would be operating in, albeit under different 
circumstances from the pre-war era, which resulted in a further synthesis of 
ideological evolution as both man and movement adapted to the situation and 
circumstances at hand. It would also display the extent to which ZBOR members 
idolised Ljotić, and yet highlight the movement’s organisational weakness, and 
increased hostility against ZBOR as being too closely identified with the Germans. 
 
Ljotić: The Beginnings and Justification of Collaboration 
 
In the wake of the devastating military defeat and the beginning of enemy occupation, 
Ljotić, like many others, would have been filled with anxiety, apprehension, fear, and 
a feeling of uncertainty. After the capitulation, and demobilisation of the majority of 
the Yugoslav Armed Forces, Ljotić returned to Smederevo, and like the majority of 
Yugoslavia’s inhabitants, simply waited for what was to come next. He was fearful of 
being arrested, as he participated in the April War as an officer, though his pro-
German stance made the Germans sympathetic, and they issued him with a discharge 
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order,77 freeing him from his military duties, and thus his status as a potential prisoner 
of war.  
 
In the aftermath of the Yugoslav surrender, after having fulfilled his military duties, 
he was, according to his wartime personal secretary Boško Kostić, to be found in 
Belgrade, after a brief sojourn in Smederevo. 78  Serbia was the only area of 
dismembered Yugoslavia in which an outright German military government was 
established on 20 April, 1941, by the order of Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, 
chief of the Army High Command.79 Serbia was considered a vital transportation 
crossroad, its railways, and its Danube links, connected Central Europe to Bulgaria, to 
Greece, and ultimately to North Africa.80 Therefore it necessitated direct military rule 
in order to safeguard its strategic importance. Serbia also had a rich supply of 
strategically important nonferrous metals, which Germany needed for its war effort. 
Maintaining law and order, to protect such valuable resources was of prime 
importance.  
 
In doing so, the Germans also wished to expend the least expense, so the idea of 
having a Serbian puppet government began to be formed.81 As an added bonus to this, 
there were certain Serbian politicians, Ljotić among them, who were willing to put 
themselves at the disposal of the Germans for just such a task. Kostić claims, that at 
the end of April, he was present at a meeting at Ljotić’s flat, along with Milan 
Aćimović, Risto Jojić, Dušan Letica, and Laza Kostić. It was at this meeting, claims 
Kostić that Ljotić, with the acquiescence of those present, decided on terms with 
which to present to the German authorities for the formation of a civilian 
administration.82 Among those conditions were that the Germans respect international 
law, the entire Yugoslav judiciary and criminal code be left untouched, that the 
Serbian Orthodox Church’s work was to be unimpeded, and that the name of the 
Patriarch and of King Peter were to be honoured, and celebrated in religious 
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services.83 It seemed that Ljotić was under the assumption that the creation of a 
Serbian civilian government was essential, rather than preferable, to the Germans, 
and would enter into negotiations with that power structure relationship in mind. 
 
For their part, meeting with Ljotić and Kostić at the end of April, the Germans, 
according to Kostić, especially the head of the German military administration in 
Serbia SS commander Dr. Harald Turner, wanted Ljotić to assume the duties as a 
commissioner for economic affairs.84 According to some sources (German sources 
consulted however make no mention of this), Ljotić refused the offer to enter into any 
civilian administration under German auspices, yet would seemingly be content to 
wield influence from the background.85 No doubt, his reputation in Yugoslavia at the 
time would work against his entering into any administration under German control. 
He could hardly escape any accusation of collaboration given his vociferous pre-war 
pro-German orientation. Certainly, Ljotić was aware of this fact, adding that the 
‘communists would look to do me harm through harming the administration’. 86 
However, Ljotić did admit to being able to wield more influence over any new 
Serbian administration being outside of it. Thereby acting in his own self-interest, but 
admitting that he was both ‘in it’, meaning the new administration, and that its ‘duties 
would be extremely difficult’.87  
 
According to Branko Petranović, the Germans viewed Ljotić as more of an ideologue 
as opposed to a politician or tactician. More than that, the Germans were aware of 
ZBOR’s compromised status, and accusations of it being financed by Germany, as 
well as Ljotić’s personal unpopularity.88 It was for this reason that they chose Milan 
Aćimović, a one-time interior minister in Stojadinović’s second government, and 
Belgrade chief of police from 1938 until 1940, as head of what was termed the 
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Komesarska Uprava (Commissioners Administration). 89  The choice was practical 
from the Germans’ point of view. Aćimović90 was not as compromised in the eyes of 
many Serbs as Ljotić was. Also, Aćimović‘s past as minister of interior and police 
chief gave the Germans more assurance about keeping peace and order in occupied 
Serbia than the politically idealistic Ljotić.91 Perhaps more tellingly was the fact that 
the Germans chose Aćimović because he would be better able to assume at least an 
assurance of peace, as opposed to the deeply unpopular Ljotić who would only 
enflame tensions even more. 
 
With the announcement of the Komesarska uprava (Commissioners Administration, 
hereafter also referred as CA) on 30 April, 1941, the first phase of Yugoslav, and 
specifically Serbian political collaboration with the Germans began. Yet it would take 
another two weeks before the public became aware of the new civilian administration, 
and it was formed under much different circumstances than Ljotić initially 
envisioned.92 Ljotić, working in the background, attempted to have ZBOR legalised, 
when all political movements and parties banned by the Germans on 9 May, 1941.93 
Recognising the dismembered state of Yugoslavia, Ljotić asks for permission for 
ZBOR to operate solely in the Serbian occupied territory, and was willing to provide a 
copy of ZBOR’s principles in order to facilitate a favourable response.94 This act was 
significant in itself as it would lead to ZBOR taking the aesthetic step of dropping the 
‘Yugoslav’, moniker from its official name, becoming just the ‘National Movement 
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ZBOR’,95 operating only in occupied Serbia, and de facto, a party for Serbs. Though 
seemingly tacit, in that no ZBOR document or order specifically mentioned the 
change, it can be seen as a sign of ZBOR’s acknowledgement and acceptance of the 
dismemberment of Yugoslavia and of ZBOR as a Serbian movement. Though perhaps 
it’s tacit approval was a sign that the movement did hold at least a faint hope for a 
reconstructed Yugoslavia (based on its own ideas and policies no doubt), and that it 
did see itself in some ways as a ‘Yugoslav’ movement. 
 
This point, the regularisation of ZBOR’s status in occupied Serbia gives rise to the 
question and nature of collaboration. This issue, in both socialist, and the successor 
states of the former Yugoslavia has proved to be a contentious point. What is 
important here is to place the actions of ZBOR and Ljotić in their proper historical 
context, without relying primarily on historical hindsight. This will be achieved 
through highlighting the contemporary perceptions of the historical actors involved, 
emphasising what they believed, whether they felt that a choice or not in relation to 
collaboration, and finally through historical hindsight as to what we know now, 
decades after the fact. It is too easy to look back with hindsight over contemporary 
events and how they moulded and shaped actions and perceptions, especially in 
regard to such a trauma as occupation and collaboration. 
 
Collaboration is a multi-faceted term that has taken on various forms in a European 
context of the Second World War. 96  Peter Davies identifies four strands of 
collaboration in Europe during the Second World War. These are ‘shield 
collaboration’, an attempt to try to ‘protect the country from the worst’, a halfway 
point between collaboration and resistance called ‘conditional collaboration’, a 
‘tactical collaboration’, aimed at outwitting the Germans, and a ‘submission to a 
superior force’, a direct acknowledgement of superior military and political might.97 
In this vein ZBOR’s collaboration can begin to be explained in a seemingly 
reductionist yet highly nuanced and superfluous strand of a fear of ‘Judeo-Soviet’ 
communism, and a desire, however suspect, to ‘shield the nation’, from the worst 
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excesses of the war and occupation, in order to protect the Serbian people and nation. 
Ljotić went to pains to showing his collaboration as pragmatic, as opposed to 
ideological reasons. There is perhaps a point in his favour in regard to pragmatism. 
Ljotić’s collaboration, like that of other collaborators can be seen as an attempt of 
making sense of both defeat and of German brutality, and as a nationalist, of 
reconciling patriotism with the reality of defeat.  
 
Yet this strand, that of a fear of communism was all the justification needed for 
ZBOR in order to enter into collaboration with the Germans. In this sense, and using 
Davies’ varieties of collaboration, ZBOR could conceivably be situated between a 
‘heart and soul’ ideological closeness with National Socialism amongst some of its 
members, to Ljotić’s more nuanced ‘shield collaboration’. This seemingly implied the 
wish to spare the country the worst excesses of German occupation, yet believing 
fully in a German victory as salvation for Yugoslavia. More cynically, or perhaps 
more accurately, it was also a chance for ZBOR ideas and policies to be implemented, 
which if Yugoslavia’s political continuity had not been ruptured, would not have 
happened.  
 
Ljotić based his belief in salvation through a German victory on his opinion that 
Yugoslavia, and specifically the Serbs, destroyed themselves, and that ‘method of 
destruction is the one that the Germans are fighting against’. Only with ‘soul’, could 
true salvation arise.98 Seeing the conflict as apocalyptic, Ljotić described the war as a 
‘fight to the death’, and that ‘every nation that awakes, will return to itself’99 as a 
means of salvation. The first duty therefore, was to ‘smash the communists’, for they 
are ‘manifestations of a foreign ideal on one side’, and of ‘inflamed selfishness of 
ourselves’.100 This was a result of what was called ‘spiritual confusion and infirmity’, 
which took on many different forms and manifestations, and would form a base of 
Ljotić’s wartime writing. 
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The nation was suffering from ‘four infirmities of a spiritual nature’, resulting from 
‘spiritual disorientation, spiritual disunity, spiritual immaturity’, and ‘absence of 
social awareness’.101 Every true patriot, Ljotić asserts, he that ‘loves his country more 
than Red Moscow or Masonic-plutocratic London’, therefore must ‘follow the path of 
reason’.102 Reason, was not to follow into a path of ‘resistance, which will bring us 
social destruction and anarchy’, but rather to concentrate on finding ‘soul, and our 
national path’.103 In attempting to justify their own collaboration, ZBOR sought to 
undermine the appeal to resistance, and to turn the population against communism by 
showcasing supposed Soviet opinions of Serbs as ‘hegemonistic’ and ‘exploiters’ 
elements in Yugoslavia.104 What the communists really are after, claimed Ljotić, was 
that they want ‘national destruction’,105 and that only a concerted moral and spiritual 
effort can counter communist destructiveness. Addressing the strong Russophile 
tendency amongst many Serbs, Ljotić warns not to expect salvation from Russia, 
because Russia is now the Soviet Union, and ‘is neither Russian nor Slavic in 
orientation’.106  
 
The focus on salvation was to look inward, not abroad ‘to those listening to radio 
broadcasts from London’. It only through the ‘return to our traditions, our spiritual 
path’, and only then will renewal occur in ‘every facet of our national life and 
national path’.107 Certainly, Ljotić and ZBOR felt it had no choice but to collaborate. 
Communism seemed on the advance everywhere, through the guise of what ZBOR 
saw as ‘Jewish internationalism’, and ‘British plutocracy’. ZBOR saw the conflict as 
an apocalyptic struggle of Good versus Evil, and of Light versus Darkness. There was 
to be no middle ground, and no half measures. Behind it all, was the hand of the Jews, 
yet Ljotić lamented that ‘few people see Jews are such a decisive and powerful force 
on humanity’.108 Salvation was to be found in returning to what was deemed to be 
national, in short, to the past and a romanticised notion of Serbian history and 
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customs. This salvation however, would be best achieved under the guise of the 
Germans, as a guarantor of anti-communist politics. 
 
The concept of the ‘national path’, would find its expression in collaboration, in order 
to extirpate communism from occupied Serbia, as a basis for a national renovation 
and renaissance based on the ephemeral ‘soul’. It would also, unsurprisingly, be based 
on ZBOR’s vague political ideas from the 1930s put into practice. But salvation was 
not just to be political or spiritual, but also economic.109 This economic renewal was 
to be found through the reorganisation of society around ZBOR’s corporatism, and in 
the ‘traditional’ Serbian concept of the zadruga.110 The defeat of Yugoslavia in 1941 
marked the ‘end of an inglorious period’ for the country, signifying a return to a 
‘Serbian national path’, and the ‘defeat of communism’.111 Yet this definition of 
reason, and the concept of a ‘national path’ would also see increased political 
collaboration on behalf of a newly re-legalised ZBOR movement, and more sinisterly, 
an active and idealistic military collaboration, with ZBOR members at its core. 
 
Ljotić and ZBOR: Collaboration and the balancing of relations 
 
Ljotić entered into talks of collaboration with the false expectation of a semblance of 
equality between a dismembered Yugoslavia and the Germans. Yet for all the 
conditions that he set out, not one was followed. As a former Justice minister, a free 
judiciary was a sign of sovereignty, and one that Ljotić made a condition of forming a 
collaborationist government. However, this was after the already implemented 
application of German criminal law on occupied Yugoslav territories, stating that 
‘anyone who commits an act punishable by German law shall be subject to German 
criminal law’.112 Yet Ljotić seemed to sincerely believe in the good intentions of the 
Germans toward Serbia, while being totally blind as to the exact nature of the 
occupation. His collaboration is made even more pathetic by the fact that he 
attempted to convince himself and others that his conditions, especially in regard to 
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‘justice’, had been met.113  He used ‘international military justice’, as a standard, 
ignoring that legal decisions were to be made in the name of the German Military 
Command of Serbia, and not of Yugoslavia. When confronted with the fact that courts 
were handing out sentences in the name of the German military command, Ljotić 
countered that ‘occupation of our country leaves justice intact’.114 In short, his fear of 
the perceived threat of communism, combined with the potential for social disorder 
grew to an almost paranoid level, in that he would countenance anything, if it meant 
that communism would be destroyed, and the Serbian people protected from it. 
 
The Commissioners Administration however was in an extremely difficult position 
from its inception. It lacked any semblance of power and was in effect nothing more 
than a tool of the German occupation regime. German propaganda made it out to 
seem like the Commissioners Administration was a continuation of domestic power 
and government in Serbia, when in effect it merely carried out orders set for it by the 
German military command in Serbia. At the heart of it, the Germans did not trust the 
Serbs,115 but as their economic and political interests dictated, they needed people 
who could ensure local control. Moreover, as a personality, Aćimović was said to be 
totally under German influence.116 He was totally convinced that working in ‘friendly 
association’ with Germany was the best political option.117 Aćimović developed close 
ties with Dr. Harald Turner guaranteeing his pliability as far as the Germans were 
concerned, but showed that he was in effect the weakness of his government. Ljotić 
remained outside of the government, but designated two close ZBOR members Dr. 
Stevan Ivanić, and Milosav Vasiljević as Commissioners for Social Policy and 
Economics respectively.118 It was within the Commissioners Administration that the 
first stage of ZBOR’s institutional collaboration began, on a political level. 
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The German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June, 1941, would add a different 
dimension to the institutional political collaboration of Ljotić and ZBOR. The 
ramifications and consequences for German occupied Serbia, and indeed for occupied 
Europe would be manifest. Organised communist cadres, many of which had 
experience in organising and clandestine affairs turned to active armed resistance 
against the Germans throughout occupied Europe. Yugoslavia was no exception, with 
the Communist Party of Yugoslavia appealing for all Yugoslavs to rise up against the 
‘German fascist-capitalist bandits’,119 on 25 June. In specific reference to Serbia, the 
Serbian Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia sent out an 
appeal to the Serbian populace to stand with ‘our Russian brothers at whose head is 
Stalin, the Russian son’, and not to listen to those who ‘talk against our brotherly 
Croatian people’, and to stand against the ‘traitorous agents of Ljotić and 
Stojadinović’.120  
 
The identification of the Commissioners Administration as ‘Ljotić’s agents’ was not 
far off the mark. Yet there was also a clear dichotomy between the Ljotić and 
Stojadinović groups within the Commissioners Administration. Though Stojadinović, 
while having Ljotić imprisoned, would later be interned himself in April 1940 until 
March 1941 on grounds of ‘possible collaboration with the Germans’. 121  Ljotić 
viewed Aćimović, as a staunch Stojadinović supporter, with suspicion falling 
especially on Aćimović’s time as Belgrade’s chief of police, and his ineffectual rule 
as commissioner of the interior. 122  Aćimović meanwhile, was totally opposed to 
granting Ljotić any sort of influence. Aćimović also, according to ZBOR General 
Secretary Milorad Mojić, tried to convince the Germans that ZBOR supporters were 
planning on ‘assassinating all Stojadinović supporters in the government’. 123 
Increasing personal tensions between Ljotić, his commissioners in the government, 
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and Aćimović would be accentuated by the disorder brought by the uprising in Serbia 
in the summer of 1941, and Ljotić’s direct attack on the validity and capability of the 
government to resist. 
 
The communist inspired revolt in Serbia would precipitate the downfall of the 
Commissioners Administration.124 Ljotić aided its downfall by publicly denouncing 
its inefficiency and recused Ivanić and Vasiljević from it. He accused the 
Commissioners Administration of inaction and inefficiency in face of the communist 
threat, and accuses the Germans of not doing enough to combat communism, and for 
outlawing all propaganda activity that could be used to counter the communist 
threat.125 What it highlighted was the evident power struggle between Aćimović and 
Ljotić, resulting in a real crisis of leadership. Aćimović was titular head, yet Ljotić 
was behind the scenes, in an unscrupulous struggle with Aćimović for favour and 
influence amongst the Germans. Evidently the Germans thought enough of Ljotić to 
not have him persecuted for his condemnation of German action, and inaction. In 
writing his memorandum denouncing Aćimović and the Commissioners 
Administration, Ljotić had his own choice as replacement in mind, in concurrence 
with the Germans, his close associate, General Milan Nedić.  
 
That Ljotić criticised the Germans in such a manner without repercussions is not 
surprising. Ljotić enjoyed a certain reputation amongst the Germans, who viewed him 
as a ‘visionary’, yet not practical and a ‘poor tactician’. They characterised him as ‘an 
ideologue, not a leader’.126 Though recognising his commitment to fighting against 
communism, the Germans were seemingly not totally convinced of Ljotić’s 
commitment to a new National Socialist Europe. In a December 1941 memorandum 
to Ljotić, ZBOR General Secretary Milorad Mojić, urges Ljotić to identify more 
closely with National Socialism. According to Mojić, the Germans saw Ljotić saw as 
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‘not guaranteeing security’, and as ‘an old style politician with new ideas but not 
energetic enough’.127 It was the youth, attests Mojić in which the future of ZBOR 
must be placed. Moreover, as Mojić states, the Germans feared that ZBOR’s hatred of 
former Stojadinović supporters would precipitate a civil war amongst the civilian 
nationalist groups.128 In foreign policy, Mojić states that the Germans are not fully 
convinced of ZBOR’s commitment to a ‘unified Europe under National Socialism’, 
being too ‘Greater Serbian chauvinistic’, and criticising ZBOR’s paper, Naša borba 
(Our struggle), as being ‘too focused on Serbian issues and not enough on the war’.129  
 
By 1943 however, with the Germans on the defensive, their opinion on ZBOR, 
especially in relation to the youth, and the formation of the collaborationist Serbian 
Volunteer corps (to be expanded on later), changed. In a March 1943 report from the 
German South-eastern Command, ZBOR was identified as having a ‘National 
Socialist base’, made up of mostly of ‘youths’, and ‘students’, who ‘energetically 
fought the communists’. It was also the ‘youth’ amongst the Serbian Volunteer Corps, 
according to the report, rather than Ljotić himself, who was advocating greater 
integration of Serbian anti-communist forces into the German military apparatus, and 
closer co-operation between Germany and Serbia. 130  This German reappraisal of 
ZBOR raises some poignant questions. Who really headed ZBOR during the 
occupation? Ljotić or Mojić? On an administrative level, it was clearly Mojić, who 
signed and decreed orders, but was this done primarily without Ljotić’s knowledge? 
Mojić had a clear idea of ZBOR mutating into a total National Socialist movement, 
whereas Ljotić was more concerned with a metaphysical and mystical cosmic 
struggle. Mojić acting independently of Ljotić is feasible not but not probable. 
Certainly however, it fits the narrative of Ljotić as a detached leader, one who 
seemingly did not seek a public profile, thus masking, but not eliminating, his self-
interest and ambitions.  
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Nevertheless, German criticism as far as Naša borba was concerned, was largely true. 
While much of the collaborationist press during the occupation, primarily the dailies 
Novo Vreme (New Times), and Obnova (Renewal), regularly featured front page 
headlines concerning the German war effort, Naša borba, as ZBOR’s official 
occupation publication, focused primarily on the idea of Serbian spiritual and national 
renewal. To the Germans, a focus on ZBOR’s ideology and the need for a total 
renewal of Serbian values and morals was not enough evidence of Ljotić’s 
commitment to a New Order in Europe. 
 
Whether or not Ljotić was affected by this report, or whether or not Mojić’s account 
is indisputably factual, there was no doubting that for Ljotić, the Germans were 
fighting the same enemy. ‘Those Germans’, said Ljotić, are ‘truly heroic and lovers of 
humanity’, as opposed to ‘our people who laugh and make merry during our national 
catastrophe’, thus ‘earning the contempt of the Germans’.131 Yet to the British, at 
least to elements within the Ministry of Information, by 1942, it appeared that the 
Germans had lost their confidence in Ljotić, with the Ministry adding their belief that 
Ljotić was a ‘good patriot of strange behaviour’. 132  The July 1941 communist 
inspired uprising in Serbia convinced Ljotić of the need to take the strictest measures 
against the communists and that the Germans, being preoccupied elsewhere, would 
not be able to save the Serbs from communism if first the Serbs do not save 
themselves. In order to achieve this, any means were deemed acceptable. 
 
Regardless, there were signs of disconnect between Ljotić and younger ZBOR 
members, as evidenced by the South-eastern Command report. This can also be 
interpreted as the beginning of a slight rift between Ljotić and Mojić, who largely 
oversaw the daily administrative tasks of ZBOR. The growing number of younger 
members eager to fight communism, to loot, or joining as adventurers, was at growing 
odds with Ljotić’s metaphysical calls for renewal. This rift would be best represented 
with the creation of the Serbian Volunteer Corps, which as will be shown later in this 
chapter, would come to be perceived as ZBOR’s armed militia, with Ljotić obsessing 
over its spiritual and moral duty rather than armed action. Armed action though was 
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what the corps was created for, and was utilised in this capacity by the man chosen to 
head a new collaborationist government, General Milan Nedić. 
 
Ljotić and Nedić 
 
Ljotić’s personal relationship with Nedić would be much warmer, and would facilitate 
a smoother relationship and integration of ZBOR’s ideas into a new government, 
called the Vlada narodnog spasa (Government of National Salvation), formed 29 
August 1941.133 Ljotić felt that he could be able to influence Nedić due to their close 
relationship.134 Yet even with the newly formed Nedić government, the same power 
struggles within differing cliques would remain. This time however, a new dimension 
would be added, those followers of Nedić’s authority who were loyal to him. These 
included former ZBOR member Velibor Jonić, Ognjen Kuzmanović, and Djura 
Dokić. Jonić especially, agitated for Nedić to be a type of ‘Serbian governor’, while at 
the same time, attempting to secure his own position.135 Both Stojadinović supporters 
and Ljotić supporters struggled for greater influence and power amongst those who 
were personally loyal to Nedić. Mihailo Olćan, a ZBOR member, wanted Ljotić as a 
head of government, while Aćimović believed that once England had sued for peace, 
Stojadinović would return.136 Olćan, as Minister of Economy in Nedić’s cabinet, was 
also very hostile to Aćimović, and would offer a resignation in December 1941 
because he felt that the government had ‘failed the people’.137 These petty power 
struggles within the government helped further to undermine a regime already lacking 
in legitimacy and power and goes toward highlighting the personal ambition and 
selfishness and unscrupulousness that is inevitably heightened in an unstable 
situation.  
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Nedić’s government would be given no more authority than that of the 
Commissioners Administration. Through Nedić, the Germans hoped that his presence 
would prove to be a strengthening factor.138 Ljotić was initially, at least, a huge 
support base for Nedić, and helped him consolidate his authority amongst the 
differing strands of collaborationists. To the British, Ljotić’s influence on Nedić was 
evident, and they were under the assumption that it was Ljotić who persuaded Nedić 
to accede as head of government. 139  Ljotić certainly helped to pave the way by 
signing, and encouraging ZBOR members to sign the Apel srpskom narodu (Appeal 
to the Serbian people), calling for national resistance to the July 1941 uprising and 
communism.140 However it was German strong-arm tactics of totally dismembering 
Serbia that saw Nedić accede to his new post. Ljotić’s personal intervention however, 
facilitated the entry of Četnik leader Kosta Milovanović Pećanac141 into the service of 
Nedić’s regime. Pećanac’s entry can be partly explained due to the strained 
relationship between the Pećanac and the leader of the other main group of Četniks, 
those of General Dragoljub ‘Draža’ Mihailović. Mihailović was the first Yugoslav 
leader of a popular uprising against the German invasion in 1941 and was quickly 
promoted to the rank of general and minister of war by the royal government in exile 
in London.142 On 12 August, 1941, Ljotić, at his own initiative sent Zoran Vuković 
(ZBOR youth leader in Niš, whose father Petar was the local ZBOR leader) to meet 
with Pećanac hoping that he ‘saw the danger the Serbian people are in’, and hoped 
that he ‘would eventually support the incoming government’.143  
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In Nedić, Ljotić presumably saw an opportunity to implement his ideological agenda, 
without taking the blame for any unpopular actions and consequences. This was 
evident in ZBOR’s call for a creation of the radna zajednica (Working Community, 
literally) in 1942, based on the German Labour Front, and with a suggestion for 
Milosav Vasiljević, as opposed to himself, to head it.144 Earlier, the Nedić regime had 
already called for mandatory labour service for the renewal of Serbia,145 but evidently 
ZBOR felt that the German example would lead to greater efficiency. To this end 
ZBOR wholeheartedly backed the Nedić regime, going so far as to criticise the 
Church for failing to endorse Nedić and for failing to denounce communism and the 
Partisans. Ljotić lamented that the ‘Church talks of peace and love’, yet ‘Nedić does 
not cause destruction as he leads the living Serbian nation’, and that the Church does 
‘not say which path is better, Nedić’s or the Communists’.146 
 
There was a certain degree of overlap between ZBOR’s ideology and Nedić’s regime. 
Nedić’s regime and propaganda tended to idealise the peasantry as the most ‘pure 
Serbs’, and ever unchanging, and always traditional.147 The city, according to Nedić’s 
propaganda, brought spiritual decay, and godlessness from ‘schools in the city’.148 
The peasant, as the ‘fount of nationalism and patriotism’, because of his ‘connection 
to the land’, is the best guarantee of Serbian culture and tradition.149 This rhetoric was 
reminiscent of ZBOR, and former British plenipotentiary to Yugoslavia Sir Ronald 
Campbell also echoed the ideal of the peasantry as the most conservative element.150 
Nedić himself saw his regime, as the beginning of a Serbian ‘peasant state’, and that 
this new state should be built on ‘national co-operative socialism’.151 This idealism 
about the purity and timelessness of the peasant as a guardian of Serbian culture was 
akin to ZBOR’s conception, but it was not an original thought conceived by ZBOR. 
Therefore, it would be wrong however to view Nedić simply as being pliable to 
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ZBOR’s influence. Nedić’s propagandists envisioned a ‘Serbian civil and cultural 
plan’, planned from the end of 1942 in the Ministry of Education.152  
 
This concept rested on three basic elements, de-politicisation, continuity, and 
nationalism.153 It was, according to its chief architect, Vladimir Velmar-Janković, to 
compose of four sections, biological, economic, spiritual, and technical.154 Nedić saw 
his task as attempting to protect the Serbian people from the worst excesses of 
occupation, though like Ljotić, he believed in a German victory, and that communism 
was a destructive force on the Serbian people. To this end, he attempted to organise 
anti-communist currents within Serbian society to use as a counterweight to 
communist resistance. He also, in conjunction with Ljotić, was instrumental in an 
attempt to build up credibility as a ‘patriotic force’. To this end the Nedić regime set 
up the Zavod za prinudno vaspitanje omladine u Smederevskoj Palanci (Department 
of compulsory youth education in Smederevska Palanka) in 1942.155 In actuality, the 
Department of compulsory youth education was a re-education centre for communist, 
or communist inspired youths who were captured by either the Germans, or the 
collaborationist forces. It was Ljotić who suggested to Nedić the founding of a ‘re-
education’ department as a means of ‘saving the youth’, in January 1942.156 It was 
officially founded 15 July, 1942. With both Ljotić and Nedić viewing communism as 
a ‘mental disease’, it was however, according to Ana Antic, not degenerative, and 
therefore, capable of being cured.157 While the head of the Department of compulsory 
youth education was Milovan Popović, head of the Anti-Communist League in 
Belgrade, the Department’s overall command was under the purview of the Ministry 
of Education, headed by former ZBOR member Velibor Jonić, who devised its 
curriculum. 158  While again, Ljotić had no official role in the founding of the 
Department of compulsory youth education, it is obvious that he took an active 
interest in its affairs. He was in frequent contact with Popović as to the Department’s 
curriculum. 159  On one occasion, according to Parežanin, Ljotić spoke at the 
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Department on the dangers of communism and on the general political situation.160 In 
this regard Ljotić helped, mobilising ZBOR to serve Nedić’s regime, however he 
faced a potential rival, in the Četnik organisation and personality of Dragoljub ‘Draža 
Mihailović.161 
 
Ljotić and ZBOR: Increased fascist mutation and Mihailović 
 
Prior to the war, Ljotić and Mihailović did not seemingly have any contact. That 
changed in the wake of Yugoslavia’s surrender in 1941 and Mihailović turning to 
resistance against the Germans. By May 1941 however, with Mihailović sending 
feelers out to possible allies, one of the officers present on the Ravna Gora plateau 
with him was Vladimir Lenac, a pre-war ZBOR youth leader at Zagreb University.162 
Lenac was sent by Mihailović to Belgrade to meet with Ljotić to ask him for the 
names of prominent Belgrade citizens who could offer financial support to the 
Četniks.163 Ljotić was even kept abreast of the organisational progress of the Četniks, 
and evidently felt assured (briefly) that they would not risk Serbian lives in attacking 
the Germans.164 Former journalist, Partisan, and academic, Vladimir Dedijer recalls a 
meeting in Toponica with a Stepan Pavičević, who claimed that Ljotić sent a delegate 
in the hope of ‘organising Četnik bands’, who would not rise until a pre-arranged 
signal.165 This does not sound as improbable as it seems, as Mihailović had sent an 
agent to Ljotić in the hope of helping to procure funding. Ljotić’s relationship with 
Mihailović, unlike with Nedić, would be adversarial. This stemmed primarily from 
Mihailović’s short-lived alliance with the communist led Partisans, his adherence to 
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the Yugoslav Government in Exile, and belief in Allied victory. While there would be 
a convergence of opinion due to exigency and convenience in the latter stages of the 
war as will be shown, Ljotić and Mihailović, both royalists and nationalists, were 
unable to agree on the best course for Serbia and Yugoslavia during the war, even if 
there was overlap.166 What overlap existed however, was overshadowed by the deep 
political cleavages and differences between them. Mihailović did not recognise the 
Yugoslav capitulation and moved to open rebellion (for a time) against the Germans, 
while Ljotić saw the best chance for survival and ‘renovation’ under the aegis of the 
Germans. 
 
While the Nedić government was able to persuade a fraction of Mihailović’s force to 
put itself at the disposal of the regime to fight communism,167 Mihailović managed to 
maintain his operational independence, though tenuously, and with great ambiguity. 
Ljotić writes that this ‘neutrality’, on the part of Mihailović ‘plays right into the hands 
of the communists’. Mihailović, contends Ljotić, was not a problem until ‘after 22 
June, 1941’, when he ‘took to the woods’, with the communists, when before, 
‘Mihailović’s men would visit their families in Belgrade regularly’.168 Here perhaps 
Ljotić alludes to what he feels to be an acceptable form of resistance that could 
conceivably be controlled or infiltrated. By not acting against the communists when 
they were weak, in June 1941 Ljotić argues, Mihailović allowed the Partisan 
movement to fester, instead of destroying it. Ljotić also laments that he repeatedly 
tried to warn Mihailović of the danger, but that Mihailović took Ljotić’s warning to 
mean that ‘he is on the right path’.169 Perhaps Mihailović’s biggest sin in Ljotić’s 
eyes was that he saw ‘salvation in London’, in ‘alliance with the communists’, and 
not in the message of Nedić, whom Mihailović characterised as a traitor. 170 
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Mihailović retaliated in 1942, calling on Ljotić to be declared a traitor by both the 
Yugoslav Government in Exile and the British.171 
 
In mid-1942, the BBC became involved unwittingly in transmitting a ‘hit list’, 
compiled by Mihailović’s men, who listed Ljotić, Nedić, and their associates as 
legitimate targets for assassination.172 The list, known as ‘Z’ was known both as 
zaklati (to slaughter), and zastrašiti (to frighten), would result in the deaths of Kosta 
Pećanac, and Miloš Masalović, Nedić’s chief of cabinet and ZBOR member, in 
1944. 173  Among ZBOR’s losses due to letter ‘Z’, was its Čačak leader, Father 
Dragutin Bulić, on 30 July, 1942.174 To Ljotić, ‘it wasn’t the ‘physical death of Father 
Bulić the martyr that killed him’, but rather ‘the slander’.175  
 
Rather than placing the blame on the Četniks, who carried out the actual 
assassination, Ljotić blamed ‘London’, and referred to those whom killed Bulić as 
Communists.176 Individual Četniks were viewed as patriotic Serbs, yet misguided in 
their following of Mihailović, who as ZBOR portrayed, was guilty of following the 
orders of London, who was in turn a pawn of the ‘Judeo-Bolshevik’ world plot. 
Nedić’s Order No. 2, appealed to the Serbian people not to support nor obey 
Mihailović, while calling for the destruction of the Četniks 177  would ensure that 
personal relations between Ljotić, Nedić, and Mihailović would be bitter until the end 
of the war. 
 
Additionally, Mihailović had to content with the ZBOR initiated and saturated Srpski 
Dobrovoljački Korpus (Serbian Volunteer Corps hereafter SVC), formed in 
September 1941 as an anti-Partisan force, but would come into conflict with 
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Mihailović’s men as well.178 Added to this was that in the summer of 1942, the 
Germans made the decision to disarm both Pećanac’s and Mihailović’s Četniks and 
transfer those men deemed reliable enough to the SVC.179   
 
The SVC is usually taken as the most clearest sign of ZBOR mutating into a more 
clearly defined fascist movement, by considering the SVC to be ZBOR’s party 
militia, emphasising therapeutic violence, and organisation of youth.180 Its aim was 
according to its initiator and ZBOR member Mihailo Olćan, a chance for the ‘Serbian 
people to take salvation into their own hands’.181 By October 1943, a year after his 
exclusion from Nedić’s cabinet, Olćan became, at German insistence, a sort of 
political commissar for the SVC, and had the full trust of the Germans.182 Ljotić’s 
own language in relation to youth had become more pronounced and more radical 
during the occupation. Speaking to a youth labour battalion helping to rebuild 
Smederevo, before the creation of the SVC, he emphasised youth to ‘struggle for 
Serbia’ and that it is ‘time to beat down this wave of anarchy’, that has destroyed 
Smederevo.183 While Ljotić had no command over the SVC, its initial members were 
drawn mainly from ZBOR, and primarily from amongst its youth.184 Moreover, Ljotić 
was a clear inspiration to the corps, giving them ideology, legitimacy, and support. To 
Ljotić, the volunteers were ‘not fighting for themselves, and not fighting for evil’ 
because they ‘firmly believe in the Faith of Christ of their ancestors, the Orthodox 
faith’.185 
 
The SVC was in effect the consequence and manifestation of the radicalism of 
ZBOR’s youth section the White Eagles. More than a simple auxiliary unit for the 
Germans, the SVC offered young ZBOR members a chance for action and the 
opportunity to fight Communism in defence of Serbia, under the pretence of ZBOR’s 
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influence. In this regard, the SVC both absorbed and drained ZBOR’s power and 
energy, and in many ways would completely subsume the entire movement into the 
collaborationist and German military apparatus. In a way, ZBOR as a political 
movement was kept relevant only through the SVC, especially as it was perceived as 
ZBOR’s armed wing. Once the SVC began to grow however, the percentage of 
ZBOR members within its ranks inevitably dwindled, down to ten per cent, according 
to its commander, General Kosta Mušicki, also a one-time ZBOR member.186 Nor 
were relations between the SVC and ZBOR always positive. On installing himself in 
Čačak in late 1941, Mušicki faced criticism for his conduct from the ZBOR youth in 
Čačak.187  
 
Local Čačak ZBOR leader Dragutin Bulić also criticised both Mušicki, for being an 
‘officer of the old guard’, and for the conduct of SVC troops, who were carrying out 
forced requisitions that amounted to looting and plundering. 188  Ljotić, who 
proclaimed that the SVC was ‘to be Christ’s’, and ‘not the Antichrist’s’, also 
criticised the conduct of the SVC on occasion.189 He condemned the drunkenness, 
sexual licentiousness, and gambling among elements of the SVC, claiming that the 
SVC was to act like a ‘heavenly seed’, and an element of ‘good will among 
people’.190 In revolutions, continues Ljotić, the winner is ‘not one who conquers 
villages’, but one who ‘conquers hearts’. 191  The SVC therefore was to be an 
instrument of Christ’s love, in the face of retaliation, not one of vengeance or 
immorality. This gross idealisation on the SVC by Ljotić seems to underline an 
escape from reality, in that ZBOR’s ideology, war, occupation, resistance, and lack of 
command and discipline, were to blame for the brutalisation of and de-humanisation 
of the SVC’s ‘enemies’. 
 
But it must be remembered that the SVC obeyed commands issued by the Germans, 
not Ljotić, nor Nedić, who was the de facto commander in chief. In this regard, while 
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those ZBOR members did not cease being ZBOR members, they were in effect, not 
acting under ZBOR’s guise. However, given the considerable ideological overlap of 
anti-Communism amongst National Socialism and Ljotić’s thinking, there are 
numerous ambiguous shades of grey. Though one should perhaps not look too deeply 
at the SVC being under German command as any potential source of friction. Ljotić, 
as titular commander of the SVC, was subject, in theory, to Nedić’s authority, which 
was subject to German commands. Neither raised any point of contention to the SVC 
being under German command, and therefore, it would be safe to assume that both 
men were in agreement with the actions taken by the SVC under German control. 
German control included participation in retaliatory actions against Serbian civilians, 
uninvolved in resistance activity. The massacre of 2,778 civilians at Kragujevac 
between 20 and 21 October 1941 is a notable example.192 The SVC at Kragujevac, 
under the command of Marisav Petrović, was complicit, along with the gendarmerie, 
in the taking of, and execution of hostages.193 Another of these noxious actions was 
the active involvement of the SVC in German service to facilitate the Final Solution.   
 
ZBOR, the SVC and the Holocaust 
 
While ZBOR’s, and especially Ljotić’s anti-Semitism may not have been based 
primarily on pseudo-scientific racial theory, it was insidious nevertheless, and during 
the occupation, would manifest itself in the service of National Socialist anti-
Semitism. In the immediate aftermath of the German invasion, Yugoslavia’s Jews 
were subjected to the standard Nazi anti-Semitic measures, among which were the 
economic ruination of Jews through exclusion and robbery, and genocide as a method 
of the physical destruction of the Jews.194 German treatment of Jews in occupied 
Serbia was outlined on 14 May, 1941. The ten points outlining and regulating the 
status and treatment of Jews in Serbia stated that all Jews must be registered, and 
wear a yellow Star of David as a sign of identification, and that all Jews were to be 
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removed from any public institution. 195  Furthermore, Jewish property was to be 
appropriated, all able-bodied Jewish men and women were to be organised into forced 
labour brigades, and the strict regulation of when Jews were allowed to enter into 
markets and stores, and when riding trams, to be in a specifically designated Jewish 
section of the rear car.196   
 
Such harsh regulations severely curtailing Jewish economic and social life would no 
doubt have been welcomed by ZBOR. In the German military order of 29 April, 1941, 
it was the responsibility of the Serbian civilian administration to register Jews, and 
indeed to implement all German orders and decrees.197Jews were forced to give up all 
radios and refrigerators, and were not to receive any regular salaries.198 Starting from 
the summer of 1941, ZBOR’s administrational section in Belgrade was involved in 
the informing of and round-up actions of Belgrade’s Jewish population.199  
 
That most of Belgrade’s Jewish population was forcibly recruited into labour 
brigades, ZBOR’s informing on and persecution of doubly vulnerable very young and 
elderly Jews makes this action all the more odious. It also wanted to stop the adoption 
of ‘Serbian names’ by Jews, as a sign of the non-assimibility and incompatibility of 
Jews in the New Serbia.200 This was in conjunction with the Wehrmacht’s setting up 
of a military propaganda section, Section ‘S’, which actively sought ZBOR’s support 
in disseminating Nazi propaganda through cinema, publications, and radio.201 That 
they achieved some success amongst ZBOR members can be explained through its 
extensive use of anti-Semitic and anti-Masonic propaganda. It also showed there were 
ZBOR members and sympathisers who were susceptible to a more racially based 
National Socialist anti-Semitism. This was evidenced from the ideal of the nation as a 
racial community and entity, in addition to being seen as a cultural or linguistic 
community.202   
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In this sense, ZBOR led an anti-Semitic press campaign aimed at both removing the 
supposed influence of the Jews and at legitimising its own collaboration. It tried, as 
part of a wider ideal of a New Serbia, to foster a new collective identity that would 
isolate and exclude ‘foreign elements’ such as the Jews. The Nedić regime codified 
anti-Semitism in lieu of National Socialist anti-Semitism, and created the Serbian 
State Propaganda apparatus, with Djordje Perić, a one-time ZBOR member, at its 
head.203 Its crude anti-Semitism was initially patterned on ZBOR’s anti-Semitism, in 
that it was largely devoid of the racial Nazi style anti-Semitism, yet Naša borba 
carried almost daily anti-Semitic articles, with little coaxing needed from the 
Germans. Lazar Prokić, another member of the propaganda apparatus, and ZBOR 
member declared that the Serbs should ‘have no compassion for the Jews’, and the 
Jews ‘were to blame for the bombing of 6 April’, while stating that ‘Serbian anti-
Semitism’ is domestic’, with ‘no connection to the German occupier’. 204  ZBOR 
member and Minister for the National Economy Mihailo Olćan went so far as to say 
that the Jews ‘got what they deserved’, and that the Serbs should be grateful that the 
‘sledgehammer of the Germans’ came down ‘on the Jews and not the Serbs’.205 
 
ZBOR’s Naša borba was filled with anti-Semitic content, ranging from Ljotić’s more 
quasi-Christian and economic based anti-Semitism to the racially based anti-Semitism 
of ZBOR general secretary Milorad Mojić.206 In addition to the usual litany of Jewish 
misdeeds, Jews were accused of running and exploiting trade in gold, and precious 
metals, but also of ‘white slavery’.207 ZBOR’s pre-war anti-Semitism, focusing on the 
image and figure of the ‘Jewish Capitalist’, was again evident in Naša borba. The 
‘Jew’ as an economic exploiter, as the main source of peasant dissatisfaction and 
anger, ‘brought all economic wealth under its control’, but ‘were not content with 
that’, and therefore ‘bought up the land that our peasants strive for’.208 The influence 
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of the ‘Capitalist Jew’ was said to have come with the appearance of ‘foreign capital’, 
after 1918, with Yugoslavia being an ‘El Dorado of speculation with foreign 
capital’.209  
 
Furthermore, the Jews were said to ‘value money and profit above life’, knew only 
one task, the ‘work’, for ‘domination’.210 The theme of Jewish capitalist exploitation, 
was linked to the wider theme of the Jews as exploiters of the Serbian people and 
nation,211 with Jews being subservient to the Ottomans in exploiting Serbia, thus 
justifying the harsh Nazi measures against them. 
 
Naša borba also took to publishing excerpts from Henry Ford’s the ‘International 
Jew’,212 in order to emphasise international solidarity on the theme of the Jew as the 
‘capitalist exploiter’. However, it would be the 22 June, 1941, German invasion of the 
Soviet Union and the July 1941 Serbian Uprising that would accentuate ZBOR’s anti-
Semitism, with the communist led Partisans being the very embodiment of the ‘Judeo-
Bolshevik’ menace. The ‘Jewish-communist’ bands had descended on the Serbs in 
their ‘greatest national misfortune and misery’, with ‘Jewish-communist cellars full of 
food’, while the rest of the ‘population starves’, and that the ‘Jews are laughing at the 
Christians, while murdering unsuspecting peasants’.213  
 
The ‘Jewish-communist’ conflagration given to the Serbian Uprising was utilised by 
the Germans, in that brutal repressive retaliatory tactics brought against the innocent 
Serbian population was deemed to be because of ‘communists and Jews’. Reprisal 
killings quickly escalated to indiscriminate killings of Serbs, rounded up at Partisan 
ambush sites and executed for ‘not warning the Germans in advance of an impending 
attack’.214 This was evident from 28 June, even before the uprising began, when the 
first order for the mass execution of Jews was issued, in which communist prisoners 
and hostages were shot as well.215 By September 1941, with the security situation in 
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Serbia becoming increasingly dire, the Germans decided on a three-pronged approach 
to dealing with the uprising. Firstly, it involved the roundup of all Jews and Roma and 
their internment in camps in Belgrade and Šabac. Secondly, the Nedić regime was 
ordered to rally and organise Serb anti-communist forces, and thirdly, that German 
front-line troops were to be redeployed to Serbia, with the use of brutal terror 
tactics.216 This resulted in certain SVC units being responsible for the persecution of 
Jews under the guise of anti-communism, where those arrested as ‘communists’, even 
if not Jewish, were ‘tainted with Judaic traits’.217 
 
By the end of 1941 however, with the uprising in Serbia extinguished, the anti-
Semitic campaign lessened. This was because the majority of Serbia’s male Jewish 
population had been shot between July and November 1941,218 with the majority of 
Jewish women and children being interned in various camps around Belgrade, most 
notably Banjica and Sajmište. This would be the fate of a majority of Smederevo’s 
Jews. By February 1942 the majority of Smederevo’s Jewish women and children, 
were forcibly transported by the Germans to Sajmište. The camp was at the time 
holding 6,300 inmates, who three months later, would be all killed.219 
 
The collaborationist anti-Semitic propaganda campaign tried to establish a link of 
Jews as exploiters, communists, Freemasons, and destroyers of Christian nations. 
Jews were not seen as citizens but rather as parasites, whether economic, ideological, 
or social. It also led to Serbian collaborationist formations, notably the SVC, in 
physically assaulting and arresting Jews for transport to the Banjica and Sajmište 
camps in Belgrade. Out of the nearly 24,000 people who were interned at Banjica 
during its four-year existence, the SVC was responsible for the incarceration of 1,096 
of the inmates, having arrested them and turned them over to the Germans.220 
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What question can be raised from the Serbian collaborators, and in particular of 
Ljotić, is the extent to which he personally, and consciously agreed with the 
implementation of Final Solution in Serbia, and whether the Jews should be 
‘sacrificed’ for the ‘renewal and rebirth of Serbia’. That however is difficult to 
quantify and establish. But the Final Solution’s implementation in Serbia, ZBOR’s 
anti-Semitism, and that of Ljotić personally, saw the implication of their beliefs. 
Boško Kostić, in his capacity as Ljotić’s personal secretary during the war recalls an 
autumn 1941 meeting between himself as translator, Ljotić, and Dr. Harald Turner, 
the then commander of the military administration in Serbia. Kostić states that Ljotić 
was ‘against the murder of the Jews’, but doesn’t want the ‘Jews to economically run’ 
his country.221 Yet during the same meeting, as Kostić alludes to, Ljotić asked for a 
‘few hundred hostages’ to be released, all Serbian, and arrested on charges of 
Freemasonry. Ljotić, as Kostić states, attested to the nationalism and loyalty of the 
Serbian hostages,222 while never asking for the same clemency for Jewish hostages. 
While it might be easy to deduce that the trauma and uncertainty of war and 
occupation meant that ZBOR encouraged the Serbs to look into themselves for their 
salvation, it, along with the SVC seemed willing and able to participate in and justify 
the persecution of the Jews if it meant that measures against the Serbs were lessened 
as a result of it. This however would also negate the image of ZBOR, and Ljotić 
personally as being little more than innocent bystanders unable to protest Nazi policy. 
It is clear in whatever form he was able to wield influence, Ljotić was not averse to 
having the Jews removed from Yugoslavia, regardless of the inevitable method, 
whether or not he agreed with Nazi anti-Semitic and racial ideology. 
 
As with his role in the SVC, the Commissioners Administration, and the Government 
of National Salvation Ljotić would officially remain outside of any government. He 
did however delegate two ZBOR members, Čedomir Marjanović, as Justice Minister, 
and Mihailo Olćan, as Minister for National Economy under Nedić’s government.223 
Olćan, by August 1943, was also given an unofficial position like Ljotić, that of 
Izvanredni komesar vlade za okrug Kruševački (Associate government commissioner 
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for the Kruševac region).224 Unofficially however, Ljotić, like Olćan, was invested 
with an official position in an unofficial capacity, that of Izvanredni komesar za 
obnovu Smedereva225 (Associate Commissioner for the Renewal of Smederevo), from 
11 July, 1941, a position he would hold until forced to flee in October 1944 
 
Ljotić and ZBOR: Regional cleavages: Smederevo and Čačak 
 
Ljotić’s position was developed because of the explosion that took place in 
Smederevo on 5 June, 1941. 226  Speaking in 1942, Ljotić describes the situation 
leading to his appointment as Associate Commissioner for the Renewal of Smederevo 
by the Commissioners Administration in July 1941. According to Ljotić, immediately 
after the explosion, both the Germans and the Serbian Red Cross organised help for 
Smederevo, while Aćimović, Ivanić, and Vasiljević sent a delegation to Smederevo to 
assess the damage. He continues by stating that the ‘Germans fed the inhabitants at no 
cost for the first few days’ after the explosion.227 The State Commissariat set aside 13 
million dinars for the renewal of Smederevo, while the Central Committee for 
fundraising campaign for Smederevo collected another 2 million dinars.228 On his 
own accord, Ljotić called for volunteers amongst the youth to help with the 
reconstruction. Primarily ZBOR youth groups answered this call. By September, there 
were two main groups of organised ZBOR volunteer groups. Around 120 were in 
Smederevo helping with the reconstruction, under Budimir Nikić. This group would 
be later moved to Belgrade where it helped the Belgrade Police in his role of 
identifying Communist sympathisers and more ominously, Jews.229 Furthermore, a 
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second group of ZBOR youth, under the command of Senior Youth leader Vladimir 
Lenac, of 350 descended on Smederevo to help with the reconstruction.230 
 
The rebuilding of Smederevo was, to Ljotić, symbolic to the rebuilding of Serbia. 
That Smederevo was one of the last Danube fortresses to fall to the Ottoman Turks in 
1459 may not have been lost on Ljotić, though he never made any statement during 
the occupation to this regard. The reason for his silence on Smederevo’s symbolism 
may be because the invaders this time were his political and ideological allies. The 
‘reality of Smederevo’, said Ljotić, would be the ‘reality of Serbia’, and ‘by 
rebuilding Smederevo’, we ‘will rebuild ourselves’,231for a Serbian future. Adding a 
metaphysical dimension to the reconstruction process, the explosion of 5 June, 1941, 
was akin to the destruction of the nation after 18 April, 1941, and part of a larger 
battle ‘between the seen and unseen’, and a ‘divine punishment’.232 To achieve this 
renewal, Ljotić embarked on a total simultaneous architectural, moral, and societal 
reconstruction of Smederevo, as his own personal fiefdom and idealised vision. 
Architectural reconstruction especially, was to be done in a traditional Serbian style, 
symbolising the return to tradition and customs. He also wanted it done in the 
quickest manner, ordering that all reconstruction projects begun on 11 June, 1941, be 
finished by 1 September, 1941.233 To help facilitate this he set up guidelines for the 
general conditions of construction sites, among whose thirteen points included a 
decree for daily salaries, between 8 to 12 dinars daily for skilled workers, and 5 to 6 
dinars daily for unskilled workers. Any contractor wishing to undertake a project, 
must first be approved by the Associate Commissariat, will be liable for any 
shortcomings in material or building quality, and must provide for his employees.234 
 
Taking up office in the Smederevo city council, the Office of the Associate 
Commissariat from September 1941 took to maximise its efficiency by announcing its 
working hours as four days a week (it was closed Tuesdays).235 Yet it was clear that 
the resources at his disposal would not allow for any sort of strict timetable, with 
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many streets well into late 1941 still left with debris on them.236 While Ljotić did 
indeed work diligently in the immediate aftermath of his appointment, it would be his 
personal secretary in Smederevo, Vladan Vujović, who would take over most of the 
running of the Associate Commissariat, along with one of Ljotić’s assistants, Andrija 
Ljolja. The uprising in Serbia, the struggle against Communism, and the problems 
arising from the Commissioners Administration, and later the Nedić government, 
would occupy most of Ljotić’s time and meant that he spent most of his time in 
Belgrade. The Smederevo district at this time, like most of the rest of Serbia, was 
teeming with a brewing ideological civil war between Serbs. Partisan activity was 
noted from July 1941, as were the activities of Četniks loyal to Kosta Pećanac, under 
the joint command locally of Timotije Bijanić and Vlatko Vlahović.237 The Partisans 
were also active, in both Smederevo and the neighbouring town of Požarevac, though 
it was not until 12 August, 1941, that units in the two towns were given operational 
autonomy from the Novi Sad regional section.238  
 
Smederevo, like the rest of Serbia was caught up in the tumult caused by a breakout 
of resistance in parts of occupied Yugoslavia, in this case in Serbia, where armed 
resistance was strongest in autumn 1941, but was almost completely crushed by the 
end of the year. The Smederevo Partisans themselves were described by ZBOR as 
immoral and greedy people who were easily misled and deceived due to their lack of 
intelligence.239 Partisan activity within Smederevo proper however, was negligible, 
with most activity concentrated in rural regions. Nevertheless, in order to counter 
such threats, and to spread propaganda about the dangers of communism, Ljotić 
would spend most of his time in Belgrade, acting almost as a benevolent, but 
constantly absent landowner in regard to Smederevo. He would be content to let his 
office staff in Smederevo run the mundane daily administrative affairs. What this 
inevitably resulted in was that Ljotić’s ideological energy would be concentrated in 
Belgrade, and one of his only ideological acts, let alone public political acts in 
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Smederevo was a rally for the oath taking of volunteers for the SVC in which he 
spoke.240 
 
When in Smederevo, Ljotić’s personal popularity in Smederevo, and that of his 
family, meant that perhaps understandably, in his role of Commissioner, the citizens 
looked him on as a sort of patrician. He seems to have taken this role seriously, as 
there are numerous records of citizens of Smederevo writing directly to him in order 
to ask for aid, mainly financial, but also for jobs. The case of Nataljija Smiljković is a 
telling example. An unemployed worker who could not also pay her rent, she wrote to 
the Associate Commissioner for help with financial aid and a job. In this rare case, 
Ljotić responded with his own hand, ordering that Smiljković be given a job as well 
as a ‘gift’ of 780 dinars monthly.241 The case of Dragutin Stoiljković is another 
example. A surveyor, he asks Ljotić for a job at the Associate Commissariat’s 
technical section. Ljotić acquiesces while stating that Stoiljković, who asks for 120 
dinars, to be given 100 monthly.242  
 
Such benevolence, and care for Smederevo and its inhabitants seems at odds with the 
actions of ZBOR during the Second World War but it appears that Ljotić did 
genuinely care for the wellbeing of both his hometown and its inhabitants. This is 
unsurprising given that Smederevo was to be at the heart of the new Serbian 
‘renewal’. His devotion to Smederevo is also evidenced by his plan to have a new 
sewage system for the town from 1941.243 He also donated books from his own 
personal library to bookstores around Smederevo at no cost, totalling to almost a 
thousand books.244 Smederevo was to be the core of a new revitalised and reborn 
Serbia, one that as Ljotić had it, would spread throughout Serbia. This of course, was 
predicated on a continued German presence and the defeat of the ideological and 
guerrilla campaign waged by the Partisans. 
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Inevitably given his rigid worldview, in his idealised new Smederevo, there were 
certain elements that would be outside its scope. This group certainly included 
communist sympathisers, but also Jews. From July 1941, there were 567 registered 
Jews in Smederevo, registered under Ljotić’s orders, in accordance with existing 
German rules. Jews were to be organised into their own work brigades, and be given a 
salary of 11.62 dinars daily.245 This in itself is both interesting and revealing. From 
the order of the Associate Commissariat of 6 July, Jews were to be paid in the same 
daily wage bracket as skilled workers on construction sites. There was inevitably, a 
catch.  Jews were not allowed to ‘hoard money’, and any money deemed greater than 
the need of its members to buy food was to be returned to the Commissariat. The 
work brigades were also to make note of any and all payment, with receipt, which 
were to be delivered every three days to the Commissariat.246 While Ljotić would be 
given no command over the fate of the Jews in Smederevo, his anti-Semitism, in 
tightly controlling the finances and expenses of the Jewish work brigades, seems 
harsh given that no similar measures were taken against any other resident in 
Smederevo. It would be as if Ljotić feared that if the Jewish community in Smederevo 
began saving money, their influence would grow, to the detriment of the Christian 
inhabitants, which would be in keeping with his own views on Jews and anti-
Semitism.  
 
Smederevo was noted for a lack of ZBOR political activity, as opposed to Ljotić’s 
own personal rule. Indeed, in the face of Ljotić’s personal rule, there seemed little 
need for any real ZBOR activity, as everything was done under Ljotić’s personal 
aegis. Where ZBOR can be said to be active is in the strength of the SVC in the 
Smederevo region, and ZBOR’s pre-war electoral support. This meant that Ljotić, and 
ZBOR could galvanise and mobilise support, even if it meant acting under German 
command. Vladimir Dedijer however notes that the Partisans had successes in 
mobilising peasant support in Ljotić’s ‘Danube heartland’.247 The town was noted for 
its relative political stability as well, a sign of the reputation of the Ljotić family, and 
again, of ZBOR’s pre-war electoral support in the area. The same cannot be said for 
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Čačak, in the heartland of Serbia, where the violence and uncertainty of collaboration, 




Located in western Serbia, Čačak, unlike Smederevo, would not be bombed during 
the April War, and no Germans would enter the town until the official Yugoslav 
surrender in April 1941, and only then only to announce its signing before 
withdrawing.248 In this thesis, Čačak is discussed as a case study that shows how 
ZBOR has been initially formed as networks of local branches that focused on local 
issues and agenda. In this manner, ZBOR in Čačak showed how the movement in one 
local area has been operational without a clearly defined centralised structure. This 
lack of a central body that monitors and control the movement as it develops in 
different local areas of the country. 
 
Čačak had a small but at least in the pre-war era a relatively active ZBOR section, 
formed in 1935, under the influence and leadership of the energetic priest Father 
Dragutin Bulić.249 Less than a month after the April 1941 surrender, ZBOR in Čačak, 
was writing to Ljotić asking him to send arms to the town so that ZBOR can defend 
itself and the town from the ‘increasing activity and influence of the Communists’, 
and to give the people a boost of morale.250 Yet it would seem that inside the town, 
ZBOR had a reputation, as being fifth columnist, and that there was a feeling that 
Ljotić personally was responsible for the invasion and occupation.251 This was a view 
evidently echoed throughout much of the Čačak district.252 Most of the time and 
energy of ZBOR in Čačak would be towards countering the supposed Communist 
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threat. This would be especially true after the 22 June, 1941 German invasion of the 
Soviet Union.  
 
Bulić notes the type of ‘psychosis that has overtaken the Serbian people’, especially 
the priests, in regard to the German invasion of the Soviet Union, in that most of the 
priests of the Žička eparhija (Žička Eparchy), under whose ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
Čačak falls under were vehemently anti-Nazi. Bulić notes that ‘most priests would 
rather Stalin win than Hitler’, and asks Ljotić to bring this issue up with the Church 
hierarchy so it does not happen again, since the ‘Soviet Union is not Russian, nor is 
Stalin a Russian, or has any links to Slavdom’.253 ZBOR’s situation in Čačak would 
be made considerably worse in the immediate aftermath of the German invasion of 
the Soviet Union. As with the outbreak of the uprising in Serbia, Čačak would find 
itself, briefly in the autumn of 1941 under the control of the liberating so-called 
Užička Republika (The Republic of Užice).254 From the Summer of 1941 however, 
ZBOR in Čačak would notice a definite worsening of the situation, with ‘most orders 
from the Commissioners Administration not being enforced’, and ZBOR noting that 
both the ‘municipal authorities and the police are incompetent’.255 During the autumn 
of 1941, the situation had worsened, with the ‘impression of civil war being 
present’.256 By this time ZBOR in Čačak had begun collaborating actively with the 
Germans, in an attempt to destroy Communist influence in the town, by supplying the 
Germans with lists of suspected Communists. But were also, at times, critical of the 
Germans who were described as ‘poor quality’, and were constantly ‘drunk, rude, and 
aggressive towards the inhabitants’.257 ZBOR losses increasingly mounted, due to 
losses in the SVC, and assassinations carried out by the Partisans, adding to the 
worsening situation in the town, and the precarious situation of ZBOR.258 By late 
1941, more than a dozen ZBOR members had been killed in targeted assassinations 
by the Partisans.259 
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Throughout this period, despite Bulić’s repeated pleas, there was no help from ZBOR 
headquarters, nor was there any response from Ljotić, who left most organisational 
matters to Milorad Mojić, the general secretary. With the situation worsening, and 
with no guidance from ZBOR headquarters, Bulić offered his resignation on 22 
September, 1941, criticising the leadership for being too involved ‘in other 
matters’.260 Bulić does not list these ‘other matters’, but it would seem plausible that 
Ljotić’s increasing ideological work, and focus on an apocalyptic world struggle, at 
the expense of his position of ZBOR’s head, would conceivably be at the core of 
Bulić’s complaint. The creation and arrival of the SVC in the Čačak region did little 
to improve ZBOR’s reputation, as in Gornji Milanovac, ZBOR and the SVC were 
seen as ‘Hitler’s mercenaries’, and fifth-columnists, and that the ‘inhabitants would 
rather see a German soldier than a volunteer’. While Ljotić personally, in contrast to 
Čačak, was viewed as ‘competent and honest’, though ZBOR was seen as little more 
than ‘Germanophiles’, who were simple ‘yes men’.261  
 
As a political movement, ZBOR in Čačak was hampered by the suspension of its 
activities by the uprising in Serbia, and it was not until early 1942 that the movement 
was able to hold meetings. Even then it would only meet twice.262 The death of Bulić 
at the hands of the Četniks would take what little impetus there remained in the 
movement so that by the end of 1942, ZBOR’s organisational activity in Čačak 
dwindled to almost non-existence. 
 
A Different ZBOR 
 
By the end of 1942, ZBOR as a movement, throughout Occupied Serbia had not 
ceased to exist, but had ceased to function as an active cohesive movement. Ljotić’s 
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statements to the movement, and official acts, would grow infrequent after 1942.263 
The general worsening of the war situation, both within Occupied Serbia and 
throughout Yugoslavia meant that much of what could be deemed ZBOR activity was 
confined to the actions of the SVC. This was evidenced in the changing nature of 
ZBOR’s propaganda, and increasingly of Ljotić’s speeches. The bulk of Ljotić’s 
writings from 1943 on reflect a much more sombre tone, especially in regard to the 
increasing threat not just to Serbia but to ‘Christian civilisation’, and ‘Europe’, as the 
Germans began to be pushed back by the Soviets. However, it was Christians, in 
particular the Serbs, who were to blame for the impending disaster. Ljotić likened the 
Serbs to prisoners, with the Germans as the jailors. The Germans however, as jailors, 
only ever implemented the will of the ‘dungeon master’, the unforeseen but ever 
present ruler. This ruler, according to Ljotić, was God.264 The ‘prisoners’, Ljotić 
writes, only ever ‘come into contact with the jailors’, is only ‘implementing the 
master’s will’.265   
 
According to Ljotić, Hitler was just a ‘truncheon in the hands of God’, and that it was 
God, and not Hitler, who were ‘beating the Serbs for their wickedness’.266 Yet ‘God’s 
justice’ visited on the Serbs could have been avoided if the Serbs had heeded the 
‘thousands of voices warning them not to go down that path’,267 in regard to the 27 
March coup. Germany’s fate then, concluded Ljotić, determined the fate of Europe.  
 
As the Germans steadily began to lose ground, Ljotić, by December 1943 began 
appealing to the Germans for a change of policy in regard to the treatment of Russian 
civilians. Yet he did not seem to argue for any change in German policy in regard to 
its occupation policies in Serbia. This could partly be explained through Ljotić’s pre-
war geopolitical thinking that gave a monarchic Russia primacy in a Pan-Slavic 
federation. This federation, now reoriented, would be formed under German auspices 
until the threat of communism was eradicated and Russia would supposedly regain 
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her position of prominence. Furthermore, he criticised the Germans for failing to see 
the ‘type of war’ being waged by the Soviets, and that the Germans have ‘only 
themselves to blame’ because their actions led to the Russian becoming their enemies 
in 1941.268  
 
It was Ljotić however, who failed to see the type of war being waged by the Germans, 
seemingly believing that the ideological and racial war for Lebensraum (Living 
Space) in the East would not preclude a monarchic Russian government, autonomous, 
yet under German over lordship That being said, he criticised the Germans for 
allowing Stalin to co-opt Russian nationalism for the ‘sake of Bolshevism’, in its fight 
against Germany and National Socialism.269 Ljotić was correct at least, in this regard. 
Stalin was able to mobilise popular support and action against the Germans by 
appropriating Russian historical and military figures of the maligned, ‘non-Soviet 
past’, for what has been termed as the ‘Great Patriotic War’.  
 
To this end, Ljotić argues, a ‘change of policy is necessary’, and a Russian 
‘government’, with a Russian army, under the Russian flag, must be created as a sign 
to the Russian people of Hitler’s good intentions, which would also have the effect of 
weakening Stalin.270 This new Russian government, by joining with the Axis was also 
to have a double effect as it would lead to Britain, in the ‘face of a real Russian 
government with a real Russian heart’, to see Bolshevism for ‘what it really was’.271  
 
Tellingly, Ljotić made no mention of the boundaries of this Russian puppet state, 
preferring to leave the question until after the war was finished, assuming, incorrectly 
and naively, that the Germans intended to deal with the Russians on a basis of respect 
and reciprocity. Serbia’s own military and political situation therefore, hinged on a 
German victory. By 1944 he was haranguing the British and French for declaring war 
on Germany in 1939 when it was ‘clear that Germany wanted to racially and 
biologically destroy communism’.272  
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The Jews, according to Ljotić, who needed this war in order to complete ‘world 
domination’, were controlling the entire war indeed the entire world.273 With the 
situation continuously worsening throughout 1943 into 1944, by October of that year, 
with Soviet forces crossing into Yugoslavia, Ljotić, Mihailović, and Nedić were 
forced to flee with the retreating German forces.274  The severity of the situation 
brought around a temporary alliance of all anti-communist forces, in delaying rear 
guard actions against the advancing Partisans.  
 
In the case Ljotić and Nedić, this came as official German orders for withdrawal, in 
their positions as commanders of the SVC. In October 1944, 4,000 SVC troops were 
transported to Slovenia under German protection, for use against Partisan bands in the 
area, but more so as safeguards against enemy encroachment surrounding the railways 
between the Izonso River, and Rijeka.275 Most collaborators, or those deemed to have 
collaborated however, were not so lucky. In Belgrade, on 27 November, 1944, 
Politika published the names of 105 ‘political and class enemies’ who were executed 
in the immediate aftermath of Belgrade’s liberation. Among those executed, ZBOR 
members made up 4 per cent of those executed, who were arrested on the basis of pre-
prepared lists and reports. 276  In the town of Valjevo in Western Serbia, in the 
aftermath of the Partisan entry on 18 September, 1941, sixty-one SVC members were 
executed outright. Documents belonging to the newly created Odeljenje za zaštitu 
naroda (Department for National Security) show more than six hundred executed in 
Valjevo alone from September 1944. 277  The worsening military situation of the 
Germans and of the collaborationist forces would see Ljotić attempt a concentration 
of Yugoslav (primarily Serbian) anti-communist forces in the Julian area of Slovenia.  
Ljotić made overtures to Mihailović to join him in Slovenia, but failed due to 
Mihailović’s mistrust of Ljotić. His was not the first attempt to try to unite the anti-
communist and collaborationist Serbian forces. From 1943, Hermann Neubacher, 
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Special Plenipotentiary of the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, had tried to unite, 
unsuccessfully, the forces of Ljotić, Mihailović, and Nedić.278 That both attempts 
failed is hardly surprising, especially given the acrimony that existed between 
Mihailović and both Ljotić and Nedić, and the fact that both the SVC and 
Mihailović’s Četniks were constantly engaging in attacking the other. 
 
 Kostić however tends to paint a contrary picture of the nature of the communication 
between Ljotić and Mihailović in late 1944 and 1945, claiming that Četnik and SVC 
representatives met in Belgrade in early September 1944 in order to agree on a 
common nationalist front against Communism. 279  In the spring of 1944, the 
Crnogorski dobrovoljački korpus (Montenegrin Volunteer Corps) was established as a 
formation of the SVC under the auspices of the Germans, and to be under the 
command of former Mihailović subordinate Pavle Djurišić.280 Djurišić was appointed 
by Mihailović head of all Četnik forces in central and eastern Montenegro in October 
1941, and from January 1942, was concluding non-aggression pacts with local Italian 
occupation troops, giving him and his troops freedom of movement against the 
Partisans.281 From November 1943, Djurišić was in Belgrade meeting with Nedić, 
who introduced him to both Ljotić and Mušicki. Nedić obtained enough munitions 
form the Germans to allow for the creation of a 5,000 strong force.282 The severity of 
the situation however necessitated a temporary alliance of all anti-communist forces, 
in delaying rear guard actions against the advancing Partisans. However, there would 
be no grand anti-communist Yugoslav united force. Nevertheless, there was a limited 
agreement to place all armed formations of the Nedić government under Mihailović’s 
control by the summer of 1944. Mihailović reportedly assured Nedić that he still had 
contact with the Anglo-American forces, and was convinced that a joint Anglo-
American force would land on the Adriatic Coast.283 
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By 1945, the soft break between the White Eagles, the SVC and Ljotić had become 
evident. Writing a public open letter to the SVC in January 1945, Ljotić criticises both 
the White Eagles and the SVC for never really understanding him. During this time, 
Ljotić and Mihailović had come to a limited agreement that would see Četnik General 
Miodrag Damjanović take overall command in the Slovene Littoral, from 27, March, 
1945.284 The main difference between the White Eagles and himself, according to 
Ljotić, was that he was constantly working on the ‘spiritual side’, as opposed to the 
‘organisational side’.285 Ljotić alludes to the fact that the White Eagles under the 
‘organisational route’, favoured quantity, over quality of ZBOR recruits. For Ljotić, a 
‘spiritual route’ as the visible side of the ‘organic’ would in itself form the 
‘organisational’ and ‘intellectual’ route.  
 
The ‘organisational route’ can be found without God, Ljotić states, and he upbraids 
the White Eagles for not having undergone sufficient ‘education and constitution’ of 
its members.286 Whether by this point Ljotić actually showed a degree of regret, or 
just acceptance of his situation is difficult to deduce. His ideology and thought was 
both rigid and sincere. He firmly believed that the war could have been avoided, and 
ultimately, won, had his ‘warnings’ been heeded. His religiosity only heightened his 
ideological rigidity, seeing the war as a ‘divine retribution’ for the actions and sins of 
the Serbs. Unfortunately, he never had the opportunity to properly explain these 
questions, as on 23 April, 1945, he was killed when the car he was traveling in veered 
off a bridge in Slovenia. His death in a car accident, ironically, and tragically, 
probably saved him from arrest, trial, and eventual execution at the hands of the 
government of the new Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or a life in exile. 
Delivering the eulogy at his funeral, Bishop Velimirović lionised Ljotić as a 
‘politician carrying a cross’, whose importance ‘transcends the boundaries of Serbian 
politics’.287 Given that Ljotić and Velimirović had a falling out over the issue of Hitler 
and of collaboration, by 1945, it is clear that both men were totally convinced that 
only a German victory could save Serbia and Europe from communism. Ljotić and 
ZBOR, mired in controversy, would see their physical ideological battles move into 
the realm of historical memory and mutual historiographical and hagiographical 
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accusations of ‘fascism’, and ‘treason’ in a new Socialist Yugoslavia, and amongst 
Ljotić’s supporters and sympathisers who emigrated throughout Europe, North and 
South America, and Australia. 
 
In early May 1945, Damjanović led most of the troops under his command into north-
western Italy where they surrendered to the British and were placed in detention 
camps. Many would be later extradited to Yugoslavia, where between 1,500 and 
3,100 were executed as traitors and enemies of the nation, and buried in mass graves 
at the Kočevski Rog plateau in Slovenia.288 Others found refuge in Australia, Western 
Europe, and the Americas, where they established émigré organisations intended to 
promote ZBOR’s political agenda. Many of Ljotić’s supporters settled in Munich, 
where they ran their own publishing house and printed a paper called Iskra (Spark). 
On 8 July, 1974, the agents of the Yugoslav State Security Service (Uprava država 
bezbednosti, UDBA), assassinated Jakov Ljotić, Dimitrije’s brother.289 Jakov Ljotić 
was active in publishing Iskra in Munich. Ljotić in his role of collaborator and traitor 
was perhaps surprisingly, not regularly portrayed in post-war Socialist Yugoslav film 
and media. One exception being Dušan Makavejev’s 1968 film Nevinost bez zaštite 
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This thesis had a threefold aim. The first was to identify the ideological origins, and 
influences of the ZBOR movement through analysing the political development and 
evolution of its founder, Dimitrije Ljotić, and through locating it in a wider European 
context. This has shown that Ljotić’s ideological influences were highly fluid 
syncretistic in that he drew from among the Russian Slavophiles, the AF, and from 
the anti-modern, religious, and monarchist thought that evolved as a rejection of the 
ideals of the Enlightenment and French Revolution. However, this syncretism was 
largely confined within the same narrative. That narrative was the negation of modern 
advances in society, technology, and the economy, as being against God, tradition, 
and the monarchy.  
 
ZBOR was as much a phenomenon of a local Yugoslav context as it was of existing 
European interwar anti-democratic and anti-modernist currents. It sought to impose its 
idea of rural life on society, in a mostly agrarian country. This rural life could best be 
protected under a monarch who would ensure what ZBOR perceived as as a God 
given mandate. That these currents coalesced into a vaguely defined ‘counter-
revolutionary’ narrative helps to place ZBOR into a European context of pre-1914 
right-wing radicalism, one which pre-dated fascism, but would in part, become later 
co-opted by it. The emergence of fascist ideology, elements of which came from the 
same ideological and intellectual precursors, would later blur the lines of distinction 
between movements like ZBOR, and Fascism and National Socialism. 
 
ZBOR’s ideological precursors looked to past eras as being pure and uncorrupted. 
Though ZBOR would never specify a period in Serbian history as a ‘golden age’.  
Operating in a predominantly agricultural and rural country, the romanticised notion 
of the peasant as a safeguard of culture and tradition against the decadent modernising 
city was evident in the rhetoric of the AE, AF, and the IL. With the ANI, operating in 
an Italy that had not fully consolidated itself, the peasant was an important feature of 
its rhetoric, however the focus was on expansionism and modernisation as a means to 
improve Italy and the creation of a better future. With the exception of the ANI, 
counter-revolutionary movements were simply unable, or unwilling to, adapt to 
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changing cultural, political, and socio-economic landscapes, as they decried their 
contemporary state as decadent and, argued for a return to tradition, and ‘order’.  
 
Because most members of the AE, AF, and the IL were mostly middle to upper class, 
including a number of landowners, the effects of industrialisation, modernisation, and 
urbanisation, combined with the perceived ills of democratic and economic 
liberalism, would drive anti-modernist rhetoric. Ljotić’s participation in agricultural 
cooperatives can certainly be seen in this light. ZBOR’s members, as evidenced by its 
list of candidates, spanned the socio-economic spectrum. However, the two more 
common features show peasants, and shopkeepers/tradesmen. This indicates a social 
base of a more middle to lower middle class base, but this deduction is highly 
subjective and more work needs to done in establishing ZBOR’s (albeit meagre) 
supporter base. As it stands, as little is known of ZBOR’s membership, even less 
about their reasons for joining, or voting for ZBOR. It is probable that most were 
nationalistic, idealistic, and primarily conservative. Youth responses to ZBOR and 
Ljotić are even more surprising, given that the movement did not actively see itself as 
a ‘youth movement’. As the case with the White Eagles show, many younger ZBOR 
members saw the movement in a much more revolutionary and fascist light, as a real 
means of affecting change. The brutality and uncertainty of the Second World War 
added a new dimension to the complex and contradictory social psychological 
phenomenon known as human nature. 
 
The AF was the standard ideological model used by counter-revolutionary and anti-
modernist movements throughout Europe. However, these movements were also both 
highly adaptable, and highly syncretic, utilising only those elements of the AF that 
would further specific domestic ends. ZBOR is no exception to this. 
 
On a personal level, Ljotić’s religiosity was contrasted with Maurras’ utilitarian view 
of religion and the church as an institution. His religiosity would bear hallmarks to 
Codreanu, and to William Dudley Pelley, founder of the Silver Legion of America.290 
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Pelley’s religiosity and profusion of metaphysical writings and Ljotić’s religiosity and 
religious metaphors would show marked similarities in their metaphysical and 
mystical anti-communism, though Pelley was more influenced by National Socialist 
aesthetics than Ljotić would be. Ljotić was aware of, and praised Codreanu for his 
resistance ‘against the Jews’. However he criticised the violence of the Iron Guard, 
believing that it would backfire, which it did, with the November 1938 murder of 
Codreanu.  
 
It would be erroneous to assume that traditionalism, or monarchism, was politicised 
only in Europe. Or that fascist, or fascist-like ideology was only politically expressed 
in Europe, North America, or Australia. Those whose political trajectories, 
ideological idiosyncrasies, or evolutions mirroring that of Ljotić, can be found 
globally. One such example is the Japanese ideologue Kita Terujirō, otherwise known 
as Ikki Kita (in Japanese the correct order is surname first, therefore it would read as 
Kita Ikki).291 Kita was like Ljotić, very much a product of his environment, but more 
importantly, displayed a superficial similarity in terms of an end goal, incoherence, 
and idiosyncrasy. Kita was as much an ideological idiosyncratic as Ljotić. Kita would 
argue for Japanese expansion, but rejected the notion of a pure Japanese race, stating 
that Japanese are a ‘mixture of Chinese, Korean, and aboriginal elements’.292 Like 
Ljotić was a monarchist, but he rejected the monarch as divine, characterising him 
rather as ‘the people’s emperor’, a ‘representative of the people’.293  
 
Kita’s ideology and trajectory, is of course, not anything more than superficially 
similar to that of Ljotić. Yet his perception as misunderstood, incoherent, and 
ultimately categorisation as fascist shares broad similarities with that of Ljotić.  
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The second aim was to deconstruct ZBOR’s ideology and political existence in 
Yugoslavia and Serbia, highlighting the similarities it shared with Fascism and 
National Socialism, but arguing that these similarities did not in themselves amount to 
a total identification with this totalitarianism, as ZBOR’s own worldview was based 
largely on a pre-modern, anti-industrialist, anti-urbanism, romantic agrarianism and 
pastoralism, coupled with a modern form of nationalism. ZBOR, through Ljotić 
would be more influenced by the AF, and elements of Catholic social thought than 
either Hitler or Mussolini, at least up to 1941. ZBOR would be much more active 
through its publications than in any actual physical manifestations. There were no 
grand rallies displaying a modicum of Fascist and Nazi aesthetics, praising rebirth and 
regeneration, or honouring a cult of heroism or martyrdom in war.  
 
The question as to whether ZBOR showed any real organisational activity is linked 
with the movement’s size and scope. From 1937 there was an active government 
campaign against ZBOR that resulted in the banning of meetings, due to ‘security 
risks’. Certainly, left-wing and wider anti-fascist opinion were active in restricting 
ZBOR’s political voice, and probably acted, as in the case of government repression, 
as barriers to potential recruits and sympathisers. Nevertheless, ZBOR’s inability to 
transmute its ideas was as much a result of its own incoherence as the existing 6th of 
January regime that banned most political parties. ZBOR had to contend with the 
JRZ, a battle that it had no chance of winning. Ljotić was a prodigious and prolific 
writer in support of Nazi anti-communist action, but he would take no physical steps 
to model ZBOR along Nazi or Fascist lines. ZBOR’s ‘renewal’ and ‘revolution’, was 
primarily spiritual, in that it necessitated a ‘state of mind’, and was to be found 
through God. But how precisely this was to be achieved, and what was to be done 
once such a state of mind had been attained, was left unanswered.  This could only 
have had a detrimental effect on potential supporters who may have wished for 
concrete action as opposed to printed metaphors. After its 1940 banning, there was 
little outcry, even among ZBOR members. Imprisonment of over 100 members, many 
who held leadership positions, had left the movement incapacitated. It also showed 
that ZBOR’s support, with the exception of those imprisoned, had not been imparted. 
Residual signs of ZBOR remained up to April 1941 through various pamphlets and 
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graffiti, but its supporters seemed to have largely disassociated themselves completely 
from the movement.  
 
 The accusation and association of ZBOR with fascism has coloured its historical 
analysis from 1935-1940. This has resulted in what ZBOR said, or how it manifested 
itself being largely overlooked, used only to highlight its similarities with fascism. 
That it has been overlooked during this timeframe is unsurprising. As a political 
movement it was a complete failure in interwar Yugoslavia, garnering no more than a 
percent of the vote in two elections. While ZBOR has been retrospectively 
characterised as the political application of Ljotić, the reality is not as clear-cut. That 
the political history of ZBOR was also in many ways a biography of Ljotić however, 
attests to his importance to ZBOR. Yet he was by no means the sole ideological 
representative of what ZBOR would claim to be, as the movement was made up of 
two distinct entities, the Slovenian BOJ movement, and the JA.  
 
Even within ZBOR, Jonić would challenge Ljotić over ideology and organisation, 
resulting in Jonić’s expulsion. Ljotić was however, the only personality within ZBOR 
who was known to the public in any capacity, thus conflating ZBOR as an ideological 
extension of Ljotić.294 Ljotić viewed ZBOR’s ideology as interrelated, each strand or 
idea being a component to the next. He was however unable to make his thought 
understood, or to have his political vision grasped by many ZBOR members, with the 
exception of the ideas of anti-Semitism and to a lesser extent, those of a corporate 
state and social organisation. It is highly likely that Ljotić himself had not totally 
worked out his thought, seeing only the end goal, without the means to achieve it. 
 
Nevertheless, despite its incoherence, ZBOR contested two parliamentary elections in 
1935 and 1938. The issue of political participation caused dissent in ZBOR’s ranks, 
which was skilfully exploited by Stojadinović at the end of 1937. Participation in 
elections would be a betrayal of the anti-democratic movement’s ideals. Yet as was 
the case with the AF, ZBOR would seemingly be happy to use the existence of 
parliamentary for its own anti-parliamentary goals. While both elections would 
highlight the total exclusion of ZBOR from political opinion, in the 1938 electoral 
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campaign, ZBOR did show, periodically, that it had a degree of political acumen. This 
was largely due to the political manoeuvring between itself and the Bloc of National 
Concord.  
 
Through ZBOR, Ljotić could not have done much to harm Stojadinović politically it 
certainly was a nuisance to the Prime Minister. Much of the animosity stemmed from 
the issue of Nazi funding, with Stojadinović evidently believing that ZBOR was Nazi 
funded.295  While the issue of specific Nazi funding has not been proven, ZBOR 
certainly did receive money and remittances from the German founded Technical 
Union. Whether this was an attempt by the German Foreign Ministry to fund a 
movement deemed suitable outside of its borders, or whether it was a strictly 
economic undertaking, is unknown. The resulting fallout and scandal however would 
further tarnish ZBOR with the fascist label. The promotion of Mojić, a staunch 
proponent of Nazi Germany to General Secretary can also be seen as an increased 
Nazification of the movement. Mojić’s extreme anti-Semitism went beyond Ljotić’s 
in its vitriol, yet this was the man entrusted with the administrative tasks of the 
movement at the same time that Ljotić was consistently attempting to downplay his 
anti-Semitism as only against ‘foreign’ Jews. The degree to which Ljotić sympathised 
with Mojić’s extremism is unclear, but in not taking any actions to countermand him, 
Ljotić cannot escape accusations, especially in regard to Mojić’s anti-Semitism, of 
ZBOR being a copy of Fascism and National Socialism.      
 
The third aim was to put ZBOR’s collaboration into the context of its own ideological 
development and geopolitical views. ZBOR was one of the only openly pro-German 
movements operating legally within Yugoslav political discourse, the Ustaša 
movement being never being legal. ZBOR’s collaboration, initially at least, was 
driven less by Nazi ideology than in its own apocalyptic view of Christianity and 
tradition against communism. Nonetheless a distinct tilt towards Nazification are 
clearly evident The experience of the communist and the Mihailović-led resistance in 
occupied Serbia, the creation of the SVC, and the turmoil of war and resistance 
hardened many within the ranks of the SVC. This saw a mutation of the White Eagles 
(many of whom joined the SVC) into a more strident Nazi like organisation, inspired 
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by Ljotić’s anti-communism, but increasingly more from National Socialism as a 
totalitarian state model.  
 
After 1941, Ljotić readjusted his Pan-Slavic goal to accommodate itself to the Nazi 
New Order. His reason for doing so was because he saw not just Serbia’s, but 
Europe’s salvation with a German victory. This salvation stemmed from his extreme 
anti-communism, one, which, in Ljotić’s thinking, was to be fought by any means 
necessary. As mentioned in the last chapter, Ljotić saw the Germans as God’s tools 
and instruments of retribution for the mistakes and sins of Yugoslavia, and the Serbs. 
His own sincere religious belief defined communism as atheistic, materialistic, and 
above all, Jewish. Thus for him the battle against communism was a clear-cut issue of 
Good versus Evil. If the Nazis were against communism, then Ljotić would support 
them. He thought in absolutes. This was the basis for his support for the Nazis. His 
unwavering support however leads to him overlooking Nazi crimes against certain 
Slavonic groups, and the Jews. His anti-Semitic views notwithstanding, he believed 
that God had sent the Nazis to punish the sins of not just Serbia, but of Europe. In this 
battle he not only inflated his own importance to that struggle, but also the role Serbia 
was to have under Nazi rule.   
 
In the context of the Second World War, ZBOR’s collaboration, while seemingly 
straightforward as a case of total identification with National Socialism, was in reality 
a manifestation of the highly complex ideological pattern created by ZBOR. In this 
context, while ZBOR’s collaboration is seen as a logical outcome of its political 
existence and ideas from 1935-1940, its reasons for collaboration were not always in 
synchronisation with the Nazi New Order but rather emanated from within its own 
mystical Pan-Slavic and Christian apocalyptic thinking, and anti-communism. This 
was combined with a gross naivety as to the exact nature of Nazi intentions towards 
occupied Yugoslavia.  
 
That it collaborated wholeheartedly with the Germans can be explained through its 
aforementioned worldview. As ZBOR saw communism as the greatest threat, the 
movement saw salvation and renewal possible under the Nazi aegis. However, ZBOR, 
and Ljotić in particular were remarkably unaware or wilfully ignorant of actual Nazi 
intent for Yugoslavia from April and May 1941. Or, following Ljotić’s own 
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ideological rigidity, they accepted the situation as a means to an end, the destruction 
of communism, and a chance for obtaining power and influence. Ljotić also 
overestimated his importance, and the importance of civilian and later military 
collaborationist units to the Germans. Ljotić seems to have entered into collaboration 
thinking that he was more important to the Germans than was actually the case.  
 
ZBOR’s actions during the Second World War however seem at odds with its prewar 
lack of activity. It also undoubtedly displayed more overt absorption and displays of 
Nazi influence. The transformation of the White Eagles is probably the clearest 
example of ZBOR’s permutation into a more clearly defined National Socialist 
organisation. That elements of the White Eagles were at the core of the SVC is not a 
mere coincidence. Radicalisation had been evident from Mojić’s promotion in 1937. 
Their motivations for joining however cannot be said to be as a result solely of 
ZBOR’s ideology. The SVC while highly ideological, had a definite initial military 
purpose in mind, that of securing Serbia against the communist threat. By doing so, a 
secured Serbia, and its valuable resources, could continue to be at the disposal for 
Nazi economic, and military needs. The Corps was, officially, not acting under 
ZBOR’s orders. There is however, no doubting Ljotić’s ideological influence. 
Whether or not he agreed with the conduct and actions of the SVC, and for the most 
have, he most likely did, he actively encouraged it, hoping to mould it into an armed 
‘Christian’ force battling against the evils of Jewish communism. But he viewed the 
war that the SVC was fighting as much about ‘hearts and minds’ as actual physical 
combat. On both counts, the SVC would fail, and by 1945, Ljotić would openly 
criticise the SVC for failing to see, and understand, his vision. 
 
Ljotić was both impressed and fearful of the Germans, and of Hitler, who for a time, 
he saw the ‘instrument of God’, who would destroy communism and restore a Holy 
Russia. Hitler as God’s instrument, according to Ljotić had less to do with the 
ideology of National Socialism apart from its anti-communism, but rather the 
destruction of ‘global Jewish power’, and the methods and success he had in 
implementing them. This thesis, furthermore, has aimed to show the highly complex, 
ambiguous, and contradictory ideology of a party whose contemporary reputation and 
instance of collaboration during the Second World War far outweighed any real 
influence it actually wielded. 
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There is no doubt that ZBOR was collaborationist, and that the SVC were fully 
indoctrinated with the ethos of anti-communism and a belief that a Nazi victory would 
lead to Serbian renewal and salvation. Within the collaborationist apparatus, Ljotić 
was the leading ideological personality, though he eschewed (publicly at least) any 
official office. Ideas common to ZBOR, such as corporatism, anti-Semitism, and the 
championing of the countryside as a source of purity became hallmarks of the Nedić 
regime. These ideas also became integral to the Nedić government’s attempt at 
renewal and rebuilding. ZBOR’s collaboration doomed the movement as much as 
Ljotić’s rigidity and naivety. ZBOR became, through the SVC, an auxiliary force of 
the Germans, being used in repressive actions against its own citizens, magnifying its 
collaborationist status in post-war historiography and public memory. In this regard, it 
is perfectly understandable why the movement is not subject to as much revisionist 
debate as either Mihailović or Nedić. There is no seeming ambiguity concerning 
ZBOR. It was not misunderstood because it put itself voluntarily at the service of the 
occupiers. It, like other collaborationist movements throughout Europe was 
diametrically opposed to the narrative of heroic resistance. While true, its reasons for 
collaborating were less to do initially with National Socialist ideology, but more to do 
ZBOR’s own geopolitical worldview, which as the war continued, was even harder to 
justify.  
 
After 1941 ZBOR’s Yugoslavism had however, been replaced by a stress on its 
Serbian core. It fought against any agreement with Croatia that would lead to 
autonomous self-regions, arguing that it would lead to the destruction of Yugoslavia. 
After 1941, ZBOR, unlike Mihailović’s movement, did not make any appeals or calls 
to a wider Yugoslav nation, being focused as it was, on Serbia.  
 
Had the occupation not occurred, ZBOR might not have been legalised following its 
1940 banning. Its status as the only political movement allowed under German 
occupation proved to be its undoing. The actions of the SVC in the cauldron of the 
ethnic and ideological micro-wars raging within Yugoslavia would see the movement 




As has been shown, Ljotić’s ideological development marked ZBOR, though his 
thought pattern would be largely incoherent, inflexible, and ultimately, rendered 
largely irrelevant. Restating this point is important. He was clear in regard to anti-
Semitism and monarchism, but his method of expressing what he wanted would be 
lost in metaphor and superficiality. His personal ideological, and tactical failings 
would also mark ZBOR, combined with his detached style of leadership. This meant 
that while he was looked on as a sort of prophet by many of his followers, it resulted 
in the detriment of any attempt to build up ZBOR as a properly organised political 
movement. Ljotić and his movement seemed to be viewed in such a manner by 
contemporaries. Dragoljub Jovanović considered Ljotić to be contradictory, 
controversial, incomprehensible, and unreasonable.296  
 
Ljotić was a prodigious writer in ZBOR’s press, but there was very little substance in 
his writing. Even those subjects that he considered important; anti-Semitism, anti-
capitalism, and nationalism, there would be little real analysis. His anti-capitalist 
discourse would show more substance, but even here it was tied in to his own 
interests. It was in his interest to be anti-capitalist because as he saw it capitalism 
would bring increased foreign competition, and drive down export prices. As a head 
of a fruit grower’s cooperative, foreign competition directly threatened him. 
Protectionism therefore, seemed natural to him. He would show a degree of 
knowledge on world events, and his geopolitical thinking and predictions were not 
always as far off the mark. He was an appeaser. He could see the problems of the 
Sudetenland, and wrote that Czechoslovakia should give up the region to save itself 
from destruction. He saw the consequences of German expansionism towards 
Czechoslovakia, yet here his Pan-Slavic rhetoric and sympathy was largely absent. He 
advocated for Poland to tread cautiously in regard to the Danzig Corridor, though he 
sided and sympathised with the country against German aggression. He would repeat 
the mistake towards 1941 and German intentions toward Yugoslavia.  
 
Where ZBOR did have a semblance of ideological cohesion, namely in relation to 
social organisation, its style of corporatism was reminiscent of a non-specified 
bygone era, based on Catholic corporatism, which was not, strictly speaking, part of 
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Serbian historical development. The millet system of Ottoman social administration, 
imposed on Serbia, placed all Orthodox Christians, regardless of ethnicity into one 
‘nation’. The social form of organisation that Ljotić advocated, based on guild like 
corporatism, was not common. ZBOR however tried to pass of Ljotić’s appropriation 
of Slavophile and AF social thought as ‘natural’ in a Yugoslav context. Jovanović 
also makes the claim that Ljotić ‘lied to himself’ and to ‘his followers’.297 Ljotić, for 
example, never openly declared himself as a fascist. For Jovanović the matter is much 
clearer. ZBOR was fascist, and in not openly admitting it, Ljotić was lying to both 
himself and ZBOR members. However, this is based on Jovanović’s contentious 
assumption that ZBOR members were only drawn to the movement because it was 
inherently fascist, and that they saw in Ljotić, a future fascist leader. Jovanović also 
does not elucidate on what he understood as ‘fascism’. It is highly plausible, indeed 
probably true, that ZBOR members, to varying degrees did join ZBOR because of 
perceived similarities with Fascism and National Socialism, and saw Ljotić in a 
similar vein to Hitler and Mussolini. While Ljotić did inspire an almost prophetic 
persona amongst his followers, and even amongst many ordinary people in 
Smederevo, to imply that his total support base, however small, was solely ‘fascist’, 
would seem to be incorrect. Due to a lack of available sources, this thesis has not 
contributed to a better understanding of the motives of ZBOR members, their reason 
for supporting the movement, and indeed any real information as to the size of the 
organisation. This highly interesting question awaits further study. 
 
ZBOR’s ideology represented Ljotić’s thinking on a micro, local level, while 
representing a pre-existing interwar anti-democratic right-wing current, encompassing 
elements of fascism, nationalism, and traditionalism on a macro, regional European 
level. This thesis has elucidated ZBOR’s ideology, which apart from Mladen 
Stefanović’s work, has not been the subject of significant study. This has been done in 
conjunction with an analysis of the pre-existing anti-democratic and anti-modernist 
European current personified by Maurras and the AF. This analysis of ZBOR’s 
ideology, rather than being merely a buttress of a preconceived notion of ZBOR as 
‘fascist’, attempts to place the movement in a historical context of the anti-democratic 
right-wing trend of pre-1914 and interwar European thought, one which with the 
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appearance of fascism, could almost be placed at the nexus of the overlap between the 
radical right and fascism. ZBOR’s ideological antecedents however, predate that of 
fascism, and much of its meagre political activity (pre-1941) cannot be said to be on 
the same aesthetic nor mobilsatory level as Fascism or National Socialism. 
Nevertheless, in a local interwar Yugoslav context, ZBOR was certainly the closest 
approximation to both Fascism and National Socialism, especially as it fused 
elements from previously fascist-like organisations such as ORJUNA and the JA.  
 
ZBOR’s ideology would also show similarities with functionalism. As a structural 
theory, the organisation of society is of greater importance than the individual in 
functionalist thinking. Ljotić alludes to society as being a tree, with roots, trunk, 
branches, and buds each representing interconnected parts making up a greater whole, 
which symbolises all the contributions to the maintenance and harmonisation of 
society. In as much as ZBOR saw itself as both organic and non-mechanical, if we 
take Émile Durkheim’s sociological concept of social solidarity, ZBOR would fit 
more as an example of a mechanically solidarist movement. Durkheim argues in De 
la Division du Travail Social (‘The Division of Labour in Society’) that mechanical 
solidarity, as a sign and symptom of a ‘primitive’ society, denotes a common 
conscience and a collective will of society working together.298 ZBOR’s thinking, and 
certainly that of Ljotić would correspond to the view of social order maintained 
through the harmonisation of the collective will. However, interwar Yugoslav society 
was not ‘primitive’ even if it was not a fully advanced, industrialist, and capitalist 
society. Durkheim’s concept of organic solidarity, as a sign of the development 
towards an advanced industrial society, saw economic regulation as important as 
moral and social regulation.299 ZBOR’s corporatist form of societal organisation and 
its insistence on a planned and controlled economy encapsulate the movement’s 
complexities and incongruences. Using Durkheim’s theories as a template, ZBOR 
utilised the political methods of its contemporary more advanced society, in order to 
regress society back to a more primitive state.  
 
ZBOR’s societal model, that of the zadruga, can be reduced to a continuation and re-
orientation of Svetozar Marković’s socialist and federalist thinking towards a 
                                                        
298 Émile Durkheim, De la Division du Travail Social, 1–11. 
299 Ibid. 
 277 
nationalist end. 300  This does not negate Slavophile thinking concerning what its 
theorists regarded as its obshcinnost (community). 301  Agrarianism as theory, in 
opposition to ZBOR’s agrarian utopia, does not necessarily correlate to any pre-
existing philosophy or set of writings. Instead, according to Johan Eelland, 
agrarianism should be viewed as a pragmatic ideology that arose and developed in 
response to concrete social situations and problems in agrarian society.302 It shared an 
acceptance of democracy and the Western liberal ideal of the freedom of the 
individual in relation to the state.303 Where ZBOR’s utopian type gelled naturally 
with agrarianism was in its opposition to economic liberalism. Elements of 
agrarianism were utilised by ZBOR to fulfil authoritarian aims cloaked in populist, 
nationalist, and traditionalist rhetoric. The supposed purity and moral character of the 
peasant, as uncorrupted and the guardian of national culture was the clearest example 
of ZBOR’s populistic rhetoric. This was tied in with criticism of the effects of the 
modernisation of agriculture, and the effects it had on peasant life as a result of 
economic liberalism.  
 
Further deconstruction of ZBOR’s ideology also opens avenues for research as to the 
nature of ethnic nationalism and particularism within Yugoslavia and how it related to 
Yugoslavist thought. Was having a mostly ethnic identification as opposed to 
Yugoslav identification inherently implying anti-democratic or anti-modern 
tendencies? The 6th of January regime was intended to be a ‘break from the past’.304 
This was why on 3 October, 1929, King Alexander introduced the Law on the Name 
and Division of the Kingdom into Administrative Regions, creating the banovina 
system. 305  According to Axboe Nielsen, this step was taken as an attempt to 
‘rationalise’ Yugoslavia’s economy and administration, as well as erasing ‘tribal 
labels’, through decentralisation.306 It also poses the question as to whether political 
leaders personify political theory. Certainly in the case of Ljotić, like that of Hitler, 
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Mussolini, Lenin, and Stalin, this can be said to be true. They came to embody 
Fascism, National Socialism, and Communism (Leninist and Stalinist). Though Ljotić 
was not always thought of as a leader (except by ZBOR supporters), he was 
identified, as has been shown, by many within Yugoslavia, not always unjustly, as 
being a leading ‘fascist’. This brings up another interesting point. Both Payne and 
Griffin state that ZBOR was not a ‘categorically’ fascist movement. In Yugoslav 
political life, from 1935 until 1941, ZBOR was the closest manifestation of fascism, 
albeit in a localised fashion. Does that then make them fascist as a consequence? In 
the context of Yugoslav political life, this is very plausible. On a wider level, this 
thesis argues that any rigid delineation of fascist or non-fascist in relation to analysing 
ZBOR’s ideology is not helpful as the movement was in a constant stage of 
ideological and geopolitical flux. It’s limitations forced it to be a reactive, rather than 
an active movement. 
 
During its initial and formative stage from 1935 until 1940, it was only in 1937 that 
ZBOR developed a codified structure and stated political ideals, with the king as the 
embodiment of the values of the nation. During this stage ZBOR was happy trying to 
influence the monarchy into adopting its corporative socio-economic mode of 
organisation and production without calling for revolution, extreme reform, or violent 
regeneration. From 1941 until 1945 it was the only legalised movement, and exhibited 
increased fascist traits. This period also saw Ljotić focus increasingly on the dangers 
of communism to the point that his ideological work left ZBOR’s administration in 
the hands of Mojić and the increasingly radicalised White Eagles.  
 
Neither Ljotić nor ZBOR can be unambiguously categorised as entirely fascist, even 
if fascist elements were clearly present. Neither however, especially in the context of 
the Second World War, can they be deemed innocent, even if almost grotesquely 
naive. This naivety however can perhaps be explained by a strong sense of conviction 
and rigidity. Ljotić certainly had an unshakeable belief in the validity of his ideas, yet 
he would be unable to convey his message to his supporters and the wider Yugoslav 
public. His focus on the end goal, while eschewing any real discussion as to the 
means, meant that he offered little in the way of a practical means to his solution. Had 
he recognised this, perhaps he would have been able to influence and inspire more 
people. This allowed for individuals such as Jonić and Mojić, who being more 
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practical, attempted to mould ZBOR as an efficient organisational, and ideological 
entity. However ZBOR’s small membership and supporter base would present 
problems. 
 
This is especially true in regard to the behaviour of many ZBOR members under 
occupation, who saw in total identification with Nazi Germany the realisation of 
ideological goals, personal advancement, self-preservation, greed, or most likely, a 
combination of all the above. Ljotić’s own political journey starting from mainstream 
liberal conservatism to outright collaboration with Nazi Germany is not outlandish, 
given that in many countries they occupied, the German authorities preferred working 
with notable elites. The case of the Occupied Netherlands, and Occupied Norway, 
where Anton Mussert and Vidkun Quisling, as perceived imitators of fascism, were 
denied leadership positions in favour of professional politicians who could guarantee 
stability are examples.  
 
Opinion in Serbia today, with the exception of various far-right organisations such as 
the now banned Obraz, 1389, Nacionalni Stroj (National Alignment), Srbska Akcija 
(Serbian Action) and the Demohrišćanska Stranka Srbije (Christian Democrat Party 
of Serbia or DHSS) sees Ljotić and ZBOR in a negative light. Within the 
heterogeneous and highly syncretic contemporary Serbian extreme right, Ljotić is 
seen as a major influence, as well as a legitimiser. This is particularly evident within 
the currently banned Obraz movement, a self-proclaimed Serbian ‘traditionalist’ and 
‘patriotic’ organisation. The miniscule Srpski Narodni Pokret ZBOR (Serbian 
National Movement ZBOR) describes itself as the continuation of the 1930s ZBOR 
movement. Within elements of the modern Serbian extreme right, Ljotić, ZBOR, and 
General Nedić, are heralded as ‘saviours’ of the Serbian nation. According to Obraz, 
which may well be considered the first post-Socialist promoters of neo-Ljotićite ideas, 
the Serbian people are threatened now; hence they urged a national state for a society 
of sensible Serbs, comprising an economically rich and strong Serbia, as a means of 
advancing Serbia and Serbian interests. Apart from these modern-day extreme right 
groups, there have been minimal traces of any desire or attempt to rehabilitate Ljotić 
or his followers. His collaboration goes against the narrative of the heroic resistance, 
from both a communist and anti-communist viewpoint. 
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In 2002, local councillors in Smederevo campaigned to have the town's largest square 
named after Ljotić, is one such attempt at resurrecting Ljotić’s memory. Despite the 
ensuing controversy, the councillors defended Ljotić's wartime record and justified 
the initiative of honouring him by stating that collaboration is what the biological 
survival of the Serbian people demanded during the Second World War.307 Later, the 
Serbian magazine Pogledi (Viewpoints) published a series of articles attempting to 
exonerate Ljotić. In 1996, future Yugoslav President Vojislav Koštunica praised 
Ljotić in a public statement. Seeking to promote a romantic and nationalist image of 
anti-Communism, the Democratic Party of Serbia actively campaigned to rehabilitate 
Ljotić together with Nedić, after the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević and his 
socialist government in October 2000.308  The attempts to rehabilitate Ljotić have 
received mixed emotions from spectators.309 
 
In the case of General Nedić, his image of a ‘saviour’ has been propagated by 
mainstream elements within the Serbian Orthodox Church, with former Serbian 
Patriarch Pavle, in 1994, declaring Nedić as a ‘saviour of the Serbian people’.310 
Twenty years later, in 2014, the Serbian appeals court ruled that the High Court was 
wrong to throw out a request by Aleksandar Nedić, grandson of General Milan Nedić, 
who filed a motion to have his grandfather’s name cleared.311 This however has been 
a corollary to a much wider debate within Serbian historiography of the dichotomy of 
remembrance between the communist struggle on behalf of the ‘working people’, to 
the nationalist struggle of the ‘Serbian people’.312 This debate, summarised crudely 
here as the ‘Partisan-Četnik’ cleavage, or ‘red-black’ cleavage, has mirrored the 
problems of transition, and remembrance in Serbian society. 313  In recent Serbian 
reports, Zoran Živanović, the legal representative of Nedić’s family including those 
who filed Nedić’s rehabilitation request, stated that they expect that Nedić will be 
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rehabilitated because he did not have a trial, there was only a decision by the 
Communist post-war commission that he was a war criminal.314 This remained their 
belief even after the higher court had thrown out requests to clear Nedić’s name twice 
in the past. In fact, in February 2014, the high court rejected the rehabilitation plea 
based on a technicality, saying that the plaintiffs failed to submit documents proving 
they are legally registered organisations that are allowed to submit such a request.315 
Nevertheless, in the latest appeal this July 2015, Belgrade’s appeals court made a final 
and binding ruling that ordered the rehabilitation process to begin.316 
 
For the case of Mihailović, by late 1942, he became convinced that communism 
posed a greater long-term threat to Yugoslavia than the Axis occupation, and he 
sought to conserve his forces for a showdown with Josip Broz Tito’s Partisan forces. 
He was later convicted of treason and was sentenced to death. His recent (14 May, 
2015) rehabilitation by the Serbian appellate court has perhaps ended his ongoing 
historical perception and one aspect of the ‘red-black cleavage’. In this appeal that 
restored his civil rights, Judge Aleksandar Trešnjev granted the rehabilitation request, 
annulling a ruling of July 15, 1946 whereby Mihailović was sentenced to death and 
shot by firing squad two days later.317 The initial appeal for rehabilitation of 
Mihailović was filed in 2006, when rehabilitation was finalised as a law in Serbia to 
allow rehabilitation of former Četniks. 
 
More recently, in July 2016, the controversial Croatian cardinal, Alojzije Stepinac, 
was rehabilitated. In the Court ruling, the decision annulled a 1946 verdict against 
Stepinac, a Catholic cardinal convicted by the former communist authorities of 
collaborating with the pro-Nazi puppet regime during the Second World War. 
Croatian public opinion for the most part sees Stepinac as a hero, for his resistance to 
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communism and his fight against the separation of the Croatian church from the 
Vatican; hence, public opinion in Croatia was largely positive to his rehabilitation.   
 
In the case of Ljotić, there has not been any similar rehabilitation process. His 
memory, and that of ZBOR is too closely tied to collaboration with Nazi Germany, 
against the patriotic resistance and heroic narrative. On a local level however, Stevo 
Kotur, of the DHSS, suggested renaming Smederevo’s Republic Square to Ljotić 
Square.318 Public outcry however was muted, largely because the DHSS was largely 
irrelevant. Nevertheless, the DHSS was reasonably influential as part of the anti-
Milošević DOS coalition in 2000, and in the subsequent years, when its late leader 
Vladan Batić became a government minister. It had, however, become almost 
completely irrelevant by 2012. Even so, the motion was not passed, but in Smederevo 
at least, there are those who seemingly view Ljotić’s legacy, or his family’s historical 
memory, as somewhat favourable.  
 
In summary, this thesis has shown that Ljotić admiration for, and influence of 
Fascism and National Socialism, while evident, was in fact a corollary to his own 
abstract metaphysical thinking. National Socialism’s anti-communist component 
appealed to Ljotić. So did its anti-Semitism, in that it linked communism to Judaism, 
as a threat to all non-Jews. Therefore it was an attractive ideology for recognising the 
same dangers that ZBOR did. During the Second World War, Ljotić was convinced of 
Germany’s victory as a victory for Christian civilisation. What is key here, however, 
is whether Ljotić was so enamoured with National Socialism that he saw it as a 
utopian state model, or whether, in his apocalyptic Christian thought, the Nazis were, 
as he put it, ‘God’s truncheons’. Ljotić’s world was black and white as far as his 
ideology was concerned. National Socialism and Fascism were ‘good’ inasmuch as 
they fought against ‘Judeo-communism’. In that fight he would do anything to make 
sure that what he perceived as ‘good’, would win, regardless of cost. Ljotić praised 
Hitler because he saw in the actions of the Nazi war machine (at least up to 1943) as a 
chance for the realisation of ZBOR’s geopolitical end, that of a resurrected Russian 
monarchic state that Slavic nations would be somehow incorporated into.  
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Ljotić’s criticism of Stojadinović as a ‘fascist apprentice’ shows that he wanted a 
name for his own. It also shows his hypocrisy. Ljotić strove for his own ideas. The 
reality however, was that most of his ideas and concepts, were already based on 
aspects of other ideologies. He never worked out a viable political system, or a 
coherent set of ideas. This also prevented him from being categorised as fascist, or 
simply a radical rightist. What is more certain is that he was a social and religious 
conservative who saw life as an apocalyptic and millennial struggle between good and 
evil. In a similar manner, this lack of one distinct idea was also manifested in ZBOR. 
BOJ, the JA, and before that, elements of the Narodna Odbrana and the ORJUNA, 
who found a home and voice in ZBOR.  
 
For all his admiration of Hitler, Ljotić did criticise National Socialist ideology. His 
criticism, far from being original, was a replica of the AF’s and Salazar’s earlier 
criticism, based on Pius XI’s encyclical Non Abbiamo Bisogno. Whether or not he 
really believed in this distinction is debateable, but be did go out of his way to stress 
ZBOR’s supposed ideological uniqueness. It is entirely true that in some ways, as 
reflected in his anti-Semitism, anti-democratic, and anti-parliamentary views, he was 
masquerading as a fascist. However, in other ways, such as the criticism of National 
Socialism as racial deification, and Fascism as state deification, he was against ideas 
that drove and were central to National Socialism and Fascism, as being incompatible 
with his religious belief. From 1935 to 1940 ZBOR was not militarised, nor did Ljotić 
seemingly intend that. He was no expansionist, nor was he militarist or imperialist. He 
sought a Yugoslavia that included Bulgaria, and a wider Pan-Slavic union, but 
believed this was to somehow occur organically due to the unitary cultural and racial 
stock of the Slavs. He stressed the quality of potential members over quantity. He had 
little inclination, nor indeed the organisational or logistic skill to turn ZBOR into a 
mass organisation. He was an ideologue, a thinker. His strength lay in the breadth of 
his ideology and in the way it was presented as a struggle. Yet even here, his rigidity 
would only appeal to those who were of a similar mindset. He was unable to 
transmute his thought and appeal to those who were politically apathetic, or indeed 
hostile to him. He was no organiser nor does he seem to have concerned himself 
much with administrative tasks. As far as Ljotić was concerned, the battle was of 
minds, of ideas. Mundane administrative tasks were below him unless it served to 
highlight his ideological superiority. He was a dogged defender of Yugoslavia’s 
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territorial integrity, especially in the face of Italian irredentism. These fluid and 
sometimes-conflicted views of Ljotić were also reflected in ZBOR’s leadership, who 
apparently, especially in the case of Velibor Jonić, had differences in views 
concerning the extent of fascism in ZBOR. This then resulted in internal conflicts and 
issues regarding the manner of how the organisation would pursue its goals. 
 
Finally, despite being an anti-Semite, Ljotić showed, during his rule as commissar in 
Smederevo, that his rule, while discriminatory towards the town’s Jewish inhabitants, 
did not entail their physical elimination. Jews were to be paid comparable salaries to 
non-Jewish workers, however any money not directly used for daily sustenance, was 
to be returned. Yet he voiced no opposition to Smederevo’s Jewish population being 
transported to their deaths. This of course does not justify Ljotić’s anti-Semitism, but 
as Kostić alluded to, he was seemingly against their murder. However even when he 
had a chance, an example being the Kragujevac massacre, to intervene, he did so only 
for Serbian hostages, leaving Jewish hostages a certain death. 
 
Ljotić’s desire to be unique and “label-less” in comparison to his contemporaries and 
ideological allies have shown that he failed to develop a strong ideology, and more 
importantly, his niche within Yugoslav political life. He failed to impart his 
ideological thought in a sustained fashion. He had an end goal in sight that of a strong 
centralised monarchy based on pre modern forms of social organisation. But the 
process of working toward this end goal was never fully elaborated on, most likely 
because Ljotić had not finished nor given undue thought to, the actual process of 
fulfilling his goals. His rigid belief in an apocalyptic struggle between good and evil, 
evident during ZBOR’s legal existence, and later applied in the context of the Second 
World War took precedence over any attempt at mass mobilisation. However, the 
masses, in any case, overwhelmingly rejected Ljotić and ZBOR.  
 
This thesis has illustrated how Ljotić, his ideology, and ZBOR as a movement are 
interrelated with each other in a wider interwar European context of anti-democratic, 
anti-parliamentary, and monarchist thought that overlapped with fascism. Hence, this 
study provides an analysis on the development of the ideology of both Ljotić and 
ZBOR, and provides elements of both political biography and an analysis of an 
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ideology, which was developed by Ljotić and some of his collaborators within ZBOR. 
These are among the more significant contributions of this study to literature. 
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Antic, Ana. “Psychiatry at War: Psychiatric Culture and Political Ideology in Yugoslavia 
under the Nazi Occupation.” Columbia University, 2012. 
Antwoord van het Nederlandsche Naational-Socialisme (Fascisme) op een tiental 
Nederlandsche vragen. Utrecht, 1935. 
Aritonović, Ivana. “Društveni položaj žena u srbiji u doba Kraljevine Jugoslavije.” 
Baština, no. 27 (2009), 233–57. 
Asher, Kenneth. T.S. Eliot and Ideology. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 
1998. 
Avramović, Mihailo. Socijalne funkcije zadrugarstva. Zemun: Rotacija, 1938. 
Avramovski, Živko. Britanci o kraljevini Jugoslaviji: godišnji izveštaji Britanskog 
poslanstva u Beogradu 1921-1938. Knjiga II. Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 1986. 
Badinovac, Tomislav. Zagreb i Hrvatska u Titovom doba. Zagreb: Savez društava Josip 
Broz Tito, 2004. 
Bainville, Jacques. La Troisième République. Arthème Fayard, 1935. 
Bakić, Jovo. “Fašizam u Jugoslaviji 1918-1941.” Nova srpska politička misao 11, no. 1–4 
(2006), 21–43. 
Banac, Ivo. The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, and Politics. Ithaca & 
London: Cornell University Press, 1984. 
Bartlett, Rosamund. Tolstoy: A Russian Life. London: Profile Books, 2011. 
 288 
Bartulin, Nevenko. “Intellectual Discourse on Race and Culture in Croatia 1900-1945.” 
Review of Croatian History 8, no. 1 (2012), 185–205. 
Bartulin, Nevenko. The Racial Idea in the Independent State of Croatia: Origins and 
Theory. Central and Eastern Europe Regional Perspectives in Global Context, 
VOLUME 4. Leiden: Brill, 2014. 
Bartulović, Niko. Od Revolucionarne do Orjune. Istorijat jugoslovenskog omladinskog 
pokreta. Split: Izdanje Direktoriuma Orjune, 1925. 
Beekman, Scott. William Dudley Pelley: A Life in Right-Wing Extremism and the Occult. 
Syracuse University Press, 2005. 
Beetham, David, ed. Marxists in Face of Fascism: Writings by Marxists on Fascism from 
the Inter-War Period. Totowa, N.J: Barnes & Noble Books, 1984. 
Bego, Marin. Vječna varka. Zagreb, 1928. 
Belić, Milorad D. “Teror ratnih pobednika u Valjevu 1944-1945.” Glasnik Istorijski Arhiv 
Valjevo, no. 44 (2010): 67–79. 
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